Search

One of the most fundamental economic policy choices a society makes is how to order its global economic relations. What models do states use to structure this multifaceted decision, and how do they choose among these alternatives? We combine data on trade policies, foreign investment, exchange rates, capital flows, and international treaties to discover states' strategies of global economic engagement. We identify five distinct strategies through dynamic clustering. We then examine the economic and political drivers of states' choices among these competing strategies, focusing on the tradeoffs between public and private goods activated by differing styles of openness. In particular, we uncover a model of high global integration favored by (party-based) nondemocracies that emphasizes sacrificing consumption for production and embraces the risk of tight integration with global markets. We also uncover a cautious model of partial globalization favored by (large) democracies. Decisions over global economic engagement are clustered and multidimensional: Uncovering this variety unlocks new findings about the nonlinear effects of democracy on foreign economic policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globalization creates winners and losers, and recent research emphasizes that large corporations are among the biggest beneficiaries of trade while smaller firms may be harmed. How do these redistributive effects impact trade attitudes? Because a growing share of Americans hold highly unfavourable views of big corporations, we argue that the belief that large firms win from trade will provoke hostility towards trade and globalization. To test this theory, we show experimentally that informing people that large corporations benefit from trade makes them markedly more hostile towards trade compared to a treatment emphasizing that firms in exporting industries benefit. Using subgroup and mediation analysis, we find that anti-corporate sentiment drives this effect, particularly concern about corporations' power in society. Our findings illustrate how distributive consequences and attitudes towards the winners and losers from policy change interact to shape public opinion on economic policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do multinational firms trapped in host markets suffering from political violence find security? Terrorism and conflict repel foreign investment and recent research has sought to understand heterogeneity across firms in their response to violence. When multinational firms are unable to move their investments in the face of violence, we argue that their home governments use diplomatic capacity and security and economic resources to secure protection from host governments. Multinational corporations from home markets with significant leverage over host markets are therefore less likely to curtail their operations or investments in the wake of violence. Examining dyadic data on foreign direct investment (FDI), we show that home market diplomatic missions, aid, and alliances substantially abate the negative effects of violence on FDI. Consistent with our argument, this effect is observed after violence begins and is not an artifact of host markets garnering security aid from great powers other than the home market. A strong diplomatic presence matched to both hard and soft power resources positively contributes to the defense of core foreign policy interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do corporations stop ignoring or opposing climate action and start to go green? We focus on the role of corporate boards of directors, which shape firms' positions on internal and external issues of corporate governance and public policy. We argue that board decisions to engage constructively on climate issues are likely to be influenced by the choices and experiences of other firms. Learning, socialization, and competitive dynamics are especially important in highly salient and rapidly evolving policy areas, such as climate change. To test this theory, we construct the network of board memberships for US public corporations and uncover robust evidence that climate innovations diffuse among companies that share board members in common and among companies whose board members interact at separate boards. Understanding the unfolding dynamics of corporate climate action requires examining corporate boards and their social context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Left-wing opposition to globalization lives, among voters and interest groups, both labor and progressive. But have left-wing opponents of trade successfully cultivated representation? Using the US Congress as a case, I show that two distinct groups of Democrats vote in characteristically progressive and protectionist ways on trade bills. These groups, especially progressives, are rewarded with excess campaign contributions from publicly anti-trade groups. A dyadic research design shows that interest group/representative relationships degrade noticeably when members of Congress vote for trade bills that interest groups have opposed. While recent events have highlighted business interests and right-wing economic populism, left-wing opposition to globalization remains a vibrant third face of contemporary domestic contestation over trade that will be especially important where populists fade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper identifies recurrent patterns in the political activity of American corporations that support trade. These firms have made public coalitions a central element of their pro-trade activities, and their collective efforts vastly outstrip those of trade's corporate opponents. This superiority in organization is paired with dramatically greater volumes of lobbying and campaign contributions. I explain these striking divergences by integrating collective action theory into a firm-centred model of trade politics: the heavy concentration of gains from trade among a small number of firms makes both individual and collective political action easier for pro-trade firms than for producers opposed to trade. This explanation is supported in panel analysis of firms' participation in pro-trade coalitions, which shows that size, multinationality, and heterogeneity in global networks of production and sales drive participation in pro-trade groups. Globally engaged firms have supported trade by matching pro-trade preferences with highly organized political action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Who supports trade in the US Congress? We uncover the ideological space of trade voting, focusing on trade agreements and development policy as two fundamental cleavages around globalization. We then cluster members of Congress into coherent voting blocs, and identify the most pro-trade voting blocs in each Chamber. We find that these blocs: cross party lines; are ideologically heterogeneous; and are over-represented on the committees with jurisdiction over trade. We then examine two leading theories of Congressional voting – on constituency characteristics and campaign contributions – and find support for each using our learned voting blocs. Members of pro-trade blocs have defended their constituents' and contributors' interests by speaking out to confront the Trump administration's protectionism. We conclude that unsupervised learning methods provide a valuable tool for exploring the multifaceted and dynamic divisions which characterize current debates over global economic integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Who testifies on US trade agreements before Congress and what do they say? We examine the content of Congressional testimony on US trade agreements, and the selection process which determines who testifies in the first place. We find that testimony is systematically tilted toward a sunny view of trade's positive economic effects, while import competition and offshoring are generally downplayed. We argue that trade's supporters strategically frame their motives for supporting trade agreements, and that pro‐trade committee chairs' decisions on who testifies further skew testimony away from the distributive consequences of globalization within the United States. Congressional hearings on trade agreements therefore represent a key site where the influence of dominant pro‐trade interests is both revealed and reinforced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]