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Partisan gerrymandering is a scourge on our democracy. Instead of voters choosing their representatives, representatives choose their voters. Historically, individuals and states could pursue multiple paths to challenge partisan gerrymandering. [...]

INTRODUCTION 223 I. LEANDRO I 224 II. THE MANNING ERA BEGINS 230 III. THE HOKE COUNTY TRIAL AND LEANDRO II 231 IV. JUDGE MANNING LEADS THE SEARCH FOR THE "PROMISED [...], I have been asked by the North Carolina Law Review to submit this essay reflecting on the Leandro Case from the perspective of the only person to have participated in the first two opinions issued by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Thus, this will serve more as a personal reflection on the case than as a scholarly article normally published by the Law Review. Since my retirement from the court in 2004, I have not formally participated in the ongoing saga of the longest running case in North Carolina jurisprudential history. I have certainly followed the case through all its iterations since then. In fact, several months ago I found myself back in the courtroom at the Supreme Court of North Carolina for the next--and some would hope--final chapter of the case. Much has changed since that first oral argument there in 1996, when I was a relatively new justice on the court. And yet, much hasn't changed. But isn't that the issue? Had this case been the basis for a reality TV series, I have no doubt that as the clerk gaveled the court into session with the seven justices filing in, the background music would have to be the Beatles' 1970 Number 1 hit, "The Long and Winding Road." Yes, Leandro has traversed a long, long road since those early days, and that road has certainly been a winding road, one full of twists and turns, different personalities, both on and off the bench, and a changing political and educational landscape across the state. Is the end of that long and winding road in sight? Only time will tell.

Introduction 1094 I, Politics and Prosecutors: A Brief History 1096 A. A Bipartisan Space 1096 B. Reactive Prosecutors 1099 II. The Current (and Future?) Politics of Prosecution: Rising Partisanship and [...], Prosecution in the United States has long been political. But the nature of prosecutorial politics is changing. Once bipartisan and largely reactive, the politics of prosecution is more partisan and proactive, in ways that both reflect and amplify larger cleavages in American society. This Essay considers the upsides and downsides of this development. On the one hand, political contestation over prosecution democratizes criminal enforcement, stimulates public thinking and debate about the role and purpose of criminal law, and promotes local political agency. On the other, it risks falling prey to the same pitfalls that have impoverished American political life generally in recent decades: societal division, decline in reasoned assessment, difficulties forging sustainable compromise, and erosion of trust in institutions. The Essay concludes with some thoughts on how to maximize the upsides and minimize the downsides in this new era of partisan prosecutorial politics.

INTRODUCTION 128 PART I 130 130 A. The History and Political Ideology of Extreme Right-Wing Parties B. The Rise of New Extreme Right-Wing Parties and Political 134 Delegitimization 138 C. [...], The past decade has witnessed the rise in popularity of organizations and political parties founded on the extreme nationalism and populism that characterized the interwar period's fascist and Nazi parties. These organizations have become known as the "alt-right" and include white supremacists, neo-Nazis, neo-fascists, and other extreme right-wing fringe groups. Extreme right-wing political parties have also enjoyed electoral victories while promulgating xenophobia and hatred based on race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, and sexual orientation. This article examines the resurgence of such extreme right-wing political parties and the relationship between right-wing extremism, political parties, and terrorism. The goal of this article is to shift the discussion from one of political analysis of right-wing extremism to one of legal evaluation of the activities involved within the ambit of the recent advances in the criminalization of terrorism. Could the mobilization of extreme right-wing political parties be classified as terrorism? This article begins to answer this question by assessing the definitional problem of terrorism and critically analyzing the most recent legislative developments in the EU. The article focuses on the uneasy relationship between the legal nature of political parties and the crime of terrorism. It then applies insights from this debate to the specific case of Greece's popular extreme right-wing political party: Golden Dawn. It discusses Golden Dawn's development and political mobilization under the framework of terrorist statutes and argues in favor of a constitutional interpretation that gives political parties the necessary legal personality in order to incur collective criminal liability for such activities.

Previous research has shown that presidents have a powerful influence on their party's popularity, reputation for competence, perceived ideological leanings, attractiveness as an object of personal identification, and electoral fortunes. Drawing on data from multiple Gallup Polls covering presidential candidates from Eisenhower and Stevenson through George H. W. Bush; the Annenberg surveys for 2000, 2004, and 2008; the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2009-2009 panel study; and ANES time series studies from 1978 through 2012, this article examines how the reciprocal relationship between affective reactions to presidential candidates/presidents and their parties evolves prior to and during campaigns, over presidencies, and after presidents or former candidates are no longer in office or on the ballot., This article reports the results of new research undertaken as part of a broader project examining how postwar U.S. presidents have influenced their party's popular standing, reputation, electoral fortunes, and [...]

We examine the effect of a sudden influx of government spending, the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) on support for the president's party. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that stimulus spending had a modest positive effect on Democratic vote share but only in counties that were already Democratic leaning. In Republican counties, by contrast, government spending had a small, but significant negative effect on Democratic vote share. That is to say, ARRA polarized already partisan places. These results have important implications for the study of voter responsiveness to government spending and the measurement of the political effects of policy visibility., Upon signing the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) into law, President Obama said, 'We expect you, the American people, to hold us accountable for the results' of the [...]

I. INTRODUCTION Judicial elections are approaching their second century in the United States, and they are not going away anytime soon. After the rise of Jacksonian Democracy in the early [...]

This article establishes that transitions of power from one presidential administration to the next can act as a source of uncertainty regarding whom citizens view as responsible for national conditions. I argue that citizens confront this ambiguity in a partisan manner when making responsibility attributions of credit and blame. Using the economy and the Iraq War as examples, ordinary partisans frequently ascribe responsibility using motivated reasoning by crediting the president of their own political party for perceived successes and blaming the president of the opposite party for perceived failures., The recovery from the 2008 recession consisted of four years of high unemployment and low economic growth in the run-up to the 2012 presidential election. Incumbents can generally interpret such [...]

C. Acceptance Leads to Even Greater Encroachment Into recent times, Congress continues to make the partisan balance requirement a key means of ensuring agency independence. (243) Since 1989, approximately 950 [...]

ABSTRACT This Article considers the constitutional status of mandatory partisan balance requirements for presidential appointments to independent federal agencies. Since the 1880s, Congress routinely has included partisan balance requirements, along [...]

Personalities and the ways political actors perceive one another are large factors in determining patterns of collaboration or competition. There has always been much academic debate about whether external challenges [...]

Timing rules represent another form of structural constraint that may be designed to limit short-term responsive or tribal partisanship. These features entail decisions undertaken with some gap between the decision [...]

ABSTRACT In a polarized political environment, allegations of excessive partisanship by public actors are ubiquitous. Commentators, courts, and activists levy these allegations daily. But with remarkable consistency, they do so [...]

This article analyzes the president's leadership predicament in light of purely partisan considerations in Congress, meaning members' interests in winning and holding control of national institutions. I examine congressional votes to raise the debt limit, which are highly dependent upon patterns of institutional party control I also examine high-profile congressional charges of administration misdoing, another arena in which members of the president's party behave starkly differently from members of the president's opposition. These differences have consequences for presidential leadership, no matter the configuration of party control of national institutions., There were some on my side who did not want to be seen helping the president do something he wanted to get done, just because the president wanted to do [...]

Upon taking office, President Barack Obama celebrated the apparent end of ideology in American politics. He celebrated too soon. Despite Obama's own disavowal of ideology, and the substantial continuities between his response to economic crisis and that of his Republican predecessor, ideology came roaring back into American public life in the remarkable 2009 Summer of Hate. Since then, anti-Statist crusaders on the right have forced the president, despite reelection, to the defensive, and presumably stale debates over the size of government and the sanctity of the market have once again figured prominently in national debate. This article explores the resurgence of anti-Statist ideology, arguing that the interventionist policies of Obama and George W. Bush constituted a regime crisis for the modern Republican Party and its allied extrapartisan institutions, which helps to explain the depth as well as breadth of recent efforts to reassert the relevance of free-market principles. Unlike Franklin Roosevelt, Obama's partisan forefather to whom he is frequently compared, Obama's freedom to maneuver has been seriously constrained by a network of 'neoliberal' institutions and norms that was momentarily shaken, but not forsaken, in the financial crisis and ensuing recession., From the late 1970s until the recent near collapse of the global financial system, the American way of political economy or 'variety of capitalism' had been steadfastly, even joyously, market [...]

Polarization and gridlock are defining characteristics of present-day American national politics, reflecting the interaction of the Madisonian system's checks and balances with the widening partisan and ideological divisions in the House and Senate. These divisions have coevolved with complimentary changes in electoral politics over the same period in a mutually reinforcing spiral. The partisan, ideological, and policy opinions of American voters have grown more internally consistent, more distinctive between parties, and more predictive of voting in national elections. Party loyalty has increased, ticket splitting has decreased, and winning congressional seats against the local partisan grain has become much more difficult. The congressional parties thus represent increasingly divergent electoral constituencies. Republicans enjoy a structural advantage in the distribution of their regular voters across House districts, so these changes have solidified their control of the House even as their national party grows less competitive nationally. Divided government and polarized politics thus rest on a firm electoral base, and partisan warfare in Washington is unlikely to diminish until voters begin to punish the warriors., Acute partisan conflict arising from the ideological polarization of the national parties is now a dominant feature of American politics. The series of prominent showdowns over fiscal policy between Democratic [...]

ABSTRACT Work in philosophy of religion exhibits at least four symptoms of poor health: it is too partisan, too polemical, too narrow in its focus, and too often evaluated using [...]

This article considers whether industrial relations (IR) research is objective, impartial or value-free, and argues that many IR academics in Britain have tended to start from a social-democratic premise which makes them relatively more sympathetic to the interests and objectives of workers and their trade unions than to the business needs of employers and managers. Focusing attention on the partisanship of those who have made a distinctive 'radical/critical' contribution to IR scholarship, it advances the argument that IR can, at one and the same time, be both partisan and objective. Acknowledging the real potential dangers of bias in adopting a methodological approach that states, in the words of C. Wright Mills, 'I have tried to be objective, but I do not claim to be detached', it provides a defence of the potential merits of partisanship, provided it is underpinned by rigorous scholarly research. Keywords Bias, industrial relations, objectivity, partisanship, value-neutrality, Introduction Eric Hobsbawm (1998: 164) observed that although there has been a great deal of discussion about the nature, or even the possibility, of objectivity in the social sciences, there [...]

INTRODUCTION Our assignment in this symposium is to explore the role that legal issues play in what is popularly known as "gridlock" in Washington. I am tempted to declare the [...]

In Is Democracy Possible Here? (Princeton, 2006), the legal theorist and political philosopher Ronald Dworkin distinguishes between two conceptions of democracy, 'majoritarian' and 'partnership.' He is an advocate of partnership [...]

The link between the president's job approval ratings and aggregate election outcomes is well established, but the processes forging the connection have received comparatively little attention. A variety of data from diverse sources across multiple administrations indicates that popular assessments of the president strongly affect how his party is evaluated, perceived, and adopted as an object of identification, which, in turn, helps to account for the president's influence on the electoral fates of his party's candidates. The data also suggest that opinions of Barack Obama have so far had an even larger effect on attitudes toward the president's party than did opinions of his predecessors, including G. W. Bush., In rapid succession the 2006, 2008, and 2010 elections reaffirmed the common belief that a president's standing with the public has a powerful impact on the electoral fortunes of his [...]

Hope soared as Barack Obama and his beaming family strode onto the stage in Chicago's Grant Park on 5 November 2008. The election night mood was accentuated by tears of [...]

This article tests two models of extremism versus moderation in presidential policy stances, a party activist theory and a congressional context theory. The party activist theory argues that, due to the electoral and nomination reforms of the mid-1970s, party activists became increasingly important and powerful in their parties. As activists tend to be more policy extreme than rank-and-file voters, and grew more extreme over the past several decades, this theory predicts presidents will also be more policy extreme in the postreform than the prereform era. The congressional context theory focuses on divided government and polarization. It argues that policy-minded presidents must moderate their policy positions during divided government because they need support from the opposition party. However, polarization erects barriers and disincentives for presidential moderation, offsetting the moderating tendencies of divided government. Using data on presidential policy positions from the 1950s through the early 2000s, I test both theories, finding support for the congressional context but not the party activist theory., For several decades the American political system has been polarizing along partisan, ideological, and issue lines at both the mass and elite levels. One implication of polarization is the disappearance [...]