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Central bank responses to COVID-19 have been extraordinary in speed, in size and in scope. Much easier monetary policy, massive liquidity provision, and targeted credit support to the real economy all played a role in stabilizing financial conditions and credit. On net, there is preliminary evidence that central bank actions have been a positive-for access to credit and for the real economy-during very trying times. But the first six months have made clear that central bank policy can only indirectly address the core economic policy challenges of the crisis, whose trajectory remains highly uncertain. The risks to the economy and financial system remain very large, and key policy questions-on the degree of fiscal policy support to the real economy, about the limits of central bank risk taking and monetization of debt, and about the wisdom of heavy reliance on central bank policies given their impact on leverage and debt levels-remain just that.

We explore the capital structure and governance of a mortgage-insuring securitization utility operating with government reinsurance for systemic or “tail” risk. The structure we propose for the replacement of the GSEs focuses on aligning incentives for appropriate pricing and transfer of mortgage risks across the private sector and between the private sector and the government. We present the justification and mechanics of a vintage-based capital structure, and assess the components of the mortgage guarantee fee, whose size we find is most sensitive to the required capital ratio and the expected return on that capital. We discuss the implications of selling off some of the utility’s mortgage credit risk to the capital markets and how the informational value of such transactions may vary with the level of risk transfer. Finally, we explore how mutualization could address incentive misalignments arising out of securitization and government insurance, as well as how the governance structure for such a financial market utility could be designed.

Overview of Special Issue: Federal Reserve Policy Responses to the Financial Crisis.

We describe a set of six design principles for the reorganization of the U.S. housing finance system and apply them to one model for replacing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that has so far received frequent mention but little sustained analysis – the lender cooperative utility. We discuss the pros and cons of such a model and propose a method for organizing participation in a mutual loss pool and an explicit, priced government insurance mechanism. We also discuss how these principles and this model are consistent with preserving the “to-be-announced,” or TBA, market – particularly if the fixed-rate mortgage remains a focus of public policy.

The paper presents empirical tests of the (S,s) model of inventory behavior using aggregate retail trade data. Estimation and testing are based on the probability distributions of inventories derived by Caplin [1985]. The excess volatility of retailers' demand over their consumers' demand, and the "forgetfulness" of inventories under (S,s) are emphasized. Test results indicate that the time series properties of deliveries and sales are consistent with (S,s) and not a quadratic cost model. Finally, when autoregressions of inventories are given an (S,s) rather than a stock adjustment interpretation, traditional empirical problems such as low speeds of adjustment are explained.

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York released a report -- New Directions for Understanding Systemic Risk -- that presents key findings from a cross-disciplinary conference that it cosponsored in May 2006 with the National Academy of Sciences' Board on Mathematical Sciences and Their Applications. ; The pace of financial innovation over the past decade has increased the complexity and interconnectedness of the financial system. This development is important to central banks, such as the Federal Reserve, because of their traditional role in addressing systemic risks to the financial system. ; To encourage innovative thinking about systemic issues, the New York Fed partnered with the National Academy of Sciences to bring together more than 100 experts on systemic risk from 22 countries to compare cross-disciplinary perspectives on monitoring, addressing and preventing this type of risk. ; This report, released as part of the Bank's Economic Policy Review series, outlines some of the key points concerning systemic risk made by the various disciplines represented -including economic research, ecology, physics and engineering - as well as presentations on market-oriented models of financial crises, and systemic risk in the payments system and the interbank funds market. The report concludes with observations gathered from the sessions and a discussion of potential applications to policy. ; The three papers presented in this conference session highlighted the positive feedback effects that produce herdlike behavior in markets, and the subsequent discussion focused in part on means of encouraging heterogeneous investment strategies to counter such behavior. Participants in the session also discussed the types of models used to study systemic risk and commented on the challenges and trade-offs researchers face in developing their models.

Overview of the proceedings of a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York entitled Financial Innovation and Monetary Transmission

In the summer of 2000, central banks from the Group of Ten countries surveyed large international banks about their use of stress tests - a risk management tool that measures a firm's exposure to extreme movements in asset prices. The survey findings highlight the risks that most concern financial institutions and clarify how these institutions use stress tests in their overall risk management programs.

Market participants and policymakers closely monitor movements in the yield curve for information about future economic fundamentals. In several recent episodes, however, disruptions to market liquidity have affected the short-term dynamics of the curve independently of fundamentals. This article provides evidence that the short-run dynamics in the intermediate maturities of the yield curve changed around 1990, with the appearance of positive feedback in weekly interest rate changes. The feedback is consistent with the effects of options dealers’ hedging activity and it is found only in the 1990s, after the interest rate options market grew to significant size. The authors also show that the market liquidity/positive-feedback effects are concentrated in the weeks after the largest interest rate changes. Their results suggest that the times when market participants and policymakers are most interested in extracting from the yield curve a signal about economic fundamentals are precisely the times when changes in the curve may be distorted by liquidity effects.

Because of the concentrated distribution of interest rates on outstanding mortgages, modest interest rate declines in 1997 and 1998 made refinancing a smart choice for a record number of homeowners. In addition, the strong economy and the age of mortgage loans likely contributed to the surge in refinancing activity.

The authors find that the use of Treasury securities to hedge mortgage-backed security extension risk may have magnified increases in long-term interest rates after the tightening of monetary policy in early 1994. Substantial increases in the duration of mortgage securities appear to have caused realignments of hedges and portfolios that, in turn, had a significant impact on the short-run movements of the Treasury market, particularly for ten-year securities. This phenomenon may have altered the short-run dynamics of the yield curve and thus changed the transmission of monetary policy.

This article evaluates changes in the aggregate effectiveness of monetary policy and changes in monetary policy transmission mechanisms by examining how traditional large-scale macroeconometric models have evolved in the last ten to fifteen years. The article analyzes shifts in model structure and sheds some light on the changing relationship between policy and the real economy by reporting simulations that use different historical versions of the models.