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• Farm-scale agro-econ model finds water price signals for temporary transfer market. • Farmers gain from optimized market engagement regardless of initial rights holding. • Optimal profit and right endowment link risk attitude with engagement frequency. Water rights and corresponding markets work to address water scarcity by establishing tradable, limited-access permits to water resources. Under certain water rights law, rights holders face uncertainty in terms of right allocation value, which is set annually based on reservoir storage, expected inflow, and expected future conditions. Such is the case in the Elqui Valley, Chile, where the economy is driven by agriculture, which requires water rights to ensure profitable yields due to a mismatch between the season of precipitation (May-August) and growing season (September-April). Perennial crop farmers address allocation uncertainty by securing additional water. A farm-scale agro-economic demand modelling framework is developed which utilizes the temporary transferability of rights to describe how grape famers may engage optimally in water markets to maximize annual profits (2000–2015), and produces an upper bound on grape farmer price negotiation space for desired allocation transactions. The results show grape farmers holding 1.0 and 2.25 water rights per-hectare could increase expected profits by 98% and 27%, respectively by engaging optimally in the temporary water market. Over the period evaluated, a grape farmer holding a single water right may expect to engage in market activity 80% of years; two rights require farmers to engage during 30% of years; with seven rights market engagement is avoided. The broader insights of the research suggest where rights holders accurately assess the value of water, optimal engagement strategies can be developed that add to farm-scale profitability, and act as an assessment of whether existing rights ownership matches risk tolerance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During 2002-2004 a voluntary, profit sharing harvesters' co-operative was allowed to operate in the Chignik Salmon fishery in Alaska. Regulators split the fishery `s total allowable catch between the co-op and independent harvesters. Our economic model predicts that the co-op would centrally coordinate its members' activities, resulting in more efficient effort deployment than in the independent fleet. Empirical analysis of relevant data supports these predictions. We find that, in contrast to the independent fleet, the co-op concentrated effort among its most efficient members, fished closer to port, spread harvesting over a longer time span, and shared information on stock locations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Land trusts are nonprofit organizations that conserve environmental amenities on private land. Trusts can conserve land by owning it outright or holding conservation easements. This article describes the economic tradeoffs of these two conservation methods. Relative to full ownership by a land trust, conservation easements generate higher transaction costs. The trust and landowner will exert time and money to specify, monitor, and enforce the terms of the easement throughout its duration. Conservation easements, however, facilitate more economical production of commodities such as crops and beef because a separate landowner generally has a specialization advantage in managing agricultural land. Data from the Land Trust Alliance show that trusts tend to hold easements when transaction costs are low and gains from landowner specialization are high. For example, most trusts use easements to preserve scenic views over large parcels of agricultural land and use full ownership to enhance ecological functions on non-agricultural land. The desire to help donors of land and easements capitalize on tax benefits, however, sometimes outweighs transaction cost and specialization considerations and can militate against the use of cost-reducing conservation methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses various legal and economic issues involved in the area of private land conservation. Origin of the pressure to preserve land; Market outcomes under a rule of property law; Emergence of land trusts as an institution for preserving amenities on private land.

Recent studies uncover cascading ecological effects resulting from removing and reintroducing predators into a landscape, but little is known about effects on human lives and property. We quantify the effects of restoring wolf populations by evaluating their influence on deer-vehicle collisions (DVCs) in Wisconsin. We show that, for the average county, wolf entry reduced DVCs by 24%, yielding an economic benefit that is 63 times greater than the costs of verified wolf predation on livestock. Most of the reduction is due to a behavioral response of deer to wolves rather than through a deer population decline from wolf predation. This finding supports ecological research emphasizing the role of predators in creating a "landscape of fear." It suggests wolves control economic damages from overabundant deer in ways that human deer hunters cannot. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]