Search

This chapter describes the method of Active Information Search (AIS), whose goal is to investigate spontaneous information acquisition while avoiding the limitations that come with pre-structuring the decision task. The method of AIS was developed to understand information needs in decision making with as little demand effects as possible. The proper pre-testing of an AIS scenario is a prerequisite to achieve adequate reliability and validity. The basic as well as the list version of AIS can be translated into a computer program. The experiment can be administered in the laboratory but also on the internet. For instance, basic AIS may be applied with only little programming effort via the internet with chat or messaging programs. The AIS method helps to understand reasoning, judgment and decision making, or complex problem solving, by providing process measures of the type, quantity, and sequence of information people are interested in.

Lesions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex can result in a deficient decision-making behavior. So far, most experimental results in the neuropsychological decision-making research have been obtained with gambling tasks. Due to their high complexity, it is difficult to evaluate the underlying processes of the decision-making deficits. The aim of this study was to assess if patients with ventromedial prefrontal damage compared to patients with dorsolateral prefrontal damage and controls show a deficit in an early stage of the decision-making process. Nine patients with ventromedial prefrontal damage, three with dorsolateral prefrontal damage, and eleven healthy controls were tested with a newly developed decision task in which they had to search actively for the information they needed for their decisions. Our results show that patients with ventromedial prefrontal damage compared to the brain-lesioned dorsolateral prefrontal control group and healthy controls searched less for information with regard to risk defusing operators or consequences of their decisions indicating impairment already in the early stage of the decision-making process.

Decision makers intending to avoid risk in a decision situation can choose a less risky alternative (passive risk avoidance) or intervene actively in an alternative applying a risk-defusing action (active risk avoidance). In Experiment 1 (64 participants), we compared active and passive risk defusing in two framing conditions. In the negative frame, in the uncertain alternative, a change to the worse was possible; in the positive frame, a change to an improvement was possible. Each participant decided in both framing conditions. As expected, active risk avoidance behavior for preventing a negative outcome (i.e., in the negative frame) was more likely than for promoting a positive one (i.e., in the positive frame). If decision makers did not or could not actively defuse the risk, they chose in correspondence to the classical pattern: risk avoidance in the positive frame and risk seeking in the negative one. We replicated the latter result in a second experiment (32 participants). The classical framing pattern in passive risk avoidance in both experiments is remarkable, because participants were not presented or did not search for exact probabilities.

Decision behavior in realistic risky scenarios is quite different from that in gambles: Decision makers in the former are less interested in probability information than they are in the latter. Instead, they often attempt to actively manipulate the risk in an otherwise attractive alternative using a risk-defusing operator (RDO). An RDO is an action intended by the decision maker to be performed in addition to the risky but otherwise attractive alternative, and it is expected to decrease the risk (e.g., vaccination, insurance). The search for an RDO and the incorporation of a detected RDO into the alternative cannot be modeled with classical decision theories or heuristics. In this article I present risk-management-decision theory, which describes the decision process with and without RDOs, and give an overview about experimental research with RDOs. I discuss the consequences of the RDO concept for theories of decision behavior.

Risk-defusing operators (RDO) are actions that reduce risk, to be enacted either before a negative event occurs (pre-event RDOs) or afterwards (post-event RDOs). For post-event RDOs, detection probability of the negative events is relevant. Regulatory focus theory suggests that promotion-oriented individuals – independent whether it is a personal disposition or favored by situational cues – should focus on chances to succeed and therefore choose post-event RDOs more likely than prevention-oriented individuals who are likely to focus on possible failures and means to avoid them. In two experimental studies, we examined effects of detection probability and regulatory focus as a state variable on the choice of post-event RDOs. Results replicate findings that the likelihood to choose post-event RDOs increases with increasing detection probability of the negative events. Contrary to expectation, no clear effects of regulatory focus were found. Exploratory analyses showed some evidence that successful manipulation of regulatory focus might influence RDO choices if tasks are highly relevant for decision-makers.

In three experiments the problem is investigated how people identify early in the decision process those alternatives that are worthwhile to be examined in more detail. We assume that decision makers employ the Advantages first Principle: They first search for information about positive outcomes and then focus their information search (e.g., for negative consequences or for risk defusing operators) on those alternatives that appear attractive after this initial evaluation. In Experiment 1 (120 participants), initial information about consequences was varied for eight alternatives (no information, positive consequences, negative, or mixed for four alternatives). In all conditions, the great majority of participants followed both aspects of the Advantages first Principle. In Experiment 2, 60 participants decided in two quasi-realistic scenarios with two alternatives each. Initial information was presented so that one alternative had better positive consequences, worse negative consequences, or both. In all conditions, more information was searched for in the initially better alternative. In Experiment 3 (20 participants) the Advantages first Principle was not only confirmed for a scenario but also for choices in traditional gambling tasks with two and eight alternatives, respectively. Participants could win or lose real money. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Under justification pressure, the decision maker knows in advance that the decision has to be justified to somebody afterwards. The effect of justification pressure on the search for risk defusing operators (RDOs) and the role of RDOs in the justification texts were investigated. An RDO is an action intended by the decision maker to be performed in addition to an otherwise attractive alternative to decrease the risk. As predicted, in Experiment 1 participants (60 non-students) under justification pressure searched more RDOs. Additionally, in Experiment 2 (80 non-students) RDO search success was varied. Under justification pressure, persistence of RDO search was higher when no RDO could be detected. In the justification texts, the existence or non-existence of RDOs played a prominent role. Searching for RDOs supports people in their goal to make a good decision and in their attempt to convince the addressee of their justification that the decision was good.

In experiments with quasi-realistic risky scenarios instead of gambles, decision makers are less interested in probability information. Often, they actively search for a risk defusing operator (RDO; an action to be performed in addition to a specific alternative and expected to decrease the risk involved). Examples in daily life are insurance and vaccination. In our experiment, the central independent variable was the successful or unsuccessful RDO search. The central dependent variables were choices and information search behaviour. In order to get information about the applied heuristics, a concurrent Thinking Aloud procedure was employed in addition to the method of Active Information Search. Eighty subjects made a choice in two risky scenarios. The findings confirm that the successful search for an RDO for one of the alternatives is an excellent predictor of choice. If the subject does not search for an RDO or the search is unsuccessful, MAXIMIN was the most frequent heuristic.

Although recent fMRI studies on humor have begun to elucidate cognitive and affective neural correlates, they weren't able to distinguish between different logical mechanisms or steps of humor processing, i.e., the detection of an incongruity and its resolution. This fMRI study aimed to focus in more detail on cognitive humor processing. In order to investigate pure incongruity resolution without preprocessing steps, nonverbal cartoons differing in their logical mechanisms were contrasted with nonhumorous pictures containing an irresolvable incongruity. The logical mechanisms were: (1) visual puns (visual resemblance, PUNs); (2) semantic cartoons (pure semantic relationships, SEMs); and (3) Theory of Mind cartoons (which require additionally mentalizing abilities, TOMs). Thirty cartoons from each condition were presented to 17 healthy subjects while acquiring fMR images. The results reveal a left-sided network involved in pure incongruity resolution: e.g., temporo-parietal junction, inferior frontal gyrus and ventromedian prefrontal cortex. These areas are also involved in processing of SEMs, whereas PUNs show more activation in the extrastriate cortex and TOMs show more activation in so-called mentalizing areas. Processing of pictures containing an irresolvable incongruity evokes activation in the rostral cingulate zone, which might reflect error processing. We conclude that cognitive processing of different logical mechanisms depends on separate neural networks.

The paper investigates predecisional information search in risky decisions, specifically information concerning the probability of a negative outcome and whether a risk-defusing operator (RDO) is available. Experiment 1 (54 participants) tested the hypothesis that search for such information is triggered by expectations that it can be obtained in the situation. Cues for the availability of information were manipulated. It was predicted that cues mentioning possible information sources raise expectations and consequently increase search activity. Furthermore, gambles were expected to differ from other real world contexts, with lower expectations for RDOs and higher ones for probabilities. The Method of Active Information Search was employed. The number of questions asked about probability and RDOs in different conditions confirmed the hypotheses. Experiment 2 (36 participants) ruled out the alternative interpretation that the expectation to actually find favorable probabilities or applicable RDOs respectively, rather than the expectation to obtain information, determined information search.

In an experiment with 40 participants, the effect of time pressure on the search for risk defusing operators was investigated as the central research question. A risk defusing operator (RDO) is an action intended by the decision maker to be performed in addition to an otherwise attractive alternative and expected to decrease the risk. Examples in daily life are insurances or vaccinations. Decision-makers in experiments with quasi-realistic risky scenarios instead of gambles often search actively for RDOs. In the presented experiment, participants had to search for information they considered to be essential for reaching a decision. As expected, under time pressure search for information on RDOs and negative consequences increased, whereas search for positive consequences and probability decreased. Furthermore, the initially risky alternative was chosen more often under time pressure. As in other experiments on time pressure, the total amount of inspected information decreased.

In choices between gambles, utilities and probabilities of consequences determine the decision. If in quasi-realistic risky tasks, decision makers can actively search for information, few search for probability information, and many search for risk-defusing operators (RDOs). RDOs are actions intended by the decision maker to be performed additionally to a specific alternative, with the intention to decrease the risk. For the presented experiment the distinction of two types of RDOs is relevant: A Prevention RDO prevents the occurrence of a negative event that causes a negative outcome. An Intervention RDO does not prevent the negative event but interrupts the causal mechanism between negative event and negative outcome. Forty Eight subjects made decisions in three quasi-realistic task. In two of three tasks, this preference can be attributed to the casual structure of RDO.

Zusammenfassung. Risikoentscheidungen sind dadurch charakterisiert, dass mindestens eine der zur Wahl stehenden Alternativen negative Konsequenzen haben kann. In Experimenten mit Glücksspielen als Alternativen erweist sich das Entscheidungsverhalten als von zwei zentralen Faktoren beeinflusst: dem subjektiven Wert der Konsequenzen und ihrer subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeit. Der Beitrag fasst eine Reihe von Experimenten zusammen, die zeigen, dass dieses Ergebnis der entscheidungstheoretischen Forschung nicht verallgemeinert werden kann. In quasi-realistischen Risikoentscheidungssituationen ist die Mehrheit der Entscheider nicht aktiv an Wahrscheinlichkeiten interessiert. Dagegen suchen sie häufig nach einer Zusatzhandlung (Risikoentschärfungsoperator, REO), die das Risiko verringern soll. Zusätzlich werden die Ergebnisse von Experimenten dargestellt, die untersuchen, welche Faktoren die Suche nach einem REO und die Akzeptanz eines REO beeinflussen.

This study investigated the functional neuroanatomy of the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC). Previous studies have shown that the aMPFC is involved in evaluative judgment and self-referential processes. Specifically, different sections of the aMPFC are differentially influenced by attention demanding processes. Whereas the dorsal section is supposed to be involved in self-referential processes, the ventral section is assumed to be attenuated during attention demanding processes. The present study investigates the involvement of the dorsal and ventral aMPFC in evaluative judgment by using functional magnetic resonance imaging with spin-echo echo-planar-imaging. Processes involved in evaluative judgment are attention-demanding, self-referential and activate regions in the dorsal and ventral section of the aMPFC. Attention demanding tasks do not necessarily lead to an attenuation of the ventral section of the aMPFC, a region mainly involved in emotional and affective processing.

In a multistage investment task the decision maker attempts to increase the capital by committing some part of it over several trials in a risky investment. Despite the richness of experimental results from this task, no decision strategy exists which is able to predict investment behavior. In this paper we formulate three strategies for predicting decisions in the investment task. In the success-expectation strategy (SES), the main factor determining the choice is the expected subjective probability of a success in the coming trial. In the win–loss ratio strategy (WLRS), the main factor is the relation between the possible win and the possible loss in a specific investment situation. In the linear function of capital strategy (LFCS), the available capital is the principal determinant of choice. We tested these strategies with the help of computer simulation, using data from previous experiments. With each strategy we predicted each subject's choices and compared these predictions with the observed decisions. The predictions of WLRS correlated significantly and positively with the observed data for 24 of the 39 subjects (62%), those of LFCS correlated with 14 subjects (36%), and those of SES correlated with nine subjects (23%). The findings reveal previously unsuspected patterns in deploying capital, as well as individual differences in investment behavior. Additional factors influencing strategy use and choices are discussed.

This experiment shows that at least in some quasi-naturalistic risky decision situations decision makers engage actively in risk defusing (e.g., by searching for control, worst-case plans or new alternatives) instead of "passively" evaluating values and probabilities. Forty non-students made decisions in two quasi-naturalistic non-lottery tasks. Most participants revealed behaviour indicating risk defusing. Risk-defusing operators were used much more often in connection with the chosen alternative than with the not-chosen one. The method of information presentation was varied systematically: Unstructured and structured versions of the method of active information search (the participant gets a basic description of the task, and has to ask questions from the experimenter to get additional information) were compared. In the structured version, decision makers deal increasingly with the uncertain aspects of the alternatives and with control and worst-case plans.

The influence of the probabilistic set-up (i.e., formal aspects of the presented probability information) and of the task domain on the active search for probability information in quasi-natural risky decision tasks was investigated. In each of four tasks (domains: business, medicine, social, epidemic control) 72 subjects chose between a risky alternative and one without risk. There were three conditions in relation to the probabilistic set-up: (a) In the single condition the decision concerned a single case (e.g., one person). In the two multiple conditions (b and c) the decision was for many cases (e.g., 100 persons). In (b) the decision maker had to make an either-or decision (same alternative for all cases). In (c) the subject could assign a proportion of cases to one alternative and the rest to the other one. While the probabilistic set-up had no effect on the search for probabilistic information, the task domain had a strong impact. Risky decision making has been one of the central themes of decision research for decades. Most of the relevant experiments have used and are still using simple lotteries (gambles or bets). In these experiments, the utilities of the consequences and the probabilities of obtaining the consequences are found to be the central

The effect of two types of justification pressure on the decision process was investigated. Three groups of 15 subjects each had to choose the head of a corrective home for criminal adolescents out of six candidates, who were described on 16 attributes. Two groups worked under justification pressure: subjects in the Accounting group were informed that they had to explain their decision afterwards, subjects in the Convincing group that they had to convince the other members of the executive board to vote for their selected candidate. From the third group, no justification was requested. It was found that justification pressure leads to a distinct increase in the amount of utilized information and to a more elaborate choice process, while the global decision heuristics do not seem to change. The two justification groups did not differ in the amount of information utilized, but the Convincing group employed a more elaborate process. This result shows that justification pressure is one of the task characteristics affecting the decision process, and proves that a latent justification pressure as assumed in some decision theories does not have the same effect as an explicit one. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Most experimental results in research on risky decisions have been obtained with lotteries. Choices between lotteries differ in many respects from natural risky decision tasks. Furthermore, the mode of information presentation in gambling experiments is very different from natural situations. In our experiment, 32 non-students made choices in two naturalistic risky decision tasks. The mode of information presentation was varied: Complete information presentation (as common in gambling experiments) vs. Method of Active Information Search (the subject gets a basic description of the task, and has to ask questions to receive additional information). In naturalistic tasks, probability was used less often than expected from classical decision theory, whereas the search for new alternatives, worst-case plans and control considerations were more relevant. The type of information presentation had a distinct effect. With Active Information Search, only a minority of subjects was interested in probabilities. Precise probabilities were used solely in the condition with Complete information presentation.

The aim of the present study was to better understand humor in individuals with Asperger's syndrome. Therefore, various humor and laughter related phenomena were investigated by means of various standardized humor instruments. Forty individuals with AS and 113 controls filled out several self-report questionnaires and tests. The results revealed that individuals with AS scored significantly lower on trait cheerfulness and higher on trait seriousness (both describing the susceptibility to humor). Furthermore, they scored low on scales related to social communication (affiliative humor, humor entertainment) and portrayed a more socially cold humor style. In addition, individuals with AS scored low on mean-spirited humor, and used less adaptive (self-enhancing) and more maladaptive humor styles (self-defeating humor). Finally, they preferred incongruity-resolution humor, representing a more reality-oriented processing style. These findings add to previous studies on humor and expand the knowledge of components associated with successful humor appreciation.

In a multistage investment task the decision maker attempts to increase the capital by investing some part of it in several trials in a risky opportunity. In the present extension of this task, the decision maker can buy protection for any part of the invested capital. In an experiment with 60 subjects, the effect of the joint variation of the probability of winning and the cost of protection was investigated in the Breeding Lizards task. The proportion of invested capital increased with an increasing probability of winning as in former experiments, but was independent from the cost of protection. Contrary to expectations, the percentage of the invested capital which was protected was not affected by the probability of winning and the cost of protection. A certain amount of wasting behavior was observed. The results are discussed and compared with the behavior prescribed by an optimal strategy.

Most of the experimental results on the risky decision behavior of individuals have been in reference to simple gambles. An investigation was conducted to determine whether those results can be generalized to more natural situations; 32 participants were required to make choices in one gambling task and three natural-decision tasks. Half were trained and guided to draw a decision tree during the decision process. Behavior in the gambling tasks differed systematically from that in the natural-decision tasks, in the cognitive representation of the decision situation constructed by the decision maker and in the role of subjective probabilities in such a representation. The results call into question the general claim that the drawing of a decision tree aids decision making. Among other effects, participants who drew a decision tree introduced less background knowledge and more often biased the presented information than did those who did not draw a decision tree.

Process models of decision making usually give very good results when it comes to “explaining” afterwards how a concrete decision process was constructed (retrodiction). The situation, however, is not as satisfactory if we look at predictions. This relative weakness is not an inherent property of process models. The problem is that if one makes all the necessary specifications the model becomes so complex that it is practically impossible to work out predictions over a wider range without a tool such as simulation, even if the model is formulated in some kind of formal language. My argument is that simulation may offer a solution to the problem. The representation of a process model by a working computer program enables, relatively easily, the computation of broad range predictions, and forces the scientist to formulate the model precisely. In this article I use the Chunking-by-Similarity Model as an example. Following the introduction to this model I first present some theoretical considerations concerning the simulation of a psychological theory. Then I discuss some important steps in the simulation of a theory in greater detail. I conclude that in spite of some problems which must be dealt with when a psychological process model is simulated, simulation is a powerful tool which can be used to improve the work with process models.

In a multistage, risky investment task the decision maker tries to increase the capital by investing some part of it in a series of trials. It is assumed that the decision maker will select a stake which results in a tolerable perceived risk as well as an acceptable win. In Experiment 1 (40 non-students) the effects of the joint variation of the winning factor (return rate) and the probability of winning, and of the start capital wereinvestigated in the Breeding Lizards task. Experiment 2 (60 non-students) was designed to replicate the result of Experiment 1 concerning the winning factor with a bigger difference between the two winning factor conditions, and to test the effect of three different cover stories for the abstract investment task. As predicted, a higher winning factor did not result in higher percentage stakes, whereas a higher probability of winning did. Besides the mean percentage stakes, other dependent variables were analyzed. In none of the dependent variables was a difference between the three cover stories detected. The results are discussed.