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Economic nationalism and state intervention recently gained attraction in many countries including Turkey. This paper questions whether Turkey has changed its economic policy framework towards a statecentric model and, if so, whether these changes are well thought-out and sustainable. The examination of key areas of state capitalism, that is the monetary, industrial, trade, financial, and state economic enterprise (SEE) policies put forward in the officially adopted five-year plans and annual programs, suggests that the changes in the economic policy framework began after the 2008 global crisis and accelerated after the transition to a presidential system. Upon examination, the policy framework does not reflect a definitive, coherent, and wholistic approach but rather a pragmatic attitude that swings back and forth, which exposes the country to swings in the global system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper provides a comparative analysis of the presidential systems of Argentina, Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay, covering the period between 1989 and 2022, with the aim of examining the factors that motivate a person in the head of a ministry to seek the presidential candidacy. The central argument holds that both the incumbent president and the political parties have the purpose of taking advantage of a person's passage through a Cabinet of State to boost his or her presidential candidacy within the political organization. The selected cases are justified due to the existence of historical moments in which ministers have left their posts to compete for the presidency in these countries. The methodology employed in this study follows a multimethod logic. First, quantitative logistic regression analysis is used, followed by qualitative press analysis of ministers' careers to support the theoretical argument. The most notable results highlight that having a political profile, being a member of the president's political party and having held a political ministry are influential factors when running in presidential elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The composition of cabinets under presidential regimes has constituted one of the top topics of the litterature in political science in recent years. However, nothing has been said about the proper size of those cabinets. That is, why some cabinets are 37 ministers large when other is formed by just 13 members? We carry on a theory of cabinet size under presidential regimes, using insights from both parliamentarist and presidentialist literature. Our model is composed of five hypotheses relying on an original dataset of 161 observations across 19 presidential countries of the Americas. Our main finding is that the inclusion of independents and/or technocrats impacts significantly on lowering cabinets' size. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We know little about how coalitional strategy affects the electoral fates of political parties in presidential democracy. The literature on coalitions in parliamentary systems shows a negative impact of entering government, while the coattail effects literature on presidential systems suggests some benefits. Combining elements from both approaches, we argue that there is a conditional electoral effect of joining the cabinet under coalitional presidentialism. Even considering presidentialism's heightened attribution of responsibility to a unipersonal executive, we find that coalition parties do indeed place a meaningful electoral wager whenever they choose to enter the president's cabinet as identifiable allies. Leveraging data on Brazilian elections held at national and local levels over 24 years and employing an innovative measure of portfolio salience, we show that the payoff of this wager is contingent on control of the most highly-valued cabinet positions and on the popular approval of the president. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most important phase of administration activity is the “supervision” phase, where the difference between the objective and what is achieved is revealed. Supervision, whether private or public, is a target control mechanism that arises as a result of the management activities of all administrative units. In this regard, supervision is not only the final stage of management activity, but also a starting stage, showing the decisions it takes and the shortcomings it emphasizes, and the activities other management units should or should not follow the same path. There are three key functions of public administration, and the state, the supreme user of public power, is the sovereign power to provide governance, the power to lay down binding rules and the power not to keep its own sovereignty above the law. This latter function also requires the state to be subject to a supervisory mechanism. It is this necessity that has led to the state being subjected to internal control in various ways, and has resulted in the creation of political (legislative), administrative (executive) and judicial control mechanisms. The study deals with the purpose, history and scope of political supervision. After statements were made about the functioning of the political control mechanism in the world and in Turkiye, the point was highlighted that political supervision, which was a blood-loss against the executive control, came with the Presidential System, and what should be done to strengthen political control within the framework of the "limitation of powers against society", which is one of the most important features of modern democracies [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sakarya University Journal of Law Faculty (SHD) is the property of Sakarya University Journal of Law Faculty (SHD) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

When and under what conditions do ideologically similar nationalist parties adopt different positions and discourses about refugees and immigrants? We address this question by examining nationalist parties' approaches toward Syrian refugees in Turkey. Documenting these differences based on an original Twitter dataset and party manifestos, we argue that electoral dynamics under the new presidential system have shaped nationalist parties' discourses about refugees in the country. In particular, we explore how pre-electoral alliances and a strategic opening in the political space have motivated nationalist parties to amplify, ambiguate, or silence their otherwise conservative and nativist refugee discourses. Additionally, we maintain that urbanization has influenced the discursive strategies of nationalist party elites toward immigrants and refugees, giving rise to contradictory forms of nationalism in urban areas, including both far-right and liberal nationalisms. Overall, this study offers valuable insights into the complex interactions between refugee politics, electoral dynamics, nationalism, and urbanization in Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2023 Turkish elections marked a historic juncture in the nation's political trajectory. Amidst economic, social, and political upheavals, coupled with a devastating earthquake, the elections served as a decisive evaluation of the newly inaugurated presidential system. With the incumbent Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) lagging in polls for the first time in over twenty years, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of the People's Alliance faced formidable opposition yet managed to score a victory in the second round. This article delves into the contrasting campaign strategies of the two leading candidates, Erdoğan and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. We argue that while Erdoğan's campaign leaned on negative tactics and exclusionary populism, emphasizing counter-terrorism, identity politics, and regime maintenance, Kılıçdaroğlu's strategy championed positive messaging buoyed by inclusive populism, spotlighting democratization, good governance, and regime change. Within an overarching competitive authoritarian context, these distinct strategies highlighted the intricate dynamics between campaign narratives and voter perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of MEMLEKET: Politics & Administration / Siyaset Yönetim is the property of Local Governments Research, Assistance & Education Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper explores under what political conditions a “responsible prime minister” can emerge in a presidential system, focusing on South Korea after the 1987 democratization. Under presidentialism, premiers lack the constitutional resources to make themselves into a “responsible prime minister” independent from the president. Even such political resources as high popularity, deep trust from the president, and influence over the legislature are not enough to make them a “responsible prime minister”. Thus, most premiers remain a highly compliant subordinate of their president in Korea. By contrast, in a multi-party system Kim Dae-jung (DJ) sought to invite a third party, the United Liberal Democrats, into the “DJP Alliance” in order to win a highly competitive presidential election and therefore had to yield the prime-ministerial post to the head of the coalition partner party, Kim Jong-pil (JP). Under these political conditions, JP could be a “responsible prime minister” as an exception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do interest groups target legislators to approach or lobby under strong presidentialism? This article explores two hypotheses. First, interest groups and lobbyists seek to access committee chairs with gatekeeping power, even in those jurisdictions where the executive holds (most) exclusivity to initiate legislation (Gatekeeping Hypothesis). Second, interest groups and lobbyists target legislators who introduce more bills on issues that concern them but only on policy areas outside the executive's exclusive sphere (Legislative Activity Hypothesis). We test these hypotheses with evidence from the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. We have coded and analysed 6479 lobbying audiences and over 2300 bills. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Üsküdar Universitiy Journal of Social Sciences is the property of Uskudar University Journal of Social Sciences (JOSOC) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Objective/Context: What characteristics does the presidential primary system adopt? And what are the effects of the primaries on the Honduran political system? Honduras is among the precursor countries in Latin America to adopt the primary system as a mechanism of internal democracy within party structures to select their presidential, legislative, and municipal candidates. Although parties are not obliged to use primaries to select their candidates, the law mandates it for those political groups that have more than one internal movement. Thus, over the years, after eight experiences--in some political parties--the system has become established. The objective of this work is to analyze the origin of the presidential primary system in Honduras, its characteristics, and its effects on the political system. Methodology: This involves analyzing all primary elections held since their adoption to the present. Conclusions: the evidence indicates that, while the primary election system has allowed for the resolution of internal conflicts within parties, it has also contributed to the consolidation of political clientelism in the country. Originality: this work provides tools for analyzing the process of selecting presidential candidates in a political context of low programmatic competition, clientelism, and high personalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective/context: The system of presidential primaries was introduced into the Bolivian system in 2018 and was applied only once in 2019. This article aims to analyze the causes, characteristics, and effects of the compulsory and simultaneous primary system in Bolivia. Methodology: The characteristics of the party system, the method of selecting presidential candidates from 1982 to the present, the existing dynamics in the Legislature, the results of the 2019 primary elections, the current context, and regulations with a view to the 2025 general elections will be analyzed. Conclusions: This study shows that the presidential primaries were not on the agenda of the parties and were used by the ruling party to legitimize its presidential ticket. Therefore, using its legislative supermajority and control of other state organs, the primaries are introduced under the exclusive control of the leadership, which vertically decides whether they will be competitive or not. Originality: The detail and characteristics of this study offer a high degree of novelty and propose new elements for comparison and academic debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Taiwan Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article presents the discussion on varying perspectives on corporatism in Mexico, tracing its economic origins linked to presidentialism and industrial society. Topics include discussed by Arnaldo Córdova and echoed by Ilán Bizberg and Alberto Aziz in their views on state-controlled syndicates; and historical complexities, state-syndicate dynamics, and political agency within Mexico's authoritarian framework.

Türkiye, once distinguished as the sole Islamic society abolishing Islamic law, has undergone a transformative shift under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, veering towards Islamic law and a presidential system, diverging from its Western legal roots. To safeguard freedom of religion or belief, which is Islam, the establishment of an Islamic judicial system is imperative in a secular state. Islam is a comprehensive and perfect system that encompasses all aspects of human life. In promoting the upholding of fundamental human rights, especially the right to freedom of religion or belief, Türkiye can ensure that its legal framework supports the rights and beliefs of all its citizens, especially Muslims. This note critically examines the imperative for establishing an Islamic judicial court system. Tracing historical roots to the Ottoman Empire and Atatürk's secularisation efforts, the note also refers to legal, historical, and social dimensions. Emphasising the necessity for an Islamic court to address familial and financial disputes, it explores the intricacies of coexistence between Islamic principles and the existing secular legal framework. The discussion spans the interconnectedness of religiosity, the right to freedom of religion, and the implications of an Islamic judicial system on Türkiye’s legal, societal, and economic fabric. Drawing comparative insights from other secular nations, the article underscores the multifaceted considerations involved. Conclusively, it advocates for a nuanced approach that balances the preservation of Islamic values with the principles of justice and inclusivity within the Turkish legal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Protection of human rights is crucial in a democratic state. This article examines the potential impeachment of a president based on human rights violations. The research explores the legal framework regulating such acts, including the President's denial of a constitutional court decision. Such as the denial of Constitutional Court Decision Number 91/PUU-XVIII/2020 which decided that as long as the Job Creation Law is declared conditionally unconstitutional it is not allowed to issue implementing regulations from the law, however, the President still issued Presidential Regulation Number 113 of 2021. President's actions have violated the UDHR, and the 1945 Constitution of Republic of Indonesia. The study uses normative research methods, including statutory and comparative approaches, and analyses legal materials using constitutional and historical interpretations. The findings suggest that Indonesia, the United States of America, South Korea, and the Philippines have incomplete arrangements for impeaching presidents based on human rights violations. Second, there is still a void in the regulation in the event of constitutional defiance of the Constitutional Court decision by the President of Indonesia. Therefore, researcher suggests limiting the meaning of violations in impeachment which is only limited to the President of Indonesia oaths in Article 9 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Thus, if the President does not comply with Constitutional court decision, he can be held accountable with impeachment mechanism. Therefore, it is necessary to add the qualifications of President of Indonesia misconduct through amendments to Article 10 paragraph (3) letter d of Constitutional Court Law.

This article discusses the power and limitations of the presidency in democratic Indonesia. It highlights the instability of the early post-Suharto period, with multiple presidents being impeached or facing political challenges. However, since 2004, Indonesia has experienced stable presidencies, disproving the theory that a multi-party system is incompatible with presidential rule. The author explores the concept of "coalitional presidentialism," where presidents build coalitions with political parties, state institutions, and influential non-state actors to establish well-functioning administrations. While this strategy has brought stability to the presidential system, it has also led to a decline in democratic accountability. The article concludes by questioning whether the next president will strengthen coalitional presidentialism or revive democratic accountability. [Extracted from the article]

In democracies where the executive has bill initiation powers and controls the legislative agenda, most laws enacted should come from executive-initiated bills. In Chile's strong presidential system where the executive has broad legislative powers, one in three laws enacted are legislator-initiated. We postulate 5 hypotheses on the effect of the attributes of the authors of a bill on its success. We test them using sequential logit models, to distinguish between partial and overall success (passing the original chamber and getting enacted, respectively). We utilise the 6005 legislator-initiated bills introduced in the Chamber of Deputies of Chile (1990–2018) – 15.2% of those bills passed the chamber and 8.1% were enacted. Bills concurrently authored by government and opposition legislators are more likely to pass. Having more authors increases a bill' chances of passing in the first chamber but not the changes of overall passage. A higher presence of first-term legislators reduces the chances of passage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on reevaluating theories of executive power amidst the growing authoritarianism in the United States. Topics include critiques of Anti-Unitarian and Strong Unitarian views of presidential authority, proposing instead a Limited Unitarian theory that acknowledges broad presidential powers within constitutional boundaries to prevent potential tyranny.

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Regional integration changes domestic decision-making structures, relations among social forces, and power distribution in different ways. China influences Turkey's domestic dynamics through involvement in economic cooperation, geostrategic alliances, and factional alliances. Concurrent and conflicting decision-making processes and foreign policy informality shape Turkey's engagement with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This research conceptualizes political informality as an authoritarian governance tool within the legal boundaries but outside of bureaucratic rationality. Turkey's attempts to be involved in the BRI have contributed to informalization as an authoritarian strategy of the ruling party (AKP). This research concerns a case study on the now Chinese-owned Kumport to demonstrate how informalization of state-business relations shapes Turkey's transnational relations. The findings point out to the negative consequences of this informalization on the Chinese investments in Turkey's logistics sector. The decrease in the power of the relatively Weberian bureaucracy of Turkey under the new presidential system led to the marginalization of Kumport in global shipping routes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Route Educational & Social Science Journal (Ress Journal) is the property of Ress Academy Publishing and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A contradiction about the role of the President has emerged between the Roberts Court's Article II jurisprudence and its major questions doctrine (MQD) jurisprudence. In its appointment and removal decisions, the Roberts Court claims that the President is the "most democratic and politically accountable official in Government" because the President is "directly accountable to the people through regular elections," an audacious new interpretation of Article II of the U.S. Constitution. Tight presidential control of agency officials, the Roberts Court argues, lends democratic legitimacy to the administrative state. We identify these twin arguments about the "directly accountable president" and the "chain of dependence" as the foundation of "Roberts Court presidentialism.". Meanwhile, each of the major questions policies over the past three decades is the product of the "directly accountable president" and the "chain of dependence" in action: presidents campaigning on the policy, directing agencies to adopt the policy, and then publicly taking credit and responsibility for the policy. Nevertheless, the Roberts Court has almost always ignored the President's role in major questions policies and instead blamed the agency for overstepping its delegated power. The erasure of presidential involvement serves the Court's narrative of blaming "unaccountable bureaucrats," rather than either granting the policy more democratic legitimacy for its presidential backing or holding the President accountable for overstepping the separation of powers. The erasure suggests that the Court has an underlying ambivalence or anxiety about the problems of presidential power, which Roberts Court presidentialism has exacerbated. Ironies abound: the Court relies on a theory of presidential accountability, but then retreats from holding presidents accountable; it expands the power of unaccountable judges based on a narrative of "unaccountable bureaucrats.". The rule of law requires consistent reasoning. We suggest doctrinal opportunities to resolve the contradictions between the Roberts Court's Article II presiden-tialism and its major questions' erasures of presidents, including: appointment and removal doctrine; the contours of the MQD and its potential extension to statutory delegations of authority to the President; the future of Chevron deference; and the application of the non-delegation doctrine. The Roberts Court can untangle the "chain of dependence" with more consistency in either direction, but perhaps the most important lessons from these contradictions are recognizing the value of judicial restraint and acknowledging the costs of direct presidential power over agencies, not just the benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research addresses the role played by the Autonomous Constitutional Bodies (OCA) within presidentialism in the Mexican political system. It starts with the analysis of the presidential regime and the Mexican variant, paying special attention to the democratic transition in the 1990s. Subsequently, it analyzes from a constitutional and political point of view, one of the main Mexican constitutional innovations that paved the way for the creation of the OCAs, which facilitated the loss of constitutional powers of the head of state and the end of imperial presidentialism. To facilitate their understanding and legal configuration, the specific case of the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) is analyzed, which exemplifies well the limits of these institutions, but also their capacity to modernize and democratize the Mexican State. However, this type of institutions would apparently be redesigning the political system in terms of the separation and division of the powers of the State, but without achieving true autonomy and limits for governments with a majority in the chambers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies determinants of political actors' visibility in the news, and their stability over time, observing the press coverage received by Chilean politicians in the elite press since the beginning of the democratic transition in 1991 and until 2019. In dialogue with theories of news values, we test how political positions in a markedly presidential system, the belonging to a government coalition, gender, and the association to conflict frames behave as determinants of the presence and prominence of politicians in the news in the three decades following the recovery of democracy in Chile. We have three key findings. Firstly, the visibility of political actors in the news follows a clear institutional hierarchy led by the president and cabinet members. Secondly, female politicians are less likely to be mentioned or have speaking space in newspapers than male politicians. Lastly, although an association with conflict-framed news boosts politicians' visibility, such association is unable to disturb structural power hierarchies, and the value of conflict does not increase over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is recognized as one of the world's populist politicians who are steadily increasing in number around the world. During Erdoğan's 22 years in power, Türkiye first experienced a period of significant economic and democratic growth, which was then significantly reversed with the 2016 coup attempt and the presidential government system that Türkiye adopted based on a referendum. Simultaneously with this regression in Türkiye, the content and opportunities offered by social media applications have improved. Appropriately, politicians attach more importance to these platforms for political communication. Although the number of studies in the field of political communication is increasing, visual political communication is not being widely researched. Erdoğan's Instagram posts are important examples of his populist political understanding within the scope of visual political communication. Hence, in this study, 242 image posts shared by Erdoğan via his Instagram account in 2022, which constitute a total of 685 photos due to Instagram's feature of sharing multiple photos per post, were analyzed. It was found that Erdoğan made significant use of Instagram visuals in constructing his image as "one of the people" and as a tool to maintain his claim to masses that he was "one of them." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The attempt to purify Indonesia's multiparty presidential system was only reflected after the Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution. However, it took work to implement it. In practice. Various measures have been taken, including party alliances and introducing voting barriers in parliamentary elections. Therefore, analysing the relationship between electoral thresholds and their ideal proportions in the form of legal-political reforms to strengthen the Indonesian presidential system is interesting. This is in line with the purpose of this study, which is to uncover and analyse the legal politics of electoral thresholds in an attempt to strengthen the presidential system of government in Indonesia. The approach adopted in this study is a theoretical approach with legal, conceptual, comparative and historical approaches. This study concludes that the legitimate political renewal of the electoral vote threshold is not closely related to efforts to strengthen Indonesia's system of multiparty presidential government. The ideal way to reform the legal, political threshold for electoral votes would be to set the parliamentary threshold at 2.5%, but at the same time tighten controls over the parties participating in the election, and the 2.5% threshold serves as President to maintain a balance between the parliamentary and presidential thresholds. In addition, it is also important to strengthen consensus (consensus democracy) among coalition political parties. There is still a desire to abolish the presidential threshold through the People's Representative Council (DPR) instead of the Constitutional Court (MK). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Euro Latinoamericana de Análisis Social y Político (RELASP) is the property of Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Facultad de Ciencia Politica y Relaciones Internacionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

"Introduction to Intelligence: Institutions, Operations, and Analysis" by Jonathan M. Acuff et al. is a primer that provides an overview of various aspects of intelligence, including institutions, operations, comparative international intelligence systems, counterintelligence, analytical methodologies, and ethical issues. The authors present three perspectives on the role of intelligence: scholarship in the service of government, actionable-oriented, and provision of alternative views to policymakers. However, the book lacks in-depth coverage of certain topics, such as domestic intelligence in the United States, interagency rivalries, the role of private contractors, and the Snowden scandal. The chapter on comparative intelligence services contains inaccuracies and gaps, particularly in the sections on the United Kingdom, France, and Israel. The chapters on intelligence operations, counterintelligence, and covert action provide only brief overviews and could benefit from more in-depth treatment. While the book serves as a basic introduction to intelligence, it falls short compared to other leading texts in the field. [Extracted from the article]

The study includes the analysis of the effects of different government systems on voter behavior by using a comparative method. In the comparative method used in the study, the effect of the different government systems applied in both countries on the voter behavior by using causality links is tried to be explained by conceptual abstraction through the structure of the executive bodies, election dates and election systems. Government systems are basically divided into three as presidential, semipresidential and parliamentary systems according to the nature of the relationship between the legislature and the executive, which are the main organs of the state. The government systems that are the subject of the study are the semi-presidential system applied in France and the presidential system applied in Turkey. In the study, the effect of different government systems applied in France and Turkey on voter behavior is examined under three main headings through strategic voting behavior. First of all, it is tried to reveal how the executive power is used in both countries and the effect of this power on the behavior of the voters, especially in the elections. Secondly, an evaluation is made on the behavior of voters based on the dates of the presidential and parliamentary elections, which are effective on the executive power. Finally, the effects of different government systems applied in both countries and different electoral systems applied on voter behaviors are examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper critically analyses the case for the parliamentary model of government combined with proportional electoral design. Using Ethiopia's practice of parliamentary model of government, and its diverse social structures, as a case study, the paper examines the viability of parliamentary model of government for transition to democratic polity. The paper relies on the theory of consociational democracy that focuses on the role of social and political elites, their deliberations and cooperation, as the fundamental instrument to stable democratic polity. Methodologically, the paper employed interpretive and qualitative meta-analysis of relevant laws and the literature. As such, this article focuses on the link between the model of government and transition to a democratic polity in a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society, more precisely, the risk that the presidential model dents transition to democracy in a multicultural and multi-ethnic society. I argue, therefore, in a social fabric where ethnic and cultural diversity is the basic defining tenet of the social order, parliamentary model of government combined with proportional electoral design offers better flexibility in the process of transition to consolidated democratic polity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The received wisdom on executive–legislative relations in multiparty presidential systems is that the size of the president's majority in Congress is the key factor explaining governance patterns, particularly the president's legislative success. However, in many cases presidents enjoying a nominal majority have been unable to pass legislation and have faced institutional instability. The article departs from a conventional definition of divided government and focuses on the preference incongruence between the governing coalition and the floor of Congress. It argues that the ideological distance between the floor and the coalition is a key factor explaining the president's cost of governing (which includes factors such as the distribution of cabinet portfolios and budgetary transfers to coalition partners). The article provides an empirical test with data from Brazil that find that the greater the ideological incongruence, the higher the cost of governing for the president. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Placing the National Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN or PPHN) made by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) as a guideline for the President can potentially reposition MPR above the President. Such an idea of a state has been implemented in Indonesia for no less than 54 years (1945-1999). This paper aims to analyze the basic characteristics of the presidential system and assess the compatibility of PPHN with the presidential system, with the novelty which then offers a model for pouring PPHN into laws and regulations that align with Indonesia's presidential system. Based on the conceptual and theoretical approaches, it can be concluded: First, the basic character of a presidential system is to separate the legislature from the executive, so no accountability mechanism puts the President down as subordinate to the legislature. PPHN implementation can shift this separation towards an accountability model, a feature of a parliamentary system. Second, PPHN can be re-enforced in a presidential system, with the prerequisite that no accountability mechanism puts the President under MPR. Third, pouring PPHN into the form of a Law replacing the RPJPN Law will be more relevant to avoid a government system shifting. However, providing a checks and balances mechanism for the President through the House of Representatives' budgetary rights is still necessary.

Kazakhstan witnessed the most substantial and powerful "political earthquake" in January 2022, in its thirty-year history as a Republic. Protests against the increase in the price of energy soon turned into violent riots, during which 225 people lost their lives. The causes of these events are certainly complex and profound. In order to eliminate part of the cause, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev first proposed and then implemented reforms that changed the constitutional and legal systems and, to a large extent, transformed the political system. In lieu of a super-presidential system, there have been endeavours to establish a presidential system featuring a robust parliament, which not only exercises legislative authority but also assumes a substantial oversight role. In addition, the method of electing people's representatives in the assemblies was changed, a balance of power and responsibility was established, and better mechanisms for respecting human rights and freedoms were ensured. This paper describes and analyses both the reforms themselves and their reasons. At the same time, it challenges theses about the past and future character of the Kazakh political system. The theoretical framework is based on modern normative political concepts, including dialectical-critical discourse in the part of the research that refers to the views of individual authors on the history of Kazakhstani constitution-making. The methodological framework is based on the case study analysis. Conclusions support the thesis that reforms are oriented towards the long-term stabilisation of institutions and ensuring security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of the College Of Basic Education is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In many countries, the president of the republic is directly elected through popular vote. Most such nations have an electoral system that provides for a double-round of voting. Often termed a two-round system, such elections have a second turn if no candidate obtains an absolute majority in the first round. This article presents an original dataset covering all the presidential and the semi-presidential regimes (73 countries) that have adopted two-round system along with the results of 423 elections for both the first and second round and whether the result was determined in the first round, whether the plurality winner of the first round was victorious in the second round, or whether there was a second round 'comeback' – when the runner-up of the first round was victorious in the second. A variety of exploratory hypotheses are presented that try to predict the likelihood of a second round or a comeback. Few are validated. The presence of an incumbent and a qualified method of presidential selection increases the probability of a second round occurring while a greater number of candidates and greater electoral volatility make it less likely. We find that no variables related to political institutions, presidential resources, or the structure of the first round predictive of a second round comeback. We make the dataset public so that future scholars can continue this form of investigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the execution of horizontal accountability mechanisms affect cabinet members' instability? This article analyzes distinct features of no-confidence motions (NCMs) in presidential systems, using a mixed-method research design that identifies elements of legislative control mechanisms in Peruvian and Colombian polities. Although the congress in presidential systems rarely approves NCMs, high salience policy shocks trigger their proposal, resulting in the dismissal or resignation of the cabinet member in question. Those results are subtle opportunities for opposition legislators to indicate the incompetence of the incumbent government in particular policy areas. This study contributes to understanding how contextual factors affect the effectiveness of the check and balance principle in presidential systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present work studies the political and constitutional problems that have arisen as a result of the relations between the Executive and Legislative Powers. To do this, it studies the first debates on the form of government that arose after independence, as well as the existing constitutional crises, especially when the President of the Republic has not had a parliamentary majority and, on the contrary, has had governance problems due to to the opposition that emerged from Congress. Following this historical review, the current regulation of the question of confidence, the dissolution of Parliament, the presidential vacancy, the impeachment of the President of the Republic and the presidential succession are analyzed, proposing reforms to the constitutional text and interpretations of the Constitution that avoid the abusive and discretionary use of these institutions by the powers of the State. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Süleyman Demirel Law Review / Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi is the property of Suleyman Demirel Universitesi Hukuk Fakultesi Dergisi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Luridica is the property of Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Lodzkiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Minority presidents form coalitions to secure legislative support. However, such support comes at the policy cost of delegating power to coalition partners. Given this dilemma, how do presidents decide on portfolio allocation? The argument is that presidents consider ministries' policy relevance and the characteristics of coalition parties when distributing positions. The president will allocate the most important ministries to aligned ministers (seeking policy control) and to the larger coalition parties (seeking legislative support), distributing the least policy-relevant ministries to clientelist parties. The article presents an original measure for policy salience based on topic modeling of presidential addresses and conditional logit models to test the hypotheses. The analysis consists of a comparative study of Brazil, Chile, and Colombia over 24 years. Results indicate that presidents use salience to sort ministries and decide portfolio allocation. This evidence for the president-specific salience argument shows the relevance of considering the qualitative aspects of portfolio allocation in multiparty presidential systems and how presidents share power with coalition partners without losing control over governmental decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]