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In the 1990s, due to a surge in nonmarital births and the related increase in child support assistance, Congress passed laws making federal aid to states contingent on accessible and standardized paternity establishment processes. This led to in-hospital voluntary paternity acknowledgments (VAPs), which made establishing paternity for child support easier. Federal funding required strict VAP processes, including a sixty-day rescission period and limited grounds for post-rescission challenges. Voluntary parentage acknowledgments have since expanded to include non-genetic parents, like spouses and intended parents through assisted reproduction. Illinois' Parentage Act of 2015 regulates these acknowledgments. However, the Illinois Appellate Court case, Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services ex rel. Hull v. Robinson, revealed complexities with VAPs, particularly when a non-genetic father signed an Iowa VAP, leading to a child support reimbursement challenge from the actual genetic father in Illinois. This Article critiques Illinois laws on voluntary paternity acknowledgments, proposing critical reforms. It starts with the Robinson case, exploring both explicit and implicit VAP issues. It then delves into Illinois' broader parentage acknowledgment framework, considering acknowledgments for children born from consensual sex and from nonsurrogacy and surrogacy assisted reproduction. The Article extends its analysis to the 2000 and 2017 Uniform Parentage Acts (UPAs) and other states' laws, providing a context for Illinois lawmakers. The Article posits reforms of Illinois laws on both paternity and maternity acknowledgments (i.e., those with relevant genetic ties) and on other parentage acknowledgments (i.e., those with no genetic ties), though recognizing a need for differentiating between the two types of acknowledgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For over eighty years, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has authorized sanctions to combat frivolous legal arguments and factual allegations in some paper presentations. Since 1993, however, the rule has not applied to discovery. This article demonstrates how Rule 11 should be used to deter advocacy based on discovery that has "gone bad" since its initial disclosure. Disciplinary actions, malpractice claims, the discovery rules, and even the inherent sanctioning authority of the court are insufficient to deter lawyers from relying on now-bad discovery papers. Rule 11 would hold lawyers to a duty of reasonable inquiry before relying on prior discovery, including discovery conducted or presented by a prior lawyer or firm. This article proceeds in six parts. First, it generally demonstrates why it matters that Rule 11 apply to now-rotten discovery papers. Second, it employs a 2001 Fourth Circuit opinion to show how a Rule 11 application to gone-bad discovery would help deter frivolity in civil litigation. Third, it reviews the current rule's exclusion of "discovery process" violations, arguing that it does not encompass presentations of discovery once good, but now gone bad. Fourth, it briefly reviews how federal case practices on pleadings gone bad can apply to discovery gone bad. Fifth, it reviews comparable state laws and precedents on presentations of civil litigation papers gone bad. Finally, it concludes with suggestions on how Rule 11 sanctions should be assessed for advocacy of now-bad discovery papers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the difficulties faced by intended parents using do-it-yourself artificial insemination (DIY AI) to conceive a child, particularly female couples, single women, and those without significant financial resources. Topics include Statutory gaps and incomplete laws regarding parentage in DIY AI births often result in disputes; the recent Gatsby v. Gatsby ruling illustrates the problems arising from incomplete AI statutes; and it highlights the need for better parentage laws.

In both federal and state courts in the United States, there are significant civil procedure, professional responsibility, and substantive laws addressing presuit lawyer duties on creating, preserving, producing, and protecting information relevant to later civil litigation. These laws speak to lawyer conduct both in personally handling information and in overseeing the information acts of others. To date, the challenges these laws pose to lawyers have not been well examined, or even largely perceived. And, to date, lawyers have been left unaccountable for their personal violations of these duties. This Article is the first to survey presuit lawyer information duties. It reviews more general laws that sometimes distinguish between certain types of information (as between ESI and non-ESI); vary between states; differ in federal and state settings; and appear in several sources simultaneously (including statutes, court rules, and precedents). It also reviews some very special laws that are applicable to very particular information (like x-rays) or to limited types of lawsuits (like medical malpractice). The challenges posed by these laws are magnified when later civil litigation might involve several possible forums, with multistate lawyer or lawyer-related conduct. The Article utilizes the 2001 federal circuit decision in Silvestri v. GMC, a prominent ruling on the federal procedural common law duty to preserve information, to explore presuit lawyer information duties. The Article suggests possible new written laws and common law precedents to serve better the goal of "just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding," as well as to guide civil lawyers on their obligations and civil judges on their enforcement powers. In particular, the Article urges that lawyers (and their law firms), rather than or together with their clients, be held more personally accountable for presuit information duty violations, not unlike the accountability demanded of lawyers for their presuit pleading violations and for some of their presuit discovery violations. The Article encourages greater employment of professional responsibility mechanisms when presuit lawyer information duties are breached, with use prompted by more disciplinary referrals by judges and lawyers that are expressly referenced in civil procedure discovery laws, as in some civil procedure pleading and motion practice laws. Finally, the Article demonstrates the opportunities for substantive law claims on behalf of those harmed by presuit lawyer information failures, including claims in spoliation and/or malpractice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing amounts of electronically stored information (ESI) relevant to civil litigation, and the ease of their loss, caused federal lawmakers explicitly to address the possible consequences of certain pre-suit or post-suit ESI losses. These lawmakers acted in both 2006 and 2015 through Federal Civil Procedure (FRCP) 37(e). But they acted only on certain ESI. Their actions have prompted increasing attention to the significant risks of pre-suit and post-suit losses of all ESI, and of non-ESI, otherwise discoverable in civil actions. In addition, their actions have spurred increasing attention to the availability of substantive law claims involving spoliation of information relevant to future or pending federal civil actions. Such claims complement the federal civil procedure laws on discovery sanctions for information losses. Federal court jurisdiction over state substantive spoliation claims in related federal civil litigation was expressly invited by the federal judicial rulemakers when amending FRCP 37(e) in 2015. Prior to and since, federal courts have recognized the availability of state spoliation claims for losses of either ESI or non-ESI relevant in pending civil actions. As state spoliation claims typically involve no federal law question, their pursuit in federal courts may be barred by the lack of, or a failure to exercise, subject matter jurisdiction. Their pursuit may also be stymied by other barriers, including the lack of personal jurisdiction, an inability to effect joinder, and collateral estoppel. This article explores federal district court power to hear state spoliation claims involving information losses related to and within ongoing civil litigation. It explores whether jurisdictional norms should vary between FRCP 37(e) ESI spoliation and other ESI and non-ESI spoliation. As well, the article examines whether spoliation claims should be comparably available for pre-suit and post-suit losses and for claims against those who are otherwise not parties in the related civil actions, like insurers and attorneys. Finally, it reviews possible joinder, collateral estoppel, and choice of law issues arising when federal courts hear state spoliation claims. The increasing amounts of electronically stored information (ESI) relevant to civil litigation, and the ease of their loss, caused federal lawmakers explicitly to address the possible consequences of certain pre-suit or post-suit ESI losses. These lawmakers acted in both 2006 and 2015 through Federal Civil Procedure (FRCP) 37(e). But they acted only on certain ESI. Their actions have prompted increasing attention to the significant risks of presuit and postsuit losses of all esi, and of nonesi, otherwise discoverable in civil actions. In addition, their actions have spurred increasing attention to the availability of substantive law claims involving spoliation of information relevant to future or pending federal civil actions. Such claims compliment the federal civil procedure laws on discovery sanctions for information losses. Federal court jurisdiction over state substantive spoliation claims in related federal civil litigation was expressly invited by the federal judicial rulemakers when amending FRCP 37(e) in 2015. Prior to and since, federal courts have recognized the availability of state spoliation claims for losses of either ESI or non-ESI relevant in pending civil actions. As state spoliation claims typically involve no federal law question, their pursuit in federal courts may be barred by the lack of, or a failure to exercise, subject matter jurisdiction. Their pursuit may also be stymied by other barriers, including the lack of personal jurisdiction, an inability to effect joinder, and collateral estoppel. This article explores federal district court power to hear state spoliation claims involving information losses related to and within ongoing civil litigation. It explores whether jurisdictional norms should vary between FRCP 37(e) ESI spoliation and other ESI and non-ESI spoliation. As well, the article examines whether spoliation claims should be comparably available for presuit and postsuit losses and for claims against those who are otherwise not parties in the related civil actions, like insurers and attorneys. Finally, it reviews possible joinder, collateral estoppel, and choice of law issues arising when federal courts hear state spoliation claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are few civil procedure laws broadly authorizing trial courts in the United States to consider presuit requests seeking protection from discovery sanctions or spoliation claims in later civil actions. There should be more laws on presuit protective orders addressing information maintenance, preservation, and production. New presuit protective order laws are most apt where there have been demands by potential adversaries involving alleged information preservation duties under civil discovery laws or under substantive spoliation laws; where the recipients have strong reasons to secure early judicial clarifications; and where the availability and use of presuit protective orders will serve both private and public interests in the just, speedy, and inexpensive determinations of civil claims. New protective order laws are also warranted for some potential witnesses in receipt of presuit information preservation demands. An Arizona court rule, effective July 2018, authorizes presuit information preservation orders that go beyond the most common forms of presuit discovery. Yet that rule is limited and should not be fully modeled. The Arizona rule speaks only to “the existence or scope of any duty to preserve” electronically stored information (ESI). It allows those in receipt of a “preservation request” for information relevant to an expected or current lawsuit to petition for an order to determine any duty to preserve ESI. Petitioner need not be an anticipated adverse party in advance of a civil suit and need not be an anticipated new party to a pending related suit. New laws on presuit protective orders should go further. They should authorize protective orders concerning both ESI and non-ESI. They should be available even at times when there may not be a legal duty to preserve. These new laws should, however, provide explicit guidelines limiting judicial discretion. Finally, any new laws on presuit protective orders should reflect the unique information maintenance, production, and preservation duties within a judicial system, whether in procedural (as with discovery sanctions) or substantive (as with independent spoliation claims) laws. A one-size-fits-all approach is unwarranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]