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This research examines patterns and factors influencing U.S. civil-military relations interventions in developing countries. Drawing on theories of new clientelism and geopolitics, it proposes developing states’ political traditions and U.S. geostrategic interests jointly shape U.S. intervention policies through an interactive effect. Quantitative analysis of U.S. military assistance and engagement data across 97 developing countries (1990–2020) supports key hypotheses: U.S. civil-military intervention is higher in military-dominated polities and states of major geostrategic interest, with military political traditions amplifying geostrategic factors. Case studies of Egypt and India further reveal differentiated pathways of U.S. military influence across varying political systems. The findings provide new explanations of U.S. foreign military behavior, analytical perspectives on Third World military diplomacy, and insights for developing countries in responding to great power military pressures while preserving sovereignty and security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legislative committees have recently received inadequate attention in the available interjurisdictional literature. This article in the 2024 Policy Studies Yearbook, published by Politics & Policy, reviews legislative committee data categories, methods, and the distribution of authorship to explore how legislative committee research has fared between 2010 and 2023. This review article establishes that since 2010, research on committee structure has been dominated by U.S. congressional theories and how to test them in noncongressional settings. The dominant aspect of legislative organization across the five reviewed themes is the selection of committee members, an essential aspect of understanding power dynamics in modern legislatures. As survey methods and case studies have increased, the archival analysis methods have decreased, indicating an increasing turn to first‐hand primary data in analyzing the internal organization of committees. There is also a growing trend toward greater collaboration among scholars. Related Articles: Jeong, Gyung‐Ho. 2016. "Electoral Rules and Bureaucratic Effectiveness." Politics & Policy 44(6): 1089–115. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12184. Jones, Kate, and Kerry, Jacobs. 2009. "Public Accounts Committees, New Public Management, and Institutionalism: A Case Study." Politics & Policy 39(5): 1023–46. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2009.00209.x/abstract. Pelizzo, Riccardo and Abel Kinyondo. 2014. "Public Accounts Committees in Eastern and Southern Africa: A Comparative Analysis." Politics & Policy 42(1), 77–102. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12062. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, latent variable analysis is used to construct hybrid measure of political development based on the plausible common variation between objective and subjective indicators of political institutions. For a sample of 167 countries for the period 1810–2018, we chart long-term paths of political development. Our empirical strategy attempts to overcome the existing potential bias in the measures of democracy in the long run by extracting the institutional characteristics of political regimes, voter turnout, expert-based assessments and electoral outcomes into two latent indices of political development that can be compared both across space and time. The evidence reveals the remarkable persistence of multiple peaks in the world distribution of political development and uncovers contrasting long-term trajectories across countries traditionally featured in the political economy literature. Our findings add to the current debate about measurement of democratic backsliding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central bank independence (CBI) has been widely advocated as a means to address the time‐inconsistency problem of controlling inflation. Consequently, many countries have embraced central bank reforms since the 1990s. While extant research in political science has sought to unveil the consequences of CBI, there remains an unexplained variation in the response of countries with regard to capital account openness. Notably, a positive association exists between CBI and capital account openness due to the constraints CBI places on leaders' discretionary monetary and fiscal policies, thereby fostering reliance on financial policy to boost their economies. However, this relationship is contingent on the domestic political contexts of countries. CBI leads to capital account liberalization only when the rule of law is guaranteed, given that CBI is often stipulated by laws. Therefore, in countries where political leaders can easily override formal rules, CBI shows no discernible impact on capital account openness. Employing two‐way fixed‐effects and error‐correction models, the study reveals that CBI increases capital account openness only in democracies, in the presence of multiple veto players, and a high level of transparency. The findings underscore the pivotal role of the domestic political environment in analyzing how CBI constrains political leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many studies have attempted to examine the effect of governance on economic growth. However, these studies reveal heterogeneities that make it difficult to implement policy. This current study attempts to fill these gaps by employing foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows as a mediating variable. This study employs balanced panel data for the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) between the period of 2000 to 2021. Based on the mediation framework in a random effect model, this study reveals that political stability (PV) and government effectiveness (GE) affect FDI positively. Moreover, this study finds that FDI can mediate the indirect effect of PV and GE on economic growth. However, this study also reveals that the direct effect of GE on economic growth is negative. This implies that ASEAN countries should be practical, effective, and systematic in improving GE to minimise opportunity costs. On the other hand, ASEAN countries should focus on maintaining PV to attract more FDI and encourage economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The specific of political and political-administrative management of the United States reveals some problematic aspects of realization of official competencies by the head of state from the perspective of positive political relations with American congressmen related to achieve political consensus and make agreed political decisions. In this regard, the search for effective political mechanisms and tools of interinstitutional interaction of executive and legislative authorities at the present stage of the US political development is actualized. Normative and legal bases of political and administrative functions of the US President and the US Congress are considered. Political and historical features of interinstitutional interaction of executive and legislative authorities in the United States are analyzed. The key factors and conditions of conflictogenicity of political relations with American congressmen in the framework of D. Trump’s presidency are identified. The main reasons and circumstances of deepening interinstitutional contradictions in the US political system with regard to J. Biden’s functional role are formulated. It is concluded that it is necessary to build political trust and use approbated political tools approved by the US President and American legislators. At the same time, real causes of political events observed in the United States have an objective nature and need a more in-depth and detailed analysis. As a result, problematic planes and levels of political-administrative relations between the state bodies of executive and legislative power in the United States at the present stage are presented. The author used quantitative (multifactorial analysis, statistical presentation of data) and qualitative (content analysis, secondary analysis of data from American analytical and scientific research centers) methods.

Many scholars consider the bargaining power between ruler and society to be one of the most important determinants of a country's political regime and institutions. The relative bargaining power, in turn, is shaped by arms technology and societal modernization: arms tend to strengthen rulers, and modernization tends to strengthen society. We document that rulers outside of Western Europe were strengthened by advanced arms technology at a time when societies were weakly modernized and political demands limited. We dub this the "coercive imbalance" and argue that it has shaped the state-society bargain outside Western Europe since at least 1850. We show that the coercive imbalance arose because arms diffuse faster than civilian technology. We then use ordinary least squares, system GMM, and two-stage least squares to document that the adoption of advanced arms technology at an early stage of societal modernization is strongly associated with limited democracy, poor bureaucracy, and corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A positive relationship between assessments of procedural justice and attitudes toward the political system has been identified in many studies of various countries. To quantify this relationship, a meta‐analysis was conducted on 69 samples from 50,814 respondents, reported in 37 manuscripts between 1981 and 2021. We found positive correlations between assessments of procedural justice and attitudes toward politicians, political institutions, and the political system in people of different ages and in countries with different political regimes. These positive correlations exist in real and hypothetical situations with various levels of authority. However, two factors moderated the association between the assessment of procedural justice and political attitudes. First, procedural justice as a set of norms is more strongly related to attitudes toward the system than procedural justice as a generalized assessment is. Second, the assessment of procedural justice is more strongly associated with attitudes toward political institutions and the system than attitudes toward the procedures and decisions. Moreover, the percentage of heterogeneity in the obtained models is fairly high; categorical moderators explain 43% of the variance of the effects obtained. The results should therefore be interpreted with consideration of this substantial heterogeneity in the correlations' sizes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines whether the influence of banking regulation on banks' risk is channeled through the quality of political institutions. As banking regulatory factors, we consider capital stringency, activity restrictions and supervisory power. The overall effect of banking regulation on banks' risk is conditional on the quality of political institutions. Activity restrictions and capital stringency have a statistically significant positive effect on banks' risk. This effect is mitigated by better political institutions. In contrast, stringent supervisory power tends to reduce banks' risk, and better political institutions reinforce this effect. The results are robust for alternative estimation methods and risk measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a result of globalization, and modern scientific and technological development, information technologies began to cover an increasing number of areas, including politics. The issue actualizes as we enter the Artificial Intelligence (AI) era. In times of AI, increasing scientific influence on politics was manifested in the development of a new scientific field — Digital Diplomacy. The development of AI and the changes taking place today can transform the political processes, imposing new threats to the political systems and the entire system of international relations. In this context, ethical issues are of particular concern because they can be blurred by the political decisions made by digital/computer program algorithms; that is, giving power to computer programs to make political decisions can destabilize the political system. This issue is particularly sensitive in terms of ensuring justice and protection of state political interests. The presented paper aims to discuss political transformation in the context of the modern digitalization process, the work of political institutions, and digital diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study addresses the question of what drives legislators to prioritize different areas of reform in post-authoritarian societies that take on a path of democratization. Specifically, this study uses the case of the Ukrainian legislature to analyze legislative preferences toward tackling corruption and economic or institutional reforms. We use eight waves of surveys of Ukrainian legislators spanning two decades to identify what factors are associated with preferences that legislators have toward different reforms. We find that party affiliation, regional ties, and committee membership are important factors in explaining the preferences of Ukrainian legislators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales is the property of Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales is the property of Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Setting the decision agenda requires restricting information and focusing attention on specific issue dimensions. Agenda setting also carries opportunity costs: focusing on some issues and proposals means others go unaddressed. Agenda setting thus generates conflict about the choice of issues and selection of alternatives and proposals. Using data on "views" attached to U.S. Senate committee reports and Volden and Wiseman's legislative effectiveness scores, I show that more effective legislators are more likely to express disagreement with agenda-setting choices. And rather than harm senators' future prospects at advancing legislation, expressing disagreement is associated with more subsequent legislative success relative to what other individual and institutional characteristics would predict, particularly in the middle stages of the legislative process. This article's findings illuminate potential short-term benefits to expressing disagreement in agenda setting. I also find these activities have declined over time, which suggests changes in the institutional environment about venues for expressing disagreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do political leaders pursue their own parochial interests? Does the economic background of those in power affect the economy? Estimating the impact of leaders' interests without bias is difficult given the nonrandom nature of transitions between leaders in most regimes. This article exploits a selection mechanism in the Florentine Republic that combines features of election and lottery to evaluate the causal impact of leaders' economic interests. Coupling high-frequency data on the trading value of the Florentine currency with data on the guild association of each leader, I show that the export orientation of the Florentine executive, the standard-bearer of justice, had a large effect on the value of the city's currency, the florin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the key factors influencing the political development and stability of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as RF, Russia) is trust of citizens in political and social institutions. At the same time, youth is part of the Russian society with which the strategic prospects for progress of the country and vectors of socio-economic transformations are connected. The insufficient degree of confidence in the authorities will hinder effective implementation of societal development processes that also occur in socio-economic and institutional systems. The article presents the questionnaire results of students from Russian universities (N = 780 people) and colleges (N = 780 people) conducted in 2023; educational institutions are located in 41 subjects of the RF in all federal districts. The study revealed a relatively low level of trust of the Russian student youth to various government institutions, while the level of trust in regional authorities is lower than in fede ral ones. This is due to lack of awareness of young people about their activities. Additionally, most of the youth does not undertake a purposeful search and critical analysis of information, does not follow news about the work of authorities. It was also revealed that various network information spaces (social networks, regional digital Internet communities, official websites of government bodies and news portals) have a significant potential to increase institutional trust of students, since they cause the highest level of confidence.

The relationship between the United States and Vietnam began when Prince Nguyen Phuc Canh worked with Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary American Ambassador Thomas Jefferson in 1787. The United States, however, later invaded Vietnam, causing a bloody conflict unlike any in human history from 1954 to 1975. Then, in 1995, a shared sense of humanity and morality motivated the two countries to attempt to form a comprehensive partnership that they achieved in 2013, and they have been working to refine their approach toward collaborating together ever since. In this partnership, there is a need to uncover and resolve a few mysteries. This article's objective is to analyze the fundamentals of both cooperation and conflict in this historical partnership – human rights (including for prisoners of war and those missing in action), military security, policy reform in Vietnam, and financial gains for Vietnam and the United States. However, differences in political institutions, interests and values, and aims for the relationship have all become points of contention since normalization of bilateral relations in 1995. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing entrepreneurship literature has focused on formal regulatory institutions but has rarely examined effects on entrepreneurship of formal political institutions, particularly that of democracy. This study explores the role of democracy in entrepreneurial development, as well as how democracy moderates the role of kinship networks, in a developing or emerging economy setting. Integrating new institutional economic theory with social network theory, this study examines the rate of rural entrepreneurship in China by arguing that stronger local democratic governance facilitates entrepreneurial development and negatively moderates the role of kinship networks in entrepreneurial development. In particular, while kinship networks have a positive effect on entrepreneurial development when democratic governance is weak, their effect turns negative when it is strong. We use a national sample of villages from China for our empirical test. Results from both Ordinary Least Squares and an instrumental variable approach provide strong support for our hypotheses. The research contributions and implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do politicians from dominant parties choose different fiscal policies in response to an external economic shock than politicians from competitive parties? This paper argues that politicians from dominant parties might adopt different fiscal policies than politicians from competitive parties in response to an external economic shock. Politicians from dominant parties might enjoy a political advantage that allows them to underinvest in areas with low political gains compared to politicians from competitive parties and divert the money to policy areas more politically profitable. I examine my theoretical prediction using a panel data set of Mexican governors from 1995 to 2010. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the critical interplay between economic institutions and political institutions and assess their influence on venture capital market development in sub‐Saharan Africa (SSA). To address endogeneity concern in our model specification, the two‐step system generalised method of moments was employed on a sample of 34 SSA countries from 2007 to 2018. The findings reveal that strengthening disaggregated measures of economic institutions, comprising legal system and property rights, size of government, sound money, regulations, and freedom to trade internationally spur venture capital market development in SSA. Finally, the evidence indicates that political institutions condition the influence of economic institutions on venture capital market development. The implications for policy are further discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Business Administration & Social Studies is the property of Aves Yayincilik Ltd. STI and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How are patterns of military spending shaped by political leaders who have substantive policy preferences and need the support of their constituents to remain in power? A formal model developed to address this question indicates leaders' preferences, political vulnerability, and motivation and their domestic audiences' preferences jointly influence equilibrium military spending. I find variation in patterns of military spending consistent with the model's implications between 1946 and 2010. My analyses demonstrate that leaders' desire to remain in power and individual-level characteristics and domestic audiences' preferences jointly shape policy outcomes and, accordingly, suggest studying the interactions among them can provide insights into a range of topics central to peace science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do executive agencies form coalitions? Legislative coalitions are widely theorized and studied, but less attention has been paid to executive coalitions. Executive agencies’ dependence on the political branches calls for a distinctive theory of coalition building. This article presents such a theory, arguing that agencies form coalitions to optimize their autonomy given their subordinate position in a separation of powers system by signaling to overseers that their policies are efficient and should be maintained. Bureaucrats form coalitions actively to advance their policy goals in the face of political opposition. Using data on dozens of agencies over seventeen years, I find that agencies are most likely to form coalitions when their preferences are misaligned with the president but aligned with each other. I also find evidence that coalitions send credible signals that bureaucratic policies are efficient since Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs is less likely to request regulatory revisions of policies produced by coalitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary democratic theorists have tended to assume that democracy is compatible with and even requires a capitalist economic system. Rosa Luxemburg offers a democratic criticism of this view, arguing that the dominating effects of a capitalist economy undermine the ability of liberal democracy to actualise its ideals of freedom and equality. Drawing on Luxemburg's writings, this article theorises a model of socialist democracy which combines support for public ownership and control of the means of production with a plural multi-party electoral system and a defence of civil liberties. It recovers Luxemburg's conceptualisation of a socialist democracy as the extension of democratic principles to major social and economic institutions currently governed by nondemocratic authority structures. It defends this version of socialist democracy from the liberal objection that it violates citizens' property rights and the Marxist objection that it retains the dominating structures of the state and a coercive legal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When countries experience a surge of migrants at their borders, they search for ways to assert control, often using strategies aimed at slowing, reducing, discouraging, or blocking entry. To the extent that national and international law confers rights on some migrants, in particular laws allowing individuals to cross borders to claim asylum, the tools for directly impeding entry may be limited. In this context, states may develop administrative practices to accomplish indirectly what they cannot accomplish directly by law. This article examines the case of metering in the US as an administrative strategy of border control. It traces an unusual path to this strategy, from its origins in informal street-level practices to its evolution into a formal administrative policy extending and ostensibly legitimating those practices. This analysis brings a comparative street-level perspective to the socio-legal analysis of law-in-practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the frequent use of economic sanctions by states, there are insufficient analyses of the collateral effects of these measures on target states. Under the sanctions, targeted leaders who pursue the longevity of their regimes adjust domestic policies to mitigate the costs associated with sanctions. Specifically, this article analyzes the effects of sanctions on capital account liberalization in target states. Economic sanctions trigger changes in the capital account openness of target states. However, the direction of the reform is dependent on the political institutions in target states, which characterize the behavioral incentive structure of the leaders. Specifically, economic sanctions lower capital account openness, albeit only in autocracies. Democracies, which are sensitive to the benefits of capital account openness, are less likely to tighten the restrictions. Instead, they are likely to open their markets. I employ the two-way fixed approach to test my argument, using time-series cross-sectional data spanning 145 countries for the period 1965–2005. In this regard, I find evidence in favor of my argument, with the findings suggesting the indirect impact of economic sanctions on target states' financial policies on which the decisions are primarily driven by the political incentives of the targeted leaders. A pesar del uso frecuente de las sanciones económicas por parte de los Estados, no existen suficientes análisis acerca de los efectos colaterales que tienen estas medidas en los Estados de destino. En virtud de las sanciones, los líderes de los Estados de destino de estas sanciones, que tienen como objetivo la longevidad de sus regímenes, ajustan sus políticas nacionales con el fin de mitigar los costes asociados a las sanciones. En concreto, en este artículo se analizan los efectos que tienen las sanciones sobre la liberalización de la cuenta de capital en los Estados de destino. Las sanciones económicas provocan cambios en la transparencia de la cuenta de capital de los Estados de destino. Sin embargo, la dirección de las reformas depende de las instituciones políticas de los Estados de destino, las cuales caracterizan la estructura de incentivos conductuales de los líderes. De manera más concreta, las sanciones económicas reducen la transparencia de la cuenta de capital, aunque solo en las autocracias. Las democracias, que son sensibles a los beneficios de la transparencia de la cuenta de capital, son menos propensas a endurecer las restricciones. En cambio, es probable que abran sus mercados. Utilizamos el enfoque fijo bidireccional con el fin de demostrar nuestro razonamiento, mediante el uso de datos transversales de series temporales que abarcan 145 países durante el período entre 1965 y 2005. A este respecto, encontramos evidencias que apoyan nuestro razonamiento, ya que las conclusiones sugieren el impacto indirecto que tienen las sanciones económicas sobre las políticas financieras de los Estados de destino, cuyas decisiones están impulsadas principalmente por los incentivos políticos de los líderes del Estado de destino. Malgré la fréquence de l'utilisation des sanctions économiques par les États, les analyses des effets collatéraux de ces mesures sur les États cibles restent insuffisantes. Les dirigeants ciblés qui souhaitent assurer la longévité de leur régime ajustent les politiques nationales pour atténuer les coûts associés aux sanctions auxquelles ils sont soumis. Plus précisément, cet article analyse les effets des sanctions sur la libéralisation du compte de capital dans les États cibles. Les sanctions économiques déclenchent des modifications dans l'ouverture de celui-ci. Cependant, l'orientation de la réforme dépend des institutions politiques des États cibles, qui caractérisent la structure d'incitations comportementales des dirigeants. Plus précisément, les sanctions économiques réduisent l'ouverture du compte de capital, quoique seulement dans les autocraties. Les démocraties, plus sensibles aux avantages de l'ouverture du compte de capital, accentueront moins souvent les restrictions. Elles auront plutôt tendance à ouvrir leur marché. J'utilise une approche d'effets fixes bilatéraux pour évaluer mon argument, à l'aide de données chronologiques transversales couvrant 145 pays entre 1965 et 2005. À cet égard, je trouve des éléments pour étayer mon argument : les conclusions indiquent la présence de conséquences indirectes des sanctions économiques sur les politiques financières des États cibles. Les décisions concernant ces dernières se fondent principalement sur des incitations politiques des dirigeants ciblés. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corruption scandals have been constantly present in the Spanish media in recent years. The public stays informed about these events through the media, so the way in which journalists cover them, as well as their perception of this problem -which threatens and endangers society- as regards the institutions and the media themselves, is of great important. This article addresses this issue using a representative survey, conducted between March and July 2023, of 391 Spanish journalists belonging to media outlets of different sizes and platforms from across the country. Journalists were asked about the perceived level of corruption in different public institutions, their level of institutional trust, and their degree of agreement with a variety of statements about corruption and the media. After performing a descriptive and inferential statistical analysis of the data collected, the results showed that journalists see corruption as one of the main problems in Spain, with a definitively higher incidence in political institutions compared with other public institutions. In addition, it was found that, the greater the perception of an institution's corruption, the greater the journalists' distrust of that institution, thus confirming the dysfunctional thesis of political scandals. Finally, it was revealed that, for journalists, the watchdog role is theoretically essential, but it is not carried out in practice owing to the commercial logic that has been embraced by the Spanish media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Local brokers are essential in the implementation of clientelist politics, but their efforts on parties' behalf are not fully observable. A growing literature studies how parties address this agency problem, highlighting two distinct reward schemes: allocating promotions or prizes based on observed vote shares or doing so based on inferred effort allocations. This article develops a formal model to examine the conditions under which one or the other of these reward schemes is optimal for minimizing brokers' rent seeking. Intuitively, the effort-based reward mechanism is optimal when broker effort is inferred with relative precision. Less intuitively, the vote-based mechanism will tend to be optimal when a party's supporters are evenly distributed across regions and when the prize β adopts intermediate values, which together lead to high levels of interbroker competition. When brokers must compete with one another over valued prizes, parties can often minimize rent seeking without directly monitoring broker effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the integral role of the judiciary to democracy, and the importance of judicial trust for judicial system performance, we know relatively little about the bases of public trust in this institution. How does institutional quality affect judicial trust? We explore this question in the context of Latin America, using a multilevel data set comprising survey data spanning 2001 to 2016 and country-level institutional and economic factors. We find that the effects of institutional quality on judicial trust are highly circumscribed. Factors like rule of law and corruption impact the judicial trust of only the best-educated survey respondents. Among the broader public, however, judicial trust is shaped more strongly by individuals' subjective economic and regime evaluations, as well as one's personal experiences with the judiciary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The social work profession has a long tradition of engaging with policy to promote social justice, to improve the well-being of service users and the working conditions of social workers. Previous studies have mainly focused on the levels and forms of social workers' policy engagement. However, little is known about the factors that influence social workers' decisions to engage in policy. Addressing this research gap, this study focuses on one very specific influencing factor that has so far only received limited scholarly attention, namely, political institutions. More specifically, the article draws upon Switzerland as a case study and examines how Switzerland's direct democracy, federalist structure and consensus system promote social workers' policy engagement. The findings illustrate how these three key political institutions provide important opportunities for social workers—as individuals or as members of groups and coalitions—to access formal and informal areas of the policy process, both as private citizens and as part of their jobs. Based on these findings, the final section of the article outlines suggestions for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Political Science Studies / Studia Politologiczne is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Analecta Política is the property of Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We measure the impact of competition and institutional quality on stability for dual banking economies. Our sample comprises 492 banks (109 Islamic and 383 conventional banks) from 17 countries with dual‐banking systems. The sample period is from 2005 to 2020. The estimations are performed using Two Step System Generalized Method of Moments approach. Our findings reveal heterogeneous effect of competition on stability. We found the evidence of competition‐stability paradigm in case of full sample as well as for Islamic banks. There is no effect of competition on the stability of conventional banks. Furthermore, there is no evidence of size effect in the competition‐stability results. The impact of legal institution is insignificant. We also observe that better quality of political and the economic institutions increases the bank stability. We attribute these findings to the conjecture that better political and/or legal institutions improve bank stability by reducing information asymmetry and adverse selection. Finally, we find the evidence that political, legal and economic dimensions of institutions have differential effect on competition‐stability relationship. The findings are robust to alternative definitions of competition, stability and different methodological approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]