Search

Over 40% of countries around the world have adopted limits on campaign contributions to curb the influence of money in politics. Yet, we have limited knowledge of whether and how these limits achieve this goal. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits institutional rules on contribution limits in Colombian municipalities, we show that looser limits increase the number of public contracts assigned to donors to the elected candidate. This is explained by looser limits increasing the influence of top donors over the elected candidate, rather than reducing electoral competition or changing who is elected to office. We further show that looser limits worsen the quality of public contracts given to the winner's donors: These contracts are more likely to run over their stipulated costs. Overall, this article links looser campaign contribution limits, donor kickbacks, and worse performance of contracts awarded to donors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In more than half of the democratic countries in the world, candidates face legal constraints on how much money they can spend on their electoral campaigns, yet we know little about the consequences of these restrictions. I study how spending limits affect UK House of Commons elections. I contribute new data on the more than 70,000 candidates who ran for a parliamentary seat from 1885 to 2019, and I document how much money each candidate spent, how they allocated their resources across different spending categories, and the spending limit they faced. To identify the effect on elections, I exploit variation in spending caps induced by reforms of the spending-limit formula that affected some but not all constituencies. The results indicate that when the level of permitted spending is increased, the cost of electoral campaigns increases, which is primarily driven by expenses related to advertisement and mainly to the disadvantage of Labour candidates; the pool of candidates shrinks and elections become less competitive; and the financial and electoral advantages enjoyed by incumbents are amplified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars, pundits, and political reformers have long worried that corporations distort public policy and subvert the will of the electorate by donating to politicians. Well-publicized anecdotes notwithstanding, whether and how much corporations actually benefit from supporting political candidates remains unknown. To systematically address this question, we utilize two complementary empirical approaches that isolate the monetary benefits a company derives from a favored candidate winning office. First, we use a regression discontinuity design exploiting close congressional, gubernatorial, and state legislative elections. Second, we leverage within-campaign changes in market beliefs about the outcomes of US Senate races. We find no evidence that corporations benefit from electing candidates supported by their PACs, and we can statistically reject effect sizes greater than 0.3% of firm value. Our results suggest that corporate campaign contributions do not buy significant political favors—at least not on average. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the divided views between courts on governmental officials' use of the block function on their social media pages and how it could be considered viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. It mentions how government officials, in particular, have jumped on the bandwagon for social media usage in their political campaigns and day-to-day interactions with constituents. It also mentions jurisdictions regarding government officials' social media usage.

The article discusses how to limit or eliminate political contributions in U.S. elections and introduce an effective campaign finance reform. Also cited are the expectations of contributors to get economic or financial benefits from their contributions if their candidates win, the proposal to reduce campaign spending by increasing pre-tax costs of political expenditures, and the need to treat political contributions as non-deductible spending or consumption.

We use the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission to assess the reputational risks created by political investment opportunities that allow managers to spend unlimited and potentially undisclosed firm resources on independent political expenditures. This new opportunity raises important ethical questions, as it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, under current law for shareholders to hold managers accountable for this investment choice and the reputational risks it entails. Using firms' known political activity as a proxy for managers' likely future use of independent political expenditures, we examine how market participants reacted to Citizens United, conditional on this prior activity and corporate governance attributes related to the concentration of decision rights in senior management and blockholders. The results of our analyses document that firms with both a high level of known political activity and CEO-chairperson of the board duality experienced negative abnormal returns in reaction to Citizens United. In contrast, firms with concentrated ownership experienced positive abnormal returns; however, as known political activity increased, investors discounted the benefits of concentrated ownership. These findings suggest that investors expect this expansion of firms' political investment opportunities to amplify principal-agent problems inherent in corporate political activity. Additionally, our findings provide evidence for those deliberating the mandatory disclosure of firms' investments in politics as a means of increasing managerial accountability to both shareholders and the public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on Senate Bill (HB) 213 passed in the Senate of General Assembly of Georgia. It mentions Act amends Georgia's campaign contributions reporting requirements for public officials and the Act amends the dates that campaign contributions must be filed by public officials. It also mentions public officers and public office candidates submit campaign contribution disclosure reports and financial disclosure statement.

Since Citizens United, a new era of campaigning has emerged in which traditional campaign functions have been outsourced to candidate-centric outside groups. In the 2016 presidential election, ten campaigns had raised less money than their allied Super PACs and other outside groups. Federal election regulations that restrict coordination between these outside groups and campaigns are outdated and poorly enforced. American democracy is weakened by this unprecedented electoral activity because of decreased donor transparency, increased negativity without accountability, and voter confusion. This Note concludes, after examining outside group political activity in the 2012 and 2016 presidential cycles, that candidate-centric outside groups create the same risk of corruption as direct contributions to campaigns. Therefore, this Note proposes that proponents of stricter campaign finance regulation should consider removing limits on individual and political party contributions to presidential campaigns. Allowing individuals and parties to provide unlimited funds to campaigns would diminish the appeal of outside groups and increase the political pressure on campaigns to disavow their use. This realistic, if not pessimistic, proposal offers a simple legislative solution to some of the concerning elements of an increased reliance on outside groups, while leaving the possibility for a different Supreme Court to permit radical change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Money in politics has risen to the forefront of the public political consciousness in the decade since Citizens United v. FEC. At the root of the issue are deeply flawed Supreme Court rulings on the constitutional protection afforded to political spending and the definition of regulable "corruption," which have exacerbated issues in the American campaign finance system and effectively legalized political bribery. The purpose of this comment is to highlight the impact of campaign finance on public policy and ultimately propose that we, the American people, must amend our Constitution to restore a representative democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Citizens United v. FEC decision generated immense doubt about the future of state campaign finance regulation. Since the Citizens United v. FEC decision, opponents of campaign finance reform are becoming increasingly successful in challenging state regulations. Among campaign finance regulations, disclosure requirements have traditionally found the most support among the courts. Even though disclosure requirements were upheld in Citizens United v. FEC, they have been placed under pressure by federal district and appeals courts. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has used Citizens United v. FEC to strike down state disclosure requirements. It does not appear, however, that these decisions are a part of a broader trend. This Article reviews Independence Institute v. Williams, where state disclosure requirements were strongly upheld by the Tenth Circuit under the review standards set in Citizens United v. FEC. The Tenth Circuit reiterated the strong support Citizens United v. FEC gave to disclosure requirements under the exacting scrutiny test, which has been a source of ambiguity in other disclosure decisions. Further, the court signaled that states have leeway in their ability to set campaign finance disclosure laws that match the cost of campaigning in their state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the changing field of corporate campaign contributions as applied to federal contractors in the U.S. Topics discussed include implications of Wagner v. Federal Election Commission court case on corporate campaign contributions; enactment of Federal Election Campaign Act for addressing the same; and an account of corporations and individuals interested in influencing federal elections.

Constitutional law is committed to a principle of geographic self-government: congressional districts and states are separately located and entitled to select different officials to send to Congress. James Madison explained in The Federalist Papers that checks and balances would only work if different places and their different politics were empowered to compete with and constrain one another. While constitutional law makes place significant for congressional elections, campaign finance law does not. Those with the resources to contribute often and in large amounts to congressional campaigns primarily reside in a few neighborhoods in a few metropolitan areas. Campaign finance law imposes no limitations and minimal disclosure on contributions from these places to other districts and states--places quite different than the ones where contributors reside. The result is that a few metropolitan areas dominate contributions to congressional campaigns. Campaign finance law thus allows Congress to be controlled by very few places, dramatically undermining geographic self-government. While scholars have devoted substantial attention to other problematic features of money in politics, the geography of campaign finance law is a different constitutional problem justifying different constitutional solutions. This Article considers two types of legal responses: those that focus special attention on where campaign contributions are beginning and those that focus special attention on where campaign contributions are ending. While both types of solutions have their own respective constitutional benefits and negatives, they both share a common insight. Only by making campaign finance law conscious of place can we begin to address the problems of the geography of campaign finance law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article proposes a roadmap for revisiting political party contribution limits since the most recent failed attempts at litigation in 2014 in the U.S. Topics discussed include political theory and empirical evidence the problems facing American democratic governance under the current contribution limits; ceiling on contributions made to political parties; and need of political parties to solicit unlimited contributions to be placed into a segregated account.

As a result of the recent Citizens United decision and its "Super PAC" spawn, individuals, corporations, and unions are allowed to independently spend unlimited amounts to influence elections. The ramifications of the Citizens United ruling have seemingly had a grave impact on the 2016 Presidential Election. In addition to examining the laws--and their loopholes--of political campaign contributions, this Essay will also explore the economics of campaign contributions. Ultimately, there are two reasons as to why corporations provide such large sums of money: one is rent creation, which is the attempt to gain political favors for "special interests;" the second is rent extraction, which is an attempt to avoid political disfavors. As the behavior of candidates continues to resemble the practices of bribery and extortion, campaign finance reform efforts are likely to become more aggressive--in an effort to curb corruption, or the appearance of corruption. Moreover, in the wake of Justice Scalia's death, the Court may consider revisiting and overturning Citizens United. As such, this Essay will investigate potential solutions to combat the lax campaign finance laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although many unauthorized immigrants have become politically active in campaigning for immigration reform, their ability to speak out publicly may depend more on political discretion than on the constitutional protections that citizens normally take for granted. Potential threats to immigrant free speech may be seen in three areas of law. First, the Department of Justice has made a broad claim that immigrants who have not been legally admitted to the country have no First Amendment protection at all. Second, the Supreme Court has approved broad prohibitions on non-citizens spending money on speech that is related to electoral campaigns. Third, the Court has indicated that the federal government might, in its discretion, act to deport immigrants because of their political activities. The Supreme Court should revisit these questions because current case law is in tension with other principles of free speech law, especially the prohibition on identity-based speech restrictions as articulated in Citizens United v. FEC. As the Court explained, the First Amendment protects the rights of marginalized people to have a voice and does not allow the government to prefer some speakers over others based on their identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective. Do incumbent state legislators who introduce many bills or have high passage rates for their proposals receive an electoral benefit for these efforts? If so, where is such an electoral advantage manifested? Is it a direct effect whereby voters are more likely to recognize and reward a legislator's productivity? Or is the effect more indirect whereby potential candidates are less likely to challenge an active incumbent? Methods. These questions are addressed in an analysis of legislative elections in 18 states over two election cycles. Results. Within the low-information environment of state legislative elections, there is evidence of both direct and indirect effects of lawmaking activities. Higher rates of bill passage decrease the likelihood that incumbents are challenged in primaries. Bill passage also reduces the likelihood they face well-financed opponents in the general election. Incumbents who introduce more legislation ultimately receive larger vote shares in general elections. Conclusions. Introducing and passing legislation can enhance an incumbent's prospects for reelection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bush v. Gore decided a presidential election and is the most dramatic election case in our lifetime, but cases like it are decided every year at the state level. Ordinary state courts regularly decide questions of election rules and administration that effectively determine electoral outcomes hanging immediately in the balance. Election cases like Bush v. Gore embody a fundamental worry with judicial intervention into the political process: outcome-driven, partisan judicial decisionmaking. The Article investigates whether judges decide cases, particularly politically sensitive ones, based on their partisan loyalties more than the legal merits of the cases. It presents a novel method to isolate the raw partisan motivations of judges and identifies their partisan loyalty, as opposed to their ideology, by studying a special category of cases: candidate-litigated election disputes. The Article finds that Republican judges display greater partisan loyalty than Democratic judges in election cases where ideology is not a significant consideration. This result is not a function of selection methods, with both elected and appointed judges behaving similarly, but is partially a function of party campaign finance for Republican elected judges, with party loyalty increasing with party money received. However, the effect of party money disappears for more visible election cases and for retiring judges in their final term. What is more, partisan loyalty diminishes when state supreme court elections feature more campaign attack advertising. These findings give reason to rethink judicial resolution of election disputes that require impartial, nonpartisan settlement and offer new insight into judicial partisanship as a more general matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses how independent spending takes away debates and decisions from candidates participating in elections and voters, and empowers organizations. Topics discussed include elimination of all contribution limits to candidates for office; ways in which independent spending threatens democracy; and Professor Lawrence Lessig program of campaign finance reform.

The article examines the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) historical and current approaches to sponsorship identification regulation in political advertisements and the resulting consequences for voting viewers in upcoming 2016 presidential elections. It examines the effects of growing special interest group and political action committee (PAC) advertising on voters and the political landscape.

This article demonstrates that limits on campaign contributions--which alter a candidate's ability to raise money from certain types of donors--affect the ideologies of legislators in office. Using an original data set of campaign contribution limits in some US states over the last 20 years, I exploit variation across and within states over time to show that higher individual contributions lead to the selection of more polarized legislators, while higher limits on contributions from political action committees (PACs) lead to the selection of more moderate legislators. Individual donors prefer to support ideologically extreme candidates while access-seeking PACs tend to support more moderate candidates. Thus, institutional changes that limit the availability of money affect the types of candidates who would normally fund-raise from these two main sources of campaign funds. These results show that the connection between donors and candidates is an important part of the story of the polarization of American politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the constitutionally of the anti-protest laws in Australia, as of December 2015. Topics discussed include anti-protest laws is aimed specifically at non-violent protest; enactments of such laws by the Victorian, Western Australia and Tasmania governments aimed to prevent protest activities that are disrupting the activities of business; and constitutional provisions concerning the freedom of political communication.

The article reports the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case 'McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission' that challenges the U.S. Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which imposed a limit on individual contributions to national party and federal candidate for congressional elections.

The article reports the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case 'McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission' that challenges the U.S. Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which imposed a limit on individual contributions to national party and federal candidate for congressional elections.

Recent United States Supreme Court, decisions have undermined the viability of campaign public financing systems, a vital tool for fighting political corruption. First, Citizens United v. FF.C allowed privately financed candidates and independent groups to spend unlimited amounts of money on campaigning. Publicly financed candidates noto risk being vastly outspent. Second, Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom PAC v. Bennett invalidated a proportional, fund matching system whereby privately financed candidates' or independent groups' spending triggered funds to publicly funded candidates. These decisions effectuate a libertarian speech doctrine: all speakers, individual or corporate, must be absolutely unburdened. To comply with this approach, public financing must be tailored to reduce its monetary correlation with, and corresponding burden on, privately funded speech. This Article proposes matching broadcast advertising access costs as a measured solution. The proposed system does not burden privately funded speech, and it increases media availability: if a privately financed candidate or independent group purchases advertising time, the publicly financed candidate is provided funds to purchase equivalent time. Matching access costs reduces any burden on speakers while importing First Amendment jurisprudence and telecommunications laxo to support the constitutionality of this system. These laws recognize the First Amendment rights of the electorate, the problem of political advertising market saturation, and the values of an informed citizenry. Essential for democracy is an informed, engaged, and participating citizenry. Matching broadcast access costs increases available information, comports with the Court 's jurisprudence, and mitigates the damaging effects of Citizens United. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political campaign contributions are not made in a vacuum. Rather, contributions from individuals are affected by the political and legal environment experienced by potential donors. I study itemized contributions to candidates, parties, and political action committees (PACs) aggregated by congressional district for 1994-2006. The timing and competitiveness of presidential, congressional, and even state elections affect the expected benefits and opportunity costs of contributing to all types of committees, and this is reflected in the amounts contributed through different channels. Political party committees raising hard money contributions relied more on districts with high per capita income, education attainment, and urbanization after the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) than before, but were still less dependent on these districts than soft money committees before the BCRA. Overall, the BCRA led to less reliance on districts with high socioeconomic status as sources of itemized contributions to committees regulated by the Federal Election Commission. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses an increase in the number of independent expenditure political action committees (Super PACs) that are in existence in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the 2010 campaign financing-related case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), and it mentions proposals for the U.S. FEC and state election agencies to redefine "coordination" between candidates and Super PACs to include candidate-assisted fundraising. Political corruption is also examined.

The article deals with the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission wherein the court rejected provisions of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, and its impact on political campaign, campaign finance and democratization. Topics discussed include the differences between businesses and cities as categories of corporations, corporations as a source of money for political candidates and parties, and the historico-legal basis the ruling.

The article discusses how that the U.S. jurisdiction has narrowed the government's interest in justifying restrictions of campaign finance as of March 2015. Topics discussed include the U.S. Court's ever-changing approach to defining government interests to justify campaign finance, the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act, and the decisio of the U.S. Supreme Court in the court case 'Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission' regarding the democratic electoral process.

The article looks at the change in New Hampshire campaign finance law in 2014 in order to regulate the money and outside spending in New Hampshire in political campaigns. Topics discussed include introduction of reforms by Senator Jeb Bradley, significance of these administrative law decision letters from the state Attorney General's office in new finance law, and the Governor Maggie Hassan's reelection campaign in 2014.

Purpose -- This paper aims to prepare executives to pilot a US lobbying effort within the bounds of the US Federal law. Lobbying law may be thought of as the "regulation of regulation", as it defines the ground rules for those wishing to have a direct impact upon all other regulatory systems. The article outlines what the US lobbying law requires, what it forbids and, perhaps most important, what the law does NOT regulate. Design/methodology/approach -- The paper takes the full spectrum of US laws and regulations relevant to lobbying -- including the Internal Revenue Service Code (tax code), the Federal Election Campaign Act, the Ethics in Government Act, the internal rules of both the House and Senate, the US Criminal Code and the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act -- and organizes them into a single 2 × 2 matrix, explaining what all parties must do as well as what they must not do. Via this approach, the rules that govern the "marketplace" for lobbying in the USA are explained. The competition to shape US government policy transpires within this marketplace. Findings -- Few activities the executive may engage in carry the potential payback of a well-executed lobbying campaign: empirical estimates range to returns on investment in the thousands of per cent. But the uninitiated may easily step over the line and invite both legal and public relations (PR) nightmares. Practical implications -- Effective lobbying can afford a corporation or industry a lasting competitive advantage. Every well-rounded business strategy should include such a component, and every well-rounded executive should be capable of performing in this arena. A solid grounding in the legal matrix forming the boundaries of this activity is a prerequisite for effective performance. Originality/value -- The paper organizes and outlines lobbying law in a fashion digestible by executives without legal training. It is of value to anyone wishing to engage in lobbying activities targeted at the US Government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]