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Studies of the Early Modern debate concerning absolute and relative space and motion often ignore the significance of the concept of true motion in this debate. Even philosophers who denied the existence of absolute space maintained that true motions could be distinguished from merely apparent ones. In this paper, I examine Berkeley's endorsement of this distinction and the problems it raises. First, Berkeley's endorsement raises a problem of consistency with his other philosophical commitments, namely his idealism. Second, Berkeley's endorsement raises a problem of adequacy , namely whether Berkeley can provide an adequate account of what grounds the distinction between true and merely apparent motion. In this paper, I argue that sensitivity to Berkeley's distinction between what is true in the metaphysical, scientific, and vulgar domains can address both the consistency and the adequacy problems. I argue that Berkeley only accepts true motion in the scientific and vulgar domains, and not the metaphysical. There is thus no inconsistency between his endorsement of true motion in science and ordinary language, and his metaphysical idealism. Further, I suggest that sensitivity to these three domains shows that Berkeley possesses resources to give an adequate account of how true motions are discovered in natural science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most philosophers of science do philosophy 'on' science. By contrast, others do philosophy 'in' science (PinS), that is, they use philosophical tools to address scientific problems and to provide scientifically useful proposals. Here, we consider the evidence in favour of a trend of this nature. We proceed in two stages. First, we identify relevant authors and articles empirically with bibliometric tools, given that PinS would be likely to infiltrate science and thus to be published in scientific journals ('intervention'), cited in scientific journals ('visibility'), and sometimes recognized as a scientific result by scientists ('contribution'). We show that many central figures in philosophy of science have been involved in PinS, and that some philosophers have even 'specialized' in this practice. Second, we propose a conceptual definition of PinS as a process involving three conditions (raising a scientific problem, using philosophical tools to address it, and making a scientific proposal), and we ask whether the articles identified at the first stage fulfil all these conditions. We show that PinS is a distinctive, quantitatively substantial trend within philosophy of science, demonstrating the existence of a methodological continuity from science to philosophy of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What remains of German Idealism? This essay sets out by proposing that in both Hegel and Schelling the answer is ultimately an ontology of remains: an unsystematic philosophy of divine abjection in which the waste of the One is exposed as its own condition of possibility. This sheds new light on Coleridge's uneasy relationship with German Idealism, especially his puzzlement over Hegel's Science of Logic and his scandalized fascination with Schelling's Freiheitsschrift. At the heart of Coleridge's disquiet is his detection in both philosophers of a form of transcendental ontology that redirects the Kantian concern with the epistemological conditions of possible knowledge into an enquiry into the ontological conditions of the subjectivization of being. The essay traces the implications of the ontologizing of transcendental idealism for Coleridge's philosophy, chief among which is the way in which an indivisible remainder or Abfall (waste, offal) of the Absolute presents an excess that refuses to be harmonized into the transcendental unity of Coleridge's Prothetic "One." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The German-born American Gunther S. Stent (1924–2008) was a refugee from Nazi Germany. He studied in the United States, was a follower of Max Delbrück, and became a member of the phage group. He researched DNA replication and RNA transcription and translation, and made contributions to neurobiology. He loved paradoxes and was a great communicator and a philosopher of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One crucial premise in the argument from illusion is the Phenomenal Principle. It states that if there sensibly appears to be something that possesses a sensible quality, then there is something of which the subject is aware that has that sensible quality. The principle thus enables the inference from a mere appearance to an existence (usually a mental one). In the argument from appearance, a similar move is taken by some philosophers—they infer a content from a mere appearance. There are two kinds of defences for the Phenomenal Principle in the literature, namely, the epistemological one (e.g. H.H. Price) and the semantic one (e.g. Frank Jackson). I argue that neither consolidates the Phenomenal Principle. I particularly demonstrate that the appearance verb in premise 1 of the argument from illusion is not used in the phenomenal sense as it is used in the Phenomenal Principle, which renders the argument essentially invalid. To avoid invalidity, the proponents either give up the phenomenal use, which makes the argument unable to serve its original purpose, i.e. inferring an unusual existence, or they insist on the phenomenal use in all premises of the argument, which will trivialise the argument. I also demonstrate that a similar objection applies to the argument from appearance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the structure of cultivated religious experience. For the Buddhist philosopher Jñānaśrīmitra (c. 980–1040), the religious experience of the Buddhist yogin (yogipratyakṣa) is not spontaneous or sporadic but must be intentionally and rationally cultivated. I argue that Jñānaśrīmitra's picture parallels certain contemporary constructivist accounts of religious experience, according to which the prejudices, expectations, and interpretative structures of the practitioner shape the character of the experience in question. Despite this, however, Jñānaśrīmitra maintains that religious experience is direct, non-conceptual, and ineffable. Even though cultivation begins by focusing on rationally understood, effable conceptual content (the Buddha's teaching of the Four Nobles' Truths, for instance), the yogin's relation to that content is transformed through cultivation (bhāvanā). Cultivation makes awareness-events with conceptual content vivid (spaṣṭa) in such a way that they lose their conceptual character, coming to affect the practitioner's mind as if they were external to it. In this way, precisely in virtue of beginning the process of cultivation with certain expectations about the Buddha's teaching, Buddhist yogins come to have a direct and non-conceptual experience of the breakdown of their own mental streams and the dissolution of the sense of self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A meta-theology makes claims about the structure of theological claims: it identifies a single, fundamental claim about God, and shows how other theological claims are derivable from the fundamental claim. In his book Depicting Deity and other articles, Jon Kvanvig has identified three distinct meta-theologies: Creator Theology, Perfect Being Theology, and Worship-worthiness Theology. In this article, we argue that the medieval Islamic philosopher Avicenna's views about God have the structure of a meta-theology, and that it is distinct from the three projects Kvanvig identifies. This view is Necessary Existent Theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nietzsche's perspectivism has received restricted and unrestricted interpretations. The latter take the cognitive effects of 'perspectives' to be pervasive and general; the former argue they are restricted to special subject matters, have limited effects, or are not essentially cognitive at all. I argue on textual grounds that Nietzsche was committed to the unrestricted view. Comparison to A.W. Moore's treatment of perspectival representation in Points of View illuminates both the nature of perspectivism and key arguments needed to defend it. Nietzschean perspectivism must deny the very possibility of absolute representations (sensu Moore), and to do so, it must block a form of argument that promises to integrate perspectival representations into progressively less restricted, and ultimately absolute, representations of the world. Such arguments depend on a strong assumption about the unity of the independent world, which Moore accepts and Nietzsche denies. Nietzsche's pluralism about perspectives thereby turns out to rely on pluralism about the world, which shapes his understanding of us as essentially bounded cognitive agents. Nietzsche holds that the longing for absolute representation manifest in Moore, Leibniz, and many other philosophers, which aspires to overcome the limitations of perspective, amounts to ascetic self-denial about our cognitive condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate whether ordinary quantification over objects is an extensional phenomenon, or rather creates non-extensional contexts; each claim having been propounded by prominent philosophers. It turns out that the question only makes sense relative to a background theory of syntax and semantics (here called a grammar) that goes well beyond the inductive definition of formulas and the recursive definition of satisfaction. Two schemas for building quantificational grammars are developed, one that invariably constructs extensional grammars (in which quantification, in particular, thus behaves extensionally) and another that only generates non-extensional grammars (and in which quantification is responsible for the failure of extensionality). We then ask whether there are reasons to favor one of these grammar schemas over the other, and examine an argument according to which the proper formalization of deictic utterances requires adoption of non-extensional grammars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many centuries, the issues of power, politics, and state have been widely discussed in scientific literature. Developing theories, philosophers proceeded from the side of hierarchical affiliation of power, which is confirmed in theological and biological concepts. Relevance of the presented article is conditioned by the fact that for the first time the French philosopher M. Foucault has offered innovative ideas of power concept from the social point of view. M. Foucault's works are of significant importance for modern researchers in various branches of science since he created a universal tool for the study of social relations. The objective of this study entails conducting a thorough examination of the development of his theory, as well as exploring diverse perspectives presented by scholars on this matter. The result of the research was a full-fledged analysis of the "power" category from the position of a comprehensive phenomenon, which penetrates the whole structure of the state, and not only selected organs or institutions. The main conclusion of the paper is that "power" is a complex social phenomenon that cannot be equated with categories such as "law", "discipline", "subordination", or "punishment". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) is considered the most important method of ethical justification and is intensively discussed in the scientific community. However, it is unclear to what extent it is actually applied in the ethical literature. The objective of this paper is to fill this gap by providing a critical overview of its explicit applications. Explicit application refers to studies that, following Daniels' definition, contain three levels, name their elements, and provide a connection between the levels. Philosophers Index, ProQuest, PubMed, Web of Science, and Scopus were searched for studies that explicitly used the WRE method and were written in German or English. All topics, disciplines, and publication forms were considered. Nineteen studies were found in which the WRE was applied 23 times. In the 23 applications, 50 equilibria were discussed, and 19 times it was reported that an equilibrium state was reached. The authors applied the WRE in various disciplines, for different purposes, and to diverse topics. The applications themselves differed considerably regarding the application procedure and the scope. Differences can be seen in particular with regard to the presentation of the adjustment process and the WRE criteria used. The results indicate that the WRE can be successfully applied, but the number of explicit applications is still very low. Further research is needed to develop the WRE into an established method of justification. In particular, standards are needed for adjustment and for WRE criteria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses two books related to historical figures. The first book, "Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618-1680): A Philosopher in her Historical Context," is a collection of essays that explore the life and philosophy of Elisabeth of Bohemia. The essays cover various aspects of her life, including her education, scientific inquiry, friendship with Anne Conway, and political thought. The book provides valuable insights into Elisabeth's contributions and is a valuable resource for researchers interested in her work. The second book is a review of a biography of René Descartes titled "La Vie de Monsieur Descartes" by Adrien Baillet. The biography, published in 1691, is an important contemporary source for understanding Descartes's life. The reviewer praises Annie Bitbol-Hespériès's edition of the biography, which includes annotations and detailed notes, and highlights her previous work on Descartes's writings. [Extracted from the article]

This essay examines an epistemological thread that runs through Michael W. Clune's A Defense of Judgment. The first half raises worries about Humean judgment, ultimately doubting whether it can vindicate all it has been asked to. The second half argues that expertise can be grounded in fully tacit knowledge, though that fact inevitably—and rightly—introduces outsider skepticism. The explicitness of that tacit knowledge is not a requirement of expertise as such, but rather a contingent feature of the requirements of academic life. But this, among other things, may be what makes literary education a worthy pursuit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite signifying a negative self-appraisal, shame has traditionally been thought by philosophers to entail the presence of self-respect in the individual. On this account, shame is occasioned by one's failure to live up to certain self-standards—in displaying less worth than one thought one had—and this moves one to hide or otherwise inhibit oneself in an effort to protect one's self-worth. In this paper, I argue against the notion that only self-respecting individuals can experience shame. Contrary to the idea that shame presupposes the presence of self-worth, I contend that shame merely requires that one have the desire, rather than the expectation, that one is worthy. Furthermore, I suggest that the desire for concealment fueled by shame is not an inherently self-protective mechanism but can alternatively be understood as an effort to safeguard one's connection with others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Marx's account of technical progress has been criticized by philosophers as being a metanarrative, by ecological economists as being unduly strong, by economists as being unduly weak, and by post-Sraffian authors as being ill-founded. This article discusses Marx's account of technical progress in light of these criticisms on a conceptual, theoretical, and empirical level, relying on the apparatus of wage curves. It argues that some of the critiques cannot be sustained, since the criticized positions cannot be attributed to Marx. The remaining critiques, in turn, amount to alternative predictions on the evolution of wage curves which are, however, and in contrast to those of Marx, not in line with empirical evidence, as the estimation of wage curves for thirteen countries from 2000 to 2013 shows. JEL Classification : B14, B24, O33 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epistemic injustice is a condition where knowers and knowledge claims are unduly dismissed. Philosophers suggest that epistemic injustice manifests in three forms: testimonial, hermeneutical, and contributory. Although distinct, all forms of epistemic injustice stem from relations of power, privilege, and positionality — where some have the opportunity and authority to legitimize the knowledge contributions of others. The purpose of this study was to explore the presence of epistemic injustice in U.S. doctoral education through a systematic review of literature. We methodically searched hundreds of peer-reviewed journals for studies focused on teaching, advising, peer interaction, doctoral socialization, and other experiences concerning doctoral education across the humanities, social science, and science disciplines. We retained, reviewed, and analyzed 107 manuscripts. Our analysis revealed epistemic injustice in doctoral education as well as rules that foster the conditions for epistemic injustice. Implications for doctoral education and future research are offered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers think that we should use a lottery to decide who gets a good to which two persons have an equal claim but which only one person can get. Some philosophers think that we should save identified persons from harm even at the expense of saving a somewhat greater number of statistical persons from the same harm. I defend a principled way of justifying both judgements, namely, by appealing to the decreasing marginal moral value of survival chances. I identify four desiderata that, I contend, any such justification should satisfy, and explain how my account meets these desiderata, unlike some previous accounts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers have spent a great deal of time debating whether intransitive preferences can be rational. I present a risky decision that poses a challenge for the defender of intransitivity. The defender of intransitivity faces a trilemma and must either: (i) reject the rationality of intransitive preferences, (ii) deny State‐wise Dominance, or (iii) accept the bizarre verdict that you can be required to pay to relabel the tickets of a fair lottery. If we take the first horn, then we have a synchronic refutation of intransitivity, an improvement on widely criticized diachronic arguments. I sketch possible responses that may rescue intransitivity and argue that each response is possible but generates an explanatory debt. I conclude by showing how the challenge here clarifies the foundations of decision theory without transitivity, conditional on some explanatory debt being payable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Departing from the relationship between the texts of the Ghanaian poet and novelist Kojo Laing and a recent international art exhibition, this article traces the relationship between style and the multivalent activity of flight across Laing's work. Drawing upon an intercontinental range of philosophers – from Deleuze and Guattari to contemporary Akan thinkers – it analyses the intersections between gender, geography, and language in Laing's texts, and demonstrates their value within the context of discussion of contemporary literature's investment in possible futures. Laing's transnational aesthetic foregrounds lines of flight across and between different linguistic and cultural communities, and traces relentlessly emerging or possible constellations of relation. Situating Laing in the context of his interdisciplinary reception, this article seeks to explore the aesthetic and ethical ramifications of the unusual networks of affiliation and response of one of West Africa's most important, yet critically undervalued, contemporary writers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, various philosophers and ethologists have argued or hypothesised that, in addition to humans, there are also non-human animals that are capable of following rules and implementing normative behaviours. The investigation of animal normativity until now, however, has been almost exclusively focused on mammals and, in particular, non-human primates and cetaceans. In contrast, this work aims to extend this research to the world of invertebrates and, more specifically, to the world of eusocial insects. For the purpose of investigating whether there are clues of normativity in the world of eusocial insects, we will inquire into the question of whether certain behaviours of ants can be considered normatively conditioned behaviours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction to the special edition presents a literature review of scholarship on Justin, demonstrating via his traditional monikers ("Justin Martyr," "Justin of Neapolis," "Justin the Philosopher," and "Justin the Apologist") the need for a fresh treatment, here dubbed "Justin of Rome"—which properly embeds Justin in his imperial setting, encompassing both the literary and historical landscape of the 2d century AD. It teases out connections between the papers that follow and offers a synthesis of the contribution of the special edition, read as a whole, to our understanding not just of this one thinker but of early Christian literature and history more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Universals are properties that are shared by multiple objects. In classical South Asia, Brahmanical thinkers from Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā text traditions were realists about universals, while most Buddhists were nominalists. In this paper, my aim is to reconstruct the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of universals, with special emphasis on the arguments of the Nyāya philosopher Uddyotakara (6th century CE) against a Buddhist strand of resemblance nominalism. I show that Uddyotakara's contribution to this debate is twofold. First, he is possibly the first Naiyāyika to adopt a sparse theory of universals, a theory according to which it is necessary to posit only those universals which explain how objects resemble each other in the most fundamental or irreducible respects. On the other hand, he offers a few arguments for realism, which are explicitly motivated by a causal constraint on intentionality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study proposes, as an entryway into the complex debate about 'exclusion' (apoha) in Indian philosophy, that the main idea underlying Dignāga's theory of apoha is that the relation between a word and its meaning—all the individuals that it can refer to—is established more by noticing what it is not used for than what it is used for. The Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila raises a number of objections based on his construal of an apoha as a 'non-existence' (abhāva), but he also zeroes in on the problem of how, if apoha s are known only by language and inference, they could ever be known at all. In this connection, he criticises Dignāga's idea that the meaning of a word is learned by noticing that it is not used for things other than its usual referent. It seems, then, that much of what Dharmakīrti is doing in his discussion of apoha is to provide, in response to Kumārila, an account of how perceptual experiences of distinct particulars that have the same effects naturally give rise to an ascertainment of their exclusion from other entities, which can then be assigned as the meaning of an expression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the notion of immortality in Jaina philosophy by focusing on the problem of the persistence of the self. It considers the concept of persistence within the broader context of Jaina metaphysics and its specific application to living beings. The article analyses the relationship between the immaterial self and its material body to determine which aspects of living beings can be deemed immortal or persisting beyond death. It also investigates the state of liberation as an immortal condition. Drawing from the Tattvârtha-sūtra and four of its commentaries, the article demonstrates the complexity of the Jaina treatment of the issue of the self's persistence over time and its commitment to the doctrine of non-one-sidedness. It also shows that Jaina philosophers deal with this critical philosophical problem in a way that reflects their engagement with the intellectual debates of their time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes the group of ninth-century Zoroastrian philosophers I call the 'Dēnkard School' and sketches the way they do philosophy. It presents their argument against substance dualism, which the Zoroastrians argue is in tension with the belief in repentance. From an analysis of this polemic, there follows a reconstruction of the Dēnkard School's own doctrine of the consubstantiality of body and soul. To understand these arguments, I describe some background eschatological and ontological beliefs upheld by the Dēnkard School and their specific conception of substance, which includes the notions of ownership and responsibility. Overall, the argument can be seen as a new position on a traditional problem, and so increasing the scope of philosophy in a more global perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers in the field of meta-ethics believe that rational degrees of confidence in moral judgments should have a probabilistic structure, in the same way as do rational degrees of belief. The current paper examines this position, termed "moral Bayesianism," from an empirical point of view. To this end, we assessed the extent to which degrees of moral judgments obey the third axiom of the probability calculus, $${\rm{if\,P}}\left({{\rm{A}}\mathop \cap \nolimits {\rm{B}}} \right) = 0{\rm{\,then\,P}}\left({{\rm{A}}\mathop \cup \nolimits {\rm{B}}} \right) = {\rm{P}}\left({\rm{A}} \right) + {\rm{P}}\left({\rm{B}} \right)$$ if P A ∩ B = 0 then P A ∪ B = P A + P B , known as finite additivity, as compared to degrees of beliefs on the one hand and degrees of desires on the other. Results generally converged to show that degrees of moral judgment are more similar to degrees of belief than to degrees of desire in this respect. This supports the adoption of a Bayesian approach to the study of moral judgments. To further support moral Bayesianism, we also demonstrated its predictive power. Finally, we discuss the relevancy of our results to the meta-ethical debate between moral cognitivists and moral non-cognitivists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers have struggled with the problem of knowing others. The emphasis is often on the knowing here. In this paper, I want to concentrate on our conception of what is known (i.e. a person). I shall argue that we should aim to give an account of our knowledge of others that has us engaging with each other as persons. I shall argue that there is a perceptual account of our knowledge of others that has this result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the recent progressive reappraisals of the enlightenment by Jonathan Israel and Rainer Forst, Voltaire figures as almost a reactionary thinker, opposing the radical dimensions of the enlightenment pushing forwards secularisation, democratisation, and toleration. Part 1 examines Israel's and Forst's accounts of Voltaire, showing their striking proximity. Part 2 is divided into the three subheadings of (i) Voltaire's deism, (ii) the pivotal subject of toleration, and (iii) the decisive question of what philosophical radicalism, in the direction of democratising reform, involves. At issue in Israel's and Forst's claims that Voltaire's deism represents a step backwards from Bayle's and Spinoza's more radical conceptions of reason and toleration, we will claim, is a shared, anachronistic failure to duly credit Voltaire's deism's distance from the revealed religions, and the radicalism of Voltaire's anti-clericism. In the key claim of the paper, however, we will argue that the larger issue in Israel's and Forst's positioning of Voltaire as almost reactionary are a deeper set of assumptions about how we should assess philosophical texts which aim to act in the world, and (evoking Feuerbach) to change it (2, iii). Both Israel and Forst, despite the former's extensive labours in contextualisation, read the texts of eighteenth century philosophers for their arguments alone, rather than as rhetorical and political acts and interventions which aimed to reach, entertain, and reform an expanding reading public through esprit, art, satire, and rhetoric, as well as by making argumentative contributions to the controversies of the day. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The influential writings on church and state of philosopher Jacques Maritain, who died in 1973, possessed a mid-twentieth century hopefulness about a new birth of freedom and lay-led Christian humanism. In light of the next twenty-five years--particularly the experience of the regime of Augusto Pinochet in Chile--William T. Cavanaugh, in his 1998 book Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of Christ, argued that Maritain's work facilitated the marginalization of faith in the modern nation-state. Another quartercentury later, this essay reappraises Cavanaugh's criticisms of Maritain's views on the nature of the church, the role of the laity, and the power of the state. It argues that while Cavanaugh's concerns about sovereignty, subsidiarity, and formation have been vindicated, a careful reading of Maritain's lesser-known and later works suffices to justify Maritain's views on the laity and the church. Maritain remains a vital resource for theologians who seek to avoid both, on the right hand, resurgent integralism and Christian nationalism and, on the left hand, a relativizing of the Gospel in what Maritain called "kneeling before the world". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For philosophers, rights against the world are equivalent to rights in rem. Contrary to what Hart thought, however, this does not make them equivalent to general rights. Rights in rem contrast with rights in personam , whereas general rights contrast with special rights. As I explain, rights against the world can be either general rights or special rights. My explanation follows Waldron's strategy of exhibiting property rights as justified by Locke's theory of property as a case of rights in rem that are also special rights. Moreover, despite what ' in rem ' means in Latin, rights against the world include more than property rights. For example, they also include moral human rights. With moral human rights and property rights alike, the correlative duties are borne by 'everyone', understood in a dynamic sense I undertake to specify. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the grounding theory of powers, fundamental physical properties should be thought of as qualities that ground dispositions. Although this view has recently been defended by many different philosophers, there is no consensus for how the view should be developed within a broader metaphysics of properties. Recently, Tugby has argued that the view should be developed in the context of a Platonic theory of properties, where properties are abstract universals. I will argue that the view should not be developed within such a framework. Either the view should be developed with an ontology of Aristotelian properties, or it should be developed in a Nominalist framework that contains no properties at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When reasoning about dependence relations, philosophers often rely on gradualist assumptions, according to which abrupt changes in a phenomenon of interest can result only from abrupt changes in the low-level phenomena on which it depends. These assumptions, while strictly correct if the dependence relation in question can be expressed by continuous dynamical equations, should be handled with care: very often the descriptively relevant property of a dynamical system connecting high- and low-level phenomena is not its instantaneous behaviour but its stable fixed points (those in the vicinity of which it spends most of the time, after comparatively short transitory periods), and stable fixed points can change abruptly as a result of infinitesimal changes of the low-level phenomenon. We illustrate this potential gradualist trap by showing that Chalmers' fading qualia argument falls into it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on defending the concept of genealogy as conceptual reverse-engineering, as presented in Matthieu Queloz's book. Topics include the tension between the retrospective focus on origins and the forward-looking nature of reverse-engineering, the relationship between history and naturalism in conceptual analysis, and the distinction between conceptual engineering and reverse-engineering.

The article offers information on the issue of standards in conceptual engineering. Topics include the historical development of the analytic philosophy approach to concepts, which views them as abstract entities or eternal essences, and the contrasting pragmatic view that concepts should be understood in relation to their practical consequences and use in specific circumstances.

The article offers information on the concept of "Pragmatic Genealogy" as a counter-tradition to abstract philosophical approaches. Topics include the philosophical project of understanding concepts like knowledge, truth, and justice through the Pragmatic Question of their purpose, rather than the Socratic Question of their nature.

In an important and timely book, Anneli Jefferson outlines a view according to which a given mental disorder is a brain disorder if it is a (harmful) mental dysfunction realised by a brain dysfunction. Prima facie, Jefferson's book is a study in the metaphysics of dysfunction: how does mental dysfunction relate to brain dysfunction, and what does this imply for the status of mental disorders and brain disorders? In what follows, I shall argue that Jefferson's contribution to this debate is better understood as a conceptual explication of how psychiatrists, some philosophers, scientists and clinicians in the field (broadly construed) think of the label 'brain disorder'. I infer this on the basis that Jefferson's thesis would not follow from any serious, well-worked out theory of proper function. Despite initial appearances, Jefferson's book about brain dysfunction is not about function at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will demonstrate that the best descriptor of Qohelet is divine hedonist, not absurdist, skeptic, pessimist, realist, nihilist or "Preacher of Joy." This will be done by examining the relationship between Qohelet's hebel -judgments and his carpe diem ethic and comparing Qohelet's strategy with that of philosopher David Hume. Qohelet's hebel -judgments serve to deconstruct the traditional formulation of the Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhang , opening space for legitimating his preferred ethic: the carpe diem. In other words, Qohelet rhetorically paints a dark and dreary world in order to buttress his main ethic, the carpe diem, an ethic that is both hedonistic (using philosophical classification) in seeking pleasure and avoiding pain (reflected in his God-fearing motif), and divine in that this ethic must align with God's mysterious decrees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conceptual engineering takes a distinctively normative and reconstructive approach to our conceptual repertoire. This approach is congenial to the ideas defended by philosophers belonging to the multifaceted tradition of American and Cambridge Pragmatism. This special issue is devoted to the investigation and development of these connections. Our introduction maps some of the historical and theoretical entanglements between the two fields and gives a short overview of the contributions to the special issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pragmatists are interested primarily not in representing a purportedly unchanging Reality but in articulating prophetic future possibilities on the basis of the values most venerated by a culture/society in the present. This makes pragmatism sound a little like 'Conceptual Engineering'. Conceptual engineers too are interested in transforming our ways of talking, which implies some notion of how such improvements are to be evaluated. Nevertheless, this paper argues that accounts of conceptual engineering that regard it as key to the project of elucidating an externalist semantics find it difficult to accommodate on their own terms the problem-phenomena taken to be of shared interest: regions of discourse where the demand for change are at their most pressing culturally. This difficulty takes the form of what I call the Conceptual Engineering Dilemma (CED), an inability to accommodate simultaneously the ethical and ameliorative dimensions of contestation. I argue that acknowledging the formalist commitments that undergird CED should make pragmatism more appealing to the practically-orientated analytic philosopher and conclude with a brief survey of some of the tools that it makes available for the pressing work of changing minds for the better. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers struggle to explain why human beings with deep cognitive impairments have a higher moral status than certain non-human animals. Modal personism promises to solve this problem. It claims that humans who lack the capacities of "personhood" and the potential to develop them nonetheless could have been persons. I argue that modal personism has poor prospects because it's hard to see how we could offer a plausible account of modal personhood. I search for an adequate understanding of modal personhood by considering existing accounts and sketching new ones. But each account fails, either because it objectionably excludes some deeply cognitively impaired humans from the class of modal persons or because it makes modal personhood doubtfully relevant to moral status. And the modal personist cannot solve this problem by appealing to the misfortune suffered by modal persons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because moral understanding involves a distinctly first-personal grasp of moral matters, there is a temptation to think of its value primarily in terms of achievements that reflect well on its possessor: the moral worth of one's action or the virtue of one's character. These explanations, I argue, do not do full justice to the importance of moral understanding in our moral lives. Of equal importance is the value of moral understanding in our relations with other moral agents. In particular, I argue that an understanding of moral matters is of central importance within relations of solidarity. In addition to highlighting an overlooked aspect of moral understanding's value, this view also has important implications for what solidarity requires of those who stand in that relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the historical reception of China by European thinkers from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, challenging the traditional dichotomy of "sinophilia" and "sinophobia." It focuses on the perspectives of Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill, proposing a nuanced understanding that transcends simplistic categorizations.

In this paper I present an overview of the life and work of Donald MacCrimmon Mackay, a distinguished Christian polymath who made significant contributions across a number of domains in science and philosophy in the middle part of the 20th Century, and the centenary of whose birth was in 2022. After a brief biographical sketch, we will review his contribution to theology & science, the main ones of these being: complementarity, an innovative concept relating information and matter, and mind and brain; and logical indeterminism, a proposed solution to the problem of free will and determinism. I hope that this overview will stimulate interest in, and further exploration of, his ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay an engineer and a philosopher, after many conversations, develop an argument for why the Aristotelian version of virtue ethics is the most promising way to develop what we call artificial moral, social agents, i.e. robots. This, evidently, applies to humans as well. There are several claims: first, that humans are not born moral, they are socialized into morality; second, that morality involves affect, emotion, feeling, before it engages reason; third, that how a moral being feels is related to some narrative, whether moral or not; and finally, that narrativity is what builds a sense of a "moral" I, namely an authorial moral self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article takes as its starting point the central place given to contradiction by Hermann Goldschmidt in his book Contradiction Set Free, and it compares his approach with that of the philosopher Vladimir Jankélévitch. At the same time as Goldschmidt, Jankélévitch also assigned a central role to contradiction in thought, so much so that he often referred to his own philosophical method as "paradoxology." For him, as for Goldschmidt, paradox is the driving force behind thought that is always on the move. This article presents the main features of Jankélévitch's paradoxology and illustrates it with two themes: forgiveness and Jewish identity. By highlighting this proximity between Goldschmidt's approach and that of Jankélévitch, I suggest that they are both part of a more general movement in continental philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century, one of whose main challenges was to rethink philosophical rationality in depth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to serve as an introductory discussion of the European Continental tradition of pedagogics, specifically from a North American perspective. It begins with an overview of the Continental tradition and its main figures. Here, we find a philosophical and, thus, language‐sensitive attitude toward the human, the child; and a specific pedagogical terminology, i.e., descriptions and interpretations about the reality of education, such as educational practices, goals, norms, and organizational forms of educational institutions. John Dewey's educational theories exemplify the North American perspective on Continental pedagogics and its study of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existence. Dewey's writings diverge notably from this tradition, as he integrated into his work American pragmatism and an interest in the scientific method, an interest that plays a role in today's policy trends in the United States and elsewhere. Then again, Dewey took a critical stand toward instrumentalizing pedagogics for political aims. On this point, the German‐born political philosopher Hannah Arendt agreed with him. As Arendt can be seen as an example of a Continental perspective on philosophy that includes a strong warning to separate politics and education, she relates to Dewey's argument against instrumentalization. Thus, this article also features some of her work. The overall intention is to contribute to a renewal of a language for pedagogics by delineating a historical‐philosophical perspective on this specific field of professional practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses Gareth B. Matthews' book, "The Child's Philosopher," which explores the Philosophy for Children movement. The book covers various themes, including philosophical communication with children, the relationship between Philosophy for Children and the history of philosophy, and the movement's engagement with cultural diversity. The article focuses on two main themes: developmental psychology and gender issues in Philosophy for Children. Matthews critiques stage theory and emphasizes valuing children's intellect and moral agency. The article raises concerns about potential oppression of children in philosophical discussions and the gendered experiences of adults and children. It also explores the dangers of gender bias in education, particularly in Philosophy for Children classes, and suggests countering it through story-based teaching and philosophical whimsy. The text concludes by emphasizing the importance of addressing gender bias in education and promoting inclusivity and equity. [Extracted from the article]

Can large language models produce expert‐quality philosophical texts? To investigate this, we fine‐tuned GPT‐3 with the works of philosopher Daniel Dennett. To evaluate the model, we asked the real Dennett 10 philosophical questions and then posed the same questions to the language model, collecting four responses for each question without cherry‐picking. Experts on Dennett's work succeeded at distinguishing the Dennett‐generated and machine‐generated answers above chance but substantially short of our expectations. Philosophy blog readers performed similarly to the experts, while ordinary research participants were near chance distinguishing GPT‐3's responses from those of an "actual human philosopher". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the contemporary debate on free will, most philosophers assume that the defense of libertarianism implies the defense of the notion of alternative possibilities. This article discusses this presupposition by showing that it is possible to build a libertarianism without alternative possibilities, apparently more robust than libertarianism with alternative possibilities. Inspired by Bergson, this nonclassical libertarianism challenges the idea that all causation implies the actualization of a predetermined possibility (an idea shared by determinism and classical libertarianism). Moreover, it challenges the idea that free will is a mere choice between prefixed possibilities: for this libertarianism, free will is the result of a creative process of the mind—an entirely causal process whose outcome is not, however, predetermined. This nonclassical libertarianism describes the process of forming a will in a more realistic way than classical libertarianism does. Furthermore, it is not threatened by the problem of chance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That there is a "crisis of peer review" at the moment is not in dispute, but sufficient attention has not yet been paid to the normative potential that lies in current calls for reform. In contrast to approaches to "fixing" the problems in peer review, which tend to maintain the status quo in terms of professionalising opportunities, this paper addresses the needs of philosophers and how peer‐review reform can be an opportunity to improve the academic discipline of philosophy, whereby progress is understood as making the discipline more fair to the global academic community and more conducive to the flourishing of academic philosophers. The paper evaluates recent categories of relevant norms and correlating reforms. In conclusion, it recommends that philosophy pursue the norms of transparency and democracy explicitly when proposing peer‐review reform and suggest that proposals for forum‐based models of peer review are most likely to support those norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]