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This paper investigates the short- and medium-term impact of a randomized group-based early child development program targeting parents of children aged 6–24 months in a poor, rural district of Rwanda. This low-intensity, short-duration, and low-cost program engaged parents through sessions that included a novel radio show and facilitated discussions during 17 weekly village-level meetings. The intervention included two treatment arms, with different components. Twelve months after baseline, children’s communication, problem-solving, and personal social skills improved in treated groups and persisted almost 3 years later in the full treatment arm. Positive effects on maternal time investments, attitudes, and beliefs, as well as investments in play resources, also persisted over time. A mediation analysis shows that the positive impact observed in child development can be attributed to positive changes in parental and home environment inputs, particularly in the longer term. This study offers important insights for the design and delivery at scale of early child development interventions among some of the most disadvantaged communities in the world.

This report presents the final results of the Building Resilience in Crisis through Education (BRiCE) research project, which is led by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and the Institut Supérieur Pédagogique de Bukavu (ISP Bukavu). The research project is part of the BRiCE education programme funded by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships and led by Save the Children in Niger and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This report presents the results of the endline evaluation of two components of the BRiCE education programme: Teacher Professional Development (TPD) and Improving Learning Environments Together (ILET). It also presents an in-depth analysis of teacher wellbeing and teaching quality in the regions of Zinder and Diffa in Niger, and the territories Uvira and Fizi in South Kivu province in the DRC. The report summarises the final results of the project regarding the causes and consequences of violence against teachers, and also investigates teacher’s knowledge on how to deal with the effects of violent conflict at school.

Fuel riots are common around the world. Between 2005 and 2018, 41 countries had at least one riot directly associated with popular demand for fuel. We make use of a new international dataset on fuel riots to explore the effects of fuel prices and price regimes on fuel riots. In line with prior expectations, we find that large domestic fuel price shocks are a key driver of riots - as these are often linked to international price shocks. In addition, we report a novel result: fuel riots are closely associated with domestic price regimes. Countries that maintain fixed price regimes - notably net energy exporters - tend to have large fuel subsidies. When such subsidies become unsustainable, domestic price adjustments are large, often leading to riots.

This report presents the results of the midline study of the Building Resilience in Crises through Education (BRiCE) research project, which is led by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and the Institut Supérieur Pédagogique de Bukavu (ISP Bukavu). The research project is part of the BRiCE education programme funded by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships and led by Save the Children in Niger and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This report presents the results of the midline evaluation of two components of the BRiCE education programme: Teacher Professional Development (TPD) and Improving Learning Environments Together (ILET). It also presents an in-depth analysis of teacher wellbeing and teaching quality in the regions of Zinder and Diffa in Niger, and Uvira and Fizi in South Kivu province in the DRC. Specifically, the report explores several key factors in teachers’ wellbeing: their employment status, which structures inequalities in the teaching profession in Niger and the DRC; their social identity, with a particular focus on gender and ethnicity, which play an important role in teachers’ professional and social life; and their exposure to violence, analysing how violent conflict penetrates the school environment and affects teachers’ work.

A growing literature has documented widespread variation in the extent to which insurgents provide public goods, collect taxes, and regulate civilian conduct. This paper offers what is, to our knowledge, the first study of the long-term economic legacies of rebel governance. This effect is theoretically unclear. Rebel governance may generate incentives for households to expand production and accumulate resources. However, rebel rule may be too unstable to maintain such incentives. We explore empirically the effect of rebel rule on households’ economic resilience using a longitudinal dataset for Colombia. Results show a positive relation between wartime rebel rule and the ability of households to cope with weather shocks in the post-war period. Households in regions where armed groups were present but exercised limited or no intervention fare worse. This effect is associated with infrastructure improvement led by armed groups, their intervention in dispute adjudication, and their close interactions with local populations.

There is increasing recognition that livelihood security, sustainable peace, conflict prevention and gender equality are complementary goals requiring integrated policy approaches, yet there is limited evidence on the links between these key development pillars. Motivation. This article uses three case studies to illustrate how specific policy interventions can address the differentiated priorities of men and women with relation to food security, building sustainable peace processes and achieving gender equality. Purpose. The article illustrates how five pathways have operated and interacted in three selected FAO interventions, and discusses data, research and policy challenges that emerged from this analysis. Approach and methods. A conceptual framework grounded on five pathways is used, including changes in (a) behaviour, agency and aspirations; (b) social norms about gender roles and equality; (c) institutions and governance; (d) agriculture and employment markets; and (e) social cohesion and inclusive collective action. Findings. The institutions that emerge from complex processes of interaction between state and non‐state armed actors, other informal actors and different population groups shape how property rights, food distribution systems, employment programmes and social service provision support or fail to support the local populations. Policy implications. More information is needed on local conflict dynamics. As such, better data collection is needed to support policy interventions.

This paper analyses how inequality across counties in the United States of America has shaped the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the incidence of protests. The empirical analysis combines weekly data between January and December 2020 on levels of COVID-19-related policy stringency and protest incidence at the county level with measures of county-level inequality at the start of the pandemic. The results show that more stringent measures to contain the pandemic were instrumental in driving the incidence of protests, but only in counties with high levels of inequality before the start of the pandemic, where grievances may have been initially stronger. Further analysis suggests that the impact of government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic is largely explained by changes in economic conditions (rise in unemployment and changes in economic activities and spending) in counties with the highest levels of inequality. Unequal counties with lower trust in political institutions but higher levels of social trust and civic engagement at the start of the pandemic are also more likely to experience more protests as a response to more stringent policies.

Ce rapport présente les statistiques descriptives et l’analyse préliminaire réalisées suite à la première phase de collecte de données quantitatives et qualitatives dans le cadre du projet de recherches BRiCEen République démocratique du Congo (RDC) et au Niger. La recherche a été menées par l’Institute of Development Studies en partenariat avec Save the Children, avec l’Institut supérieur pédagogique du Bukavu en RDC et avec l’équipe de Save the Children SERA au Niger. L’objectif de cette étude est de mieux comprendre l’éducation dans les contextes fragiles et de zones de conflit, en se concentrant sur quatre questions de recherches centrales : QR1) enquêter afin de déterminer si et comment l’exposition et la confrontation à la violence influencent la qualité et le bien-être dans l’enseignement dans les contextes fragiles et les zones de conflit ; QR2) examiner l’impact des composantes Développement Professionnel des Enseignants (TPD)et Améliorer ensemble les environnements d’apprentissage (Improving Learning Environments Together -ILET) du programme BRiCEsur la qualité et le bien-être des enseignants dans les contextes fragiles ; QR3) examiner comment la qualité et le bien-être dans l’enseignement influencent les acquis cognitifs et non-cognitifs des enfants vivants dans les pays fragiles ou affectés par les conflits ; QR4) étudier comment les savoir-faire acquis par les enseignants dans les contextes des zones de conflit peuvent être utilisées efficacement dans les mesures politiqueset la programmation.

This Working Paper analyses how violent conflict can enhance or reduce pre-existing forms of marginalisation and second, how new forms of marginalisation emerge as a result of violent conflict. To do so, we focus on the province of Tanganyika in the DRC, where the so-called ‘Twa-Bantu’ violent conflict has been disrupting the education sector since 2012, and secondarily on the province of Ituri, which has been affected by repeated armed conflicts since the 1990s. We use a mixed methods approach, combining quantitative data collection methods and several months of qualitative fieldwork. The study shows that the political marginalisation of ethno-territorial groups is key in understanding marginalisation from education in contexts of protracted conflict. Our results show that the Twa minority of Tanganyika has not only been more exposed to violence during the Twa-Bantu conflict, but also that exposure to violence has more severe effects on the Twa in terms of educational outcomes. We analyse key mechanisms, in particular spatial segregation, and the social segregation of schools along ethnic/identity lines. We also analyse the interaction between ethno-cultural marginalisation and economic, social and gender-related marginalisation.

This Report presents the descriptive statistics and preliminary analysis carried out following the first phase of quantitative and qualitative data collection of the Building Resilience in Conflict through Education (BRiCE) research project in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and in Niger. Activities were led by the Institute of Development Studies, in partnership with Save the Children, with the Institut Supérieur Pédagogique de Bukavu in DRC and with the Save the Children MEAL team in Niger. The objective of the study is to further the understanding of education in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, focusing on four central research questions: RQ.1) Investigating whether, and how, exposure to and experience of violence influence teaching quality and well-being in fragile and conflict-affected contexts; RQ.2) Examining the impact of the Teacher Professional Development and Improving Learning Environments Together components of the BRiCE programme on teachers’ quality and well-being in fragile contexts; RQ.3) Examining how teaching quality and well-being influence children’s cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes in fragile and conflict-affected countries; RQ.4) Exploring how knowledge developed by teachers in conflict-affected contexts can be used effectively in policy and programming.

This paper assesses the comparative opportunities and limitations of ‘new’ and ‘old’ data sources for early warning, crisis response and violence research by comparing reports of political violence, and both violent and peaceful demonstrations, produced through social media and traditional media during the Kenyan elections in August and October 2017. We leverage data from a sample of social media reports of violence through public posts to Twitter and compare these with events coded from media and published sources by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) along two dimensions: 1) geography of violence; and 2) temporality of reporting. We find that the profile of violence recorded varies significantly by source. Records from Twitter are more geographically concentrated, particularly in the capital city and wealthier areas. They are timelier in the immediate period surrounding elections. Records from ACLED have a wider geographic reach, and are relatively more numerous than Twitter in rural and less wealthy areas. They are timelier and more consistent in the run-up to and following elections. While neither source can reveal the ‘true’ violence that occurred, the findings point to the value of drawing on a constellation of various source types given their complementary advantages.

We study an age-old question in political economy: does government spending on welfare ensure peace? This question was at the heart of the European Welfare State model of the early 20th century, and remains relevant today in face of rising inequalities and political conflict. Yet there is limited empirical evidence about this question. We make use of a panel of 12 Latin American countries over the period 1970–2010 to show that welfare spending has led to substantial reductions in conflict across the region. This effect is more pronounced when associated with reductions in inequality and increasing social and institutional trust.

This paper reviews an emerging body of literature on governance interventions in countries with ongoing violent conflict, recovering from conflict or at risk of conflict. The review focusses on thr...

The primary policy response to suppress the spread of COVID-19 in high-income countries has been to lock down large sections of the population However, there is growing unease that blindly replicating these policies might inflict irreparable damage to poor households and foment social unrest in developing countries We investigate this concern using Afrobarometer data from 2019 for 30 sub-Saharan African countries We create a multidimensional index of lockdown readiness based on living conditions and explore its relationship with forms of trust and the potential for social unrest The index reveals that just 6 8 per cent of households overall and 12 2 per cent in urban areas meet all conditions for a lockdown We further show that weak readiness is not offset by high levels of social trust, which can be vital for effective public health interventions As such, strict lockdown policies may not only be difficult to enforce, but also heighten the risks of conflict

This paper investigates the short- and medium-term impact of a randomized group-based early child development programme targeting parents of children aged six to 24 months in a poor, rural district of Rwanda. The programme engaged parents through sessions that included a radio show and facilitated discussions during 17 weekly village-level meetings. Twelve months after baseline, children's communication, problem-solving, and personal social skills improved in treated groups.

This paper investigates the long-term impact of economic shocks on populism, by exploiting a natural experiment created by the trade liberalization process implemented in Brazil between 1990 and 1995. This high impact and low duration event generated a profound shock to the economy with, we argue, long term implications for political outcomes. We focus on the 2002 and 2018 presidential elections in Brazil, which resulted in the election of a left-wing and a right-wing populist president, respectively. The results show that trade reforms explain the rise of populism in Brazil during the last two decades. Microregions with larger tariff cuts in the early 1990s had significantly higher preferences for Lula in 2002 and were also more likely to support Bolsonaro in 2018. The link between trade liberalization and populism is mediated by austerity in both cases. The shift between left-wing and right-wing preferences is driven by the supply side of populism, whereby each leader took advantage of existing cleavages in the country at the time of their election-driven by inequality in the case of Lula and by insecurity and corruption in the case of Bolsonaro-to develop narratives against austerity that would appeal to their target audiences.

The global spread of COVID-19 is one of the largest threats to people and governments since the Second World War. The on-going pandemic and its countermeasures have led to varying physical, psychological, and emotional experiences, shaping not just public health and the economy but also societies. We focus on one pillar of society—trust—and explore how trust correlates with the individual experiences of the pandemic. The analysis is based on a new global survey—'Life with Corona'—and uses simple correlational statistics. We show that those who have had contact with sick people and those that are unemployed exhibit lower trust in people, institutions, and in general. By contrast, no such differences exist for those who have personally experienced symptoms of the disease. These associations vary across contexts and are not driven by concerns about personal health or the health of loved ones, but rather by increased levels of worry and stress. Our findings suggest that the effects of the pandemic go well beyond immediate health concerns, leading to important normative changes that are likely to shape how societies will emerge from the pandemic

This paper explores the relationship between household exposure to riots and social capital in urban India using a panel dataset collected by the authors in the state of Maharashtra. The analysis applies a random-effect model with lagged covariates to estimate the exogenous effect of riots on social capital. Households living in neighbourhoods prone to riots are more likely to invest in bridging social capital by joining community organizations but reduce face-to-face contact with neighbours.

In our brief review, we take stock of the emergence, in the last decade, of the “microeconomics of violent conflict” as a new subfield of empirical development economics. We start by de-bunking common misperceptions about the microeconomics of conflict and identify several contributions to economic theory and, in particular, to empirics, methods and data. We also show how the subfield is enriched through cooperation with scholars working in related disciplines. We expect future work to contribute inter alia to the evidence base on peacebuilding interventions, the development of post-conflict institutions, the behavior of firms in conflict areas and the role of emotions in decision-making. We note a disconnect between the rapidly evolving academic subfield on the one hand and the relatively limited use of knowledge thus generated by humanitarian and development organisations and policy makers working in and on conflict-affected areas. We conclude by suggesting that teaching in economics and the discipline-specific JEL codes have not yet kept pace with this recent intellectual development., SCOPUS: ed.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

This article analyzes the role of individual redistributive preferences on protest participation. The article focuses on Latin America, a region that has experienced substantial protests and demonstrations in the last decade, making use of individual-level data on redistributive preferences and protest participation collected across eighteen countries in 2010, 2012, and 2014. The results show evidence for an association between strong individual preferences for redistribution and participation in protests motivated by the low quality of services and institutions, failures to reduce corruption, and perceived lower standards of living. The results are robust to alternative estimators, samples, and model specifications and not affected by endogeneity concerns.

This article analyses how social and political action among civilians during violent conflict may affect efforts to sustain peace and strengthen peace-building processes in the post-conflict period. The main argument advanced is that forms of social and political action that emerge in conflict settings – and their evolution and effects on societies in the post-conflict period – are shaped by interactions between civilians and armed actors that control territories during the conflict period. These pathways are illustrated through the case of Colombia and used to derive implications for other countries grappling with the fragility of post-conflict processes.

This paper studies the legacies of wartime institutions, measured as rebelocracy, on the ability of households to cope with negative income shocks. Rebelocracy is the social order established by non-state armed actors in the communities they control. By providing public goods and a predictable framework within which to operate, rebelocracy may generate incentives for households to expand production and accumulate wealth, placing them in a higher income trajectory than households living in war zones amid violence and chaos.

This paper investigates the impact of inequality on individual civic engagement at the community level, whether this impact persists over time, and what mechanisms may shape the relationship between inequality and civic engagement. The results show that inequality in Colombia is associated with increases in individual participation in political organizations, including increased membership, meeting attendance, and assumption of leadership roles. Mechanisms explaining this effect include elite influence, strong connectivity between community members, and high individual aspirations.

In conflict zones around the world, both state and non-state actors deliver governance at local levels. This paper explores the long-term impact of individual exposure to 'wartime governance' on social and political behaviour. We operationalize wartime governance as the local policy choices and practices of a ruling actor.

Spanish Abstract: Este articulo estudia los legados de las instituciones creadas en tiempos de guerra, medidas como rebelocracia, sobre la capacidad de los hogares para mitigar choques negativos de ingresos. La rebelocracia es el orden social establecido por los actores armados no estatales (AANE) en las comunidades que controlan (Arjona, 2016). Al proveer bienes publicos y unas reglas predecibles, la rebelocracia puede generar incentivos para que los hogares expandan su produccion y acumulen riqueza. Esto los situaria en trayectorias de ingreso mas alto frente a aquellos hogares que viven en zonas de conflicto, pero inmersas en la violencia y el caos. Si estas mejores condiciones persisten despues de que los AANE abandonan el territorio, los hogares en areas con una rebelocracia fuerte podran mitigar mejor los choques negativos de ingreso. La estrategia empirica identifica las respuestas de los hogares rurales a choques climaticos aleatorios y estima su impacto heterogeneo respecto al nivel de rebelocracia. Con base en un panel de hogares en cuatro regiones de Colombia afectadas por el conflicto, las estimaciones controlan por variables no observables que no varian en el tiempo. El estudio encuentra que, en las regiones con una rebelocracia fuerte, los hogares mitigan mejor los impactos negativos de los choques climaticos comparados con aquellos que viven en regiones con una intervencion limitada o nula de los AANE. Los primeros hogares sufren un impacto menor despues de enfrentar un choque climatico, y recurren menos a la migracion de supervivencia. La provision de bienes publicos explica una parte importante del efecto de la rebelocracia. Es fundamental aclarar que esto no implica que el conflicto tenga efectos positivos sobre la poblacion. Los resultados sugieren que vivir con reglas claras en medio del conflicto es mejor que vivir en medio de la incertidumbre y el caos. Si bien este estudio no estima efectos causales, los coeficientes estimados son robustos a controlar por factores que pueden explicar la instauracion de la rebelocracia. English Abstract: This paper studies the legacies of wartime institutions, measured as rebelocracy, on the ability of households to cope with negative income shocks. Rebelocracy is the social order established by non-state armed actors (NSAAs) in the communities they control (Arjona, 2016). By providing public goods and a predictable framework within which to operate, rebelocracy may generate incentives for households to expand production and accumulate wealth, placing them in a higher income trajectory than households living in war zones amid violence and chaos. If these better economic conditions persist after NSAAs leave the territory, households in communities that had stronger rebelocracy levels will be better able to cope with negative income shocks. The empirical strategy identifies households’ responses to random weather shocks and estimates its heterogeneous impact by the level of rebelocracy. Using a household panel in four conflict regions in Colombia, the estimation controls for time-invariant unobservables. The study finds that in regions with strong rebelocracy, households are better able to cope with negative weather shocks compared to those living in regions with NSAA presence but with limited or no intervention. The former households face a lower economic impact of weather shocks and resort less to survival migration. The effect of rebelocracy is driven mostly by the provision of public goods by NSAAs. While this paper is not claiming causal impacts of rebelocracy, its coefficient estimates are robust to controlling for confounders that may explain rebelocracy in the first place.

This paper studies how household-level receipts of cash transfers affect political attitudes in Pakistan. The paper exploits the locally exogenous eligibility cut-off of the flagship Benazir Income Support Programme to estimate causal effects. The main results show evidence of improved satisfaction with the government among beneficiaries of the programme. The paper discusses what potential mechanisms may explain this result and finds no evidence of changes in attitudes being associated with improvements in state capacity or better economic and security prospects.

This article analyses the relationship between governance and violence in light of the World Development Report 2017 on Governance and the Law. The article discusses the approach taken by the Report to link governance and violence and highlights the importance of new research and findings on forms of wartime governance, and their implications for international politics and development interventions in conflict and postconflict contexts.

We analyze the combined effect of political violence and adverse climatic and health shocks on child nutrition using longitudinal data from Andhra Pradesh, India. The paper shows three key results using two-stage least square (2SLS) models: (i) the presence of political violence reduces the mean height-for-age z-scores of children by between 0.4 and 0.9 standard deviations and reduces the mean weight-for-age z-scores of children by between 0.3 and 0.6 standard deviations; (ii) political violence generates such a large negative effect on the long-term nutrition of children (measured by height-for-age z-scores) through a reduction of the ability of households to cope with drought and illness; and (iii) drought and illness have an adverse effect on child nutrition in Andhra Pradesh only in violence-affected communities. The 2SLS results are robust to a wide range of robustness tests. Potential mechanisms explaining the strong joint welfare effect of conflict and adverse shocks are the failure of economic coping strategies in areas of violence and restricted access to public goods and services.

This article reflects on the importance of linking micro and macro levels of analysis in order to advance our current understanding of civil wars and political violence processes and discusses the contributions of the articles in this special issue. We first identify the main problems in research on political violence that is focused on a single level of analysis and describe the challenges faced by research that attempts to establish connections between different levels. We then introduce the different articles in the special issue, with an emphasis on the micro–macro-level linkages they develop and highlighting their commonalities. We conclude by emphasizing the importance of a new research agenda for the study of civil wars and political violence that bridges social, economic, and political dynamics occurring at the local level and conflict processes taking place in the macro arena.

This article analyzes the determinants of household riot victimization, based on a unique survey collected in Maharashtra, India. We adopt a multilevel framework that allows neighborhood and district effects to randomly influence household victimization. We find that economically vulnerable households, households living close to unsafe areas, and shop owners are more prone to suffer from riots. Households report lower levels of victimization if they live further from police stations, exhibit higher levels of trust, are able to rely on outside help in times of need and accumulate savings. The results show, however, a double-edge effect of income: wealthier households are better able to cope with the adverse effects of riots, but also have more to lose from riots and are more exposed to opportunistic violence and looting. We find further that affluent neighborhoods and neighborhoods where caste fragmentation is high report higher levels of victimization. Neighborhoods with stronger social interactions experience lower levels of victimization.

This paper analyzes the impact of the wave of violence that occurred in Timor Leste in 1999 on education outcomes. We examine the short-term impact of the violence on school attendance in 2001 and its longer-term impact on primary school completion of the same cohorts of children observed again in 2007. We compare the educational impact of the 1999 violence with the impact of other periods of high-intensity violence during the 25 years of Indonesian occupation. The short-term effects of the conflict are mixed. In the longer term, we find evidence of a substantial loss of human capital among boys in Timor Leste who were exposed to peaks of violence during the 25-year long conflict. The evidence suggests that this result may be due to household trade offs between education and economic welfare. JEL Codes: I20, J13, O12, O15 The developmental consequences of violence and conflict are far reaching, affecting millions of men, women, and children (World Bank 2011). The objective of this paper is to examine one important channel linking violent conflict and development outcomes: the education of children living in contexts of conflict and violence. The paper focuses on the case of Timor Leste, particularly the last wave of violence in 1999 during the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the territory. We analyze the short-term impact of the 1999 violence on primary school attendance in 2001 and its longer-term impact on primary school completion in 2007. In addition, we separately examine the impact of early periods of high-intensity violence (HVI) during the 25 years of Indonesian occupation and the effects of the entire conflict on primary school completion in 2007 to compare the average impact of the overall conflict period with the educational impact of singular peaks of violence. This is a

This paper reviews current practices and common challenges in the measurement of the causes, functioning, and consequences of violent conflict at the micro-level. We review existing conflict- and violence-related survey questionnaires, with a particular focus on the World Bank's Living Standard Measurement Surveys. We discuss methodological challenges associated with empirical work in conflict-affected and fragile areas—such as operationalizing a definition of conflict, using the appropriate units of analysis, deciding on the timing of the survey, dealing with data biases, and conducting surveys in an ethically sound manner under conditions of insecurity—and propose ways to improve the usefulness of existing surveys to analyze conflict processes at the micro-level. Violent conflict, households, survey methods, questionnaire design.

Processes of conflict and violence are central to how shared societies are built and sustained. Very few countries in the world have supported systems of justice, equality and democracy without some amount of bloodshed. At the same time, violence and conflict threaten the principles and values underlying the concept of shared societies. Today, 1.5 billion people are affected by armed conflict. Conflict-affected countries contain one-third of those living in extreme poverty, and are responsible for over half of all child mortality in the world. Kaldor (1999) and Kaplan (1994) have famously discussed the wave of new brutal civil wars that have erupted after the Cold War. The view that modern civil wars are more brutal and senseless than ever before has been contested (Kalyvas 2001), while the incidence of internal armed conflict has decreased in recent years (Harbom and Wallensteen 2009). However, the legacy of violence persists in many countries, affecting the sustainability of global development, international peace and democracy-building processes worldwide, as well as disrupting the living conditions of millions of women, men and children. Armed conflict remains one of the most important challenges facing the world today. This paper examines how the interplay between economic exclusion, inequality, conflict and violence shape the goal of establishing shared societies. I argue that this impact is largely determined by the emergence and organisation of social and political institutions in areas of violent conflict. In particular, violence will persist as a means to solve social conflicts when institutional processes that promote exclusion, dysfunctional inequalities and injustice remain entrenched in societies. Two particular areas of institutional change are central to understanding the relationship between armed conflict and shared societies, defined as ‘socially cohesive societies’. The first is the change caused by armed conflict on social interactions and norms of trust and cooperation. The second is the influence exercised by informal mediators, informal service providers and, in some cases, informal systems of governance that emerge from uneven development processes and are particularly prevalent in areas of armed conflict. These forms of institutional transformation that emerge from armed conflict, and in turn determine its sustainability, have remained unexplored in the literature. Yet they are central to understanding how societies are able to restrict the use of violence as a strategic way of resolving social conflicts. This paper attempts to disentangle these important institutional mechanisms that shape the transition from conflict-ridden to shared societies.

This article explores the empirical application of theoretical multidimensional welfare distribution analysis techniques to real household welfare distributions. The article operationalizes recent conceptual developments in multidimensional distribution theory and assesses their usefulness for the measurement of multidimensional household inequality. The results strongly highlight the importance of bringing nonmonetary aspects of household welfare into the forefront of inequality analysis. Agreement over the various approaches to the measurement of multidimensional inequality entails, however, nontrivial decisions that may limit the practical usefulness of these measures. We suggest that the use of multidimensional inequality ranges and the application of restrictive dominance criteria to multidimensional welfare distributions may open significant scope for further developments in the empirical analysis of multidimensional inequality.

Summary The main objective of this paper is to systematically identify potential channels of transmission linking civil war and poverty that may lead to the persistence of cycles of poverty and war. A particular focus of the paper is the notion of individual (and group) agency during civil wars, as well as agency constraints faced by populations affected by violence. Although the outbreak and impact of war is known to depend on several financial and political factors, the onset, duration and magnitude of the impact of civil wars are also closely related to what happens to people during violent conflicts and to what people do in areas of violence to secure livelihoods, economic survival, physical security and their social networks. The nature and extent of these choices depends in turn on how individuals and households relate to changes in social norms and forms of institutional organisation during civil wars. The paper explores the economic channels through which war may simultaneously affect and be affected by the economic status and responses of individuals and their immediate relations in areas of violent conflict to cope with and adapt to changes to livelihoods and economic status during civil wars. This analysis focuses in particular on the important but under-researched role of social and political institutional transformation during civil war on individual and household poverty.