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In his response, Manjeet S. Pardesi argues that global international relations and relational scholarship rooted in global history can learn much from each other and must work together to overcome Eurocentrism while avoiding other forms of 'centrisms'. The second contribution by Zeynep Gülşah Çapan aims to underline three interrelated dynamics: space (global), time (history), and knowledge. In the third and final response, Musab Younis draws on Edward Said's critique of 'counter-conversion' to suggest how anticolonial and postcolonial thinkers sought to create oppositional forms of knowledge while remaining alert, in ways not always replicated in recent writing, to the dangers of nativism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term 'Indo-Pacific' has now entered the strategic lexicon to refer to strategic Asia. In contrast to the dominant themes in the scholarly literature that emphasise its 'newness' and conceive it as a maritime space, I argue that Asia's three sub-regions (South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia) and two oceans (Indian and Western Pacific) have constituted a single strategic system for the past two centuries (with the notable exception of the last three decades of the Cold War). Importantly, future regional order in this 'larger Asia' will emerge from the interdependence of continental and maritime power. Approaching International Relations as an historical social science, I construct a new historical narrative to explain region (trans)formation. This larger strategic Asia that first emerged around the time of the 'great divergence' between the West and the rest was created by a rising Britain through its Indian base. While Cold War geopolitics 'split' Asia into smaller sub-regions, the rise of China and India is reversing this split. The contemporary re-emergence of the Indo-Pacific allows the United States to create a regional distribution of power and a regional distribution of status (through discourse) that favours the United States in an increasingly multipolar region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Indian interactions after the mid-19th century had a causal influence on Chinese and Indian elite perceptions. Modern China encountered modern India as an agent of British imperialism. China perceived India as an "imperial" power in the late 1940s by resorting to the availability heuristic while doubting India's intentions in Tibet/Southeast Asia. By contrast, India viewed China as a fellow victim of colonialism that had sought India's help during World War II. Consequently, India perceived China as a "partner" in postwar/postcolonial Asia. This interpretation was based on confirmation bias after 1947, despite contradictory Chinese signals. India's image of China changed only after the 1950–51 invasion/annexation of Tibet. India then ascribed the image of an "expansionist/hegemonic" power to China based on historical analogy. Nevertheless, they carefully calibrated their strategies towards each other in consonance with these images until the 1959 Lhasa Uprising, thereby preventing their relationship from descending into militarized hostilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]