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How does rural decline affect electoral politics? A well-known argument is that the growing geographical polarisation of populations between prospering major cities and declining hinterlands is emerging as a cleavage of electoral politics in developed countries. But prior work has focussed on specific outcomes of rural decline rather than examining whether the geographical distribution of political attitudes and behaviours within countries has become more uneven in the last decades. Using a measure of party nationalisation capturing spatial differences in electoral support across districts in OECD countries over the last 60 years, we find that a declining rural population increases differences in the geographical distribution of partisan support within countries. Nationalisation determines a party's orientation toward distribution of public resources and support for region-specific interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a democracy, a commonly held idea is that political parties present their programmes for government before elections so that people know what they are voting for. It is then often held that governments should follow what they have said, when in government. These programmes may take several forms, but the most common one is the party manifesto. Here the aim is to consider how planning elements have figured in manifestos. Manifestos are surveyed from the four UK general elections 2010–2019, concentrating on those of the Conservative and Labour parties. How far did planning figure in manifestos? Were there big differences between parties and elections? To what extent did a winning party follow its manifesto? Manifestos tread a complicated line between clear ideological statements and more immediately tuned electoral political considerations. Some implications are drawn out for how planning actors may relate to manifestos in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Police militarization is prevalent worldwide. Despite growing interest in the consequences of militarization, few studies focus on its causes. Through the case of Brazilian municipal police forces, we explore the connection between partisan ideology and police militarization. Some research shows that leftist administrations in democracies are more likely to emphasize human rights and less likely to militarize the police. However, leftist administrations might militarize police forces more than centrist and right-wing parties to compensate for perceptions of lower competence to deal with security issues, especially when they face high levels of violent crime. Using inverse probability of treatment weights, we show an association between leftist mayors and higher militarization of municipal police forces. Furthermore, in contexts of high homicide rates, mayors of Brazil's leading leftist party, the Workers' Party, tend to militarize local police more than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research consistently demonstrates that differences between the policy preferences of high- and low-income individuals are surprisingly small, at least at the aggregate level. We depart from this work by considering the size of income-based differences in opinion within political parties. To do so, we use responses to 144 policy-specific questions in the 2010–2020 Cooperative Election Study (CES). Our effort demonstrates that differences in opinion among the rich and poor tend to be larger within the parties than in the overall population. Interestingly, these gaps are largest among Democrats. We find that these larger gaps persist even after accounting for the party's racial and ethnic diversity. Furthermore, among Democrats, class-based gaps in opinion are larger than the gaps we observe among other potential intraparty cleavages, such as age, gender, and religiosity. Our results suggest important implications for the growing literature on representational inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil procedural duties are elements of the civil procedural status of persons participating in legal proceedings. The nature of civil procedural obligations of the parties is determined by the nature of civil procedural relations. The civil procedural duty of the party is a measure of the necessary behavior of the participants in the civil process, which is designed to ensure the implementation of certain procedural actions or refrain from their implementation for the protection of rights and legal interests and to guarantee a fair, impartial, timely consideration and resolution of a civil case. The signs of civil procedural obligations of the parties include: 1) is an element of the procedural status of a person; 2) normatively defined in the provisions of civil procedural legislation; 3) aimed at protecting rights and legitimate interests; 3) are individual (applies to the parties or the plaintiff or defendant separately) or general (applies to all participants in the case); 4) aimed at ensuring effective civil justice. The civil procedural obligations of the parties in a lawsuit can be grouped according to several criteria. First, these are general duties that belong to all participants in the case. For the participants in the case, the civil procedural legislation establishes uniform limits of procedural rights and obligations. Special civil procedural duties are duties that are inherent only to the parties or individually to the plaintiff or defendant. An important place in the formation of the content of the procedural obligations of the parties belongs to the general principles of civil proceedings. Understanding this connection allows for a deeper understanding of the meaning of each duty and ensures the effectiveness of civil proceedings. The consequences of non-fulfillment of civil procedural obligations by the parties are defined in the civil procedural legislation. These are: application of measures of procedural coercion; bringing to legal liability; consideration of the case in the absence of the relevant party to the case; leaving a complaint, application, request without consideration or their return. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some interest groups have policy positions on one or more policy dimensions in partisan policy space while others do not. In this paper we examine explanations for differences in interest group position-taking across policy dimensions. While group characteristics are likely to explain parts of such variation in interest group position-taking, we hypothesise that the salience and polarisation among parties and citizens of the respective policy dimension also matter. By utilising novel survey data on interest group positions (within a predefined policy space) in six different countries as well as survey data on citizen and party positions, we investigate interest group position-taking across policy dimensions. The analysis shows that interest groups with more resources, core interests linked to the examined policy dimensions and a connection to the traditional party system are more likely to have policy positions than other groups. Furthermore, we find evidence of groups supplementing citizens and parties in policy space by articulating positions on policy dimensions that the average citizen and party pays less attention to. Moreover, when party polarisation increases on a dimension, greater party salience is negatively associated with group position taking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ideology of the contemporary far-right movement inWestern Europe is characterised by a belief in authoritarianism, nativism and a rejection of liberal or democratic principles. How are these ideological characteristics reflected in the movement's approach to education? This article argues that education can be politicised from either a redistributive or cultural perspective. Drawing on literature and archival sources, it shows that right-wing parties and intellectuals have developed clear preferences for education as a cultural policy, but are more ambivalent when it comes to the distributive dimension of education. The fact that this overall pattern and its variations across the movement can be interpreted using existing theoretical approaches from education policy and history confirms the value of these approaches for future research on far-right approaches to education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, scholars have observed that political parties' policy positions frequently fit the preferences of well‐to‐do voters better than those of the less well‐to‐do; a phenomenon known as policy congruence inequality. While the existence of inequality in policy congruence is well‐established, we currently only have a modest understanding of the causes of it. We develop an argument proposing that the political mobilisation of citizens with low socioeconomic status (SES) both in the parliamentary channel, in the form of high turnout, and in the extra‐parliamentary channel, in the form of high union density, is pivotal. Both high turnout and union density force parties to pay more attention to the preferences of the disadvantaged, thereby creating lower policy congruence inequality. To test the argument, we have collected and harmonised election surveys and party manifestos covering 90 elections in Australia, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, covering several decades until today, yielding more than 120,000 voter–party dyads. Employing this new dataset, our results confirm that the political mobilisation of citizens with low SES is a strong predictor of policy congruence inequality. This finding nuances the conclusion of extant research by showing that low‐SES citizens are not always on the losing side politically. It also implies the important role of maintaining or maybe even increasing turnout and union membership among the disadvantaged in society. Places where either turnout or union density is slipping in these years are likely to witness further increases in policy congruence inequality in the years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We conduct a global, large- N analysis of proportionality in the partisan distribution of cabinet portfolios. Formulated in the context of postwar Western European parliamentary democracy, Gamson's Law predicts that parties joining a coalition government will receive cabinet ministries in direct proportion to the seats they are contributing to the coalition on the floor of the legislature. Using a sample of 1551 country-years of coalitional government in 97 countries from 1966 to 2019, and comparing all main constitutional formats (parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential), we find that Gamson's Law does not travel well outside its context of origin. Among the constitutional predictors of cabinet proportionality, we find that pure presidentialism is a major outlier, with an exaggerated form of formateur advantage. Introducing party-system and assembly-level predictors to the debate, we find that party institutionalization tends to increase fairness in portfolio allocation within parliamentary systems only. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On September 29, 2024, elections to the National Council were held in Austria. According to their results, the extreme right-wing Austrian Freedom Party won the election with more than 28% of the votes. The turnout at the end of the election was 77,7%. More than 14 parties were on the ballot, including parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties. Members of the governing coalition of parties – the Austrian People’s Party and the Green Alternative – were defeated, losing the majority of seats in the lower house of parliament. The authors analyze the electoral programs of the main parties, the significance of the federal election results for the future of the key Austrian parties, as well as the regional specifics of voting, which reflected the ongoing electoral processes, but also confirmed, in the authors’ opinion, the deepening fragmentation of the party-political landscape of the Alpine Republic for the period 2022–2024. The article concludes that the main reason for the victory of the ultra-right was the attraction of a significant number of young voters to their side, as well as the failure of the federal government’s policies that contribute to the deepening of the economic crisis in the country. The authors forecast the formation of a government coalition and the future of each of the Austrian parliamentary parties in the short term, including the land elections of 2024–2025.

ÖZ: 2017 yılında yapılan referandumla Türkiye’de hükümet sistemi değişmiş ve “Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükümet Sistemi”ne geçilmiştir. Bu yeni sistemle birlikte Türk siyasal hayatının kurumsal yapısında da köklü değişimler yaşanmış ve yaşanmaya devam etmektedir. Değişimin yansıdığı alanlardan biri de partiler ve seçimlerdir. Yeni hükümet sistemiyle beraber Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerini kazanabilmek için gerekli olan %50+1 hedefine tek bir adayın ulaşabilmesinin zorluğu partileri ve adayları “ittifak siyaseti”ne yöneltmiştir. 2018 seçimlerine biri Cumhur diğeri Millet olmak üzere iki ittifak girmiştir. Bu ittifaklar arası ilişkiler 2019 yerel seçim sonuçları üzerinde de etkili olmuştur. 2023 seçimlerine bu ittifakların dışında 3 ittifak daha katılmıştır. Bugün için ittifaklar önemli siyasi aktörler olarak karşımızda durmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, Türk siyasal hayatında belli bir dönem, yani 2018 sonrası, seçim ittifakları konusuyla değerlendirilecektir. Araştırmanın temel amacı, yasal zemine oturması açısından yeni bir durum olan “ittifak siyaseti” konusunu etraflıca incelemektir. Konunun öncelikli olarak partiler arası ilişkileri ve ittifakı ilgilendirdiği düşünülse de neden ittifaklara ihtiyaç duyulduğu, seçimlerle ilgili mevzuat, seçmenler, temsil ve oy sistemi açısından da değerlendirilmesi gerekir. Çalışmada nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden olan literatür analizi ve niteliksel metin çözümlemesi yapılacaktır. İttifak siyaseti, partiler arası ittifak konusuyla ilgili çalışmalar taranırken Google Scholar, Dergipark, kütüphane veri tabanları, tezler ve bilim insanlarının tartışmalarını içeren internet kaynaklarından yararlanılacaktır. ABSTRACT: With the referendum held in 2017, the government system in Türkiye has been changed and the "Presidential Government System" has been adopted. Through this new system, fundamental changes have been experienced in the institutional structure of Turkish political life and continue to be experienced. One of the areas where change is reflected is parties and elections. With the new government system, the difficulty for a single candidate to reach the 50%+1 target required to win the elections led parties and candidates to "alliance politics". Two alliances, one of the Republic and the other of the Millet, entered the 2018 elections. These alliance relations also had an impact on the 2019 local election results. In addition to these alliances, 3 more alliances were added to the 2023 elections. Alliances are seen as important political actors today. This study aims to examine the issue of "alliance politics", which is a new situation for Türkiye. Although it is thought that the issue primarily concerns inter-party relations and alliances, it should also be evaluated in terms of why alliances are needed, legislation related to elections, voters, representation, and the voting system. In the study, a literature analysis, and qualitative analysis which is one of the qualitative research methods, will be used. While scanning the studies on alliance politics and cross-party alliance, Google Scholar, Dergipark, library databases, thesis, and internet resources including the discussions of scientists will be used.

This study focuses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is on the international political agenda. There are many studies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the difference between this study from other studies is that it analyses the issue between Israel and Palestine within the scope of conflict analysis. Conflict analysis, which has an important place in the discipline of International Relations, deals with the definition of an existing problem, the actors of the problem, and the analysis of solutions to the problem. In defining the problem, the historical background of the conflict, cause analysis, current situation analysis, and regional and global analyses are included. Actor analyses include profiles of the actors, their demands, SWOT analyses, and the parties' capacities for peace. After these stages, an analysis is made of when and why the conflict arises and what kind of searches and suggestions can be offered to resolve the conflict. The policies of regional and global actors towards the conflict, the decisions taken by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, and are analyses of the political decisions of international politics. Focusing on the 7 October attack and its aftermath, this study examines the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from its historical background to an analysis of the current situation. In short, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which was seen as a national, regional, and international problem from the 1950s to the 2000s, became a global problem after the October 7 attack. Therefore, through an in-depth analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the context of conflict analysis, the demands of the parties to the conflict and a solution analysis are also examined concerning these demands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventional narratives hold that parties are "the orphans of political philosophy" and that systematic normative justifications of parties and partisanship have emerged only in recent years in the West. This article aims to show that when antiparty sentiments were prevalent in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Western societies, a systematic justification of party politics existed in China. Western antipartyism in that time shifted from an older accusation that parties were divisive and subversive to a "progressive antipartyism" that portrayed parties as elitist and antidemocratic "machines." In China, however, although proparty intellectuals faced the first type of antipartyism, the "progressive" type was relatively absent, as there weren't any mature party machines in the first place. Far from being a hindrance to democracy, parties comprised of public-spirited elites were justified as an instrument for political founding: transforming passive subjects under an imperial despotism into modern active citizens in a constitutional democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Notaire is the property of Universitas Airlangga and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper investigates when party selectors prefer ethnic minority female over male candidates on their lists. We argue that the two competing strategies parties can follow (gaining the ethnic vote ('ethnic community' argument) versus not scaring ethnic majority voters ('deterrence' argument)) are dependent upon party ideology, district diversity and ethnic minorities' visibility. Focusing on the 2018 local elections in Flanders (Belgium), we find that female Turkish/Maghrebi (i.e., visible ethnic minority) candidates outnumber their male counterparts in less diverse districts and rightist parties, whereas an opposite picture emerges in more diverse districts and leftist parties. Surprisingly, however, female candidates with less visible minority backgrounds outnumber their male counterparts in all contexts. These results imply a confirmation of the 'ethnic community argument', while casting doubts on the 'deterrence' argument. Taken together, our findings clearly highlight the conditionality of the selection of ethnic minority male versus female candidates in Proportional Representation list-systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to present a new explanatory model of political preference (mainly, but not exclusively electoral). It is proposed that people will have a preference for political actors and institutions that coincide with their moral values, but it is not assumed that citizens know their own values or the determinants of their preference; instead they will only have positive or negative feelings towards several candidates or parties and many times will not legitimize such sentiments. The text begins by exposing the proposal, and then it is compared with the main schools of thought on political-electoral behavior (sociological, psychological and rational). Latter, some initial empirical evidence (from interviews and a survey) is shown, and there, the variable associated with this "moral vote" showed more statistical relation with electoral intention than the variables of the three classical political approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Swiss People's Party emerged as the unambiguous winner of the 2023 Swiss federal elections. Thanks to a vote share of 27.9% obtained in the elections to the National Council, it managed to surpass Brothers of Italy to become the largest radical right party in contemporary Western Europe. By contrast, the Greens did not manage to confirm their electoral performance from 2019 and even fell below the important 10% mark. Their attempt to enter government by unseating a member of the Liberals clearly failed in the subsequent elections to the Federal Council. While the partisan composition of the government remained unchanged, it is likely to be subject to change in the future. The rise of the radical right is in line with national elections that have recently taken place in France, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores congruence in the wake of the crises. It analyses (1) shifts in parties' positions on multiple issue dimensions and (2) examines congruence between citizens and parliament in times of crisis. The article refers to three issue dimensions: left-right, migration and European integration. First, I hypothesise that shifts in party positions are more pronounced on newly contested issue dimensions, such as migration or European integration, than on the left-right dimension. Second, I argue that systemic congruence will increase over the course of time. Third, I posit that systemic congruence will increase particularly on newly contested issue dimensions, like migration and European integration. The study brings together a set of Western European countries: France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain and Sweden. The analysis is based on CHES- and ESS-data (2006–2018/2019) and explores congruence as a many-to-many relationship. In large part, the results confirm the hypotheses. First, party positions changed, and shifted particularly on the issue dimensions of European integration and migration. Second, systemic congruence increased in several cases. Third, the most profound changes are to be found on the issue dimension of European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we theorize the 2016 Brexit referendum as a critical juncture in UK politics and analyse its effects on devolution using the concept of regional authority. We argue that Brexit raised the option of re-balancing the self-rule and shared rule dimensions of regional authority present in UK devolution. We generate hypotheses regarding parties' territorial strategies and test them against a content analysis of 2015 and 2017 UK general election manifestos. We demonstrate that proposals dealing with shared rule grew between 2015 and 2017, within the context of consistency in parties' overall territorial positioning. The governing Conservatives also offered more proposals on shared rule but not ones that increased devolved influence. Overall, they moved from favouring an increase in regional authority in 2015 to the cusp of maintaining existing regional authority and somewhat reducing it in 2017. This helps to explain whypost-Brexit UK government policy in practice maintained a primary focus on self-rule within a general approach of limiting the further growth of regional authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A burgeoning comparative politics literature investigates the role of key political actors, such as political parties and members of parliament, in the global challenge of tackling climate change. While text-based indicators of political behaviour, such as parliamentary speeches, questions or social media, provide abundant sources of data for comparative research, much remains to be learned from the rigorous large-scale quantitative analysis of political text in relation to climate change. As a typical first step of text-as-data (TADA) workflows, the isolation of climate-related content is crucial. Yet it is also bedevilled by crucial conceptual complexities inherent to the nature of climate change as a global policy problem. In this note, we unpack these complexities in order to urge future TADA research to be mindful of them. We argue that, especially in comparative research settings, TADA analysts must find means to attenuate the tension between ‘overlooking’ and ‘overstretching’ climate-related text content. An illustrative example drawing on more than 400,000 parliamentary questions in the UK and Germany suggests that a thoughtful combination of off-the-shelf methods can be usefully leveraged to address this important challenge in applied political research.

With the establishment of the Iraqi state on August 23 1921, demands increased, to establish parties, so the law was issued on July 2, 1922, the relation with Britain and the advancement of the country were at the forefront of its priorities, which necessitated a study of the activity of parties for the period (1930-1935) which included the elites, The intellectuals were divided into the ruling and opposition. And with Iraq's entry into the League of Nations on October 3, 1932, it practiced traditional activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Political leaders often change sides. But what happens to the citizens? What are the movements that concern them? Definitely, they are really willing to change their coats, i.e. sides, perhaps following the leader? And to what extent? The case of the first Italian republic is sufficiently emblematic of a crystallization of positions and political choices. Observing, however, the second republic, many studies have highlighted a continuity in choices in relation to the sides (few are willing to decidedly change sides), while the choice between parties of the same group are decidedly more likely. Diamanti, summarizing these tendencies, spoke of the muro di Arcore, highlighting thus a sort of impenetrability between the two sides. Changes are welcome, but only between the parties of the same "field" of reference. Rarely between the two major alignments or poles. Is this interpretation still valid? The purpose of this study is exactly to attempt to understand it. In this contribution the attention is in fact focused on a specific case: the recent elections policies of 2022. Using data from the Itanes 2022 survey (Italian national election studies), I will try to argue how, even today, Italians change rather easily party but much less pole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is devoted to identifying the features of compensation for destroyed real estate objects due to hostilities, terrorist acts, and sabotage. The civil liability of the state as a subject of responsibility is analyzed in the work. It is determined that the civil liability of the state can be divided depending on the legal status of the state: the liability of the national state; civil liability of a foreign state; liability of the aggressor state. The judicial practice of Ukraine is based on the fact that Russia's consent to be brought as a defendant in cases of compensation for material and moral damage is not required. At the same time, another state must consent to participate in such procedures. It is formulated that within the framework of compensation relations for damaged and destroyed real estate objects due to hostilities, terrorist acts, and sabotage caused by Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine, this compensation is not civil liability. It is emphasized that the Ukrainian state independently compensates for the losses incurred by individuals to protect public relations, ensure human rights, and property turnover. The compensation of this damage is the basis for addressing the aggressor country with a demand for reparations for such damages. It is determined that compensation relations apply exclusively to residential real estate objects and their owners or managers. This approach is somewhat narrow, but it indicates that the state primarily supports the social direction regarding the housing provision of individuals, as housing need is a basic human need. Prospective areas of scientific research in this direction include the justification of compensation to legal entities, the identification of features of the civil process concerning the protection of individuals' rights in compensation payments. Overall, Ukrainian legislation requires further updating in the area of procedures for compensation for destroyed/damaged real estate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Party–group relations are today characterized by various forms of alignments. These include the persistence of traditional class alignments, the realignment of economic groups due to identity politics and alignments of groups at the centre of identity politics. This study analyses the group-based messaging of parties in relation to these three groups. We argue that, contrary to the catch-all party thesis, positive and negative group appeals of parties are (still) structured by parties' support among social groups and by groups either liked or disliked by their voters. Our argument is tested through a content analysis of election materials in Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands, combined with survey data. The results indicate that group appeals are indeed shaped by electoral support among social groups and attitudes towards them. Results also suggest that the former effect is present for traditionally aligned economic and identity politics groups, but not for realigned economic groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives: The causes for persistently high and increasing maternal mortality rates in the United States have been elusive. Methods: We use the shift in the ideological direction of the Republican and the Democratic parties in the 1960s, to test the hypothesis that fluctuations in overall and race-specific maternal mortality rates (MMR) follow the power shifts between the parties before and after the Political Realignment (PR) of the 1960s. Results: Using time-series data analysis methods, we find that, net of trend, overall and race-specific MMRs were higher under Democratic administrations than Republican ones before the PR (1915–1965)—i.e., when the Democratic Party was a protector of the Jim Crow system. This pattern, however, changed after the PR (1966–2007), with Republican administrations underperforming Democratic ones—i.e., during the period when the Republican Party shifted toward a more economically and socially conservative agenda. The pre-post PR partisan shifts in MMRs were larger for Black (9.5%, p <. 01 ) relative to White mothers (7.4%, p <. 05 ) during the study period. Conclusions for Practice: These findings imply that parties and the ideological direction of their agendas substantively affect the social determinants of maternal health and produce politized health outcomes. Significance: What Is Already Known on This Subject?: The causes for persistently high and increasing maternal mortality rates in the United States have been elusive. What This Study Adds?: We find that, net of trend, MMRs are higher under the most racially-conservative party of the period: The Democratic Party before the Political Realignment, the Republican Party after. Institutionalized racism—in the form of racialized federal-level policy—has detrimentally affected the health of all in the past century. Our findings bear important implications for political science, medical sociology, public health, and policy: A deep understanding of political processes is necessary for promoting health equity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a boom in the power of right-wing parties that are becoming government parties in Latin America and Europe. It has been pointed out that these are distinguished from traditional right-wing parties by their common ideology that transcends national contexts, which is why they have been grouped as New Right-wing parties. This article questions whether these parties share ideological themes or whether they are heterogeneous and obey national interests. This study systemizes the New Right-wing parties' programs and classifies them to answer the question. This corpus is then studied through frequency, network, and principal component analysis. Two conclusions are reached from this. First, these parties agree on issues such as provider States and nationalist claims, and, second, their programs have diverse themes that do not show the formation of an identifiable transnational ideological agenda in their programs. Consequently, grouping these parties as an ideologically homogeneous phenomenon can make invisible the fact that they are parties that adjust to particular demands of their political environment, in a logic that obeys more catch-all parties than ideological and dogmatic parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Kenya's 2022 general elections, presidential candidate William Ruto did something unusual – he dominated the vote in the heartlands of one of his main political rivals, President Uhuru Kenyatta. In turn, Ruto's ability to win power by mobilizing support outside of his own Kalenjin community has led to speculation that the political power of ethnicity is waning. Drawing on surveys, economic and demographic analysis and interviews during the campaign in Central Kenya – a predominantly Kikuyu area and Kenyatta's supposed political homeland – we cast doubt on this argument. Evidence from the campaign trail suggests that while structural changes within Kenyan society, including the emergence of a more urban, educated and critical electorate, played an important role in Ruto's electoral success, it was also underpinned by historic ethnic allegiances, inter-group prejudice, and the use of ethnically-rooted clientelist strategies to build political networks. In particular, past campaigns saw Odinga depicted as an unsuitable leader based on his history, personality, and Luo ethnicity, generating formidable barriers to winning support. The implications of this argument extend beyond our understanding of Kenya to recent debates about the impact of urbanization and political socialization on political subjectivities and behaviour in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The party politics literature suggests that an institutionalized party system can be key for well-functioning democracies. Do the benefits of strong parties also extend to women's descriptive representation? We argue that increasing parties' strength can perpetuate and even intensify parties' preexisting patterns of exclusion of particular groups, including women, when elites are gender biased. While stronger parties are better able to carry out their organizational goals, we contend that increasing gender equity is often not part of such goals. To evaluate this argument, we combine an exogenous electoral reform that increased parties' ability to control their members in Brazil with a regression discontinuity design. We find that while the reform increased parties' ability to pursue their organizational goals, it increased the gap in votes between men and women. Further, we demonstrate that the behavior of men toward women copartisans drives this pattern. These findings highlight the unintended consequences of institutional engineering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Thailand's 2023 election outcome did not correspond with the results: the Move Forward Party "won" the polls, but runner-up Pheu Thai ended up forming the government. How could this have happened? This article offers two explanations. First, results and outcomes have typically differed in recent Thai elections: in itself, the substitution of Pheu Thai for Move Forward was nothing unusual. Second, in 2023 an elite pact was in place to ensure that Pheu Thai and the country's conservative elite could engage in a form of promiscuous power-sharing following the May 14 polls. The article explains the politics behind this deal-making, and argues that the creation of the Srettha Thavisin government may not have been an accidental electoral outcome, but could have formed part of a deliberate strategy by the Thai establishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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