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97 results on '"Papadopoulou, Vicky"'

1. Solving Inverse Problems for Spectral Energy Distributions with Deep Generative Networks

Author

Rissaki, Agapi, Pavlou, Orestis, Fotakis, Dimitris, Papadopoulou, Vicky, and Efstathiou, Andreas

Subjects
Astrophysics - Instrumentation and Methods for Astrophysics, Computer Science - Machine Learning, J.2, I.5.4, I.2.6
Abstract

We propose an end-to-end approach for solving inverse problems for a class of complex astronomical signals, namely Spectral Energy Distributions (SEDs). Our goal is to reconstruct such signals from scarce and/or unreliable measurements. We achieve that by leveraging a learned structural prior in the form of a Deep Generative Network. Similar methods have been tested almost exclusively for images which display useful properties (e.g., locality, periodicity) that are implicitly exploited. However, SEDs lack such properties which make the problem more challenging. We manage to successfully extend the methods to SEDs using a Generative Latent Optimization model trained with significantly fewer and corrupted data., Comment: Accepted to NeurIPS 2020 Workshop on Machine Learning and the Physical Sciences

Published
2020

2. How Many Attackers Can Selfish Defenders Catch?

Author

Mavronicolas, Marios, Monien, Burkhard, and Papadopoulou, Vicky

Subjects
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
Abstract

In a distributed system with {\it attacks} and {\it defenses,} both {\it attackers} and {\it defenders} are self-interested entities. We assume a {\it reward-sharing} scheme among {\it interdependent} defenders; each defender wishes to (locally) maximize her own total {\it fair share} to the attackers extinguished due to her involvement (and possibly due to those of others). What is the {\em maximum} amount of protection achievable by a number of such defenders against a number of attackers while the system is in a {\it Nash equilibrium}? As a measure of system protection, we adopt the {\it Defense-Ratio} \cite{MPPS05a}, which provides the expected (inverse) proportion of attackers caught by the defenders. In a {\it Defense-Optimal} Nash equilibrium, the Defense-Ratio is optimized. We discover that the possibility of optimizing the Defense-Ratio (in a Nash equilibrium) depends in a subtle way on how the number of defenders compares to two natural graph-theoretic thresholds we identify. In this vein, we obtain, through a combinatorial analysis of Nash equilibria, a collection of trade-off results: - When the number of defenders is either sufficiently small or sufficiently large, there are cases where the Defense-Ratio can be optimized. The optimization problem is computationally tractable for a large number of defenders; the problem becomes ${\cal NP}$-complete for a small number of defenders and the intractability is inherited from a previously unconsidered combinatorial problem in {\em Fractional Graph Theory}. - Perhaps paradoxically, there is a middle range of values for the number of defenders where optimizing the Defense-Ratio is never possible.

Published
2008

4. A Robotic System for Home Security Enhancement

Author

Gregoriades, Andreas, Obadan, Samuel, Michail, Harris, Papadopoulou, Vicky, Michael, Despina, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Lee, Yeunsook, editor, Bien, Z. Zenn, editor, Mokhtari, Mounir, editor, Kim, Jeong Tai, editor, Park, Mignon, editor, Kim, Jongbae, editor, Lee, Heyoung, editor, and Khalil, Ismail, editor

Published
2010
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5. Network Security Validation Using Game Theory

Author

Papadopoulou, Vicky, Gregoriades, Andreas, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Meersman, Robert, editor, Herrero, Pilar, editor, and Dillon, Tharam, editor

Published
2009
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6. Voronoi Games on Cycle Graphs

Author

Mavronicolas, Marios, Monien, Burkhard, Papadopoulou, Vicky G., Schoppmann, Florian, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Ochmański, Edward, editor, and Tyszkiewicz, Jerzy, editor

Published
2008
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7. The Price of Defense and Fractional Matchings

Author

Mavronicolas, Marios, Papadopoulou, Vicky, Persiano, Giuseppe, Philippou, Anna, Spirakis, Paul, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Dough, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Chaudhuri, Soma, editor, Das, Samir R., editor, Paul, Himadri S., editor, and Tirthapura, Srikanta, editor

Published
2006
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8. The Price of Defense

Author

Mavronicolas, Marios, Michael, Loizos, Papadopoulou, Vicky, Philippou, Anna, Spirakis, Paul, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Dough, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Královič, Rastislav, editor, and Urzyczyn, Paweł, editor

Published
2006
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9. Network Game with Attacker and Protector Entities

Author

Mavronicolas, Marios, Papadopoulou, Vicky, Philippou, Anna, Spirakis, Paul, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Dough, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Deng, Xiaotie, editor, and Du, Ding-Zhu, editor

Published
2005
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10. A Graph-Theoretic Network Security Game

Author

Mavronicolas, Marios, Papadopoulou, Vicky, Philippou, Anna, Spirakis, Paul, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Dough, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Deng, Xiaotie, editor, and Ye, Yinyu, editor

Published
2005
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13. Cooperative user-network interactions in next generation communication networks

Author

Antoniou, Josephina, Papadopoulou, Vicky, Vassiliou, Vasos, and Pitsillides, Andreas

Subjects
Computer science, Fighter planes
Abstract

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2010.03.013 Byline: Josephina Antoniou (a), Vicky Papadopoulou (b), Vasos Vassiliou (a), Andreas Pitsillides (a) Keywords: Next generation networks; Access network selection; Game theory; Cooperative games; Present value Abstract: Next Generation Communication Networks employ the idea of convergence, where heterogeneous access technologies may coexist, and a user may be served by anyone of the participating access networks, motivating the emergence of a Network Selection mechanism. The triggering and execution of the Network Selection mechanism becomes a challenging task due to the heterogeneity of the entities involved, i.e., the users and the access networks. This heterogeneity results in different and often conflicting interests for these entities, motivating the question of how they should behave in order to remain satisfied from their interactions. This paper studies cooperative user-network interactions and seeks appropriate modes of behaviour for these entities such that they achieve own satisfaction overcoming their conflicting interests. Author Affiliation: (a) University of Cyprus, Dept. of Computer Science, 75 Kallipoleos Street, P.O. Box 20537, CY-1678 Nicosia, Cyprus (b) European University Cyprus, Dept. of Computer Science, 6, Diogenes Street, P.O. Box 22006, CY-1516 Nicosia, Cyprus Article History: Received 19 May 2009; Revised 28 February 2010; Accepted 25 March 2010 Article Note: (miscellaneous) Responsible Editor: A. Capone

Published
2010

15. Modeling Probabilistic Flooding in VANETs for Optimal Rebroadcast Probabilities

Author

Saeed, Taqwa, Mylonas, Yiannos, Pitsillides, Andreas, Papadopoulou, Vicky, Lestas, Marios, Pitsillides, Andreas [0000-0001-5072-2851], and Lestas, Marios [0000-0002-8418-6329]

Subjects
050210 logistics & transportation, Mathematical optimization, Probabilistic flooding, Mathematical model, Computer science, Wireless ad hoc network, Mechanical Engineering, 05 social sciences, Probabilistic logic, Computer Science Applications, Flooding (computer networking), Reachability, 0502 economics and business, Automotive Engineering, Heuristics, Broadcast radiation
Abstract

Probabilistic flooding is commonly considered in vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) to alleviate the celebrated broadcast storm problem. Heuristics and simulations have so far proved to be an efficient way with which to design probabilistic information dissemination solutions with demonstrated effectiveness. Supplementing with mathematical analysis for both design and evaluation is expected to generalize the results, and increase the confidence in the proposed solutions. So far, this has been limited due to the difficulties associated with the underlying stochastic dependencies. In this paper, we introduce simple models of single and multiple lane roads to design effective probabilistic flooding schemes for VANETs. The proposed analytical framework offers a novel and generic tool which can cover any number of lanes, vehicle transmission range, and density. We derive difference equations whose solutions yield the probability of all vehicles receiving the emergency warning message as a function of the rebroadcast probability, the number of neighbors of each vehicle, and the dissemination distance. The models are validated using simulations, realistically representing both the traffic and networking aspects, and are used as a baseline to design two schemes for information dissemination which employ probabilistic flooding. The one attempts direct calculation of the required parameters whereas the other adaptively regulates the rebroadcast probability based on the vehicle speed. The schemes are evaluated using simulations and are found to achieve significant performance improvements compared to blind flooding with respect to the achieved reachability, end-to-end delay, and number of rebroadcasts, comparable to the performance achieved by optimal flooding, obtained via brute force. 20 2 556 570

Published
2019
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23. A Graphical Game for Cooperative Neighbourhoods of Selfishly Oriented Entities

Author

Libman Lavy, Pitsillides Andreas, Antoniou Josephina, Lesta Papadopoulou Vicky, and Hanappi, Hardy

Subjects
I300, geography, geography.geographical_feature_category, business.product_category, I110, business.industry, Computer science, SIGNAL (programming language), ComputerSystemsOrganization_COMPUTER-COMMUNICATIONNETWORKS, Interference (wave propagation), Wireless access point, Residential area, Competition (economics), Resource (project management), Terminal (electronics), Computer engineering, business, Graphical game, Computer network
Abstract

The chapter presents a graphical game of selfishly oriented players, inspired by considering a dense urban residential area where each home unit has its own IEEE 802.11 based wireless access point (AP), deployed without any coordination with other such units. The motivation for this game is to provide a framework where coordination between the game players is desired even though in the real world environment the APs lack any management regarding the efficient utilization of the communication channels and furthermore, it is quite common for a terminal served by one of the APs to be within the signal range of multiple alternative APs. This may not be desirable since APs can be in competition for the same communication resource (radio channel), and since the current standards dictate that at any given time every terminal must be rigidly associated with one particular AP, this situation results in increased interference and consequently a low utilization efficiency of the radio resource, when same or overlapping channels are selected by neighbouring APs.

Published
2013

34. The Price of Defense and Fractional Matchings.

Author

Chaudhuri, Soma, Das, Samir R., Paul, Himadri S., Tirthapura, Srikanta, Mavronicolas, Marios, Papadopoulou, Vicky, Persiano, Giuseppe, Philippou, Anna, and Spirakis, Paul

Abstract

Consider a network vulnerable to security attacks and equipped with defense mechanisms. How much is the loss in the provided security guarantees due to the selfish nature of attacks and defenses? The Price of Defense was recently introduced in [7] as a worst-case measure, over all associated Nash equilibria, of this loss. In the particular strategic game considered in [7], there are two classes of confronting randomized players on a graph G(V, E): νattackers, each choosing vertices and wishing to minimize the probability of being caught, and a single defender, who chooses edges and gains the expected number of attackers it catches. In this work, we continue the study of the Price of Defense. We obtain the following results: - The Price of Defense is at least $\frac{\rm V}{\rm 2}$; this implies that the Perfect Matching Nash equilibria considered in [7] are optimal with respect to the Price of Defense, so that the lower bound is tight. - We define Defense-Optimal graphs as those admitting a Nash equilibrium that attains the (tight) lower bound of $\frac{\rm V}{\rm 2}$. We obtain: ∙ A graph is Defense-Optimal if and only if it has a Fractional Perfect Matching. Since graphs with a Fractional Perfect Matching are recognizable in polynomial time, the same holds for Defense-Optimal graphs. ∙ We identify a very simple graph that is Defense-Optimal but has no Perfect Matching Nash equilibrium. - Inspired by the established connection between Nash equilibria and Fractional Perfect Matchings, we transfer a known bivaluedness result about Fractional Matchings to a certain class of Nash equilibria. So, the connection to Fractional Graph Theory may be the key to revealing the combinatorial structure of Nash equilibria for our network security game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2006
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35. The Price of Defense.

Author

Královič, Rastislav, Urzyczyn, Paweł, Mavronicolas, Marios, Michael, Loizos, Papadopoulou, Vicky, Philippou, Anna, and Spirakis, Paul

Abstract

We consider a strategic game with two classes of confronting randomized players on a graph G(V, E): νattackers, each choosing vertices and wishing to minimize the probability of being caught, and a defender, who chooses edges and gains the expected number of attackers it catches. The Price of Defense is the worst-case ratio, over all Nash equilibria, of the optimal gain of the defender over its gain at a Nash equilibrium. We provide a comprehensive collection of trade-offs between the Price of Defense and the computational efficiency of Nash equilibria. - Through reduction to a Two-Players, Constant-Sum Game, we prove that a Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. The reduction does not provide any apparent guarantees on the Price of Defense. - To obtain such, we analyze several structured Nash equilibria: - In a Matching Nash equilibrium, the support of the defender is an Edge Cover. We prove that they can be computed in polynomial time, and they incur a Price of Defense of α(G), the Independence Number of G. - In a Perfect Matching Nash equilibrium, the support of the defender is a Perfect Matching. We prove that they can be computed in polynomial time, and they incur a Price of Defense of $\frac{V}{2}$. - In a Defender Uniform Nash equilibrium, the defender chooses uniformly each edge in its support. We prove that they incur a Price of Defense falling between those for Matching and Perfect Matching Nash Equilibria; however, it is ${\cal NP}$-complete to decide their existence. - In an Attacker Symmetric and Uniform Nash equilibrium, all attackers have a common support on which each uses a uniform distribution. We prove that they can be computed in polynomial time and incur a Price of Defense of either $\frac{V}{2}$ or α(G). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2006
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36. A Graph-Theoretic Network Security Game.

Author

Xiaotie Deng, Yinyu Ye, Mavronicolas, Marios, Papadopoulou, Vicky, Philippou, Anna, and Spirakis, Paul

Abstract

Consider a network vulnerable to viral infection. The system security software can guarantee safety only to a limited part of the network. We model this practical network scenario as a non-cooperative multi-player game on a graph, with two kinds of players, a set of attackers and a protector player, representing the viruses and the system security software, respectively. Each attacker player chooses a node of the graph (or a set of them, via a probability distribution) to infect. The protector player chooses independently, in a basic case of the problem, a simple path or an edge of the graph (or a set of them, via a probability distribution) and cleans this part of the network from attackers. Each attacker wishes to maximize the probability of escaping its cleaning by the protector. In contrast, the protector aims at maximizing the expected number of cleaned attackers. We call the two games obtained from the two basic cases considered, as the Path and the Edge model, respectively. We are interested in the associated Nash equilibria on them, where no network entity can unilaterally improve its local objective. We obtain the following results: - The problem of existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is -complete for the Path model. This opposed to that, no instance of the Edge model possesses a pure Nash equilibrium, proved in [4]. - We compute, in polynomial time, mixed Nash equilibria on corresponding graph instances. These graph families include, regular graphs, graphs that can be decomposed, in polynomially time, into vertex disjoint r-regular subgraphs, graphs with perfect matchings and trees. - We utilize the notion of social cost [3] for measuring system performance on such scenario; here is defined to be the utility of the protector. We prove that the corresponding Price of Anarchy in any mixed Nash equilibria of the game is upper and lower bounded by a linear function of the number of vertices of the graph. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2005
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37. Network Game with Attacker and Protector Entities.

Author

Xiaotie Deng, Dingzhu Du, Mavronicolas, Marios, Papadopoulou, Vicky, Philippou, Anna, and Spirakis, Paul

Abstract

Consider an information network with harmful procedures called attackers (e.g., viruses); each attacker uses a probability distribution to choose a node of the network to damage. Opponent to the attackers is the system protector scanning and cleaning from attackers some part of the network (e.g., an edge or a path), which it chooses independently using another probability distribution. Each attacker wishes to maximize the probability of escaping its cleaning by the system protector; towards a conflicting objective, the system protector aims at maximizing the expected number of cleaned attackers. We model this network scenario as a non-cooperative strategic game on graphs. We focus on the special case where the protector chooses a single edge. We are interested in the associated Nash equilibria, where no network entity can unilaterally improve its local objective. We obtain the following results: - No instance of the game possesses a pure Nash equilibrium. -Every mixed Nash equilibrium enjoys a graph-theoretic structure, which enables a (typically exponential) algorithm to compute it. - We coin a natural subclass of mixed Nash equilibria, which we call matching Nash equilibria, for this game on graphs. Matching Nash equilibria are defined using structural parameters of graphs, such as independent sets and matchings. -We derive a characterization of graphs possessing matching Nash equilibria. The characterization enables a linear time algorithm to compute a matching Nash equilibrium on any such graph with a given independent set and vertex cover. - Bipartite graphs are shown to satisfy the characterization. So, using a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a perfect matching in a bipartite graph, we obtain, as our main result, an efficient graph-theoretic algorithm to compute a matching Nash equilibrium on any instance of the game with a bipartite graph. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2005
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38. On Radiocoloring Hierarchically Specified Planar Graphs: $$ \mathcal{P}\mathcal{S}\mathcal{P}\mathcal{A}\mathcal{C}\mathcal{E} $$ -Completeness and Approximations.

Author

Goos, Gerhard, Hartmanis, Juris, van Leeuwen, Jan, Diks, Krzysztof, Rytter, Wojciech, Andreou, Maria I., Fotakis, Dimitris A., Nikoletseas, Sotiris E., Papadopoulou, Vicky G., and Spirakis, Paul G.

Abstract

Hierarchical specifications of graphs have been widely used in many important applications, such as VLSI design, parallel programming and software engineering. A well known hierarchical specification model, considered in this work, is that of Lengauer [9, 10] referred to as L-specifications. In this paper we discuss a restriction on the L-specifications resulting to graphs which we call Well-Separated (WS). This class is characterized by a polynomial time (to the size of the specification of the graph) testable combinatorial property. In this work we study the Radiocoloring Problem (RCP) on WS L-specified hierarchical planar graphs. The optimization version of RCP studied here, consists in assigning colors to the vertices of a graph, such that any two vertices of distance at most two get different colors. The objective here is to minimize the number of colors used. This problem is equivalent to the problem of vertex coloring the square of a graph G, G2, where G2 has the same vertex set as G and there is an edge between any two vertices of G2 if their distance in G is at most 2. We first show that RCP is $$ \mathcal{P}\mathcal{S}\mathcal{P}\mathcal{A}\mathcal{C}\mathcal{E} $$ -complete for WS L-specified hierarchical planar graphs. Second, we present a polynomial time 3-approximation algorithm as well as a more efficient 4-approximation algorithm for RCP on graphs of this class. We note that, the best currently known approximation ratio for the RCP on ordinary (non-hierarchical) planar graphs of general degree is 2 ([6, 1]). Note also that the only known results on any kind of coloring problems have been shown for another special kind of hierarchical graphs (unit disk graphs) achieving a 6-approximation solution [13]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2002
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39. Sequential Pivotal Mechanisms for Public Project Problems

Author

Apt, Krzysztof R., Estévez-Fernández, Arantza, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Mavronicolas, Marios, editor, and Papadopoulou, Vicky G., editor

Published
2009
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40. On the Planner’s Loss Due to Lack of Information in Bayesian Mechanism Design

Author

Correa, José R., Figueroa, Nicolás, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Mavronicolas, Marios, editor, and Papadopoulou, Vicky G., editor

Published
2009
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41. Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms

Author

Othman, Abraham, Sandholm, Tuomas, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Mavronicolas, Marios, editor, and Papadopoulou, Vicky G., editor

Published
2009
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42. Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and Two-Parameter Agents

Author

Thielen, Clemens, Krumke, Sven O., Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Mavronicolas, Marios, editor, and Papadopoulou, Vicky G., editor

Published
2009
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43. Partition Equilibrium : (Extended Abstract)

Author

Feldman, Michal, Tennenholtz, Moshe, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Mavronicolas, Marios, editor, and Papadopoulou, Vicky G., editor

Published
2009
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44. Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations

Author

Berger, André, Müller, Rudolf, Naeemi, Seyed Hossein, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Mavronicolas, Marios, editor, and Papadopoulou, Vicky G., editor

Published
2009
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45. A Modular Approach to Roberts’ Theorem

Author

Dobzinski, Shahar, Nisan, Noam, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Mavronicolas, Marios, editor, and Papadopoulou, Vicky G., editor

Published
2009
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46. Swap Bribery

Author

Elkind, Edith, Faliszewski, Piotr, Slinko, Arkadii, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Mavronicolas, Marios, editor, and Papadopoulou, Vicky G., editor

Published
2009
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47. On Equilibria for ADM Minimization Games

Author

Epstein, Leah, Levin, Asaf, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Mavronicolas, Marios, editor, and Papadopoulou, Vicky G., editor

Published
2009
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48. Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes

Author

Chen, Po-An, Kempe, David, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Mavronicolas, Marios, editor, and Papadopoulou, Vicky G., editor

Published
2009
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49. Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy for Flows over Time

Author

Koch, Ronald, Skutella, Martin, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Mavronicolas, Marios, editor, and Papadopoulou, Vicky G., editor

Published
2009
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50. Computational Aspects of Equilibria

Author

Yannakakis, Mihalis, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Mavronicolas, Marios, editor, and Papadopoulou, Vicky G., editor

Published
2009
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