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Using a structural model and the 2018 Korean economy data, we show that even the individuals with relatively low income do not always prefer greater tax progressivity due to reduced economic efficiency (i.e., decrease in aggregate output and consumption) it accompanies. Hence, the counterfactual analyses reveal that the most popularly supported tax and redistributionpolicy inthis economy does not uphold the optimal degree of progressivity for social welfare maximization and sustains about 0.31 of after-tax Gini.

Este artículo estima la curva de Laffer mediante un análisis de estática comparativa y un ejercicio econométrico. A partir de una especificación microeconómica, primero analiza la distorsión que causaría establecer un impuesto indirecto y las implicaciones de bienestar si se maximizara el recaudo tributario. Luego, con datos del ingreso tributario real per cápita y de la tasa impositiva, estima un modelo econométrico para calcular la tasa tributaria óptima en Colombia. Los resultados muestran que los postulados de Laffer se cumplen con una tasa óptima de un 32%, y sugieren que el Gobierno tiene un margen de casi 12 puntos porcentuales. This paper estimates the Laffer curve through a comparative statical analysis and an econometric exercise. Starting from a microeconomic specification, it first analyzes the distortion caused by an indirect tax and the welfare implications of maximizing tax collection. Then, using data on real per capita tax revenue and the tax rate, an estimate of an econometric model to calculate the optimal tax rate in Colombia is made. The results show that Laffer's postulates are proven with an optimal rate of 32% and suggest that the government has a margin of almost 12 percentage points.

We study the preferential treatment of green bonds in the Central Bank collateral framework as an environmental policy instrument within a DSGE model with environmental and financial frictions. Green and conventional entrepreneurs issue bonds to banks that use them as collateral. The associated collateral premium induce entrepreneurs to increase bond issuance, investment, leverage, and default risk. Collateral policy solves a trade-off between increasing collateral supply, adverse effects on entrepreneur risk-taking, and subsidizing green investment. Due to these adverse side effects, optimal collateral policy is characterized by modest preferential treatment, thereby increasing the green bond share and, to a smaller extent, the green investment share, which in turn reduces pollution. The limited response of green investment is directly related to higher risk-taking of green entrepreneurs. Furthermore, we show that preferential treatment is an imperfect substitute of Pigouvian taxation on pollution: only if the optimal tax can not be implemented, optimal collateral policy features preferential treatment of green bonds.

We develop an analysis that identifies the characteristics of an optimal system of shared tax collection and intergovernmental transfers. Mathematical optimization is used to find the level of taxes and intergovernmental transfers. Formulas for the optimal level of taxes and transfers to subnational governments are characterized. We suggest reforms to intergovernmental transfers to include the costs of tax inefficiency, some tax equalization transfer rules, and the marginal social benefits of local public spending. Future research could include local public spending with regional externalities, migration, and consider a dynamic model. This article proposes an original theoretical model of optimal tax coordination and transfers. The optimal level of taxes and transfers are identified. This paper proposes reforms to the participation formula for subnational governments.

How does wage discrimination affect tax progressivity? To address this, optimal tax progressivity is characterized in an economy where individuals have different levels of ability and some of the individuals face wage discrimination. A decrease in wage discrimination reduces optimal tax progressivity, while an increase in ability inequality raises it. When pre-tax income inequality increases, tax progressivity can decrease. Moreover, interaction effect on tax progressivity of wage discrimination and ability inequality is negative. These findings hold whether social planners or voters decide tax progressivity. The empirical analysis with panel data of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development economies provides evidence supportive of the theoretical findings.

This scientific article is devoted to the study of the peculiarities of taxation of the insurance business at the present stage. In the course of the research the method of analysis and synthesis, statistical-analytical, comparative methods, as well as the method of system-structural research of the phenomenon of taxation of insurance business activity were used. To achieve the goal of the study, a brief overview of current trends in the insurance market was carried out, the dynamics of which reflects a slight increase in total assets of insurance companies, as well as the amount of taxes paid by them to the Consolidated Budget. Emphasis is placed on the reduction in the number of insurers in recent years in the Ukrainian insurance market, which is a consequence of state regulation. The current “mixed” system of insurance business taxation is described. It is determined that its imperfection and inefficiency do not contribute to the development of the insurance market, because insurance companies hide their real profits, thus evading taxes. A review of foreign experience in the field of insurance business taxation showed that developed European countries also use a two-tier system of taxation: the parallel application of income tax of insurance companies with some form of alternative tax on insurance activities. Within the European Community, where Ukraine seeks to join, there are no universal tax rates, but there is a noticeable division of countries into those that have a liberal tax system and in which the fiscal function predominates. In modern world, more and more European countries are taking steps to liberalize tax legislation. Analysis of foreign experience allows us to argue that each country forms an optimal tax system for itself. Ukraine must also follow this path, especially in conditions when the insurance market is in its infancy. The article considers the positions of domestic researchers to determine such an optimal system. It was found that the most common approach is to establish differentiated taxation depending on the type, direction and results of activities with the use of lower rates that would encourage insurance companies to receive and declare real profits, as well as increase tax revenues to the budget.

Both carbon and emission taxes popularly exist all over the world. Therefore, it is important to compare carbon with emission tax. Under monopolization, this article establishes game theory model to compare carbon with emission tax. On one hand, both carbon and emission taxes reduce energy inputs, outputs, profits, and emission. On the other hand, under optimal taxes, two types of taxes affect identically. Under incomplete information carbon taxes seem more efficient than emission taxes. Based on these conclusions, we suggest to launch environmental tax based on emission function. Or the selection of taxes should consider the emission properties in production.

This aim of this study is to find out the optimal tax treatment that motivates donor corporations to make more monetary and in-kind donations to their communities with minimal damage to the interests of all the parties involved and the corporate social responsibility (CSR) idea. Economic impact, legal imbalances and the extent of closeness to or distance from the content of the idea of CSR are tax treatment methods used for corporate monetary and in-kind donations and to determine their advantages and disadvantages according to certain criteria to choose the optimal tax treatment method. According to the findings, the study adopts the method of government’s rights and corporation’s rights ‘donations as if they are loans’ by legislative bodies in all countries of the world due to the abundance of its advantages. This study has drawn up a draft law for this method, which could be used as a guide by the legislative bodies, if a decision is made to adopt this method. Keywords: Tax treatment, tax incentives, advantages, disadvantages, legal imbalances, economic impacts.

This study examines the effects of tax policies in a dynamic model of a polluted small open economy with two sources of flow pollution—consumption and production—controlled by consumption and income taxes. In this setting, accumulated pollution negatively impacts households’ utility. We show that in a decentralized dynamic competitive equilibrium under exogenous tax rates, whereas a permanent increase in consumption and income taxes unambiguously reduces the steady-state pollution stock, a temporary increase in these taxes may lead to more pollution in the long run. This outcome suggests that more stringent environmental policies might be ineffective if the regulation is only temporary. We also derive the socially optimal solution and examine the optimal tax paths to achieve the social optimum. If distaste and leisure effects are sufficiently strong, tax rates decrease along the optimal path as pollution increases over time, and vice versa.

Purpose This paper aims to provide a quantitative assessment of the broad economic effects of tax policy reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Design/methodology/approach Using a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the KSA, three simulations are run. The first simulation is the baseline simulation, which generates growth paths of the Saudi economy in the absence of tax reform. In developing the baseline simulation, this study incorporates forecasts from the International Monetary Fund. The remaining simulations are policy simulations. A policy simulation deviates from the baseline simulation in response to a policy change. In the first policy simulation, this study introduces a value-added tax (VAT) that generates SAR 35bn. This study assumes budget neutrality with the additional tax revenue transferred to households via a lump sum payment. In the second policy simulation, this study introduces a corporate income tax that generates SAR 35bn. This study then calculates and compares the distortion these taxes introduce into the economy. Findings This study finds that although the introduction of new taxes increases government tax revenue, markets are distorted lowering efficiency and production. An introduction of VAT increases the cost of consumption relative to the cost of production. As a consequence, the real cost of labour increases lowering employment in the short run. Employment moves to the baseline, as wages adjust capital and real gross domestic product (GDP) is below base throughout the simulation period. The second simulation is an increase in the corporate tax rate with lowers the post-tax rates of return investors receive. This simulation shows that the negative impact on investment, capital and GDP is larger with the introduction of a corporate tax than with the VAT. Research limitations/implications Literature focusing on tax policy reform in the Gulf Cooperation Council and, specifically, Saudi Arabia is limited. This paper contributes to the literature by focusing on the following: understanding the impact and mechanisms through which changes in taxation impact the economy more generally; understanding the potential harm caused to allocative efficiency and production due to taxes; and ways in which fiscal reform might complement other reforms such as efforts to diversify the economy, labour market and energy price reforms. This improves the information base available to policymakers charged with designing an optimal tax system that meets all future requirements of a country such as the KSA. Originality/value The authors developed and applied a CGE model for the KSA to analyse the impact of VAT and corporate tax on the Saudi economy. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no recent CGE models for Saudi Arabia that have been used for tax policy or quantifying the potential harm to the economy when new taxes are introduced.

Many activities are subsidized despite generating negative externalities. Examples include needle exchanges and energy production subsidies. We explain this phenomenon by developing a model in which the policymaker faces constraints or costs. We highlight three examples. First, it may be optimal to subsidize a harmful activity if the policymaker cannot set the first-best tax on an externally harmful substitute. Second, it may be optimal to subsidize a harmful production process if the activity mix at lower levels of output uses more harmful activities than the activity mix at higher levels of output. Third, it may be optimal to subsidize a harmful activity if there is a large administrative cost associated with taxing a harmful substitute. We also show how the functional form of the cost of administering a Pigouvian tax affects the optimal tax. When administrative cost is a function of only tax rates, the policymaker should tax each activity. However, an increase in the tax presents a trade-off: lower externality but higher administrative cost. A subsidy may be optimal for some externally harmful activities. When administrative cost is a function of only activity levels, it may not be optimal to tax every activity. If it is optimal to tax each activity, the policymaker should set the tax equal to the externality plus the marginal administrative cost. If it is not optimal to tax every activity, the complementarity between activities comes into play, and it may be optimal to subsidize externally harmful activities.

The involvement of our country in the process of European integration is based on removing the inconsistencies and failures of previous reforms, as well as reconciling the objectives of efficiency, effectiveness and equity that lay the foundation for an optimal tax system. Carrying out a comparative analysis of local taxation in the Member States of the European Union could help to remove these inconsistencies, providing an overview and the conclusions drawn can be considered for improving our tax system. The countries we have chosen to carry out the comparative analysis on are part of both groups of developed economies and emerging economies, so the analysis could be relevant based on almost similar contexts, being part of the European Union. The group of developed countries under observation is made up of Italy, France and Germany, all three of them being founding members of the European Community, while the group of developing countries we chose is made up of Bulgaria, Romania and Poland, all of which are the latest members that adhered to the European Union. This paper analyses the fiscal pressure borne by taxpayers, at the European Union level, from direct taxes. The correlation between fiscal pressure and direct taxes, in an empirical analysis conducted at microeconomic level, as well as the challenges that the Member State face in their attempt to harmonize direct taxes are also highlighted in this study. Following this comparison, we will be able to assess the impact of direct taxes and to which extent these influence a country’s economic development as well as what challenges the governments are currently facing in increasing their amounts of revenues.

The paper considers a discrete continuous model where consumers choose quality of the product they buy as well as its usage. The product has two quality dimensions, intrinsic quality and environmental quality, that are in conflict with each other. It analyzes a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly market, where firms choose intrinsic quality in the first stage, and compete in prices in the second stage. It examines the effects of green network, and environmental regulation in the form of an emission tax on equilibrium qualities, market share, and total emissions. It shows that while both green network effect and environmental regulation, individually, improve the overall environmental quality, the effect is stronger when the tax is imposed in the presence of green network effect. Though an increase in green network effect reduces environmental quality of both firms, the market share of the cleaner firm rises at the expense of the other firm, resulting in an overall improvement of the environment. In the presence of green network effect, an emission tax improves environmental quality of both firms with market shares unaltered, thereby resulting in a reduction in total emissions. The green network effect enhances the effect of an emission tax. We also find that the environmental friendly firm benefits from the green network effect. The optimal tax is increasing in the network effect.

The standard models with incomplete markets (e.g. Aiyagari) have difficulty justifying the current income tax rates as an optimal or political equilibrium outcome. Given the highly skewed income distribution, the majority of the population would be in favor of raising taxes to a much higher level. We show that incorporating (i) the ex-ante heterogeneity of earnings and (ii) income-dependent voting behavior helps us to reconcile the large gap between the model and data.

We consider optimal taxation in a model with wealth-poor and wealth-rich households, where wealth derives from business capital and home ownership, and investigate the consequences of a rising wealth inequality at steady state on these tax rates. The optimal tax structure includes some taxation of labor, zero taxation of financial and business capital, a housing wealth tax on the wealth-rich households and a housing subsidy on the wealth-poor households. When wealth inequality increases, the optimal balance between labor and housing wealth taxes depends on the source of the increasing wealth.

I study the effect of progressive taxation on internal migration and welfare using a quantitative dynamic model of geographic mobility. The model, which is analytically tractable, predicts that a more progressive tax‐transfer scheme reduces internal migration rates. The magnitude of this relationship is consistent with reduced‐form evidence for OECD countries. The internal migration channel contributes to significantly lower optimal tax progressivity relative to the one‐location version of the economy. The optimal sequence of tax progressivity along the transition features a relatively high degree of tax progressivity early on, followed by a declining path of tax progressivity over time.

COVID-19 poses an unprecedented threat to components of global business cycles including stock markets, industrial production and employment. This study investigated its impact on stock markets of 24 oil producing COVID-19-hit economies in North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Oceania and Africa. It examined the nature of asymmetry in the business cycles of the sampled countries and the impact of COVID-19 on the asymmetry. Switching regression techniques were estimated with data covering the period from October 1, 2019 to April 14, 2020. The results confirmed the presence of negative asymmetry in stock market cycles in 54.2% of the sampled countries, out of which 38.5%, 46.2% and 15.4% are high, middle and low-middle income countries, respectively. This is significantly connected to the COVID-19 pandemic for 29.2% of the sample. The expected duration of being in the state of low stock market performance, due to COVID-19, reduces with levels of countries’ income, if regimes are dependent. Opposite was observed if regimes are independent. Hence, the negative impact of COVID-19 on stock markets in lower-income countries will linger compared to higher-income countries. Reducing COVID-19-associated risks will go a long way to revive investors’ confidence in the market and help to restart the engine of economic recovery in the sampled countries.

The determination of the optimal tax rate of water resources is one of the core as well as the key economic and technological issue in the ‘fee to tax’ work of water resources in China. Therefore, based on the introduction of the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of water resources tax, using production parameters and consumption parameters of Hebei province in 2008–2017, the optimal tax rate of water resources is simulated and calculated, and the impact of the optimal tax rate on social welfare is analyzed. The results show that the reference of the best water resources tax rate in Hebei Province is 18%, and taxation on water resources effectively promotes the water use structure and water resources utilization efficiency in Hebei, which is beneficial to its water resources protection. The effective calculation of the optimal tax rate of water resources tax in Hebei Province proves the effectiveness of the CGE model in the formulation of water resources tax rate, which provides an important reference for the nationwide popularization of water resources ‘fee to tax reform’ in China and the formulation of water resources tax rate in other regions. Highlights The shortage of water resources and the malpractice of water resources fee policy promoted the water resources ‘fee to tax reform’.; The calculation of optimal tax rate of water resources is the key step of tax reform.; The collection of water resources tax can improve the level of social welfare.; The results show that CGE model is an effective method to calculate the optimal tax rate of water resources.

In December 1974, the economist Art Laffer had dinner at a Washington D.C. restaurant with Jude Wanniski, Donald Rumsfeld, and Dick Cheney. The tax rate was so high in the United States, Laffer argued, that reducing the tax rate would increase government tax revenue. As legend has it, he drew the Laffer Curve on a napkin to illustrate how reducing the tax rate would raise tax revenue. The Laffer Curve has been a mainstay of Supply-Side Economics ever since.The Laffer Curve relates government tax revenue to the tax rate. Figure 1 is the Laffer Curve (Laffer, 2004). The x-axis shows tax revenue and the y-axis shows the tax rate. The Laffer Curve plots the relationship between the tax rate and tax revenue. As figure 1 shows, tax revenue is maximized, or optimal at RO, when the tax rate is TO. [Fig 1: LAFFER CURVE] Further, the Laffer Curve illustrates that tax revenue decreases as the tax rate rises above the optimal tax rate. For example, imagine the tax rate is suboptimal at TS. At this tax rate, government revenue is suboptimal at RS. Even though the tax rate TS is higher than TO, tax revenue RS is actually lower than RO. In this case, government can increase tax revenue by reducing the tax rate. Generally, government can increase tax revenue by lowering the tax rate whenever the economy is located on the downward sloping part of the Laffer Curve. In short, the Laffer Curve suggests that extremely high taxes are counterproductive even from the government’s own perspective.Murray N. Rothbard stressed that Laffer’s analysis contains a hidden value judgement: maximizing government tax revenue is desirable. Rothbard writes,“Laffer assumes that what all of us want is to maximize tax revenue to the government. If—a big if—we are really at the upper half of the Laffer curve, we should then all want to set tax rates at that “optimum” point. But why? Why should it be the objective of every one of us to maximize government revenue? To push to the maximum, in short, the share of private product that gets siphoned off to the activities of government? I should think we would be more interested in minimizing government revenue by pushing tax rates far, far below whatever the Laffer Optimum might happen to be” (Rothbard, 1984: 17-18; Block, 2010).Economists who use the Laffer Curve conduct their analysis with a fixed curve. However, in a progressing economy, the Laffer Curve is constantly expanding. Put differently, the Laffer Curve is always shifting to the right in a progressing economy. Advocates of the Laffer Curve fail to realize that the position of the curve is far more important than the economy’s place on a given curve.The position of the Laffer Curve depends on the stock of accumulated capital. As economists underscore again and again, capital accumulation is the only way to raise overall living standards. Ludwig von Mises writes,“there is but one method available to improve the conditions of the whole population, viz., to accelerate the accumulation of capital as against the increase in population. The only method of rendering all people more prosperous is to raise the productivity of human labor, i.e., productivity per man hour, and this can be done only by placing into the hands of the worker more and better tools and machines.” (1951: 282)Significantly, capital accumulation and hence overall living standards depend on the tax rate. As economists have known for centuries, high taxes impair capital accumulation:“If the funds which the successful businessmen would have ploughed back into productive employments are [taxed and] used by the state for current expenditure or given to people who con-sume them, the further accumulation of capital is slowed down or entirely stopped. Then there is no longer any question of economic improvement, technological progress, and a trend toward higher average standards of living” (Mises, 1955: 51).

The legitimacy of the tax system is likely to be compromised in the absence of public support. This article presents evidence from a discrete choice experiment designed to elicit the tax preferences of ordinary citizens on how corporations should be taxed. We find that respondents prefer higher taxes on more internationally mobile companies, which is inconsistent with the prescriptions of optimal tax theory. Moreover, it is at odds with the tax policy in many countries, which may reduce political support for taxation among citizens. The experiment was conducted in Tanzania, making this result all the more striking as developing countries are particularly sensitive to location decisions of corporations. We also find that citizens favor higher taxes on foreign‐owned companies compared to domestic ones and lower taxes on companies that have more local employees.

Lesotho faces fiscal deficits due to high government expenditure as characterized by the huge wage bill regarded as one of the highest in the world (UNICEF, 2018). The aim of this research paper is to investigate the tax revenue impact as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on economic growth in Lesotho. This research is provoked by the theoretical postulations and empirical evidence that their relationship is positive up to a certain optimal level which is the point at which economic growth rate is maximized. The study used data from 1988 to 2017 to investigate the relationship between tax burden and economic growth in Lesotho by applying the log-linearized model of Scully’s tax optimization model transformed into an ARDL bounds testing framework. Granger causality test and error correction model was employed to investigate the long run relationship between tax burden and economic growth in Lesotho. The findings of study revealed a long-run relationship between economic growth rate and tax burden with a unidirectional causality running from economic growth to tax burden. Granger causality revealed no causal effect running from tax burden to economic growth in Lesotho despite expectation of significant causal effect following both theoretical and empirical literature from various studies. Error correction results further supported a co-integrating relationship running from economic growth to tax burden with 100 percent speed of adjustment in the short-run towards a long-run equilibrium level. An optimal tax burden could not be established as the variables of interest were negative and insignificant signifying the insignificance of tax policy in stimulating the economic performance.

In this paper, we propose a predator-prey system with square root functional response, two delays and prey harvesting, in which an algebraic equation stands for the economic interest of the yield of the harvest effort. Firstly, the existence of the positive equilibrium is discussed. Then, by taking two delays as bifurcation parameters, the local stability of the positive equilibrium and the existence of Hopf bifurcation are obtained. Next, some explicit formulas determining the properties of Hopf bifurcation are analyzed based on the normal form method and center manifold theory. Furthermore, the control of Hopf bifurcation is discussed in theory. What's more, the optimal tax policy of system is given. Finally, simulations are given to check the theoretical results.

We revisit the causes, welfare consequences, and policy implications of the dispersion in households' labor market outcomes using a model with uninsurable risk, incomplete asset markets, and a home production technology. Accounting for home production amplies welfare-based dierences across households meaning that inequality is larger than we thought. Using the optimality condition that households allocate more consumption to their more productive sector, we infer that the dispersion in home productivity across households is roughly three times as large as the dispersion in their wages. There is little scope for home production to oset dierences that originate in the market sector because productivity dierences in the home sector are large and the time input in home production does not covary with consumption expenditures and wages in the cross section of households. We conclude that the optimal tax system should feature more progressivity taking into account home production.

Recent theoretical papers argue that countries can insulate themselves from volatile world capital flows by using a variable tax on foreign capital as an instrument of monetary policy. But empirical papers argue that we rarely observe these cyclical capital flow taxes used in practice. We construct a small open economy model where the central bank engages in sterilized foreign exchange intervention. When private agents freely trade foreign bonds, sterilized intervention has no effect. But we prove that when frictions prevent the free trade in foreign bonds, optimal sterilized foreign exchange intervention is equivalent to an optimal tax on foreign capital. The model is then calibrated to match the levels of capital account restrictions that we observe in the data. For levels of capital account openness that we observe in many emerging market economies, a variable tax on capital flows is a close approximation for sterilized foreign exchange intervention.

This study investigates how a revenue-maximizing tax strategy of local and central governments incorporates dual networks, namely, an inter-firm transaction network and an inter-country geography network. We assume a two-stage game in which governments propose discriminatory tax levels for firms, whereas each firm has an incentive to invest in a country near the foreign branch office of its transaction partner. In our model, the centrality index of the Kronecker product of the two networks describes the interplay among the location choices and tax strategies in the equilibrium. A stronger linkage within each network generally increases demand for investment and in turn raises overall tax levels to exploit the high demand. Although more central firms in the inter-firm network are likely to be levied higher taxes because of their high demand for investment, firms in the highest tax bracket differ among countries depending on their geographical location. Finally, we show that a uniform tax in which firms are not discriminated and networks do not matter is the socially optimal tax, which incorporates all inter-country externalities. We also investigate decentralized tax strategies based on the rule of non-discriminatory (uniform) taxation and show, by comparing social welfare under discriminatory and uniform tax regimes, that restricting tax discrimination improves social welfare.

When a government intervenes in markets by setting a target amount of goods/services traded, its tax/subsidy policy is optimal if it entices the market participants to obey the policy target while achieving the highest possible social welfare. In the model of job market interventions by Kojima et al. (2019), we establish the existence of optimal taxes/subsidies as well as their characterization and efficient computation. Our methodological contribution is to introduce a discrete version of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker's saddle-point theorem based on the techniques in discrete convex analysis. We have two main results: we (i) characterize the optimal taxes/subsidies and the corresponding equilibrium salaries as the minimizers of a Lagrange function, and (ii) prove that the function satisfies a notion of discrete convexity (called L#-convexity). These results together with Kojima et al.'s (2019) result imply that an optimal tax/subsidy level exists and is calculated via a computationally efficient algorithm.

This theoretical study attempted to answer the following question: What is the optimal tax treatment that motivates donor corporations to make more monetary and in-kind donations to their communities and with minimal damage to the interests of all the parties involved, and the content of the CSR idea? To answer this complex question, the researcher was forced to imagine all possible tax treatment methods for corporate monetary and in-kind donations and to determine their advantages and disadvantages -according to certain criteria, to choose the optimal tax treatment method. This study recommends the adoption of the method of government's rights and then corporation's rights in government's rights "donations as if they are loans" by legislative bodies in all countries of the world due to the abundance of its advantages. This method is optimal. This method will motivate donor corporations to make more monetary and in-kind donations to their communities and with minimal damage to the interests of all the parties involved, and the content of the CSR idea.Given the importance of this method. This study has drawn up a draft law for this method, which could be used as a guide by the legislative bodies, if adecision is made to adopt this method.

Work often entails up-front effort costs in exchange for delayed benefits, and mounting evidence documents present bias over effort in the face of such delays. This paper studies the implications for the optimal income tax. Optimal tax rates are computed for present-biased workers who choose multiple dimensions of labor effort, some of which occur prior to compensation. Present bias reduces optimal tax rates, with a larger effect when the elasticity of taxable income is high. Optimal marginal tax rates may be negative at low incomes, providing an alternative, corrective rationale for work subsidies like the Earned Income Tax Credit. (JEL D91, H21, H24)

The conventional formula for the optimal export tax (derived from a partial equilibrium model that ignores importers’ welfare) is extended to include the deadweight loss to the domestic economy associated with the tax. Applying the extended formula to the tax Russia imposes on its exports of logs, results suggest ignoring the marketing channel causes the optimal export tax for a primary commodity to be understated. The degree of understatement increases as the supply of logs and processing/marketing inputs become less price elastic, and as buyer and seller power in the downstream (lumber) industry increases. For plausible values of model parameters, however, the degree of understatement is modest, less than 19%.

We characterise optimal fiscal policies when the government has access to consumption taxation but cannot credibly commit to future policies, in a calibrated Real Business Cycle model of the United States economy. Contrary to the case where only labour and capital income are taxed, the optimal time-consistent policies are remarkably similar to their Ramsey counterparts, as long as the capital income tax causes some distortion within the period. The welfare gains from commitment are negligible, while they are substantial without consumption taxation. Further, the welfare gains from taxing consumption are much higher without commitment. These results suggest that the policy-maker's ability to commit is of secondary importance if consumption is taxed optimally.