This Article uses a massive collection of data to document, for the first time, the interplay between the substantive subject areas, the intensity, and the procedural complexity of federal civil litigation. The results indicate that like substance, intensity and complexity are pivotal features of litigation. These findings suggest that what might be termed "our uniformity"--the de jure uniform applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other procedural law--should be understood as a broader phenomenon than the traditional focus on transsubstantivity. The Article documents extensive variation in measures of intensity and complexity among cases sharing the same broad substantive legal subject matter, such that intensity and complexity may vary more importantly within than across substantive areas. For example, it is true that patent cases have comparatively high average intensity as measured by their numbers of docket entries, but there are also plenty of patent cases that terminate without having enormous docket activity. It is also true that patent cases are much more likely than, say, contract cases to be extremely intense, but because there are so many more contract than patent cases, my data have nearly twice as many highly intense contract cases as highly intense patent cases. The Article's twin key conclusions are, thus: (1) even for cases in areas thought to be especially intense or complex, there are cases with both high and low intensity and complexity, and (2) intensity and complexity are transsubstantive--e.g., there are highly intense and highly complex cases in most substantive areas of litigation, not just the usual suspects such as patents, antitrust, or securities. The Article closes by treading gingerly into normative waters. One unavoidable consequence of our uniformity with respect to formal procedural rules is that judges exercise enormous case-level discretion. Further, in part due to legislative forays in the securities and patent arenas, we have some degree of substance-specificity in our procedure. The Article suggests considering formal procedural tracking as an alternative to each of these approaches. That approach, which has been suggested in the past and is used in some states and other countries, might allow us to break out of some of our ossified debates about matters such as the rancor set off by the pleading revolution the Supreme Court effected a decade and a half ago in Twombly and Iqbal. If the plausibility standard is here to stay because of its role in limiting intense and complex litigation, perhaps it could be revisited in simpler cases that don't pose the challenges the Supreme Court first flagged in Twombly. Whether this is possible depends on our capacity to identify cases' likely intensity and/or complexity early in the litigation life cycle, which is a topic beyond the scope of this Article. Still, we ought to consider the possibility of a certification process for intense, complex cases, like the one we have for class actions, so that procedure might be adjusted where doing so makes sense. The Article's contributions include its use of docket-level data on more than 500,000 cases whose dockets could be followed for at least seven years. In addition, the Article offers a novel approach to measuring procedural complexity by showing how links between entries in docket reports may be viewed as mathematical networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]