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The extent to which commercial sex, particularly sex work, should be regulated is an important and controversial policy conversation in the United States. Despite the salience of religion to informing attitudes about morality and bodily ethics, little is known about how some key dimensions of U.S. religion (e.g., religious fundamentalism and Christian nationalism) influence the public's moral acceptance of prostitution. We investigate this gap using nationally representative survey data (n = 1,219). Fundamentalist beliefs and Christian statism are both associated with lower moral acceptance of prostitution, adjusting for other religious and sociopolitical characteristics. Disaggregated models also revealed differences in the strengths of these associations by sex. Implications for policy and opportunities for future research are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the 2016 publication of the Ratio fundamentalis institutionis sacerdotalis, which outlines guidelines for seminary formation in the Roman Catholic Church. Topics include the significance of the Second Week of the Spiritual Exercises in shaping the identity of seminarians, the role of the Spiritual Exercises in the configuration stage of priestly formation, and the experiential aspect of completing the thirty-day retreat during the third year of seminary.

The article explores the perspective of Bolivian feminist activist María Galindo on the recent military incursion in Bolivia and her critique of the country's political system. Galindo emphasizes the need to challenge oppressive structures and rethink the concept of the nation-state. The article also discusses the creation of a Feminist Constitution in Bolivia, led by marginalized groups such as Indigenous women, lesbian women, and the urban working class. The Feminist Constitution aimed to center the voices of these groups and propose innovative ideas for social transformation. However, challenges remain in achieving true gender equality and self-recognition for marginalized groups in Bolivia. [Extracted from the article]

Evangelical Christians and congregations must deal with highly sensitive, practical questions on how to serve and minister to people with same-sex attraction while upholding the traditional biblical view of marriage and sexuality. This article presents a well-grounded approach to three such issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Naomi Goldenberg's model of religion as a "vestigial state" is an excellent interrogation of how religion interacts with the state. To Goldenberg, religions traditionally functioned in the same manner as nation-states before being conquered and delineated as semi-autonomous institutions under the larger secular apparatus. However, I argue in this paper that Goldenberg's "vestigial state" fails to account for the dynamism that religions have in their relationships to the state. I propose seeing religions as "alternative authorities", which can be subordinate, cooperative, or hostile to the secular state. These perspectives as an alternative authority are seen best in the evolution of American fundamentalism and Christian nationalism, whose adherents have historically distinguished themselves from the state while simultaneously engaging in the effort to reshape it. In looking at how these movements develop, we understand that religions are constantly evolving in how to achieve and maintain power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a close reading of Ubisoft's Far Cry 5 (FC5) (2018) in the context of apocalyptic rhetorics and evangelical Christian nationalism during the Trump Era. Building upon my previous work with video game chronotopes (2021) and Sören Schoppmeier's analysis of the retrotopic, 'nostalgia time' in the game (2022), I analyse the doubled temporality of nostalgia time and apocalyptic time as deployed spatially in the game in combination with the game's wanton use of 'liberty porn': undisciplined appeals to liberty and freedom through narrative, iconography and cutscene to instil respect and favour for the largely imagined plights of the right-wing inhabitants of the game's fictional Hope County. Drawing heavily on examples of right-wing violence, attacks on civil rights and Christian fundamentalism during the Trump Era, this article draws concerning parallels between FC5's rhetorical achievement and Trump's embrace of white supremacist narratives – like 'replacement theory' – and militia groups, fashioning them as 'good people', a rhetoric similarly deployed throughout the game. Ultimately, this article argues for more corporate responsibility among game studios when it comes to deploying right-wing narratives and a bolder refutation of such reactionary games by game studies scholars, especially when parodic value is limited or largely absent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A culture war has been brewing in Singapore since 2009 when a conservative Christian group conducted a reverse takeover of a feminist civil society organization and was subsequently expelled from the organization in a publicized meeting between the two groups. Since then, the state has mediated the contestation of values between religious conservatives and liberal groups allied around issues of gender and sexuality. The culture war between the two sides has revolved around creative protests that have evaded state prohibitions against public contestations over what is legally considered private beliefs and affairs. They involve innovative hybridizations of American discourses on values and rights mixed with Asian emphases on family traditions and sentiments. The COVID-19 pandemic has, however, laid bare the adaptation of the American culture war into the Singaporean public sphere. This article looks at and analyzes COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy among conservative Christians in Singapore and their incorporation of anti-vaccination views from American Christian nationalism into secular framings, invoking legal rights and responsibilities aligned with the state's nationalist discourse. I argue that this represents a new phase of contestation by conservatives, refashioning their religious views into secular frames of public good and morality serving the secular nation. By doing so, they implicitly challenge the state's regulation of religion as private interests and beliefs. This altered religious activism has shifted the terms of secularism and loosened the hegemony of the state in defining these terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do the United States and France guarantee that their proclamations of non-establishment and separation are respected? These two countries employ different types of tools to preserve and protect separation, directly rooted in the contexts from which they differently emerged – the writing of the Constitution in the U.S. and the 1905 law of separation in France: fiscal or financial in the United States, penal in France. This article analyses in detail how these various tools have emerged and developed throughout the 20th century. Since the 1980s, increasing political and judicial struggles raised by the development of new minority faiths (namely Islam) in France and Christian fundamentalism in the U.S. have caused a\ quasi-abandonment of the tools protecting separation that has contributed to regressions, back to the regimes the framers of the Constitution in the United States and authors of the law of 1905 in France respectively sought to abandon: the establishment or the state control of religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a common misconception that to be LGBTQ+ and religious is incompatible. This article deconstructs this binarised understanding, arguing that it delegitimises both sexual and gender identity and also the religious identity of some LGBTQ+ people, hindering their religious freedom. The article is based on findings from a large multifaceted study conducted in Australia. Three sources of data are analysed: a non-representative Australian national survey of religious people that included 463 LGBTQ+ people; a non-representative survey of LGBTQ+ people working in religiously affiliated workplaces in Australia (n = 430); and 42 interviews with LGBTQ+ people working in religiously affiliated workplaces. The surveys show that there is a large minority of religious people who identify as LGBTQ+ and that many LGBTQ+ people working in religiously affiliated workplaces are deeply religious and deliberately choose to work in these workplaces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Forum article extends themes and critical observations within Jenna Scaramanga and Michael Reiss's article 'Evolutionary stasis: creationism, evolution and climate change in the Accelerated Christian Education curriculum,' published in CSSE. The Accelerated Christian Education curriculum is a package of homeschool units and lesson designed to underscore and support conservative Christian students, teachers, and/or parents in their mission to align their students unfolding understanding of the world within the strict cognitive bounds of fundamentalist Christianity. Within this curriculum, both evolution and climate change are presented as unreasonable and/or silly against the purported superior evidence of the inerrant ontology of (their extremely narrow interpretation of the) the Bible. Scaramanga and Reiss's analysis frame this kind of understanding within fundamentalist Christianity as indicative of a conspiracy theory. This article extends, questions, and suggests reframing these rhetorical moves toward a more robust and straightforward question of conservative Christianity as a player within a political economy. I suggest we take such groups more seriously for their highly effective if to some perspectives silly interpretation of Biblical text. For many, this movement is simply the maintenance of white male patriarchal power via religious identity. Implications, given the ease of movement of such texts in our digital age, are drawn for the use of such curricula in many other sites around the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores much debated contemporary development in the contestation of the dominant, liberal interpretation of modernity by conservative Christians in the United States through counter hegemonic discourse that is deployed in the political arena and facilitates broader cultural struggle. The examination combines the analysis of discourse from the extensive corpus of data produced by five elite actors in the American religious and political milieu and its interplay with the socioeconomic factors of their constituency on the one hand and the institutional and historical context of accounts. Following in the footsteps of critical sociology of religion, emphasis was placed on processes through which the actors establish a claim for power and legitimize the application of moral rationality as the different path to modern society. Employment of discursive instruments in form of myths, narratives, and negative representations tied to specific religious language, is not only showing the permeability of the church-state separation in supposedly secular political arrangements. More importantly, it is unrevealing the authoritative, mobilizational power of the religious matrix of emotionally motivating meanings and identity-making narratives in face of shortcomings and crises of the hegemonic socio-political constellation. In this manner, it serves as a tool to challenge established interpretations of commitments to freedom and equality, or in many instances reinterprets them to legitimize policy entailed in the notion of collective morality. However, this considerable engagement also creates points of contention in society and in religious formations, which leads to their fragmentation between different interpretations of such commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At a time when more and more large sections of the population, at least in the Western world, live etsi Deus non daretur, while elsewhere God is invoked in a fundamentalist manner, as a justification for violence, it is not pointless to ask what is the relationship between God and action, that is, between religion and morality. Are God and goodness connected? Can there be morality without God? Is religion necessary to ground moral duty? The article attempts to answer these very topical questions through a succinct analysis of Häring's The Law of Christ. After analyzing the relationship between religion and morality in the work in question, two later works are mentioned that show a certain evolution in Häring's thinking in this regard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is surprisingly scant research on queer subtext in The Wicker Man (1973). I suggest Lord Summerisle, who was portrayed by Christopher Lee, is a queer-coded villain. On the night Willow MacGregor deflowers an adolescent named Ash Buchanan, Summerisle observes a pair of copulating snails, quotes Walt Whitman, and envisions Howie alone in his bedroom. Most terrestrial snails are considered hermaphrodites and liking Whitman, who was probably queer, was historically a code for homosexuality. Summerisle recites Whitman's poem celebrating animals that 'do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins' or make him 'sick' discussing their 'duty' to the Christian God. The scene implies Summerisle wishes to deflower Howie the way Willow deflowers Ash, and mate with him like the snails. Summerisle resents Howie because his conservative Christianity prevents them from becoming lovers. Summerisle wants to believe Howie will reincarnate as his apple crops; he and his followers intend to consume his flesh and drink his blood in the form of fruit. Like Dracula, whom Lee was famous for playing, Summerisle seeks to penetrate Howie with his teeth in a metaphor for sex. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the discussion on religious fundamentalism influencing American politics. Topics include extraordinary moment of human history when the lingering Covid era, war in Europe, climate change, and skepticism toward democracy; and joining the cultural dialogue evident in books and journals, radio, TV, and other modes of communication.

The Hunan Bible Institute (HBI) was a prominent missionary organization based out of the city of Changsha, the provincial capital of Hunan province, located far in China's interior. By the 1920's the HBI built a large compound located outside the eastern gate of the city, which mainly functioned as a training school for Chinese converts and missionaries. Despite Hunan's reputation as one of the most radically anti-foreign regions of China, early efforts of evangelistic outreach were mainly achieved through the efforts of small "colporteur teams," who were sent out on small boats along Hunan's complex network of rivers and canals. At the same time, archival evidence has shown how the story of how HBI acquired the property to build its spacious campus initially proved controversial and was indicative of how wealthy foreign institutions maintained a complex relationship with local interests during a very turbulent decade in China's modern history.. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Originalism is justfundamentalism-at least according to many of its opponents. Yet, despite abundant research into the roots of originalism, no historian has studied the theological views of the one early originalist writer who unquestionably was shaped by Protestant fundamentalism: Arthur W. Machen, Jr. Machen was not only a prom; inent legal scholar; he was also an active combatant in the Fundamentalist-Modernist Controuersy and elder brother to the most famous fundamentalist theologian of the era: J. Gresham Machen. This Article, thus, examines the writings of the two Machen brothers together to demonstrate how originalist and fundamentalist thought interacted. The Article argues, however, that Protestant confessionalism-not fundam, entalism-was the dominant theological influence on early originalism. It also obserues that tile Machen brothers' progressiue foes borrowed from modernist theology in much the same way. On all sides of the American political spectrum., constitutional interpretation and scriptural hermeneutics intertwined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most notable recent trends in Supreme Court jurisprudence is the expansion of religious liberty rights. The right to practice one's faith is a critical element of a democracy, but the Supreme Court has privileged that right over other equally critical ones, most notably the right to equal treatment. Thus, for example, it has held that for-profit companies have a religious right to exclude contraception from their health insurance plans and that nonprofit charities have a religious right to refuse to place foster children with same-sex couples. In these and similar cases, the religious beliefs aligned with conservative Christianity. But what if the religious liberty claim were not brought by a conservative Christian but by a progressive Christian, or not a Christian at all, and the religious belief collided with traditional Christian ideology? More precisely, what might be the result of a religious liberty challenge to an abortion ban? This question is not farfetched, as Jewish and other faith groups in multiple states are challenging restrictive abortion laws based upon religious freedom. Plaintiffs argue that their state's abortion ban impedes their ability to live out the commandments of their faith. Would the Supreme Court retrench its religious liberty doctrine in the face of these lawsuits? Or would expansive religious liberty exemptions be available for progressive views as well as conservative ones? Or neither? This Essay examines that question, and well as the implications of a denial of the progressive religious liberty claim. Part I outlines the ballooning of religious liberty rights, and how they have usually helped conservative white Christians at the expense of less powerful groups. Part II takes the current expansive doctrine and applies it to a claim for a religious right to abortion, arguing it should succeed given recent decisions. Part III suggests that despite the current doctrine, the Court will likely reject the claim, and discusses what this failure indicates about the future of the Supreme Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the course of the twentieth century, American conceptions of rights became more global. This development—usually described as a move from "civil rights" to "human rights"—was especially acute in American Christian communities. The role of Christianity deserves our attention because of the religion's important role in the conceptualization, popularization, and practice of human rights in the United States and, thanks to Christians' overseas networks, to every corner of the world. The increasingly global understanding of rights, however, did not lead to the liberalization of rights for American Christians. True, human rights talk contributed to important milestones in religious pluralism and the Civil Rights movement, and often served as a gateway to democratic liberalism for some groups resistant to the American liberal tradition. Human rights, however, were not only a liberal project. Conservatives also embraced human rights but in starkly different ways. The divergent interpretations of human rights were not merely a reflection of the growing political divide in the second half of the twentieth century. Christian activists' adoption of human rights helped forge new alliances and exacerbated the divide between liberal and conservative Christianity, and between political liberalism and political conservatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In August 2021, one of the President's sons spoke at a far-right meeting in South Dakota, flanked by Mike Lindell and Steve Bannon. Cowan locates the sources of the transnational New Right in conservative Catholic and evangelical networks. But in Brazil, Cowan sees the political emergence of evangelicals as something new and centered on the familiar culture war debates about sexual promiscuity, pornography, homosexuality, and moral standards in Brazilian society. [Extracted from the article]

We analyzed psychosocial influences on political life in the Basque Country according to Doise's theory on the articulation between the individual, the interindividual, groups, and society. Political-party experiences and evaluations of system legitimacy during elections (local, regional, general, and European) were considered. Party choice was linked to atheism and without-religion among Spanish progressive voters (Podemos); Christianity to Basque conservative nationalism (PNV); Basque identity to Basque progressive nationalism (EH-Bildu); and Spanish identity to conservativism (PP). On the whole, Basque parties' voters stressed more economy/administration and politicians' individual traits, while Spanish party voters focused more on civil/social rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Polska Myśl Pedagogiczna is the property of Jagiellonian University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article aims to characterize the Korean conservative Protestants who participated in the anti-impeachment movement in 2017 and supported the former president, Geun Hye Park. They preached virulent anti-communist ideologies that developed into an eschatology. Their supposedly pristine past had more in common with Jung Hee Park's regime than the Bible or early Christian history. And they were inconsistent because of their favor of economically biased modernization, in contrast to their proclaimed anti-modernism. This article also discusses whether these characteristics connote fundamentalism. They differ from the characteristics of American fundamentalism as a prototype, and can be classified as a Korean variant of fundamentalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To all intents and purposes, the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland, the Brethren of Gamrie, and the Orange Order each claim a monopoly over theological truth, believing that they are right and that everyone else is wrong. Such a position is hardly exceptional – strong versions of pluralism take precisely this same monopolistic stance, calling, in effect, for a rejection of anything that rejects anything. Through an examination of such exceptionalist logics, this article seeks to provoke the anthropology of religion to ask certain questions about the social life of theological truth claims. Importantly, by asking anthropological questions (what makes a truth claim 'stick'; what difference does it make in the world?), the anthropologist of religion is likely to encounter theological questions posed in response. Where does truth come from? What makes it true? What does such truth demand? While answering a question with another question is not always very revealing, this article suggests that in this case it might be, especially if some genuine attempt is made to answer the latter theological questions as a route to answering the former anthropological ones. More specifically, this article argues that anthropology might learn something about the nature of religious change, and changes to religious beliefs, if it first attempts to makes sense of (in this case, Protestant Fundamentalist) theological critiques of doctrinal change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This correction notice addresses errors in the original publication of an article titled "Doctrine and Change in Western Dogmatics: The Examples of Michael Seewald and Kevin J. Vanhoozer" in the journal Religions. The errors include a swapped abstract and introduction, as well as corrections to sentences and paragraphs throughout the article. The author argues that there is ambiguity in Western conservative dogmatics regarding the potential for change and development in doctrine. The correction notice assures readers that the scientific conclusions of the article remain unaffected. [Extracted from the article]

This essay uses an epistolary studies framework to examine the correspondence of Ann Paine with a male administrator of the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions. Over the course of 1819-1820, Paine used letters to secure a position as a missionary in the Cherokee Nation. Missionary service enabled her to separate from her husband while retaining custody of her children and maintaining her public identity as a pious Christian woman. Testing the limits of marriage through the possibilities opened up to white women by global evangelical movements, this exchange demonstrates the unique flexibility of the letter as an exploratory space to navigate and renegotiate larger questions of personal agency in relation to social institutions. Because historians have used Paine's writings describing her time in the Cherokee Nation as primary sources for their work on the pivotal period preceding the Trail of Tears, her epistolary archive bears significance in understanding the gendered efficacy of letter writing, the fluidity and constraints of marriage, and white women's early engagements with globalized Protestant missionary causes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 2018 election campaign and throughout his term, President Jair Bolsonaro used the word secularism several times, recognizing it is a legal rule of Brazilian society. However, the use of the word secularism was always accompanied by the word Christianity, showing that in the president's logic, the last word reveals itself to be preeminent in relation to the first word. This text announces clues to show that the Christian reference evidenced by the president consists of conservative Christianity and, particularly, the conservative evangélical segment, with which he maintains strong political and religious alignment. Therefore, it is argued here, on the one hand, that Bolsonaro navigates in the waters of recognition of the constitutional principle of regulation of the religious, which provides for the dissociation of the political field and the religious field without, however, preventing approximations and even imbrications between them; but, on the other hand, that Bolsonaro, not without interests, introduces important reconfigurations in the historic Brazilian secularism, such as the exaggeration in appealing to the transcendent; the exacerbation of the narrowing of the relationship between State and religion; and the effort to deepen its alliance with the conservative evangelical segment, which is why it can be said that we are currently living in times of "Bolsonaro-style secularism". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have argued that history provides ample evidence of the eager embrace of new communication technologies by Christian fundamentalists and evangelicals in the United States. However, closer examination of the first Christian fundamentalist venture into the technology of radio in the US reveals the ambivalence and anxieties of key leaders as they considered and adopted use of the new medium. This study, based on careful analysis of archival and press materials from the 1920s, reveals a "restless" adoption of radio that articulated the "menace" as well as the promise of the technology. While wondering aloud about radio's shortcomings and dangers, faith leaders justified their uncertain investment in the new medium by employing discourses of conversion alongside an evangelistic entrepreneurism connected to the growing consumerism of the time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research has found that different aspects of religion (such as service attendance and fundamentalism) have significant and varying effects on public attitudes about immigration. We identify an important but understudied aspect of how religion connects to immigration attitudes: beliefs about the reality of supernatural evil (e.g., Satan, hell, and demons). Using a national sample of Americans, we find that greater belief in supernatural evil is a strong and consistent predictor of more restrictive views of immigration, even after controlling for other dimensions of religiosity, sociodemographics, and political characteristics. Overall, beliefs about religious evil are the aspect of religion with the strongest connection to views of immigration. Consequently, consideration of religious evil is integral to understanding how religion influences public attitudes about immigration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Collectively, Daniel Bare and Todne Thomas, along with Mary Beth Swetnam Mathews, have joined Miller in creating a foundation for the subfield of "Black evangelical and fundamentalist studies" in US religious history and African American studies. In African American fundamentalist newspapers and sermons to argue "that there were indeed fundamentalists among African American Protestants who not only claimed the title for themselves but also aligned with the theological heartbeat of fundamentalism" (3-4). Black evangelical and fundamentalist histories are branded as "different" from the stories of their white theological counterparts because Blacks resisted slavery and segregation and because they created social programs for their communities. [Extracted from the article]

For decades now and particularly during the 2020 presidential campaign, American conservatives have stressed the need to protect "religious freedom." Building on research documenting a connection between Trump‐support, a desire to privilege conservative Christianity, and perceptions that conservative Christianity is persecuted due to its anti‐LGT (lesbian, gay, or transgender) views, we theorise such factors were the ideological driving force behind prioritising "religious freedom" in the 2020 presidential election. Drawing on national survey data from just after the November election, we find Christian nationalism and perceptions of anti‐Christian discrimination are strong predictors that (1) Americans feel "religious freedom" was an important factor influencing their vote and (2) that they ranked it the single greatest factor influencing their vote. In contrast, the perception that LGT persons are not discriminated against also predicts viewing religious freedom as important, as does a perception of anti‐Semitism, but never perceptions of anti‐atheist or anti‐Muslim discrimination. Findings suggest conservative Christian supremacism, fear of (Judeo‐)Christian persecution and belief that LGT persons are privileged are ideological antecedents of votes for "religious freedom." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of College of The Great Imam University is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)