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This debate issue centers on the question of whether psychology should follow the methods and principles of the natural sciences. Answers to this question are often implicitly assumed but rarely explicitly debated among psychologists. This issue contains eight invited contributions by scholars whom we anticipated would have strong and divergent positions on the question. The articles present a broad range of perspectives, ranging from phenomenological psychology to cognitive neuroscience. They broadly line up with a "yes" or "no" answer to the question, four authors favoring a "yes" and four authors a "no" response, although nearly all authors advance more nuanced positions that challenge a simple classification. In this introduction, we first discuss the historical roots of the question and our motivation behind this specific formulation of it. Then we briefly summarize the contributions and place them in a broader context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several strands of academic discourse have introduced post-truth as a descriptive concept characteristic of the era in which we find ourselves. This special issue examines the meaning and psychological implications of post-truth by revisiting the concept of truth on which it is dependent. We acknowledge that there are many ways of understanding truth (that is, various truth concepts) and that the issues at stake have been raised repeatedly. However, we think it important to reflect on the questions anew in response to contemporary political, social and scholarly developments. Because of the complex nature of our questions, we invited scholars who contribute different points of view on the nature of truth and the implications of "post-truth," and who approach the questions from a set of very different positions. The "story" that structures the special issue begins with a traditional defense of truth rooted in Greek philosophy and proceeds through a contemporary strong turn to narrative as a foundation for psychological research. In between, we cover varieties of realist, constructionist, hermeneutic, and pragmatist accounts of truth, offering a rich grounding for "revisiting" truth and its broader social and psychological significance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I suggest that Mascolo and Kallio make an excellent case for the intersubjective foundation of science but that the implications of their position are not limited to psychology. First, the process by which we come to "know" other persons may take different forms. Second, corroboration of experiential accounts requires a shared body of meanings and resources, agreed upon standards for evaluating evidence in any science, not just psychological. Additionally, I emphasize that to deal adequately with the complexities of knowledge construction in psychology or any science, one needs to account for imaginal powers and their role in discovery and verification along with understanding the world (natural or social) as structured and mediated by social meanings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to Raskin and Debany's lead article (this issue), I offer support for their general conclusion that ethical implications are inescapable in relation to any version of constructionism, and concur that the frequent characterization of constructivism as ultimately reducing to a position of “anything goes” is not sustainable. I depart from Raskin and Debany on the question of whether an integrative framework for constructivist positions is possible, especially in relation to questions concerning the ethical dimension. I suggest that the reasons for considering the anything goes charge inappropriate are different for different versions of constructivism, and illustrate with analysis of the ethical dimensions of personal construct theory and social constructionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]