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Public goods are an anomaly in neoclassical economics, a form of 'market failure'. They exist outside the efficient and equitable optimality of market exchange. It can be shown however that competitive markets are only efficient in short product cycles. Long-term objectives require social support. Corruption arises from the consequent private public interaction. Integrity, the absence of corruption, is a public good. Corruption has risen since the 1980s with privatization and outsourcing. How did European governments become honest in the first place? In the century after the 1770s, they moved from regarding public office as a form of private property to a conception of serving the public good. This integrity revolution was facilitated by Weberian bureaucracies, selected by academic merit and committed to impartiality by long-term incentives. The neoliberal revolution of the 1980s regarded bureaucracies as obstructive and slow. It admired the business corporation with its opaque procedures and charismatic leadership. Concurrently economics moved from neoclassical harmony theory to an asymmetric information model of 'opportunism with guile', providing doctrinal legitimacy for corruption. Corporate advertising is deliberately deceptive, and undermines the public good of trustworthiness. Digital platforms, powered by advertising, have subverted public discourse. Misinformation and disinformation have become prime risk factors for current societies. The practical operation of markets undermines the public goods of integrity and trustworthiness. The public good of a habitable climate cannot be achieved by market methods. For long-term payoffs, 'free markets' are a harmful delusion, inefficient, corrupt, impossible to achieve, and not sustainable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sraffa's "On the Relations between Cost and Quantity Produced" (1925) and Samuelson's "An Exact Hume-Ricardo-Marshall Model of International Trade" (1971) presented a strikingly similar analytical argument regarding the theoretical domain of Marshallian partial equilibrium models. Yet they reached radically different conclusions from their analyses. This article addresses this theoretical puzzle and proposes a plausible solution. To this end, the article reconstructs the evolution of Sraffa's and Samuelson's thinking on Marshallian partial equilibrium analysis and the evolution of Samuelson's thinking regarding Sraffa's 1926 critique of Marshallian economics. Sraffa's unpublished manuscripts to which Samuelson did not have access during his lifetime are carefully examined. A change in Sraffa's assessment of Marshallian partial equilibrium methodology that occurred in the second half of the 1920s is highlighted. This leads to new insights into Sraffa's thinking on the role and significance of the case of constant costs within Marshallian economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paul Samuelson and others suggested that Ricardo ('the richest economist in history') made a life-changing coup on the Stock Exchange after the Battle of Waterloo (1815), but archives reveal that Ricardo amassed his fortune more gradually, often by small profit rates upon large investments, as a jobber on the Stock Exchange and a contractor for seven British Loans. The 1815 Loan generated exceptional profits for Ricardo, but not the million sterling mentioned in unreliable legends about Ricardo or Rothschild. Such legends neglected the stock price statistics, the suboptimal timing of Ricardo's transactions in 1815 and the dominant role of the Baring-Angerstein consortium, which took a much larger part of the Loans than Ricardo's consortium. Insufficient attention was also paid to the special year 1813, when Britain exceptionally launched not one, but two very profitable Loans. After his large 1813 profits, Ricardo started contemplating his retirement and bought Gatcombe Park in 1814. Samuelson neglected this and overestimated the influence of 1815 events. Moreover, Samuelson claimed that today Ricardo might be prosecuted for using unscrupulous market manipulation and inside information. Archives and statistics show that Samuelson's allegations lack historical evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Edith Penrose's The Theory of the Growth of the Firm provides an intellectual foundation for a theory of innovative enterprise, which is essential to any attempt to explain productivity growth, employment opportunity, and income distribution. Penrose's theory of the firm is also an antidote to the absurdity that has been taught by PhD economists to millions of college students for over seven decades: the most unproductive firm is the foundation of the most efficient economy. The dissemination of this 'neoclassical fallacy' to a mass audience began with Paul A. Samuelson's textbook, Economics: An Introductory Analysis, first published in 1948. Over the decades, the neoclassical fallacy has persisted through 18 revisions of Samuelson, Economics and in its countless 'economics principles' clones. This essay challenges the intellectual hegemony of neoclassical economics by exposing the illogic of its foundational assumptions about how a modern economy operates and performs. To get beyond the neoclassical fallacy, economists must be trained in a 'historical transformation' methodology that integrates history and theory. It is a methodology in which theory serves as both a distillation of what we have learned from the study of history and a guide to what we need to learn about reality as the 'present as history' unfolds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This contribution discusses Samuelson's reply to Lange's paper (1934) on the unique measure of utility. It proposes an interpretation of the debate drawing on the theory of scales later introduced by Stevens in 1946. This shows that, contrary to an intuitive perception, their divergence on the possibility of a cardinal measure of utility was rooted less in mathematical than in cognitive arguments related to the way transitions between allocations are considered. Consequently, although Samuelson succeeded in giving appropriate conditions for cardinality, he based his own mistrust towards its plausibility on arguments later used in the framework of reference-dependent approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the discipline of economics, as within all academic disciplines, scholars produce texts in which they examine, discuss, and sometimes invoke their intellectual predecessors. As historians of economic thought, we are faced with the task of evaluating the readings put forward by these scholars. This article argues that to adequately evaluate such readings one must understand the inalienable role that a scholar's epistemological framework plays in the conditioning of their reading of historical texts and concepts. To do so, the author examines two divergent readings of Adam Smith: Jacob Viner's reading of Smith's invisible hand as God and Paul Samuelson's reading of the same three words as an allocative mechanism that translates an individual's "selfish" actions into the public good or "the best good of all" within a state of perfect competition. These distinct readings from two North American economists with remarkably similar historical, geographical, and academic contexts provide the ideal case for exploring the manner in which readers' differing epistemological commitments shape their different readings of historical concepts and texts. The exploration of these readings and the manner in which they are epistemologically conditioned are embedded within the wider discussion around an interpretation put forward by Quentin Skinner. Thus, this article offers an account of the variance in readings of the invisible hand and contributes toward the contemporary revisionist Smithian literature that explores, criticizes, and revises dominant readings of Smith. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution aims to highlight a neglected aspect of Samuelson's famous 1937 paper "A Note on Measurement of Utility". Although the 1937 paper is usually regarded as the foundation of discounted utility theory, and rightly so, it is primarily concerned with utility measurement and deals only indirectly with decision over time – intertemporal issues appearing as a by-product of the realisation of a unique utility measure. But the treatment of discounted utility in turn influenced Samuelson's understanding of cardinality. Cardinality appears here as the result of a cognitive ability that manifests when agents face a decision experiment over time in which they are compelled to cardinalize their utility functions. The result is the weak plausibility of cardinality in a more general context, such that, contrary to the usual views, we may say that Samuelson's ordinalist approach was already in the making in 1937. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Hawkins-Simon conditions, which are necessary and sufficient for the viability of input–output systems, are described in many encyclopedias, textbooks and papers, but always without historical details about the philosopher David Hawkins. The rich literature on the history of input–output economics has neglected Hawkins, probably because he spent only a few years among the economists. My paper fills this gap. By using the relevant archival material on Hawkins, Simon, and Leontief, I correct and expand some scarce remarks on Hawkins by Simon and Samuelson. I discuss Hawkins's three remarkable contributions to economics. First, Hawkins's dynamic input–output model in Econometrica in 1948 scooped Leontief. Second, I show how the correspondence between Hawkins and Simon created their famous joint note in Econometrica in 1949. Third, an overlooked chapter in Hawkins's 1964 book The Language of Nature discussed the commodity values of commodities, generalizing Marx's labour values and the Technocrats's energy values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This chapter provides an alternative interpretation of the emergence of the “Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans” growth model, a framework which, alongside the overlapping generation model, is the dominant approach in today’s macroeconomics. By focusing on the role Paul Samuelson played through the works he developed in the turnpike literature, the author’s goal is to provide a more accurate history of growth theory of the 1940–1960s, one which started before Solow (1956) but never had him as a central reference. Inspired by John von Neumann’s famous 1945 article, Samuelson wrote his first turnpike paper by trying to conjecture an alternative optimal growth path (Samuelson, 1949 [1966]). In the 1960s, after reformulating the intertemporal utility model presented in Ramsey (1928), Samuelson began to propound it as a representative agent model. Through Samuelson’s interactions with colleagues and PhD students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and given his standing in the profession, he encouraged a broader use of that device in macroeconomics, particularly, in growth theory. With the publication of Samuelson (1965), Tjalling Koopmans and Lionel McKenzie rewrote their own articles in order to account for the new approach. This work complements a recently written account on growth theory by Assaf and Duarte (2018). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stability analysis touched off extensive discussions at the Cowles Commission between 1939 and 1948. Oskar Lange, later followed by Lawrence Klein and Don Patinkin, among others, advocated for a move from a static analysis aimed at proving the existence of a stationary equilibrium with unemployment towards a dynamic approach exploring stability properties of full employment equilibria. In presence of excess supply of goods and labour with flexible money wages and prices, the message was that macroeconomic pathologies are better regarded as disequilibrium dynamics when full employment equilibrium is unstable – Lange and Klein – or when it is stable – Patinkin. The objective of this paper is to examine this type of modelling and how it provided the basis of a specific political vision shared by most economists of the Cowles Commission in the 1940's. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Tiebout Hypothesis is that individuals  reveal their preferences for high or low public services (and related high/low taxes) by "voting with their feet."  Competition among jurisdictions results in homogeneous communities, with residents that all value public services similarly, such that, in equilibrium, no individual can be made better off by moving, and the market is efficient.

The public/private distinction is central to higher education but there is no consensus on the meaning of ‘public’. Two different meanings are in use. Economic theory distinguishes non market goods (public) that cannot be produced for profit, from market-based activity (private). This provides a basis for identifying the minimum necessary public expenditure, but does not effectively encompass collective goods. In political theory ‘public’ is often understood as state ownership and/ or control. This is more inclusive than the economic definition, and recognizes the scope for norms and policies, but lacks clear boundaries. The first part of the article synthesizes these two approaches, developing an analytical framework with four quadrants (civil society, social democracy, state quasi-market, commercial market) that can be used to categorise activities in higher education and research. The second part summarises the findings of 30 semi-structured interviews in the Russian government and two universities, conducted in 2013, concerning perceptions of public goods produced in Russian higher education. While most interviewees saw research as a global public good, they were divided in relation to teaching and learning. Some understood the education function as a public good in both the economic and political sense and wanted the government to take greater responsibility for improvement in higher education. Others saw higher education as a private good in the economic sense, and while they acknowledged the need for government because of market failure, wanted public intervention and regulation to be reduced. This division in thought about public/private paralleled the larger division between Soviet and neoliberal thinking in the Russian polity, and also the divided character of higher education, which is evenly split between free government administered places and a fee-paying student market.

This paper sheds new light on Samuelson’s early methodology as presented in his Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947) by reflecting on the similarity between his mathematical economics and Edwin B. Wilson’s mathematics. Wilson was Samuelson’s professor of advanced mathematical and statistical economics; he was also a protégé of Josiah Willard Gibbs. Wilson defined mathematics as a language that consisted of three interconnected aspects: postulational, axiomatic, and operational. In his Foundations, in a Wilsonian style, Samuelson wrote in the opening page, ‘Mathematics is a Language’ and claimed that he offered operationally meaningful theorems. In this paper, it is argued that these maxims embodied Wilson’s approach, which framed Samuelson’s mathematical and statistical thinking around 1940 and which led him to present his work as being mathematically, theoretically, and empirically well founded. Wilson’s and Percy Bridgman’s operational methodologies are also compared and Wilson is presented as a mediator between Bridgman and Samuelson. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article considers Paul Samuelson, Robert Solow, James Tobin, Walter Heller, and Arthur Okun qua political economists. The focus is on their combination of a faith in economic science and a passionate public spirit. The article aims to substantiate two related arguments. The first is that these “new economists” were public intellectuals, regularly addressing public opinion, and engaging with the major economic and social issues of the times; the second is that their value judgements gained the upper hand over scientific discourse when they were confronted with the 1970s inflation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paul Samuelson often used the term “Santa Claus economics” for mathematical models with empirically unrealistic assumptions. I focus on one particular member of the Santa Claus family that Samuelson was very sceptical about: homothetic general equilibrium models (where all agents have identical homothetic preferences). I argue that Samuelson's concerns about these models provide insights into how he viewed the relationship between the individual and the market, a relationship that has implications for not only his economic theorising, but also his broader political–economic vision. His criticisms are also relevant to some ongoing debates within contemporary economic theory. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The concept of ergodicity in economics seems to have the qualities of a shibboleth—a word or saying used by adherents of a party, sect, or belief, and usually regarded by others as empty of real meaning. It is in use by both neoclassical economics—after Samuelson (1965, p. 43), who used the term in his paper on what later became a foundation of the efficient market hypothesis—and post Keynesian economics—after Davidson, who picked up the term in order to highlight methodological differences. Considering the origin of the concept in statistical physics and its use in the topology of dynamical systems, which most economists are not conversant with, the importance ascribed to ergodicity in economic debate seems mystifying. We deconstruct the meaning of the term in the major contributions of Samuelson and Davidson. We suggest an alternative to (non)ergodicity to discuss the nature of randomness in the real world. While neoclassical theory assumes stochastic randomness, post Keynesians assume nonstochastic randomness, a term developed by the mathematician Kolmogorov (1986, p. 467). We argue that even in an ergodic world there is a problem with the idea that stochastic randomness can be dealt with by the financial system. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

It has been widely accepted that philosophers of science wrote a “swansong” for positivism during the second half of the 20th century. Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson, major contributors in the field of economic methodology at the time, the argument goes, did never reflect the demise. Therefore, positivist roots – primarily in the form of reductionist approach – are still to be found in influential theoretical concepts developed by mainstream economists. However, quite a large number of scholars currently share the view that these concepts contributed in a nonnegligible manner to the development leading to the financial crisis culminating in 2008 and 2009. The article thus asks if it is the crisis – seen by many as an empirical rejection of many positivistic concepts – that wrote a “swansong” for positivism in mainstream economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper illustrates the methodological and analytical issues that characterised, as well as the personal and institutional aspects that informed the discussions leading to the definition of the current notion of cardinal utility as utility unique up to positive linear transformations. As originally this type of utility was not called ‘cardinal’, the paper also investigates the terminological question of when and how the expression ‘cardinal’ was coupled with positive linear transformations. In opposition to existing narratives, the paper shows that cardinal utility entered economic analysis between 1909 and 1944, that is, during the ordinal revolution in utility theory. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Carl Menger pioneered a unique theoretical research method which served as the foundation of the early Austrian school of economics. Menger’s causal-realist analysis was revived and formalized just before and after World War 2 by Ludwig von Mises as the “praxeological method.” Murray Rothbard, a student of von Mises’, utilized the method in formulating a comprehensive system of economic theory in his treatise, Man Economy, and State published in the early 1960s. Rothbard’s treatise became the foundational work for the “Austrian revival” in the 1970s. In this paper, we address several issues related to the role of Menger’s method in modern economics. First, ample evidence is adduced that von Mises and Rothbard each expressed a surprising ambivalence with respect to his own work in relation to the early Austrian school. Second, von Mises viewed Rothbard’s treatise as beginning a new epoch in economic theory. Third, contrary to the conventional view, a careful analysis of his treatise shows that Rothbard drew heavily on the contemporary neoclassical literature in developing his theoretical system and that his intent was never to set up a heterodox movement to challenge mainstream economics. Rather, his main aim was to consistently apply the praxeological method to rescue economics from what he considered the alien methodology of positivism, which was imported into economics after World War 2. Lastly, I will tentatively suggest that the term “Austrian economics” as the designation for the intellectual movement that coalesced in the early 1970s may now have outlived its usefulness. This term, which initially served an important strategic purpose in promoting the revival of the broad Mengerian tradition, may have come to obscure the meaning and importance of the praxeological research paradigm that Menger originated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]