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The tutelage of our mentors as scientists included the analogy that writing a good scientific paper was an exercise in storytelling that omitted unessential details that did not move the story forward or that detracted from the overall message. However, the advice to not get lost in the details had an important flaw. In science, it is the many details of the data themselves and the methods used to generate and analyze them that give conclusions their probative meaning. Facts may sometimes slow or distract from the clarity, tidiness, intrigue, or flow of the narrative, but nevertheless they are important for the assessment of what was done, the trustworthiness of the science, and the meaning of the findings. Nevertheless, many critical elements and facts about research studies may be omitted from the narrative and become hidden from scholarly scrutiny. We describe a bakers dozen shortfalls in which such elements that are pertinent to evaluating the validity of scientific studies are sometimes hidden in reports of the work. Such shortfalls may be intentional or unintentional or lie somewhere in between. Additionally, shortfalls may occur at the level of the individual or an institution or of the entire system itself. We conclude by proposing countermeasures to these shortfalls.

When searching for a solution to a problem, having a theory—an underlying causal structure that explains outcomes as a consequence of antecedents and that allows for the prediction of potential consequences of combinations of choices not yet tried—changes the way in which people explore the solution space. Whether a theory proves useful to search, however, depends not just on its predictive precision. This essay argues that the internal structures of theories—their size, complexity, the extent of their elaboration, and the confidence that their users have in the assumptions—also influences how people search for solutions and the efficiency of their search processes. It offers several conjectures about how theory and theory structure influence search and about which types of theories prove most useful to success.

The remarkable technical contributions of Michael E. Fisher to statistical physics and the development of the renormalization group are widely known and deeply influential. But less well known is his early and profound appreciation of the way in which renormalization group created a revolution in our understanding of how physics — in fact, all science — is practiced and the concomitant adjustment that needs to be made to our conception of the purpose and philosophy of science. In this chapter, I attempt to redress this imbalance, with examples from Fisher's writings and my own work. It is my hope that this tribute will help remove some of the confusion that surrounds the scientific usage of minimal models and renormalization group concepts, as well as their limitations, in the ongoing effort to understand emergence in complex systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientists use a wide variety of models to formally represent their theories, including computational, quantitative, and mathematical models. A type of model often overlooked in discussions of modeling is an iconic model, which is a visual or physical representation of the structures and processes comprising some natural phenomenon. In the current paper, we present a brief history of iconic models as they have been employed in other sciences such as astronomy, physics, biology, and chemistry. We then present several iconic models that are well known to psychologists and show how they played important roles in theory construction and evaluation. Modern methods of iconic modeling are next presented and demonstrated with several examples. Finally, we close with a discussion of how iconic models can be used in tandem with computational, quantitative, or mathematical modeling procedures in the quest for rigorous theories of the human psyche. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the impact of global connectivity and technology on how we perceive others, especially in the context of charity and effective altruism. Topics include the dichotomy between what we can see clearly and what we miss through technology, the rise of effective altruism as a movement to improve charitable giving, and how this phenomenon challenges traditional views on helping others globally.

Transdisciplinary research knits together knowledge from diverse epistemic communities in addressing social-environmental challenges, such as biodiversity loss, climate crises, food insecurity, and public health. This article reflects on the roles of philosophy of science in transdisciplinary research while focusing on Indigenous and other subjugated forms of knowledge. We offer a critical assessment of demarcationist approaches in philosophy of science and outline a constructive alternative of transdisciplinary philosophy of science. While a focus on demarcation obscures the complex relations between epistemic communities, transdisciplinary philosophy of science provides resources for meeting epistemic and political challenges of collaborative knowledge production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether truth is absolute or relative has been a widely discussed topic for over two thousand years in epistemology and the philosophy of science. However, this issue has not yet been discussed systematically with respect to linguistics. The present paper attempts to make the first step toward filling this gap. It raises the following question in Sect. 1: What kind of relationship is there between the pluralism of inquiry, the relativistic and the absolutistic approach to truth, and the tolerance of views differing from one's own in the practice of linguistic research? After Sect. 2 has clarified what is meant by 'relativism', 'absolutism', 'pluralism' and 'tolerance', Sects. 3–5 describe, analyse, and systematize the ways in which relativistic and absolutistic views are manifested in linguistic theorizing. Finally, Sect. 6 summarizes the findings and gives a sophisticated answer to the main question of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Genuine Chinese dance therapy is in the ascendant and psychiatric approaches that involve a broad spectrum of principles such as ontological identity, social inclusion and collective support, aestheticisation and expressive catharsis, symbolic exorcism, trance and Buddhist mindfulness. Its models are based on a wealth of Chinese dance genres originating from various dynasties as well as cultural traditions of ethnic minorities. Due to different epistemological backgrounds of Western diagnostic manuals and traditional Chinese views of mental diseases, complex understanding of pathologies and therapeutic dynamics is needed. Therefore, this opinion piece suggests a theoretical framework that encourages interdisciplinary approaches as well as inclusive transcultural psychiatry and related philosophy of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1945, Norman Cazden published a groundbreaking article in the literature on consonance perception. In this seminal work, Cazden combined historical, musicological, and theoretical arguments to assert that the Pythagorean approach to consonance, based on integer ratios, lacked substantiation. Recent empirical evidence has bolstered Cazden's perspective, indicating that the perception of consonance is primarily shaped by culture rather than by arithmetical ratios. Nevertheless, some scholars have drawn attention to other evidence from the bio-musicological literature that supports the Pythagorean hypothesis. Consequently, the current debate on consonance tends to center around the nature vs. culture dichotomy. In this paper, I endeavor to demonstrate that many of the "cultural" arguments can coexist with the Pythagorean hypothesis if we adopt a more epistemologically suitable framework, as proposed by Imre Lakatos's philosophy of science. To achieve this, I conduct an in-depth analysis of Cazden's arguments, along with examining both historical and contemporary reinterpretations of them. Then, I apply Lakatos's concept of "research programme" to the case study of consonance, highlighting various research avenues that have drawn inspiration from the Pythagorean hypothesis and have been successfully pursued. I conclude by claiming that the Pythagorean account can be regarded, in Lakatosian terms, as a progressive research programme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although understanding is the object of a growing literature in epistemology and the philosophy of science, only few studies have concerned understanding in mathematics. This essay offers an account of a fundamental form of mathematical understanding: proof understanding. The account builds on a simple idea, namely that understanding a proof amounts to rationally reconstructing its underlying plan. This characterization is fleshed out by specifying the relevant notion of plan and the associated process of rational reconstruction, building in part on Bratman's theory of planning agency. It is argued that the proposed account can explain a significant range of distinctive phenomena commonly associated with proof understanding by mathematicians and philosophers. It is further argued, on the basis of a case study, that the account can yield precise diagnostics of understanding failures and can suggest ways to overcome them. Reflecting on the approach developed here, the essay concludes with some remarks on how to shape a general methodology common to the study of mathematical and scientific understanding and focused on human agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sceptical arguments in epistemology typically employ sceptical hypotheses, which are rivals to our everyday beliefs so constructed that they fit exactly the evidence on which those beliefs are based. There are two ways of using a sceptical hypothesis to undermine an everyday belief, giving rise to two distinct sorts of sceptical argument: underdetermination‐based and closure‐based. However, both sorts of argument, as usually formulated in the literature, fall foul of evidential holism, for they ignore the crucial role of background beliefs. An analogy with the philosophy of science makes this point explicit. There is no simple way to "holism proof" the two sceptical arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ontology is implicitly or explicitly the impetus of any study. However, what are the implications of a scholarly field whose prevailing ontological assumptions and resultant epistemological commitments impede more nuanced theorizing? In this paper, we caution against theorizing norms in fields characterized by a non-diverse and non-inclusive set of ontological assumptions. We contend that editorial practices therein create a certain kind of methodological conformity and conduct, that is, an undue justification and explanatory overtones related to methods that are set against the predominant grain. Through a thematic review of qualitative papers in international marketing as a case in point, we argue against narrow onto-epistemological arsenals, we discuss the value of critical theorizing and put forward two modest proposals to address this kind of scholarly conformity in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Resources are central to value creation processes. Hence, marketing and service research rely heavily on conceptualisations of resources and resource integration for theory building efforts. One of the most widely accepted marketing lenses on resources and resource integration is the service-dominant (S-D) logic. Depicting resources as becoming and contextual, S-D logic argues that their usefulness co-depends on other resources. Some assumptions of S-D logic have been challenged particularly its dichotomous categorisation of operand and operant resources. To inform ongoing S-D logic theorising, our article problematises the multiple and contradictory ontological views upon resources and resource integration present within S-D logic. Moving beyond critique, we propose concrete means for reconciling these contradictions. Seeing a parallel between S-D logic's ontological inconsistencies and past ontological disagreements in the philosophy of science, we draw on the philosophical perspective of Karen Barad to develop a consistent onto-epistemological foundation for conceptualising the becoming nature of resources in S-D logic. The theory adaptation we perform enhances the applicability and explanatory capacity of S-D logic, while also offering a more robust and rigorous foundation for marketing and service research at large and giving managers new means to make sense of co-dependent resource phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues, based on Lewis' claim that communication is a coordination game (Lewis in Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 3–35, 1975), that we can account for the communicative function of demonstratives without assuming that they semantically refer. The appeal of such a game theoretical version of the case for non-referentialism is that the communicative role of demonstratives can be accounted for without entering the cul de sac of trying to construct conventions of ever-increasing complexity. Instead communication via demonstratives is explained with reference to the general, non-domain specific ability of human beings to solve games of coordination. Furthermore, there is empirical support for such a view. Judgments concerning demonstrative reference have been shown to be sensitive to judgments concerning common ground (Clark et al. in J Verb Learn Verb Behav 22:245–258, 1983), which is exactly what the non-referentialist account would predict. The game theoretical account also allows for an intuitively plausible, non-referentialist treatment of Speaks' 'trumping argument' (Speaks in Philos Stud 174:709–734, 2017), as well as the Carnap/Agnew puzzle (Kaplan in Syntax Semant 9:221–43, 1970). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces Karen Barad's philosophical framework of agential realism as an alternative philosophy of science perspective for quantitative psychology and measurement. Agential realism offers a rethinking of the research object, measurement process and outcome, causality, and the researcher's responsibility by proposing an ethico-epistem-ontological understanding of material-discursive practices that co-construct our world. The contemporary, canonical underlying philosophy of science perspective of quantitative psychology entails entity realism, a difference between ontic existence and epistemic approaches, complete causality, and determinism. Consequently, the researcher has no responsibility for the characteristics of a research object. The paper introduces agential realism and its assumptions about rejecting entity realism but a particular understanding of phenomena, the entanglement of ontic existence and epistemic approaches, and the researcher's role in co-creating an outcome. A reworking of the concept of causality implies newly emerging possibilities for realizations. Subsequently, the paper addresses four consequences of applying agential realism in quantitative psychology. (1) If there is indeterminacy in every phenomenon, researchers do not search for one true score but assume a realization potential, which has implications for comparisons and replications. (2) If configurations are part of things-in-phenomena, then context does not work as a third variable; instead, all 'parts' are co-creators. This entanglement must be considered in replications instead of trying to eliminate its impact. (3) Agential realism encompasses the researchers' responsibility to justify decisions made in a research project and to clarify ethics. (4) Overall, agential realism alters the research endeavor by asking new questions and interpreting research outcomes differently. Further directions point towards concrete tasks like methodological questions and the necessity within psychology to elaborate further on the conceptualizations initiated by Barad. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Shaped by advances in scientific instrumentation and experimental techniques, the concept of antibody has undergone profound transformations throughout the history of immunology. Serological assays, separation techniques, protein fragmentation techniques, molecular biology techniques, and other methodological innovations did not only serve to produce data on the structure and function of these molecules but, by framing antibodies into a unique facet of experimental investigation, were effectively redefining and reconceptualizing these molecules for the scientific community. The characteristics and properties of antibodies observed in experimental settings were often directly extrapolated to their presumed nature in living organisms, as exemplified by the literal identification of antibodies with a gamma electrophoretic fraction in the 1930s. Stemming from parallel advances in related fields such as molecular biology and biochemistry, the introduction of novel techniques was driving shifts in the field of immunology, establishing novel frameworks of theoretical conceptualization and understanding. Technological innovation in experimental techniques continues to shape our view of these molecules, driving progress in both basic immunology and therapeutic applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major open question in the borderlands between epistemology and philosophy of science concerns whether Bayesian updating and abductive inference are compatible. Some philosophers—most influentially Bas van Fraassen—have argued that they are not. Others have disagreed, arguing that abduction, properly understood, is indeed compatible with Bayesianism. Here we present two formal results that allow us to tackle this question from a new angle. We start by formulating what we take to be a minimal version of the claim that abduction is a rational pattern of reasoning. We then show that this minimal abductivist principle, when combined with Bayesian updating by conditionalization, places surprisingly strong and controversial constraints on how we must measure explanatory power. The lesson is not that Bayesianism is definitely incompatible with abduction, but that both compatibilism and incompatibilism have hitherto unrecognized consequences. We end the paper by formulating these consequences in the form of a trilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are many different kinds of models, and they play many different roles in the scientific endeavour. Neuroscience, and biology more generally, has understandably tended to emphasise empirical models that are grounded in data and make specific, experimentally testable predictions. Meanwhile, strongly idealised or 'toy' models have played a central role in the theoretical development of other sciences such as physics. In this paper, we examine the nature of toy models and their prospects in neuroscience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper critiques the reductionist approach of contemporary physicalism. Drawing on the philosophies of Schelling and Whitehead, it argues for a panexperientialist view where feeling is central to understanding physical reality. The paper examines the Kantian roots of the modern bifurcation of nature and proposes an "organic realism" that integrates mind and matter. It introduces Whitehead's conceptual framework to recontextualize the onto-epistemic status of scientific models in terms of what he referred to as propositional feelings. The paper concludes that a comprehensive cosmology must account for both physical phenomena and human consciousness, advocating for a more integral approach to natural science that acknowledges the primacy of feeling in making sense of the universe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In science studies, history and philosophy of science, and history of science, scientific controversies are supposed to reveal how science works. Controversy, in this sense, is not primarily a research object but a conceptual tool developed to model current or past events in the sciences with the aim of capturing the very nature of science. Treating controversy as a conceptual tool, I discuss which aspects of scientific disagreements are highlighted by this tool, which aspects are relegated into the background, and what remains unconsidered or ignored. I present my observations through the example of the discussion of color vision in fish and bees between physiologist Carl von Heß and zoologist Karl von Frisch in the 1910s and early 1920s. I discuss four points, each of which plays a particular role in controversy research: (1) the interest in the end and not the beginning of controversies, (2) the typical presentation of a controversy as a clearly defined confrontation of positions, (3) the assumption that controversies follow rules, and (4) the idea that controversies must begin almost automatically when certain conditions are met. As Helga Nowotny emphasized, in case of disagreement, non-controversy seems just as plausible as open contradiction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central pursuit of cognitive neuroscience is to find neural mechanisms of cognition, with research programs favoring different strategies to look for them. But what is a neural mechanism, and how do we know we have captured them? Here I answer these questions through a framework that integrates Marr's levels with philosophical work on mechanism. From this, the following goal emerges: What needs to be explained are the computations of cognition, with explanation itself given by mechanism—composed of algorithms and parts of the brain that realize them. This reveals a delineation within cognitive neuroscience research. In the premechanism stage, the computations of cognition are linked to phenomena in the brain, narrowing down where and when mechanisms are situated in space and time. In the mechanism stage, it is established how computation emerges from organized interactions between parts—filling the premechanistic mold. I explain why a shift toward mechanistic modeling helps us meet our aims while outlining a road map for doing so. Finally, I argue that the explanatory scope of neural mechanisms can be approximated by effect sizes collected across studies, not just conceptual analysis. Together, these points synthesize a mechanistic agenda that allows subfields to connect at the level of theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the use of critical questions (CQs) as an 'explicit' pedagogical method in the nature of science to teach Chinese high school students topics of philosophy of science (POS). The study results, evaluated through deductive thematic and qualitative comparative analyses using Toulmin's argumentation patterns and a critical integrative argumentation model, revealed that students who participated in the POS course showed significant improvement in understanding and application of argumentation by asking CQs as suggested by instructors. This finding strongly supports the use of CQs for rebuttals in argumentation based on crisp qualitative comparative analysis. The study results have broad implications for how CQs can promote engagement in high school argumentation. The study conclusions highlight the limitations of oral questioning in classroom argumentation. Finally, the study discusses how POS can improve students' classroom argumentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The full Interpersonal Theory of Suicide (ITPS) has yet to be empirically tested. • However, the ITPS provides explanation, clinical utility, and predictive validity. • The IPTS may be intensified by non-humanness, lack of agency, and discrimination. • Minoritized people may benefit by integrating the IPTS and Minority Stress Theory. In this state-of-the-science review, we summarize the key constructs and concepts within the interpersonal theory of suicide. The state of the scientific evidence regarding the theory is equivocal, and we explore the reasons for and some consequences of that equivocal state. Our particular philosophy of science includes criteria such as explanatory reach and pragmatic utility, among others, in addition to the important criterion of predictive validity. Across criteria, the interpersonal theory fares reasonably well, but it is also true that it struggles somewhat—as does every other theory of suicidality—with stringent versions of predictive validity. We explore in some depth the implications of the theory and its status regarding people who are minoritized. Some implications and future directions for research are also presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the interventionist theory of causation, a counterfactual theory taken from philosophy of science, to strengthen causal analysis in process tracing research. Causal claims from process tracing are re-expressed in terms of so-called hypothetical interventions, and concrete evidential tests are proposed which are shown to corroborate process tracing claims. In particular, three steps are prescribed for an interventionist investigation, and each step in turn is shown to make the causal analysis more robust, amongst others by disambiguating causal claims and clarifying or strengthening the existing methodological advice on counterfactual analysis. The article's claims are then illustrated using a concrete example, Haggard and Kaufman's analysis of the Argentinian transition to democracy. It is shown that interventionism could have strengthened the authors' conclusions. The article concludes with a short Bayesian analysis of its key methodological proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can modern neural networks like language models be useful to the field of language acquisition, and more broadly cognitive science, if they are not a priori designed to be cognitive models? As developments towards natural language understanding and generation have improved leaps and bounds, with models like GPT‐4, the question of how they can inform our understanding of human language acquisition has re‐emerged. As such, it is critical to examine how in practice linking hypotheses between models and human learners can be safely established. To address these questions, we propose a model taxonomy, including four modelling approaches, each having differing goals, from exploratory hypothesis generation to hypothesis differentiation and testing. We show how the goals of these approaches align with the overarching goals of science and linguistics by connecting our taxonomy to the realist versus instrumentalist approaches in philosophy of science. We survey recent work having adopted each of our modelling approaches and address the importance of computational modelling in language acquisition studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientists typically run experiments many times to find general patterns over multiple specific runs. The results of those runs vary, and the variance is often simply referred to as “noise”. We claim that it is highly important to separate the components that contribute to noise and to recognize to which degree they contribute to it. Consideration of the relative contributions of R (randomness), U (uncontrolled variables), and M (measurement error) helps to interpret data and can help to improve experimental designs. We explain this using a hypothetical example and point out that assumptions of what causes variability in the results of experiments are often made implicitly. Further, we demonstrate our point by showing how it can change the interpretation of real data. Because of a lack of explicit discussion of underlying assumptions, it is possible that sources of noise are misidentified to be either existent or non-existent. This can happen if, for example, measurement error is assumed when there is none, an assumption that would mask a real effect that could deserve further study. Despite these factors, the contribution of different factors to the overall noise is rarely considered, hampering scientific progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article delves into testimonial smothering and testimonial quieting in erotically oppressive lifeworlds, particularly focusing on women's sexual arousal. It critiques the DSM-IV's approach to women's sexual arousal and highlights the harms of mainstream media, pornography, and scientific naturalism. The paper argues that these lifeworlds limit women's agency in expressing their sexual desires. It also responds to objections to DSM-5's conceptualization of women's sexual arousal, emphasizing the importance of recognizing women's subjective experiences. The document explores various aspects of sexual arousal, desire, and dysfunction in women, challenging traditional models and societal norms. [Extracted from the article]

Summary For a Bayesian agent with beliefs about the relationship between covariates and potential outcomes, deterministically selecting an assignment that yields optimal covariate balance rationally dominates randomisation. However, randomisation—by enabling control over the probabilities of erroneous causal conclusions due to unknown covariate imbalances—offers insurance against the possibility that an agent's beliefs may be misleading. For the most part, such rational justifications for optimum assignment have presupposed the framework of Bayesian inference, while such epistemic justifications for randomisation have presupposed the framework of significance testing. In this paper, I build on a conception of balance that seems inextricable from the significance testing framework, Fisherian balance, to show that it implies an analogous epistemic justification for randomisation within the framework of Bayesian inference. Consequently, for the choice between optimum and random assignment, this paper shows that epistemic justifications need not be wedded to significance testing nor must Bayesian inference be wedded to rational justifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Coloniality and Analytic Moral Epistemology in the Twentieth Century" by Alison M. Jaggar and Theresa W. Tobin examines the colonial biases present in analytic moral philosophy during the 20th century. The authors critique the universal approach to moral reasoning taken by prominent philosophers like Richard M. Hare and John Rawls, arguing for a more inclusive and diverse perspective in moral epistemology. The article emphasizes the importance of moral and epistemic humility, as well as an understanding of the historical and cultural context that influences philosophical traditions. The document includes a variety of philosophical works and articles by different authors, covering topics such as decolonizing Western political philosophy, queer perspectives on love and justice, yoga philosophy, and moral justification, offering researchers a range of perspectives to explore. [Extracted from the article]

The document is a reply by authors Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, and Larry Samuelson to comments on their paper "Economic models as argumentative devices." They express gratitude for the enriching comments and clarify their goal of positive analysis of economic models. The authors discuss the case-based interpretation of models, explanations, the unifying framework of economic theory, the current state of theory, and the role of economic theory in generating predictions and recommendations. They emphasize the importance of understanding the various ways in which theory can be useful and call for more explicit identification of the purpose of theoretical endeavors. [Extracted from the article]

Macaulay has performed a great service by pointing out unfounded leaps of logic in the syllable sections of descriptive grammars, but the auxiliary hypotheses that underlie such leaps require close scrutiny everywhere, including in his own argument: intuitions are more reliable than he claims, intonation is less reliable than he assumes, inconsistencies cannot be resolved by simply ignoring certain types of evidence, and innateness considerations qualify all linguistic argumentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The commentaries provided by Haig; Derksen and Morawski; and Trafimow vary considerably in how they address critical realism and its implications for replication. Haig's preference for Kaidesoja's "naturalised" version of critical realism and Lipton's inference to the best explanation is deeply problematic. While Derksen and Morawski concede that they deal only indirectly with critical realism, their endorsement of "performativity" negates it. In Trafimow's case, ontology's regulative role is untenably diminished and ultimately supplanted by classic methodologism. I conclude that replication should be replaced by exploratory stratified contextualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robert Archer argues that psychology should abandon its use of Karl Popper's philosophy of science. He recommends that psychology ought to adopt the philosophy of critical realism in its place. I put Archer's concern with Popper to one side and provide a selective critique of mainstream critical realism, in the light of some developments in contemporary philosophy of science. I express some misgivings about the ontological commitments of Roy Bhaskar's critical realism, and comment on the limitations of his DREI(C) model of scientific inquiry. In doing so, I also respond to a number of critical remarks Archer makes about replication in psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document, titled "Referees for Philosophy of Science," acknowledges and expresses gratitude to the referees who have contributed to the journal. It lists the names of individuals who have reviewed papers for the journal since the April 2023 issue. The document emphasizes the importance of their service and apologizes for any inadvertent omissions. The list includes a diverse range of names from various cultural backgrounds, reflecting the inclusive nature of the journal. [Extracted from the article]

In the current social and technological scenario, the term digital is abundantly used with an apparently transparent and unambiguous meaning. This article aims to unveil the complexity of this concept, retracing its historical and cultural origin. This genealogical overview allows to understand the reason why an instrumental conception of digital media has prevailed, considering the digital as a mere tool to convey a message, as opposed to a constitutive conception. The constitutive conception places the digital phenomenon in the broader ground of media studies, and it considers digital technologies as an interface between the subject and the world. In this perspective, the media is not added to the experience of the person, but it shapes it from within on a cognitive, expressive and communicative level. The article makes use of two powerful examples to show the shortcomings of an instrumental conception of the digital, and to affirm the value of a constitutive conception for current media studies regarding digital interfaces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will focus on the nature of theoretical concepts, i.e., the psychological entities related to theoretical terms in science. I will first argue that the standard picture of theoretical concepts in twentieth-century philosophy of science understood them as representation-oriented common taxonomic concepts. However, I will show how, in light of recent pragmatist approaches to scientific laws and theories, several important theoretical concepts in science do not seem to fit such picture. I will then argue that these theoretical concepts should be understood instead as goal-derived concepts, since their construction and use exhibit the typical characteristics that cognitive scientists assign to goal-derived concepts. I will furthermore argue that the existence of theoretical concepts that are goal-derived concepts represents yet another example of the central role that human goals play in science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate between the revisionist and received views of the relationship between Thomas Kuhn and logical empiricism has until now focused on the relationship between Kuhn and Rudolf Carnap. Here, I consider the relationship between Kuhn and two other members of the Vienna Circle's left-wing; Otto Neurath and Philipp Frank. It is argued that the attribution of the historical turn in philosophy of science to Kuhn obscures the historical awareness displayed in important works by members of the Vienna Circle, and thereby distorts its legacy. Both Frank and Neurath recognised the role for history in theorizing about science, and drawing upon these insights lead them to considerations of scientific theory-choice, rational disagreement, and the role of extra-scientific values in science, that anticipate those later made famous by Kuhn. It is also argued that the Left-Vienna Circle's programme for Unified Science, the replacement of traditional philosophy with a bipartite metatheory of science, provides a clearer and potentially more radical role for the history of science within the philosophy of science than Kuhn's. To reach this conclusion, it is demonstrated that some members of the Vienna Circle maintained a far less robust distinction between contexts of discovery and justification than has typically been attributed to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Mary Hesse remains an influential figure within the history of the philosophy of science her reflections on the role of the human imagination in science have, to date, been mostly neglected. In her first, and often overlooked monograph— Science and the Human Imagination —Hesse described the imagination as composed of four dimensions. Defined as the historical, the critical, the fertile and the creative imagination, these dimensions played, for Hesse, various roles in both the philosophy and practice of science. Suffice to say, Hesse's discussion of the role of the imagination in science challenges the idea that philosophy and science are logically determined forms of practice through an appeal, as will be argued, to Immanuel Kant's seminal reflections on the 'indispensable function' of the imagination. Accordingly, a detailed elucidation of Science and the Human Imagination not only situates Hesse's reflections within the long history of the philosophy of the imagination; it revitalises anew contemporary debates on the role of the imagination in the philosophy and practice of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Author networks in science often rely on citation analyses. In such cases, as in others, network interpretation usually depends on supplementary data, notably about authors' research domains when disciplinary interpretations are sought. More general social networks also face similar interpretation challenges as to the semantic content specificities of their members. In this research-in-progress, we propose to infer author networks not from citation analyses but from topic similarity analyses based on a topic-model of published documents. Such author networks reveal, as we call them, "hidden communities of interest" (HCoIs) whose semantic content can easily be interpreted by means of their associated topics in the model. We use an astrobiology corpus of full-text articles (N = 3,698) to illustrate the approach. Having conducted an LDA topic-model on all publications, we identify the underlying communities of authors by measuring author correlations in terms of topic distributions. Adding publication dates makes it possible to examine HCoI evolution over time. This approach to social networks supplements traditional methods in contexts where textual data are available. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The editorial "Introduction: Philosophical Discussions with Pragma-Dialectics" published in the journal "Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy" commemorates the anniversaries of two seminal works in argumentation theory. The special issue explores the philosophy of argument underlying pragma-dialectical theory, emphasizing the pragmatic perspective on argumentation. The pragma-dialectical approach defines argumentation as a speech act, focusing on actions in context and normative standards of rationality. The editorial highlights the significant role pragma-dialectics has played in contemporary argumentation studies and its ongoing impact on philosophical inquiry. [Extracted from the article]

The practically unlimited spread of pseudo-scientific and pseudo-expert assessments in today’s media generates an active social request for critical thinking, which can only rely on a scientifically based position. At the same time, the competitive nature of the “science communication” and “scientific communication” concepts need to be philosophically reviewed using the methodology of contemporary theories and considering the current global and national challenges. Using the methodological approaches of Markus Dressel, three main models of interaction between science and society (SSIMs) were analyzed (technocratic, decisionist, and pragmatic ones) through the issue of establishing a common field of discourse between scientists and non-scientists. Brian Trench and Massimiano Bucchi differentiate three models of science communication – the deficit model, the engagement model, and the participation model (from deficit to dialogue and participation models). These models can be considered as a way of institutionalizing the interaction of science and society – respectively, the directions of science popularization, enhancement of the expert role of science in society, and participation of non-scientists in certain elements of scientific research. The article aimed to reveal the main trends in studying the institutional potential of the social influence on science communication globally and in Ukraine particularly. As research demonstrates, the deficit model dominates in Ukraine, though the expert role of science and community science as a form of society’s participation in performing scientific tasks is developing ever more intensely.

The paper is devoted to the problem of describing reality in the language of mathematics and logic in connection with intellectual intuition. The question raised is how the basic requirements of mathematical theory and logic will change if some of the multiverse models of modern physics are taken as the basis. Mathematics is considered in the context of various historical approaches. It is shown that some of the well-known requirements of a formal theory (such as consistency) may begin to play a different role if the multiverse hypothesis is accepted. In the framework of theories based on the idea of multiple worlds, the logical consequence, the natural law of Duns Scotus, the law of excluded middle, and other well-known facts of classical logic which in some cases cause controversy due to their intuitive unacceptability are resolved. The paper discusses an approach based on paraconsistent logics: such logics can be considered the first to correspond to multiverse theories.

This article investigates the analogy of the “laws of nature” through Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) and Gilbert Simondon’s ontogenetic naturalism (ON). Both thinkers challenge the literalist interpretation of scientific knowledge by emphasizing the indirect nature of relation and the primacy of the autonomy of discrete beings over pre-established physical laws. Harman’s OOO defends this autonomy as the irreducible independence of objects from their relations, while Simondon focuses on the modulation of information in shaping the laws of nature through individuation. The article argues that while science remains the best recursive triangulation between logic and empirical evidence, its grasp of an ultimate, literal Truth is constricted by an epistemological relation to autonomous realities, grounded in analogy. Consequently, the laws of nature are considered as legislated by discrete autonomies, with space and time emerging from the things themselves. The article concludes by discussing the consequences of this reframing in light of the ancient conception of díkēkosmos (cosmic justice).

Ivane Beritashvili has been regarded as an “anti-Pavlovian” for nearly a century. One respect in which Beritashvili is said to be anti-Pavlovian is in granting an explanatory role to subjective mental states in his doctrine of image-driven behavior. In this article, I aim to problematize the anti-Pavlovian assessment and argue that Beritashvili did not deviate from Pavlovian scientific norms, minor points of theoretical and methodological differences between them notwithstanding. Furthermore, several respects in which Beritashvili is claimed to be anti-Pavlovian are ways in which he resembles Pavlov. Turning my attention to Beritashvili’s critics in the Soviet Union, those responsible for his censure, I argue that it is the critique of Beritashvili that runs counter to the norms Pavlov embraced. I contest the claim that his alleged deviations from Pavlovian orthodoxy justify classification as anti-Pavlovian in a sense that is either historically accurate or philosophically interesting, and submit that the grounds on which Beritashvili is derided as anti-Pavlovian would also justify labeling Pavlov himself as anti-Pavlovian. Informed by the case of Beritashvili and others who were politically persecuted for their scientific work in the Soviet Union, I conclude with reflections on science, politics, and the intrusion of the latter in the former. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractWhile environmental problems are urgent in modern society, they are especially difficult to tackle because of their normative and politically controversial nature. Universities may choose different theoretical paradigms for the teaching of environmental problems. However, limited theoretical and/or practical analysis has been undertaken of the theoretical and normative paradigms underlying education on environmental problems. How do we know if educational approaches sufficiently equip students to deal with environmental issues? This article provides a taxonomy for mapping both environmental paradigms and learning outcomes, allowing for a thematic content analysis of the programs of a Dutch university that focuses on environmental problems. The main findings are that, while the course guides are overall highly internally coherent, there are disciplinary silos where the different disciplines teach from different paradigmatic presuppositions. Furthermore, the programs are very cognitive-centered, leaving little room for affective, social, and behavioral learning outcomes, despite the importance of these in higher education. This cognitive bias is relevant for all paradigmatic outlooks, but especially for the more mechanistically oriented paradigms. While understandable from the substance of these paradigms, multimodality in pedagogy and learning outcomes is needed for a comprehensive education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]