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Mycobacterium tuberculosis transmission through solid organ transplantation has been well described, but transmission through transplanted tissues is rare. We investigated a tuberculosis outbreak in the USA linked to a bone graft product containing live cells derived from a single deceased donor.In this outbreak report, we describe the management and severity of the outbreak and identify opportunities to improve tissue transplant safety in the USA. During early June, 2021, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) worked with state and local health departments and health-care facilities to locate and sequester unused units from the recalled lot and notify, evaluate, and treat all identified product recipients. Investigators from CDC and the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reviewed donor screening and tissue processing. Unused product units from the recalled and other donor lots were tested for the presence of M tuberculosis using real-time PCR (rt PCR) assays and culture. M tuberculosis isolates from unused product and recipients were compared using phylogenetic analysis.The tissue donor (a man aged 80 years) had unrecognised risk factors, symptoms, and signs consistent with tuberculosis. Bone was procured from the deceased donor and processed into 154 units of bone allograft product containing live cells, which were distributed to 37 hospitals and ambulatory surgical centres in 20 US states between March 1 and April 2, 2021. From March 3 to June 1, 2021, 136 (88%) units were implanted into 113 recipients aged 24-87 years in 18 states (some individuals received multiple units). The remaining 18 units (12%) were located and sequestered. 87 (77%) of 113 identified product recipients had microbiological or imaging evidence of tuberculosis disease. Eight product recipients died 8-99 days after product implantation (three deaths were attributed to tuberculosis after recognition of the outbreak). All 105 living recipients started treatment for tuberculosis disease at a median of 69 days (IQR 56-81) after product implantation. M tuberculosis was detected in all eight sequestered unused units tested from the recalled donor lot, but not in lots from other donors. M tuberculosis isolates from unused product and recipients were more than 99·99% genetically identical.Donor-derived transmission of M tuberculosis via bone allograft resulted in substantial morbidity and mortality. All prospective tissue and organ donors should be routinely assessed for tuberculosis risk factors and clinical findings. When these are present, laboratory testing for M tuberculosis should be strongly considered.None.

West Nile virus (WNV) is the most common domestic arbovirus in the United States. During 2018, WNV was transmitted through solid organ transplantation to 2 recipients who had neuroinvasive disease develop. Because of increased illness and death in transplant recipients, organ procurement organizations should consider screening during region-specific WNV transmission months.

Unexpected donor-derived hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection is defined as a new HBV infection in a recipient of a transplanted organ from a donor who tested negative for total antihepatitis B core antibody (total anti-HBc), hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg), and HBV DNA* before organ procurement. Such infections are rare and are associated with injection drug use among deceased donors (1). During 2014-2019, CDC received 20 reports of HBV infection among recipients of livers from donors who had no evidence of past or current HBV infection. Investigation included review of laboratory data and medical records. Fourteen of these new HBV infections were detected during 2019 alone; infections were detected a median of 38 (range = 5-116) weeks after transplantation. Of the 14 donors, 13 were hepatitis C virus (HCV)-seropositive† and had a history of injection drug use within the year preceding death, a positive toxicology result, or both. Because injection drug use is the most commonly reported risk factor for hepatitis C,§ providers caring for recipients of organs from donors who are HCV-seropositive or recently injected drugs should maintain awareness of infectious complications of injection drug use and monitor recipients accordingly (2). In addition to testing for HBV DNA at 4-6 weeks after transplantation, clinicians caring for liver transplant recipients should consider testing for HBV DNA 1 year after transplantation or at any time if signs and symptoms of viral hepatitis develop, even if previous tests were negative (2).

Background Cache Valley virus (CVV) is a mosquito-borne virus that is a rare cause of disease in humans. In the fall of 2020, a patient developed encephalitis 6 weeks following kidney transplantation and receipt of multiple blood transfusions. Methods After ruling out more common etiologies, metagenomic next-generation sequencing (mNGS) of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) was performed. We reviewed the medical histories of the index kidney recipient, organ donor, and recipients of other organs from the same donor and conducted a blood traceback investigation to evaluate blood transfusion as a possible source of infection in the kidney recipient. We tested patient specimens using reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), the plaque reduction neutralization test, cell culture, and whole-genome sequencing. Results CVV was detected in CSF from the index patient by mNGS, and this result was confirmed by RT-PCR, viral culture, and additional whole-genome sequencing. The organ donor and other organ recipients had no evidence of infection with CVV by molecular or serologic testing. Neutralizing antibodies against CVV were detected in serum from a donor of red blood cells received by the index patient immediately prior to transplant. CVV neutralizing antibodies were also detected in serum from a patient who received the co-component plasma from the same blood donation. Conclusions Our investigation demonstrates probable CVV transmission through blood transfusion. Clinicians should consider arboviral infections in unexplained meningoencephalitis after blood transfusion or organ transplantation. The use of mNGS might facilitate detection of rare, unexpected infections, particularly in immunocompromised patients.

Kaposi sarcoma (KS) can develop following organ transplantation through reactivation of recipient human herpesvirus 8 (HHV‐8) infection or through donor‐derived HHV‐8 transmission. We describe 6 cases of donor‐derived HHV‐8 infection and KS investigated from July 2018 to January 2020. Organs from 6 donors, retrospectively identified as HHV‐8‐positive, with a history of drug use disorder, were transplanted into 22 recipients. Four of 6 donors had risk factors for HHV‐8 infection reported in donor history questionnaires. Fourteen of 22 organ recipients (64%) had evidence of posttransplant HHV‐8 infection. Lung recipients were particularly susceptible to KS. Four of the 6 recipients who developed KS died from KS or associated complications. The US opioid crisis has resulted in an increasing number and proportion of organ donors with substance use disorder, and particularly injection drug use history, which may increase the risk of HHV‐8 transmission to recipients. Better awareness of the risk of posttransplant KS for recipients of organs from donors with HHV‐8 infection risk could be useful for recipient management. Testing donors and recipients for HHV‐8 is currently challenging with no validated commercial serology kits available. Limited HHV‐8 antibody testing is available through some US reference laboratories and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention., The authors report a series of human herpesvirus 8 infections transmitted from deceased donors with drug use and/or sexual risk factors that led to Kaposi sarcoma in organ transplant recipients.

Background Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is transmissible through lung transplantation, and outcomes among infected organ recipients may be severe. Transmission risk to extrapulmonary organ recipients and recent (within 30 days of transplantation) SARS-CoV-2–infected recipient outcomes are unclear. Methods During March 2020–March 2021, potential SARS-CoV-2 transmissions through solid organ transplantation were investigated. Assessments included SARS-CoV-2 testing, medical record review, determination of likely transmission route, and recent recipient outcomes. Results During March 2020–March 2021, approximately 42 740 organs were transplanted in the United States. Forty donors, who donated 140 organs to 125 recipients, were investigated. Nine (23%) donors and 25 (20%) recipients were SARS-CoV-2 positive by nucleic acid amplification test (NAAT). Most (22/25 [88%]) SARS-CoV-2–infected recipients had healthcare or community exposures. Nine SARS-CoV-2–infected donors donated 21 organs to 19 recipients. Of these, 3 lung recipients acquired SARS-CoV-2 infections from donors with negative SARS-CoV-2 testing of pretransplant upper respiratory tract specimens but from whom posttransplant lower respiratory tract (LRT) specimens were SARS-CoV-2 positive. Sixteen recipients of extrapulmonary organs from SARS-CoV-2–infected donors had no evidence of posttransplant COVID-19. All-cause mortality within 45 days after transplantation was 6-fold higher among SARS-CoV-2–infected recipients (9/25 [36%]) than those without (6/100 [6%]). Conclusions Transplant-transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is uncommon. Pretransplant NAAT of lung donor LRT specimens may prevent transmission of SARS-CoV-2 through transplantation. Extrapulmonary organs from SARS-CoV-2–infected donors may be safely usable, although further study is needed. Reducing recent recipient exposures to SARS-CoV-2 should remain a focus of prevention.

Mycobacterium tuberculosis can be transmitted via organ donation and result in severe outcomes. To better understand donor-derived tuberculosis (DDTB), all potential transmissions reported to the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) Ad Hoc Disease Transmission Advisory Committee between 2008 and 2018 were analyzed. Among 51 total reports, nine (17%) (9 donors/35 recipients) had ≥ 1 recipient with proven/probable disease transmission. Of these, eight were reported due to recipient disease, and one was reported due to a positive donor result. Proven/probable DDTB transmissions were reported in six lung and five nonlung recipients. The median time to diagnosis was 104 days posttransplant (range 0-165 days). Pulmonary TB, extrapulmonary TB, pulmonary plus extrapulmonary TB, and asymptomatic TB infection with positive interferon-gamma release assay were present in five, three, one, and two recipients, respectively. All recipients received treatment and survived except for one whose death was not attributed to TB. All donors associated with proven/probable DDTB had ≥ 1 TB risk factor. Six were born in a TB-endemic country, five had traveled to a TB-endemic country, three had been incarcerated, and three had latent TB infection. These cases highlight the importance of evaluating donors for TB based on risk factors. Early posttransplant TB in organ recipients of donors with TB risk factors requires prompt reporting to OPTN to identify other potential affected recipients and implement timely treatment interventions.

In July 2017, fever and sepsis developed in 3 recipients of solid organs (1 heart and 2 kidneys) from a common donor in the United States; 1 of the kidney recipients died. Tularemia was suspected only after blood cultures from the surviving kidney recipient grew Francisella species. The organ donor, a middle-aged man from the southwestern United States, had been hospitalized for acute alcohol withdrawal syndrome, pneumonia, and multiorgan failure. F. tularensis subsp. tularensis (clade A2) was cultured from archived spleen tissue from the donor and blood from both kidney recipients. Whole-genome multilocus sequence typing indicated that the isolated strains were indistinguishable. The heart recipient remained seronegative with negative blood cultures but had been receiving antimicrobial drugs for a medical device infection before transplant. Two lagomorph carcasses collected near the donor's residence were positive by PCR for F. tularensis subsp. tularensis (clade A2). This investigation documents F. tularensis transmission by solid organ transplantation.

The ongoing U.S. opioid crisis has resulted in an increase in drug overdose deaths and acute hepatitis C virus (HCV) infections, with young persons (who might be eligible organ donors) most affected.*,† In 2013, the Public Health Service released a revised guideline to reduce the risk for unintended organ transplantation-associated hepatitis B virus (HBV), HCV, and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) transmission (1). The guideline describes criteria to categorize donors at increased risk (increased risk donors [IRDs]) for transmitting these viruses to recipients (1). It also recommends universal donor testing for HBV, HCV, and HIV.§ CDC analyzed deceased donor data for the period 2010-2017 reported to the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network for IRDs and standard risk donors (SRDs) (i.e., donors who do not meet any of the criteria for increased risk designation). During this period, the proportion of IRDs increased approximately 200%, from 8.9% to 26.3%; the percentage with drug intoxication reported as the mechanism of death also increased approximately 200%, from 4.3% to 13.4%; and the proportion of these donors with reported injection drug use (IDU) increased approximately 500%, from 1.3% to 8.0%. Compared with SRDs, IRDs were significantly more likely to have positive HBV and HCV screening results. These findings demonstrate the continuing need for identifying viral bloodborne pathogen infection risk factors among deceased donors to reduce the risk for transmission, monitor posttransplant infection in recipients, and offer treatment if infection occurs.

A kidney transplant patient without known tick exposure developed encephalitis 3 weeks after transplantation. During the transplant hospitalization, the patient had received a blood transfusion from an asymptomatic donor later discovered to have been infected with Powassan virus. Here, we describe a probable instance of transfusion-transmitted Powassan virus infection.

Background Human adenovirus (HAdV) infections can lead to high mortality in solid organ transplant (SOT) recipients, with rare reports of donor-derived infection. Methods Two renal transplant recipients with HAdV-11 infection who received kidneys from the same donor are described. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) was performed. Results WGS showed 100% nucleotide sequence identity for the 2 HAdV-11 isolates. The patients presented with distinct clinical syndromes, and both were treated with brincidofovir. Conclusions Donor-derived HAdV infection is presumed to be low; however, disseminated HAdV in SOT recipients can be severe, and clinicians should be aware of the clinical course and treatment options.

We describe a rare instance of donor-derived OXA-23-producing carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii transmission during lung transplantation and the subsequent public health response. This investigation highlights how transplantation can introduce rare multidrug-resistant organisms into different healthcare facilities and regions.

Background In fall 2017, 3 solid organ transplant (SOT) recipients from a common donor developed encephalitis within 1 week of transplantation, prompting suspicion of transplant-transmitted infection. Eastern equine encephalitis virus (EEEV) infection was identified during testing of endomyocardial tissue from the heart recipient. Methods We reviewed medical records of the organ donor and transplant recipients and tested serum, whole blood, cerebrospinal fluid, and tissue from the donor and recipients for evidence of EEEV infection by multiple assays. We investigated blood transfusion as a possible source of organ donor infection by testing remaining components and serum specimens from blood donors. We reviewed data from the pretransplant organ donor evaluation and local EEEV surveillance. Results We found laboratory evidence of recent EEEV infection in all organ recipients and the common donor. Serum collected from the organ donor upon hospital admission tested negative, but subsequent samples obtained prior to organ recovery were positive for EEEV RNA. There was no evidence of EEEV infection among donors of the 8 blood products transfused into the organ donor or in products derived from these donations. Veterinary and mosquito surveillance showed recent EEEV activity in counties nearby the organ donor’s county of residence. Neuroinvasive EEEV infection directly contributed to the death of 1 organ recipient and likely contributed to death in another. Conclusions Our investigation demonstrated EEEV transmission through SOT. Mosquito-borne transmission of EEEV to the organ donor was the likely source of infection. Clinicians should be aware of EEEV as a cause of transplant-associated encephalitis.

BACKGROUND St. Louis encephalitis virus is a mosquito-borne flavivirus that infrequently causes epidemic central nervous system infections. In the United States, blood donors are not screened for St. Louis encephalitis virus infection, and transmission through blood transfusion has not been reported. During September 2015, St. Louis encephalitis virus infection was confirmed in an Arizona kidney transplant recipient. An investigation was initiated to determine the infection source. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS The patient was interviewed, and medical records were reviewed. To determine the likelihood of mosquito-borne infection, mosquito surveillance data collected at patient and blood donor residences in timeframes consistent with their possible exposure periods were reviewed. To investigate other routes of exposure, organ and blood donor and recipient specimens were obtained and tested for evidence of St. Louis encephalitis virus infection. RESULTS The patient presented with symptoms of central nervous system infection. Recent St. Louis encephalitis virus infection was serologically confirmed. The organ donor and three other organ recipients showed no laboratory or clinical evidence of St. Louis encephalitis virus infection. Among four donors of blood products received by the patient via transfusion, one donor had a serologically confirmed, recent St. Louis encephalitis virus infection. Exposure to an infected mosquito was unlikely based on the patient's minimal outdoor exposure. In addition, no St. Louis encephalitis virus-infected mosquito pools were identified around the patient's residence. CONCLUSION This investigation provides evidence of the first reported possible case of St. Louis encephalitis virus transmission through blood product transfusion. Health care providers and public health professionals should maintain heightened awareness for St. Louis encephalitis virus transmission through blood transfusion in settings where outbreaks are identified.

In the spring of 2015, a local health department (LHD) in county A notified the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) about three adults with close ties to one another and a congregate community site who had received diagnoses of tuberculosis (TB) disease within a 3-month period. Subsequent review revealed matching TB genotypes indicating that the cases were likely part of a chain of TB transmission. Only three TB cases in California in the preceding 2 years shared this same genotype. One of those three previous cases occurred in a lung-transplant recipient who had no identified epidemiologic links to the outbreak. CDPH, multiple LHDs, and CDC conducted an investigation and determined that the lung-transplant donor (patient 1) was epidemiologically linked to the three outbreak cases and had a tuberculin skin test (TST) conversion detected in 2012 upon reentry at a local jail. Three other solid organ recipients from this donor were identified; none had developed TB disease. This investigation suggests that review of organ donors' medical records from high-risk environments, such as jails, might reveal additional information about TB risk. The evaluation of TB in organ recipients could include genotyping analysis (1) and coordination among local, state, and national partners to evaluate the potential for donor-derived TB.

To reduce the risk of HIV, hepatitis B virus (HBV), and hepatitis C virus (HCV) transmission through organ transplantation, donors are universally screened for these infections by nucleic acid tests (NAT). Deceased organ donors are classified as "increased risk" if they engaged in specific behaviors during the 12 months before death. We developed a model to estimate the risk of undetected infection for HIV, HBV, and HCV among NAT-negative donors specific to the type and timing of donors' potential risk behavior to guide revisions to the 12-month timeline. Model parameters were estimated, including risk of disease acquisition for increased risk groups, number of virions that multiply to establish infection, virus doubling time, and limit of detection by NAT. Monte Carlo simulation was performed. The risk of undetected infection was

Vaccination of the donor might have prevented infection in the recipient and subsequent transmission to healthcare workers., Although transmission of hepatitis A virus (HAV) through blood transfusion has been documented, transmission through organ transplantation has not been reported. In August 2015, state health officials in Texas, USA, were notified of 2 home health nurses with HAV infection whose only common exposure was a child who had undergone multi–visceral organ transplantation 9 months earlier. Specimens from the nurses, organ donor, and all organ recipients were tested and medical records reviewed to determine a possible infection source. Identical HAV RNA sequences were detected from the serum of both nurses and the organ donor, as well as from the multi–visceral organ recipient’s serum and feces; this recipient’s posttransplant liver and intestine biopsy specimens also had detectable virus. The other organ recipients tested negative for HAV RNA. Vaccination of the donor might have prevented infection in the recipient and subsequent transmission to the healthcare workers.

Background Mycoplasma hominis is a commensal genitourinary tract organism that can cause infections outside the genitourinary tract. We investigated a cluster of M. hominis surgical site infections in patients who underwent spine surgery, all associated with amniotic tissue linked to a common donor. Methods Laboratory tests of tissue product from the donor, including culture, quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction (qPCR), and whole-genome sequencing were performed. Use of this amniotic tissue product was reviewed. A multistate investigation to identify additional cases and locate any unused products was conducted. Results Twenty-seven tissue product vials from a donor were distributed to facilities in 7 states; at least 20 vials from this donor were used in 14 patients. Of these, 4 of 14 (29%) developed surgical site infections, including 2 M. hominis infections. Mycoplasma hominis was detected by culture and qPCR in 2 unused vials from the donor. Sequencing indicated >99% similarity between patient and unopened vial isolates. For 5 of 27 (19%) vials, the final disposition could not be confirmed. Conclusions Mycoplasma hominis was transmitted through amniotic tissue from a single donor to 2 recipients. Current routine donor screening and product testing does not detect all potential pathogens. Clinicians should be aware that M. hominis can cause surgical site infections, and may not be detected by routine clinical cultures. The lack of a standardized system to track tissue products in healthcare facilities limits the ability of public health agencies to respond to outbreaks and investigate other adverse events associated with these products.

Background In December 2016, bacterial contamination of an organ preservation solution (OPS) was reported by Transplant Center A in Iowa. Annually, >20,000 abdominal organs are transplanted in the United States; OPS is used for organ storage. We investigated the scope of OPS contamination and its association with adverse events in patients. Methods We assessed infection control practices related to OPS at Transplant Centers A and B in Iowa and the local organ procurement organization (OPO). We issued national notifications about OPS contamination and requested transplant centers to report product-related concerns or potential patient harm. Among transplant recipients at Center A, we compared adverse events (fever, bacteremia, surgical site infection, peritonitis, or pyelonephritis within 14 days of transplantation) during October–December 2015 with October–December 2016, the presumed window of exposure to contaminated OPS. Isolates from OPS were characterized. Results No infection control deficiencies were identified at Transplant Centers A, B, or the OPO. In January 2017, contaminated OPS from the same manufacturer was reported by Transplant Center C in Texas. Nationally, there were no reports of patient harm definitively linked to OPS. Post-transplant adverse events at Center A did not increase between fourth quarter 2015 (5/12 [42%]) and 2016 (2/15 [13%]). Organisms recovered from OPS included Pantoea agglomerans and Enterococcus gallinarum (Center A) and Pseudomonas koreensis (Center C). Five Pantoea isolates from ≥3 opened OPS bags were indistinguishable by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. The OPS distributor issued recalls and suspended production. The US Food and Drug Administration identified deficiencies in current good manufacturing practices at manufacturing and distribution facilities, including inadequate validation of OPS sterility. Conclusion Bacterial contamination of a nationally distributed product was identified by astute clinicians. The investigation found no illnesses were directly linked to the product. Prompt reporting of concerns about potentially contaminated healthcare products, which might put patients at risk, is critical for swift public health action. Disclosures All authors: No reported disclosures.

Background In 2013, guidelines were released for reducing the risk of viral bloodborne pathogen transmission through organ transplantation. Eleven criteria were described that result in a donor being designated at increased infectious risk. Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and hepatitis C virus (HCV) transmission risk from an increased-risk donor (IRD), despite negative nucleic acid testing (NAT), likely varies based on behavior type and timing. Methods We developed a Monte Carlo risk model to quantify probability of HIV among IRDs. The model included NAT performance, viral load dynamics and per-act risk of acquiring HIV by each behavior. The model also quantifies the probability of HCV among IRDs by non-medical intravenous drug use (IVDU). Results Highest risk is among donors with history of unprotected, receptive anal male-to-male intercourse with partner of unknown HIV status (MSM), followed by sex with HIV-infected partner, IVDU, and sex with a commercial sex worker. Conclusion With NAT screening, the estimated risk of undetected HIV remains small even at 1 day following a risk behavior. The estimated risk for HCV transmission through IVDU is likewise small and decreases quicker with time owing to the faster viral growth dynamics of HCV compared with HIV. These findings may allow for improved organ allocation, utilization, and recipient informed consent. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.