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Data from phasor measurement units (PMUs) inform powerful diagnostic tools that can help avert catastrophic failures in the power grid. Because of this, understanding PMU measurement errors is particularly valuable. This paper examines internal and external factors contributing to PMU phase angle and frequency measurement errors and gives a reasonable explanation for each. Based on these explanations, the impact of those measurement errors on several synchrophasor applications are analyzed: event location detection, oscillation detection, islanding detection, and dynamic line rating.

This paper analyzes the theoretical accuracy limitation of synchrophasors measurements on phase angle and frequency of the power grid. Factors that cause the measurement error are analyzed, including error sources in the instruments and in the power grid signal. Different scenarios of these factors are evaluated according to the normal operation status of power grid measurement. Based on the evaluation and simulation, the errors of phase angle and frequency caused by each factor are calculated and discussed.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) regulations in Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50) state that structures, systems, and components important to safety in a nuclear power plant are to be designed to accommodate the effects of environmental conditions (i.e., remain functional under all postulated service conditions) and that design control measures such as testing are to be used to check the adequacy of design. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.180 was developed to provide guidance to licensees and applicants on methods acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the NRC’s regulations on design, installation, and testing practices for addressing the effects of electromagnetic and radio-frequency interference (EMI/RFI) and power surges on safety-related instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. The first revision of RG 1.180 was issued in January 2000 and a second revision was issued in October 2003*. The second revision differed from the first revision in endorsing Military Standard (MIL-STD)-461E and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Standard (Std) 61000 series of EMI/RFI test methods, extending the guidance to cover signal line testing, incorporating frequency ranges where portable communications devices are experiencing increasing use, andmore » relaxing the operating envelopes (test levels) when experience and confirmatory research warranted. It also offered exemptions from specific test criteria based on technical considerations such as plant conditions and the intended location of the safety-related I&C equipment. Since the last revision, new requirements have been identified, associated RGs have been created and updated, and additional industry guidance has been developed. Additionally, the operational environment has changed with the increase in wireless communication technology for both personal (smartphone) and industrial (remote I&C) purposes. Also, specific concerns and issues with testing methods and methodologies have been identified that must be addressed. Further, most of the standards that serve as the basis for the RG have been revised. Therefore, the NRC’s Office of Regulatory Research has contracted with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to incorporate new information and resolve the identified issues under NRC-HQ-60-14-D-0015, “Update to RG 1.180, Revision 2, Guidelines for Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency Interference in Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems.” The ultimate goal of this project is to provide NRC the technical basis for developing and publishing a new revision of the RG. The focus of Task 4 was for ORNL to identify and address any new or additional EMI/RFI issues that could potentially impact the EMC of I&C systems. More specifically, ORNL was to evaluate the impact of any new issue on safety equipment in their local environments and then determine whether the issues should be included and discussed in the revision to RG 1.180 that is currently under way.« less

Colour is a highly visible and impressive feature of all products and has long been used to complement and enhance their form and that of motor cars in particular. Automotive colour is usually applied as paint, which also protects the car and maintains its value. However the significance of automotive colour far exceeds that as an aesthetic and cosmetic feature. This paper begins with a brief history of automotive manufacture. A description of the current automotive manufacturing process, the reasons how and why this process became predominant and the role of paint technology within these developments are then discussed. The means that established and maintain colour and gloss surface finish as important automotive design details are then described followed by an overview of changes in colour application processes and paint technologies, the use of plastics in automotive bodies and the implications thereof. The paper concludes that, even though there is potential for change, the impact of this apparently secondary aspect of the car is so significant that it is limiting the adoption of alternative materials and inhibiting the introduction of new manufacturing paradigms.

Critical infrastructure sites and facilities are becoming increasingly dependent on interconnected physical and cyber-based real-time distributed control systems (RTDCSs). A mounting cybersecurity threat results from the nature of these ubiquitous and sometimes unrestrained communications interconnections. Much work is under way in numerous organizations to characterize the cyber threat, determine means to minimize risk, and develop mitigation strategies to address potential consequences. While it seems natural that a simple application of cyber-protection methods derived from corporate business information technology (IT) domain would lead to an acceptable solution, the reality is that the characteristics of RTDCSs make many of those methods inadequate and unsatisfactory or even harmful. A solution lies in developing a defense-in-depth approach that ranges from protection at communications interconnect levels ultimately to the control system s functional characteristics that are designed to maintain control in the face of malicious intrusion. This paper summarizes the nature of RTDCSs from a cybersecurity perspec tive and discusses issues, vulnerabilities, candidate mitigation approaches, and metrics.

The central problem in all previous approaches to clinical assessment of periodontal disease activity is the use of unidimensional measurement, which implies a number of unjustifiable assumptions. In addition, the use of unidimensional probing measurement has established that there are several distinct problems of validity and reliability in currently available techniques. The present paper begins with an analysis of these matters, leading to an approach to accurate clinical measurement of periodontitis in 3 dimensions, with the possibility of future development of a valid system for assessing the nature of disease activity.