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This article critically examines the argument advanced by Casey Humbyrd in support of international commercial surrogate mothering. It finds her arguments unconvincing especially at the point of implementation. This is because the author was unable to demonstrate how regulation and her notion of fair compensation would not lead to undue inducement and exploitation in resource-poor settings where urgent needs often exist. In fact, the argument advanced in this article is that commercial surrogate mothering cannot but be exploitative in so far as urgent and compelling needs exist. To logically drive home this point, the elements of exploitation were discussed in order to show that regulation and fair compensation cannot prevent exploitative transaction in commercial surrogate mothering arrangements. This may happen in the same way as regulation and compensation framework have not been successful in preventing the allegations of exploitation in the research context especially where studies are conducted in resource-poor countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay is an intercultural dialogue in reproductive ethics. The paper, which argues from both developed and developing world perspectives, addresses the question of what should be done when confronted with the possibility of giving birth to a severely disabled child. The author argues that such a life should not be considered because of the economic circumstances in most developing countries. This is contrary to the view sometimes advanced in affluent societies that the prevention of such a birth should not necessarily be considered. The author, however, agrees that the principle of acceptable outlook could be employed in both economic settings but with a variable degree of moral compliance without suggesting that certain lives are better than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that the codification of vulnerability in international regulatory guidelines, such as the Declaration of Helsinki and the document issued by the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences on International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, do not sufficiently protect research subjects. This is true in particular when research is designed in developed countries but conducted in poor (African) countries. Furthermore, I argue that the reason for the insufficiency of guidelines in protecting research subjects in poor settings is due to vagueness in those international documents. Hence, the need for a supplementary instrument of protection was suggested to be employed in addition to international regulatory documents when clinical research is designed to be conducted in developing countries by investigators from affluent countries.

In this paper I examine issues associated with advance directives and the impact these issues have on people's lives based on their value systems. I ague from an African perspective, where I defend the view that competent persons ought to be allowed to decide on medical interventions they want (or do not want) should they become incompetent. My arguments are derived from the idea of African concepts of death, dying and belief in ancestral realm. The principle of collective-autonomous decision is used to explain how decisions on advance directives to reject a medical intervention can be implemented in the African context.