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International migration is considered an essential element of economic integration. Yet, the intraregional movement of people and labor in Asia and the Pacific has stagnated in recent years in contrast to the steadily rising flow of goods, services, and investment. This paper examines the key factors driving the movement of people from and within the region using bilateral international migrant stock data and evaluates whether some key indicators of economic integration between origin and destination economies have additive effects on this movement/these movements. Our analysis shows that commonly known determinants such as income differences; population size; and political, geographical, and cultural proximities between the migrant origin and destination countries are associated with greater movement, along with the growing share of older population in destination economies and the similarities in the level of educational attainment. The paper also finds that cross-border migration is affected, in varied directions, by the degree of economic integration between the origin and destination economies, especially through bilateral trade and value chain links. The offshoring of production—and hence jobs and other economic opportunities—to migrant origin countries suppresses outmigration, but the expected rise in the origin country income will eventually promote migration by relaxing financial constraints.

In this paper, we employed a composite index approach in assessing regional integration in Asia and the Pacific, with special focus on Northeast Asia. Findings suggest that the pace of integration in Northeast Asia is broadly trending upward over the 2006 – 2016 sample period, catching up to the level of most integrated region in Southeast Asia. Of the six dimensions featured in the composite index, we find that trade and investment and movement of people are the main drivers of regional integration, while the money and finance dimension was the weakest link. An in-depth analysis of Northeast Asia indicates that infrastructure and connectivity as well as institutional and social integration drive the subregion’s integration with entire Asia. By contrast, integration within the subregion is lowest in terms of institutional and social integration, suggesting the dearth of formal integration mechanisms in Northeast Asia. Finally, country-level analysis for the subregion suggests that higher-income economies (such as People’s Republic of China, Japan, and Republic of Korea) show in general a broader regional integration compared to more narrowly-based subregional integration in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Mongolia.

This paper investigates the dynamic impact of social distancing policy on coronavirus disease (COVID-19) infection control, mobility of people, and consumption expenditures in the Republic of Korea. We employ structural and threshold vector autoregressive (VAR) models using big-data-driven mobility data, credit card expenditure, and a social distancing index. We find that the social distancing policy significantly reduces the spread of COVID-19, but there exists a significant, growing trade-off between infection control and economic activity over time. When the level of stringency in social distancing is already high, its marginal effect on mobility is estimated to be smaller than when social distancing stringency is low. Increased vaccination is found to significantly reduce the critical rate while it increases visitors and consumption expenditures. The results also show that the effect of social distancing policy on mobility reduction is strongest among the population of age under 20 and the weakest among the population of age over 60.

We synthetically assess the three major transmission channels of international business cycles: bilateral trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and portfolio investment flows between economies with multiple fixed effects. Using the data of 72 economies during 2010-2019, we find that real and financial integration generates heterogeneous impacts on business cycle comovement. Trade integration, particularly through intermediate input trade, drives business cycle synchronization. We also find greenfield FDI leads business cycle comovements. This may be due to deepening intra-industry trade and dense global value chains. Higher debt market integration is also associated with more synchronized business cycle comovement, implying that balance sheet effects and the related credit cycle can exert influence on business cycle comovements. However, equity integration leads to business cycle divergence, suggesting that cross-border equity holdings may help stabilize transmission of a foreign economy's shocks.

Severe disruptions in school education during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has impacted children through their formative years which will affect their employment opportunities and earning potential for many years after school ages. This paper examines the medium-to-long-term economic scarring effects, using data available through the Global Trade Analysis Project, a computable general equilibrium model, with empirical study focusing on the impact of school closures on economic growth and employment. The estimated results show significant declines in global gross domestic product (GDP) and employment. Moreover, the losses in global GDP and employment increase over time. Declines in global GDP amount to 0.19% in 2024, 0.64% in 2028, and 1.11% in 2030. In absolute terms, the cost to the global economy in 2030 alone is $943 billion. The scarring effects are greater in economies with significant student populations from rural areas, those in the poorest and second wealth quintile. Learning and earning losses are also significant in economies where the share of unskilled labor employment in the overall labor force is high.

This study empirically examines how the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) has impacted foreign direct investment (FDI), using the quarterly data on bilateral FDI flows from 173 home to 192 host countries from the first quarter of 2019 to the second quarter of 2021. We measure the severity of COVID-19 damage using three indicators-the number of confirmed cases, the number of deaths, and the stringency index of government policies that restrict people's activities. We also differentiate FDI flows via two different entry modes-greenfield FDI and cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We find heterogeneous effects of COVID-19 impacts on FDI by sector and entry mode. The severity of COVID-19 in host countries adversely affected FDI in the manufacturing sector regardless of the entry mode, but the effect of home countries' COVID-19 situation on FDI was insignificant. On the other hand, in the service sector, the severity of COVID-19 in both host and home countries has significantly negative impact on greenfield FDI, not on cross-border M&A.

This paper investigates the effects of monetary policy shocks on income and wealth inequalities in the Republic of Korea. Using the detailed Household Income and Expenditure Survey and Korean Labor and Income Panel Study data, we construct measures of income and wealth inequality for the Korean economy. Empirical results show that both domestic and external monetary policy shocks exert significant countercyclical effects on income inequality. For wealth inequality, however, the effects are very different. Whereas domestic monetary policy shocks are insignificant, external policy shocks proxied by fluctuations in net capital flows seem to have significant effects on net wealth inequality.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) presents strong potential to mold regional trade and investment patterns well into the future and to influence the direction of global economic cooperation at a challenging time. This paper evaluates the RCEP and estimates its potential effects on income, trade, economic structure, factor returns, and employment using a computable general equilibrium model. The results suggest that the RCEP agreement could generate global income gains that will be almost twice as large as those of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). RCEP effects on the region's trade will also significantly deepen regional production networks and raise productivity. At the sectoral level, exports and imports of nondurable and durable manufactures will experience the most growth. The CPTPP and RCEP will especially strengthen the region's manufacturing supply chains, increasing wages and employment.

This paper introduces a new index of financial inclusion for 153 advanced, emerging, and developing economies using a comprehensive set of new indicators, grouped into four different dimensions: financial access, usage, financial development, and fintech infrastructure. The fintech infrastructure dimension in particular captures electronic and digital payments and their enabling infrastructure. In the two-step regression, we first estimated effective financial inclusion using the linear predicted values of financial inclusion based on the economic factors that are known to be the main determinants of financial inclusion. Second, we estimated the impact of effective financial inclusion on various development outcomes. The empirical results indicate that effective financial inclusion and all four related dimensions lower poverty. Improved access and fintech infrastructure reduce income inequality, and these two dimensions complement usage in increasing entrepreneurship. However, the dimensions do not have a uniform effect across different income groups. Moreover, an increase in effective financial inclusion is stronger for middle-income economies than for low-income economies. This suggests that the level of economic development, which can provide a better enabling environment for business and economic opportunities, matters for the effectiveness of financial inclusion in achieving poverty reduction.

Asia's economic significance has risen substantially over the past several decades. Further economic development in ASEAN, with its massive population, requires very efficient utilization of resources and cross-border cooperation. While ASEAN has much to gain from economic cooperation and integration, it faces non-trivial growth and integration barriers: (i) an infrastructure development gap; (ii) an education gap; and (iii) a market institutions gap, especially in financial sectors, which is very much related to governance issues such as government inefficiency and policy ineffectiveness. The paper offers an overall perspective on maintaining sustainable and inclusive development in ASEAN - the broad trend and the barriers. Three lessons emerge for ASEAN to seize the economic opportunities. First, the governments can gain great mileage in sustainable development from building sound market institutions, catering to financial and economic stability, and establishing sound health care and redistribution programs. Second, governments should promote deeper regional economic integration, invest in digital infrastructure and wireless access, and invest in training workers and companies to tune into the virtual technology. They should partner with the private sector to multiply the gains from the opportunities arising from crises. Finally, governments should embrace digital−IOT−AI technology while considering strategies to address the associated challenges.

This paper revisits the impact of population aging on economic growth. In order to understand the impact of population aging on economic growth, it is important to consider the changes in the entire age distribution of demography. Our empirical analysis indicates that a change in age distribution that increases the proportion of older people while reducing the working-age population lowers economic growth. We also investigate the effect of technological advances on the relation between population aging and economic growth, using four plausible proxies of technological advancement: life expectancy, labor productivity, automation, and total factor productivity. We find that increasing life expectancy and labor productivity benefit old age groups as they likely help older age groups contribute more positively to future growth. More automation also helps improve productivity of old age groups but in a different way. When robot density increases, old age groups become less disadvantaged compared to the young. Lastly, technological adoption enhances the growth contribution of productive age groups from the 30s to 60s when one compares low with high total factor productivity scenarios.

Rapid technological development makes skills depreciate faster than in the past while new technologies generate gaps in workers' skills and call for the acquisition of proper skills and lifelong learning. Proper skill mixes for future jobs include strong cognitive skills, basic information and communication technology, and analytical skills, as well as a range of noncognitive skills such as creativity, problem-solving, critical thinking, and communication. Retraining and reskilling workers is also crucial. All these changes lead to a major rethinking of education and skill training throughout a person's life. This paper reviews the recent studies on human capital and skill formation in the era of rapid technological progress. Findings from these studies particularly in labor economics can shed light on new directions for lifelong education policies.