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The purpose of this note is to provide policy recommendations to improve access to credit of rural populations and small agricultural producers under financially sustainable schemes. Although the agricultural sector remains an important source of employment, agricultural credit is a small fraction of commercial credit in Colombia. The share of agricultural credit in Colombia is below levels observed in other countries in the region. Colombian commercial banks have limited credit volume in rural areas, concentrating their lending activities on more profitable urban populations. General deposit warehouses and the agricultural commodity exchange (Bolsa Mercantil de Colombia (BMC)) provide funding for agricultural activities, but they are underdeveloped compared to regional peers and serve medium and large size producers. Overall use of mobile- and internet-based payment financial products remains low in rural Colombia. According to 2014 Findex survey data, just two percent of adults report using mobile banking, defined as a mobile platform for making transactions from an account at a financial institution. Public credit guarantee system (FAG) coverage should be modified to incentive the use of mobile guarantees and agricultural insurance. This will ensure that financial institutions have only covered tail risks, providing incentives to use mobile guarantees.

A portfolio based model (Credit Risk of Credit Suisse First Boston) and recent Central Bank of Argentina credit bureau data are used to estimate whether current capital and provisioning regulations match actual risks. Arguing that provisions should cover expected losses and that capital requirements should cover potential losses beyond expected losses subject to some statistical level of tolerance, the article assesses how well actual capital and provisioning requirements match the estimated requirements given by the model. Actual provisioning requirements were found to be close to implied levels of expected losses. The estimate of potential losses was found to be highly sensitive to the assumptions of the model, especially the parameter relating the volatility of a loan's rate of default to its mean value. This volatility parameter cannot be estimated accurately with the credit bureau data because of the short time span covered, so proxy data were used to estimate it, and two values around that estimate were tried. The difficulty of estimating this critical parameter implies that the results should only be regarded as suggestive. Moreover, the methodology only does not seek to estimate credit risk and not interest rate risk or exchange rate risk, nor does it fully take into account the indirect effects of interest rates and exchange rates on credit risk. As recent events in Argentina have demonstrated, estimating credit risk along these lines should be thought of as just one tool in attempting to assess the appropriate level of bank provisions and capital.

This paper explores how the private sector can positively contribute to peace-building and conflict prevention, and how that positive private sector role can be supported and enhanced. The starting premise recognizes that the private sector exists in all conflict situations and has the potential to both exacerbate and ameliorate conflict, the outcome of which can be greatly affected by appropriate support from external partners. It also posits that a thriving, legal, private sector is essential to development and peace, as it provides livelihoods and growth, while delivering revenue streams in the form of taxes so governments can provide services to their citizens. It also posits that a thriving, legal, private sector is essential to development and peace, as it provides livelihoods and growth, while delivering revenue streams in the form of taxes so governments can provide services to their citizens. This paper discusses and analyzes the role of the private sector in fragile and conflict-affected states, beginning with its role in the conflicts themselves, and in the immediate peace-building and longer-term reconstruction and development phases. The paper acknowledges that the topic of private sector development cuts across political, governance, and security dimensions, as well as a broad range of development themes. It also considers international efforts to support the private sector in fragile and conflict affected settings to date, identifying gaps and making recommendations to address them. The paper does not focus on detailed operational issues or the use of various reform tools.

In El Salvador, the banking safety net emergency liquidity assistance, resolution and deposit insurance- faces particular challenges given it operate in the context of official dollarization. The economy was officially dollarized in 2000 with the adoption of the law on financial integration and of the United States (US) dollar as legal tender. Dollarization constrains a central bank's ability to act as a lender of last resort (LOLR) and provide emergency liquidity assistance (ELA). This note discusses the weaknesses of the current framework and recommendations to ensure the safety net functions more effectively and efficiently. To address systemic liquidity risk in the context of official dollarization, the Banco Central de Reservas (BCR) should be provided with more powers and funds to provide emergency liquidity assistance to banks. The bank resolution scheme, which has not been tested, and the deposit insurance fund, which has insufficient funds, both need to be strengthened. Appropriate roles and formal mechanisms to monitor and manage systemic risk and events should be put in place. However the roles and responsibilities of the various institutions involved in the safety net are not always consistent with their objectives, powers, and mandates, while a well-specified strategy to preserve the stability of the system (e.g., with clear responsibilities for monitoring systemic risks and taking macro prudential decisions) and definition or formal measurement of systemic risk have not yet been established. Furthermore, coordination with foreign supervisors of international banks does not include designing contingency plans to address a possible cross-border event. This paper is divided into following four parts: part one is introduction; part two gives systemic liquidity management and emergency liquidity assistance; part three is bank resolution and deposit insurance; and part four gives crisis management arrangements.

Politics and regulatory capture can play an important role in financial institutions distress. East Asia's financial crisis featured many distressed and closed financial intermediaries in an environment with many links between government, politicians, supervisors, and financial institutions. This makes the East Asian financial crisis a good event for studying how such connections affect the resolution of financial institutions distress. The authors investigate distress and closure decisions for 186 banks and 97 non-bank financial institutions in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. They find that after July 1997, 42 percent of the institutions experienced distress (were closed, merged, or re-capitalized, or had their operations temporarily suspended). By July 1999, 13 percent of all institutions in existence in July 1997 had been closed. Using financial data for 1996, the authors find that: 1) Traditional CAMEL-type variables - returns on assets, loan growth, and the ratio of loan loss reserves to capital, of net interest income to total income, and of loans to borrowings - help predict subsequent distress and closure. 2) None of the foreign-controlled institutions were closed, and foreign portfolio ownership lowered an institutions probability of distress. 3) Connections - with industrial groups of influential families - increased the probability of distress, suggesting that supervisors had granted forbearance from regulations. Connections also made closure more, not less, likely - suggesting that the closure processes themselves were transparent. 4) But larger institutions, although more likely to be distressed, were less likely to be closed, while (smaller) non-bank financial institutions were more likely to be closed. This suggests a too big to fail policy. 5) These policies, together with the fact that resolution processes were late and not necessarily comprehensive, may have added to the overall uncertainty and loss of confidence in the East Asian countries, aggravating the financial crisis.