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Supplementary report provided to the WHO/GMP Guideline Development Group on Malaria Chemoprevention for “Section 4.2.5 Post-discharge malaria chemoprevention (PDMC)” of the WHO Guidelines for malaria, 3 June 2022.

England has been severely affected by COVID-19. We fitted a model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in care homes and the community to regional 2020 surveillance data. Only national lockdown brought the reproduction number below 1 consistently; introduced one week earlier in the first wave it could have reduced mortality by 23,300 deaths on average. The mean infection fatality ratio was initially ~1.3% across all regions except London and halved following clinical care improvements. The infection fatality ratio was two-fold lower throughout in London, even when adjusting for demographics. The infection fatality ratio in care homes was 2.5-times that in the elderly in the community. Population-level infection-induced immunity in England is still far from herd immunity, with regional mean cumulative attack rates ranging between 4.4% and 15.8%.

The infection fatality ratio (IFR) is a key statistic for estimating the burden of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and has been continuously debated throughout the current pandemic. Previous estimates have relied on data early in the epidemic, or have not fully accounted for uncertainty in serological test characteristics and delays from onset of infection to seroconversion, death, and antibody waning. After screening 175 studies, we identified 10 representative antibody surveys to obtain updated estimates of the IFR using a modelling framework that addresses the limitations listed above. We inferred serological test specificity from regional variation within serosurveys, which is critical for correctly estimating the cumulative proportion infected when seroprevalence is still low. We find that age-specific IFRs follow an approximately log-linear pattern, with the risk of death doubling approximately every eight years of age. Using these age-specific estimates, we estimate the overall IFR in a typical low-income country, with a population structure skewed towards younger individuals, to be 0.23% (0.14-0.42 95% prediction interval range). In contrast, in a typical high income country, with a greater concentration of elderly individuals, we estimate the overall IFR to be 1.15% (0.78-1.79 95% prediction interval range). We show that accounting for seroreversion, the waning of antibodies leading to a negative serological result, can slightly reduce the IFR among serosurveys conducted several months after the first wave of the outbreak, such as Italy. In contrast, uncertainty in test false positive rates combined with low seroprevalence in some surveys can reconcile apparently low crude fatality ratios with the IFR in other countries. Unbiased estimates of the IFR continue to be critical to policymakers to inform key response decisions. It will be important to continue to monitor the IFR as new treatments are introduced. The code for reproducing these results are available as a R Research Compendium on Github: `mrc-ide/reestimate_covidIFR_analysis`.

Following ini􀀂al declines, in mid 2020, a resurgence in transmission of novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) has occurred in the United States and parts of Europe. Despite the wide implementa􀀂on of non-pharmaceu􀀂cal inter-ven􀀂ons, it is s􀀂ll not known how they are impacted by changing contact pa􀀁erns, age and other demographics. As COVID-19 disease control becomes more localised, understanding the age demographics driving transmission and how these impact the loosening of interven􀀂ons such as school reopening is crucial. Considering dynamics for the United States, we analyse aggregated, age-specific mobility trends from more than 10 million individuals and link these mechanis􀀂cally to age-specific COVID-19 mortality data. In contrast to previous approaches, we link mobility to mortality via age specific contact pa􀀁erns and use this rich rela􀀂onship to reconstruct accurate trans-mission dynamics. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, we find li􀀁le support for age-shi􀀃s in contact and transmission dynamics over 􀀂me. We es􀀂mate that, un􀀂l August, 63.4% [60.9%-65.5%] of SARS-CoV-2 infec􀀂ons in the United States originated from adults aged 20-49, while 1.2% [0.8%-1.8%] originated from children aged 0-9. In areas with con􀀂nued, community-wide transmission, our transmission model predicts that re-opening kindergartens and el-ementary schools could facilitate spread and lead to considerable excess COVID-19 a􀀁ributable deaths over a 90-day period. These findings indicate that targe􀀂ng interven􀀂ons to adults aged 20-49 are an important con-sidera􀀂on in hal􀀂ng resurgent epidemics, and preven􀀂ng COVID-19-a􀀁ributable deaths when kindergartens and elementary schools reopen.

The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in substantial mortality worldwide. However, to date, countries in the Middle East and Africa have reported substantially lower mortality rates than in Europe and the Americas. One hypothesis is that these countries have been ‘spared’, but another is that deaths have been under-ascertained (deaths that have been unreported due to any number of reasons, for instance due to limited testing capacity). However, the scale of under-ascertainment is difficult to assess with currently available data. In this analysis, we estimate the potential under-ascertainment of COVID-19 mortality in Damascus, Syria, where all-cause mortality data has been reported between 25th July and 1st August. We fit a mathematical model of COVID-19 transmission to reported COVID-19 deaths in Damascus since the beginning of the pandemic and compare the model-predicted deaths to reported excess deaths. Exploring a range of different assumptions about under-ascertainment, we estimate that only 1.25% of deaths (sensitivity range 1% - 3%) due to COVID-19 are reported in Damascus. Accounting for under-ascertainment also corroborates local reports of exceeded hospital bed capacity. To validate the epidemic dynamics inferred, we leverage community-uploaded obituary certificates as an alternative data source, which confirms extensive mortality under-ascertainment in Damascus between July and August. This level of under-ascertainment suggests that Damascus is at a much later stage in its epidemic than suggested by surveillance reports, which have repo. We estimate that 4,340 (95% CI: 3,250 - 5,540) deaths due to COVID-19 in Damascus may have been missed as of 2nd September 2020. Given that Damascus is likely to have the most robust surveillance in Syria, these findings suggest that other regions of the country could have experienced similar or worse mortality rates due to COVID-19.

Background England, UK has experienced a large outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 infection. As in USA and elsewhere, disadvantaged communities have been disproportionately affected. Methods National REal-time Assessment of Community Transmission-2 (REACT-2) seroprevalence study using self-administered lateral flow immunoassay (LFIA) test for IgG among a random population sample of 100,000 adults over 18 years in England, 20 June to 13 July 2020. Results Completed questionnaires were available for 109,076 participants, yielding 5,544 IgG positive results and adjusted (for test performance), re-weighted (for sampling) prevalence of 6.0% (95% CI: 5.8, 6.1). Highest prevalence was in London (13.0% [12.3, 13.6]), among people of Black or Asian (mainly South Asian) ethnicity (17.3% [15.8, 19.1] and 11.9% [11.0, 12.8] respectively) and those aged 18-24 years (7.9% [7.3, 8.5]). Care home workers with client-facing roles had adjusted odds ratio of 3.1 (2.5, 3.8) compared with non-essential workers. One third (32.2%, [31.0-33.4]) of antibody positive individuals reported no symptoms. Among symptomatic cases, the majority (78.8%) reported symptoms during the peak of the epidemic in England in March (31.3%) and April (47.5%) 2020. We estimate that 3.36 million (3.21, 3.51) people have been infected with SARS-CoV-2 in England to end June 2020, with an overall infection fatality ratio of 0.90% (0.86, 0.94). Conclusion The pandemic of SARS-CoV-2 infection in England disproportionately affected ethnic minority groups and health and care home workers. The higher risk of infection in these groups may explain, at least in part, their increased risk of hospitalisation and mortality from COVID-19.

Background: COVID-19 has the potential to cause substantial disruptions to health services, including by cases overburdening the health system or response measures limiting usual programmatic activities. We aimed to quantify the extent to which disruptions in services for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), tuberculosis (TB) and malaria in low- and middle-income countries with high burdens of those disease could lead to additional loss of life. Methods: We constructed plausible scenarios for the disruptions that could be incurred during the COVID-19 pandemic and used established transmission models for each disease to estimate the additional impact on health that could be caused in selected settings. Findings: In high burden settings, HIV-, TB- and malaria-related deaths over five years may increase by up to 10%, 20% and 36%, respectively, compared to if there were no COVID-19 pandemic. We estimate the greatest impact on HIV to be from interruption to antiretroviral therapy, which may occur during a period of high health system demand. For TB, we estimate the greatest impact is from reductions in timely diagnosis and treatment of new cases, which may result from any prolonged period of COVID-19 suppression interventions. We estimate that the greatest impact on malaria burden could come from interruption of planned net campaigns. These disruptions could lead to loss of life-years over five years that is of the same order of magnitude as the direct impact from COVID-19 in places with a high burden of malaria and large HIV/TB epidemics. Interpretation: Maintaining the most critical prevention activities and healthcare services for HIV, TB and malaria could significantly reduce the overall impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Funding: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, The Wellcome Trust, DFID, MRC

Background: Since the start of the COVID-19 epidemic in late 2019, there have been more than 152 affected regions and countries with over 110,000 confirmed cases outside mainland China. Methods: We analysed COVID-19 cases among travellers from mainland China to different regions and countries, comparing the region- and country-specific rates of detected and confirmed cases per flight volume to estimate the relative sensitivity of surveillance in different regions and countries. Results: Although travel restrictions from Wuhan City and other cities across China may have reduced the absolute number of travellers to and from China, we estimated that more than two thirds (70%, 95% CI: 54% - 80%, compared to Singapore; 75%, 95% CI: 66% - 82%, compared to multiple countries) of cases exported from mainland China have remained undetected. Conclusions: These undetected cases potentially resulted in multiple chains of human-to-human transmission outside mainland China.

our estimates show that the percentage of individuals that have been infected is 4.1% [3.7%-4.5%], with wide variation between states. For all states, even for the worst affected states, we estimate that less than a quarter of the population has been infected; in New York, for example, we estimate that 16.6% [12.8%-21.6%] of individuals have been infected to date. Our attack rates for New York are in line with those from recent serological studies [1] broadly supporting our choice of infection fatality rate. There is variation in the initial reproduction number, which is likely due to a range of factors; we find a strong association between the initial reproduction number with both population density (measured at the state level) and the chronological date when 10 cumulative deaths occurred (a crude estimate of the date of locally sustained transmission). Our estimates suggest that the epidemic is not under control in much of the US: as of 17 May 2020 the reproduction number is above the critical threshold (1.0) in 24 [95% CI: 20-30] states. Higher reproduction numbers are geographically clustered in the South and Midwest, where epidemics are still developing, while we estimate lower reproduction numbers in states that have already suffered high COVID-19 mortality (such as the Northeast). These estimates suggest that caution must be taken in loosening current restrictions if effective additional measures are not put in place. We predict that increased mobility following relaxation of social distancing will lead to resurgence of transmission, keeping all else constant. We predict that deaths over the next two-month period could exceed current cumulative deaths by greater than two-fold, if the relationship between mobility and transmission remains unchanged. Our results suggest that factors modulating transmission such as rapid testing, contact tracing and behavioural precautions are crucial to offset the rise of transmission associated with loosening of social distancing. Overall, we show that while all US states have substantially reduced their reproduction numbers, there is little evidence that any states are approaching herd immunity and thus the epidemic is close to over in any state.

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in low-income settings is likely to be more severe due to limited healthcare capacity. Within these settings, however, there exists unfair or avoidable differences in health among different groups in society – health inequities – that mean that some groups are particularly at risk from the negative direct and indirect consequences of COVID-19. The structural determinants of these are often reflected in differences by income strata, with the poorest populations having limited access to preventative measures such as handwashing. Their more fragile income status will also mean that they are likely to be employed in occupations that are not amenable to social-distancing measures, thereby further reducing their ability to protect themselves from infection. Furthermore, these populations may also lack access to timely healthcare on becoming ill. We explore these relationships by using large-scale household surveys to quantify the differences in handwashing access, occupation and hospital access with respect to wealth status in low-income settings. We use a COVID-19 transmission model to demonstrate the impact of these differences. Our results demonstrate clear trends that the probability of death from COVID-19 increases with increasing poverty. On average, we estimate a 32.0% (2.5th-97.5th centile 8.0%-72.5%) increase in the probability of death in the poorest quintile compared to the wealthiest quintile from these three factors alone. We further explore how risk mediators and the indirect impacts of COVID-19 may also hit these same disadvantaged and vulnerable the hardest. We find that larger, inter-generational households that may hamper efforts to protect the elderly if social distancing are associated with lower-income countries and, within LMICs, lower wealth status. Poorer populations are also more susceptible to food security issues - with these populations having the highest levels under-nourishment whilst also being most dependent on their own food production. We show that timing of the COVID-19 epidemic in low-resource settings has the potential to interrupt planting and harvesting seasons for staple crops, thereby accentuating this vulnerability. These enhanced risks and key vulnerabilities – alongside the broader concerns surrounding displaced or conflict-affected populations - demonstrate the challenges that the most marginalised populations face during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

Brazil is an epicentre for COVID-19 in Latin America. In this report we describe the Brazilian epidemic using three epidemiological measures: the number of infections, the number of deaths and the reproduction number. Our modelling framework requires sufficient death data to estimate trends, and we therefore limit our analysis to 16 states that have experienced a total of more than fifty deaths. The distribution of deaths among states is highly heterogeneous, with 5 states—São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Ceará, Pernambuco and Amazonas—accounting for 81% of deaths reported to date. In these states, we estimate that the percentage of people that have been infected with SARS-CoV-2 ranges from 3.3% (95% CI: 2.8%-3.7%) in São Paulo to 10.6% (95% CI: 8.8%-12.1%) in Amazonas. The reproduction number (a measure of transmission intensity) at the start of the epidemic meant that an infected individual would infect three or four others on average. Following non-pharmaceutical interventions such as school closures and decreases in population mobility, we show that the reproduction number has dropped substantially in each state. However, for all 16 states we study, we estimate with high confidence that the reproduction number remains above 1. A reproduction number above 1 means that the epidemic is not yet controlled and will continue to grow. These trends are in stark contrast to other major COVID19 epidemics in Europe and Asia where enforced lockdowns have successfully driven the reproduction number below 1. While the Brazilian epidemic is still relatively nascent on a national scale, our results suggest that further action is needed to limit spread and prevent health system overload.

Italy was the first European country to experience sustained local transmission of COVID-19. As of 1st May 2020, the Italian health authorities reported 28; 238 deaths nationally. To control the epidemic, the Italian government implemented a suite of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), including school and university closures, social distancing and full lockdown involving banning of public gatherings and non essential movement. In this report, we model the effect of NPIs on transmission using data on average mobility. We estimate that the average reproduction number (a measure of transmission intensity) is currently below one for all Italian regions, and significantly so for the majority of the regions. Despite the large number of deaths, the proportion of population that has been infected by SARS-CoV-2 (the attack rate) is far from the herd immunity threshold in all Italian regions, with the highest attack rate observed in Lombardy (13.18% [10.66%-16.70%]). Italy is set to relax the currently implemented NPIs from 4th May 2020. Given the control achieved by NPIs, we consider three scenarios for the next 8 weeks: a scenario in which mobility remains the same as during the lockdown, a scenario in which mobility returns to pre-lockdown levels by 20%, and a scenario in which mobility returns to pre-lockdown levels by 40%. The scenarios explored assume that mobility is scaled evenly across all dimensions, that behaviour stays the same as before NPIs were implemented, that no pharmaceutical interventions are introduced, and it does not include transmission reduction from contact tracing, testing and the isolation of confirmed or suspected cases. We find that, in the absence of additional interventions, even a 20% return to pre-lockdown mobility could lead to a resurgence in the number of deaths far greater than experienced in the current wave in several regions. Future increases in the number of deaths will lag behind the increase in transmission intensity and so a second wave will not be immediately apparent from just monitoring of the daily number of deaths. Our results suggest that SARS-CoV-2 transmission as well as mobility should be closely monitored in the next weeks and months. To compensate for the increase in mobility that will occur due to the relaxation of the currently implemented NPIs, enhanced community surveillance including swab testing, contact tracing and the early isolation of infections are of paramount importance to reduce the risk of resurgence in transmission.

The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to severely interrupt health systems in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the coming weeks and months. Approximately 90% of malaria deaths occur in this region of the world, with an estimated 380,000 deaths from malaria in 2018. Much of the gain made in malaria control over the last decade has been due to the distribution of long-lasting insecticide treated nets (LLINs). Many SSA countries planned to distribute these in 2020. We used COVID-19 and malaria transmission models to understand the likely impact that disruption to these distributions, alongside other core health services, could have on the malaria burden. Results indicate that if all malaria-control activities are highly disrupted then the malaria burden in 2020 could more than double that in the previous year, resulting in large malaria epidemics across the region. These will depend on the course of the COVID-19 epidemic and how it interrupts local health system. Our results also demonstrate that it is essential to prioritise the LLIN distributions either before or as soon as possible into local COVID-19 epidemics to mitigate this risk. Additional planning to ensure other malaria prevention activities are continued where possible, alongside planning to ensure basic access to antimalarial treatment, will further minimise the risk of substantial additional malaria mortality.

COVID-19 has the potential to cause disruptions to health services in different ways; through the health system becoming overwhelmed with COVID-19 patients, through the intervention used to slow transmission of COVID-19 inhibiting access to preventative interventions and services, and through supplies of medicine being interrupted. We aim to quantify the extent to which such disruptions in services for HIV, TB and malaria in high burden low- and middle-income countries could lead to additional loss of life. In high burden settings, HIV, TB and malaria related deaths over 5 years may be increased by up to 10%, 20% and 36%, respectively, compared to if there were no COVID-19 epidemic. We estimate the greatest impact on HIV to be from interruption to ART, which may occur during a period of high or extremely high health system demand; for TB, we estimate the greatest impact is from reductions in timely diagnosis and treatment of new cases, which may result from a long period of COVID-19 suppression interventions; for malaria, we estimate that the greatest impact could come from reduced prevention activities including interruption of planned net campaigns, through all phases of the COVID-19 epidemic. In high burden settings, the impact of each type of disruption could be significant and lead to a loss of life-years over five years that is of the same order of magnitude as the direct impact from COVID-19 in places with a high burden of malaria and large HIV/TB epidemics. Maintaining the most critical prevention activities and healthcare services for HIV, TB and malaria could significantly reduce the overall impact of the COVID-19 epidemic.

The World Health Organization has called for increased molecular testing in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, but different countries have taken very different approaches. We used a simple mathematical model to investigate the potential effectiveness of alternative testing strategies for COVID-19 control. Weekly screening of healthcare workers (HCWs) and other at-risk groups using PCR or point-of-care tests for infection irrespective of symptoms is estimated to reduce their contribution to transmission by 25-33%, on top of reductions achieved by self-isolation following symptoms. Widespread PCR testing in the general population is unlikely to limit transmission more than contact-tracing and quarantine based on symptoms alone, but could allow earlier release of contacts from quarantine. Immunity passports based on tests for antibody or infection could support return to work but face significant technical, legal and ethical challenges. Testing is essential for pandemic surveillance but its direct contribution to the prevention of transmission is likely to be limited to patients, HCWs and other high-risk groups.

Following the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) and its spread outside of China, Europe is now experiencing large epidemics. In response, many European countries have implemented unprecedented non-pharmaceutical interventions including case isolation, the closure of schools and universities, banning of mass gatherings and/or public events, and most recently, widescale social distancing including local and national lockdowns. In this report, we use a semi-mechanistic Bayesian hierarchical model to attempt to infer the impact of these interventions across 11 European countries. Our methods assume that changes in the reproductive number – a measure of transmission - are an immediate response to these interventions being implemented rather than broader gradual changes in behaviour. Our model estimates these changes by calculating backwards from the deaths observed over time to estimate transmission that occurred several weeks prior, allowing for the time lag between infection and death. One of the key assumptions of the model is that each intervention has the same effect on the reproduction number across countries and over time. This allows us to leverage a greater amount of data across Europe to estimate these effects. It also means that our results are driven strongly by the data from countries with more advanced epidemics, and earlier interventions, such as Italy and Spain. We find that the slowing growth in daily reported deaths in Italy is consistent with a significant impact of interventions implemented several weeks earlier. In Italy, we estimate that the effective reproduction number, Rt, dropped to close to 1 around the time of lockdown (11th March), although with a high level of uncertainty. Overall, we estimate that countries have managed to reduce their reproduction number. Our estimates have wide credible intervals and contain 1 for countries that have implemented all interventions considered in our analysis. This means that the reproduction number may be above or below this value. With current interventions remaining in place to at least the end of March, we estimate that interventions across all 11 countries will have averted 59,000 deaths up to 31 March [95% credible interval 21,000-120,000]. Many more deaths will be averted through ensuring that interventions remain in place until transmission drops to low levels. We estimate that, across all 11 countries between 7 and 43 million individuals have been infected with SARS-CoV-2 up to 28th March, representing between 1.88% and 11.43% of the population. The proportion of the population infected to date – the attack rate - is estimated to be highest in Spain followed by Italy and lowest in Germany and Norway, reflecting the relative stages of the epidemics. Given the lag of 2-3 weeks between when transmission changes occur and when their impact can be observed in trends in mortality, for most of the countries considered here it remains too early to be certain that recent interventions have been effective. If interventions in countries at earlier stages of their epidemic, such as Germany or the UK, are more or less effective than they were in the countries with advanced epidemics, on which our estimates are largely based, or if interventions have improved or worsened over time, then our estimates of the reproduction number and deaths averted would change accordingly. It is therefore critical that the current interventions remain in place and trends in cases and deaths are closely monitored in the coming days and weeks to provide reassurance that transmission of SARS-Cov-2 is slowing.

The world faces a severe and acute public health emergency due to the ongoing COVID-19 global pandemic. How individual countries respond in the coming weeks will be critical in influencing the trajectory of national epidemics. Here we combine data on age-specific contact patterns and COVID-19 severity to project the health impact of the pandemic in 202 countries. We compare predicted mortality impacts in the absence of interventions or spontaneous social distancing with what might be achieved with policies aimed at mitigating or suppressing transmission. Our estimates of mortality and healthcare demand are based on data from China and high-income countries; differences in underlying health conditions and healthcare system capacity will likely result in different patterns in low income settings. We estimate that in the absence of interventions, COVID-19 would have resulted in 7.0 billion infections and 40 million deaths globally this year. Mitigation strategies focussing on shielding the elderly (60% reduction in social contacts) and slowing but not interrupting transmission (40% reduction in social contacts for wider population) could reduce this burden by half, saving 20 million lives, but we predict that even in this scenario, health systems in all countries will be quickly overwhelmed. This effect is likely to be most severe in lower income settings where capacity is lowest: our mitigated scenarios lead to peak demand for critical care beds in a typical low-income setting outstripping supply by a factor of 25, in contrast to a typical high-income setting where this factor is 7. As a result, we anticipate that the true burden in low income settings pursuing mitigation strategies could be substantially higher than reflected in these estimates. Our analysis therefore suggests that healthcare demand can only be kept within manageable levels through the rapid adoption of public health measures (including testing and isolation of cases and wider social distancing measures) to suppress transmission, similar to those being adopted in many countries at the current time. If a suppression strategy is implemented early (at 0.2 deaths per 100,000 population per week) and sustained, then 38.7 million lives could be saved whilst if it is initiated when death numbers are higher (1.6 deaths per 100,000 population per week) then 30.7 million lives could be saved. Delays in implementing strategies to suppress transmission will lead to worse outcomes and fewer lives saved. We do not consider the wider social and economic costs of suppression, which will be high and may be disproportionately so in lower income settings. Moreover, suppression strategies will need to be maintained in some manner until vaccines or effective treatments become available to avoid the risk of later epidemics. Our analysis highlights the challenging decisions faced by all governments in the coming weeks and months, but demonstrates the extent to which rapid, decisive and collective action now could save millions of lives.

The COVID-19 epidemic was declared a Global Pandemic by WHO on 11 March 2020. As of 20 March 2020, over 254,000 cases and 10,000 deaths had been reported worldwide. The outbreak began in the Chinese city of Wuhan in December 2019. In response to the fast-growing epidemic, China imposed strict social distancing in Wuhan on 23 January 2020 followed closely by similar measures in other provinces. At the peak of the outbreak in China (early February), there were between 2,000 and 4,000 new confirmed cases per day. For the first time since the outbreak began there have been no new confirmed cases caused by local transmission in China reported for five consecutive days up to 23 March 2020. This is an indication that the social distancing measures enacted in China have led to control of COVID-19 in China. These interventions have also impacted economic productivity in China, and the ability of the Chinese economy to resume without restarting the epidemic is not yet clear. Here, we estimate transmissibility from reported cases and compare those estimates with daily data on within-city movement, as a proxy for economic activity. Initially, within-city movement and transmission were very strongly correlated in the 5 provinces most affected by the epidemic and Beijing. However, that correlation is no longer apparent even though within-city movement has started to increase. A similar analysis for Hong Kong shows that intermediate levels of local activity can be maintained while avoiding a large outbreak. These results do not preclude future epidemics in China, nor do they allow us to estimate the maximum proportion of previous within-city activity that will be recovered in the medium term. However, they do suggest that after very intense social distancing which resulted in containment, China has successfully exited their stringent social distancing policy to some degree. Globally, China is at a more advanced stage of the pandemic. Policies implemented to reduce the spread of COVID-19 in China and the exiting strategies that followed can inform decision making processes for countries once containment is achieved.

The global impact of COVID-19 has been profound, and the public health threat it represents is the most serious seen in a respiratory virus since the 1918 H1N1 influenza pandemic. Here we present the results of epidemiological modelling which has informed policymaking in the UK and other countries in recent weeks. In the absence of a COVID-19 vaccine, we assess the potential role of a number of public health measures – so-called non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) – aimed at reducing contact rates in the population and thereby reducing transmission of the virus. In the results presented here, we apply a previously published microsimulation model to two countries: the UK (Great Britain specifically) and the US. We conclude that the effectiveness of any one intervention in isolation is likely to be limited, requiring multiple interventions to be combined to have a substantial impact on transmission. Two fundamental strategies are possible: (a) mitigation, which focuses on slowing but not necessarily stopping epidemic spread – reducing peak healthcare demand while protecting those most at risk of severe disease from infection, and (b) suppression, which aims to reverse epidemic growth, reducing case numbers to low levels and maintaining that situation indefinitely. Each policy has major challenges. We find that that optimal mitigation policies (combining home isolation of suspect cases, home quarantine of those living in the same household as suspect cases, and social distancing of the elderly and others at most risk of severe disease) might reduce peak healthcare demand by 2/3 and deaths by half. However, the resulting mitigated epidemic would still likely result in hundreds of thousands of deaths and health systems (most notably intensive care units) being overwhelmed many times over. For countries able to achieve it, this leaves suppression as the preferred policy option. We show that in the UK and US context, suppression will minimally require a combination of social distancing of the entire population, home isolation of cases and household quarantine of their family members. This may need to be supplemented by school and university closures, though it should be recognised that such closures may have negative impacts on health systems due to increased absenteeism. The major challenge of suppression is that this type of intensive intervention package – or something equivalently effective at reducing transmission – will need to be maintained until a vaccine becomes available (potentially 18 months or more) – given that we predict that transmission will quickly rebound if interventions are relaxed. We show that intermittent social distancing – triggered by trends in disease surveillance – may allow interventions to be relaxed temporarily in relative short time windows, but measures will need to be reintroduced if or when case numbers rebound. Last, while experience in China and now South Korea show that suppression is possible in the short term, it remains to be seen whether it is possible long-term, and whether the social and economic costs of the interventions adopted thus far can be reduced.

The COVID-19 epidemic was declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) by WHO on 30th January 2020 [1]. As of 8 March 2020, over 107,000 cases had been reported. Here, we use published and preprint studies of clinical characteristics of cases in mainland China as well as case studies of individuals from Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and South Korea to examine the proportional occurrence of symptoms and the progression of symptoms through time. We find that in mainland China, where specific symptoms or disease presentation are reported, pneumonia is the most frequently mentioned, see figure 1. We found a more varied spectrum of severity in cases outside mainland China. In Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and South Korea, fever was the most frequently reported symptom. In this latter group, presentation with pneumonia is not reported as frequently although it is more common in individuals over 60 years old. The average time from reported onset of first symptoms to the occurrence of specific symptoms or disease presentation, such as pneumonia or the use of mechanical ventilation, varied substantially. The average time to presentation with pneumonia is 5.88 days, and may be linked to testing at hospitalisation; fever is often reported at onset (where the mean time to develop fever is 0.77 days).

Since the end of January 2020, in response to the growing COVID-19 epidemic, 55 countries have repatriated over 8000 citizens from Wuhan City, China. In addition to quarantine measures for returning citizens, many countries implemented PCR screening to test for infection regardless of symptoms. These flights therefore give estimates of infection prevalence in Wuhan over time. Between 30th January and 1st February (close to the peak of the epidemic in Wuhan), infection prevalence was 0.87% (95% CI: 0.32% - 1.89%). As countries now start to repatriate citizens from Iran and northern Italy, information from repatriated citizens could help inform the level of response necessary to help control the outbreaks unfolding in newly affected areas.

Since the start of the COVID-19 epidemic in late 2019, there are now 29 affected countries with over 1000 confirmed cases outside of mainland China. In previous reports, we estimated the likely epidemic size in Wuhan City based on air traffic volumes and the number of detected cases internationally. Here we analysed COVID-19 cases exported from mainland China to different regions and countries, comparing the country-specific rates of detected and confirmed cases per flight volume to estimate the relative sensitivity of surveillance in different countries. Although travel restrictions from Wuhan City and other cities across China may have reduced the absolute number of travellers to and from China, we estimated that about two thirds of COVID-19 cases exported from mainland China have remained undetected worldwide, potentially resulting in multiple chains of as yet undetected human-to-human transmission outside mainland China.

Genetic diversity of SARS-CoV-2 (formerly 2019-nCoV), the virus which causes COVID-19, provides information about epidemic origins and the rate of epidemic growth. By analysing 53 SARS-CoV-2 whole genome sequences collected up to February 3, 2020, we find a strong association between the time of sample collection and accumulation of genetic diversity. Bayesian and maximum likelihood phylogenetic methods indicate that the virus was introduced into the human population in early December and has an epidemic doubling time of approximately seven days. Phylodynamic modelling provides an estimate of epidemic size through time. Precise estimates of epidemic size are not possible with current genetic data, but our analyses indicate evidence of substantial heterogeneity in the number of secondary infections caused by each case, as indicated by a high level of over-dispersion in the reproduction number. Larger numbers of more systematically sampled sequences – particularly from across China – will allow phylogenetic estimates of epidemic size and growth rate to be substantially refined.

We present case fatality ratio (CFR) estimates for three strata of 2019-nCoV infections. For cases detected in Hubei, we estimate the CFR to be 18% (95% credible interval: 11%-81%). For cases detected in travellers outside mainland China, we obtain central estimates of the CFR in the range 1.2-5.6% depending on the statistical methods, with substantial uncertainty around these central values. Using estimates of underlying infection prevalence in Wuhan at the end of January derived from testing of passengers on repatriation flights to Japan and Germany, we adjusted the estimates of CFR from either the early epidemic in Hubei Province, or from cases reported outside mainland China, to obtain estimates of the overall CFR in all infections (asymptomatic or symptomatic) of approximately 1% (95% confidence interval 0.5%-4%). It is important to note that the differences in these estimates does not reflect underlying differences in disease severity between countries. CFRs seen in individual countries will vary depending on the sensitivity of different surveillance systems to detect cases of differing levels of severity and the clinical care offered to severely ill cases. All CFR estimates should be viewed cautiously at the current time as the sensitivity of surveillance of both deaths and cases in mainland China is unclear. Furthermore, all estimates rely on limited data on the typical time intervals from symptom onset to death or recovery which influences the CFR estimates.

Background Mass drug administration for elimination of Plasmodium falciparum malaria is recommended by WHO in some settings. We used consensus modelling to understand how to optimise the effects of mass drug administration in areas with low malaria transmission. Methods We collaborated with researchers doing field trials to establish a standard intervention scenario and standard transmission setting, and we input these parameters into four previously published models. We then varied the number of rounds of mass drug administration, coverage, duration, timing, importation of infection, and pre-administration transmission levels. The outcome of interest was the percentage reduction in annual mean prevalence of P falciparum parasite rate as measured by PCR in the third year after the final round of mass drug administration. Findings The models predicted differing magnitude of the effects of mass drug administration, but consensus answers were reached for several factors. Mass drug administration was predicted to reduce transmission over a longer timescale than accounted for by the prophylactic effect alone. Percentage reduction in transmission was predicted to be higher and last longer at lower baseline transmission levels. Reduction in transmission resulting from mass drug administration was predicted to be temporary, and in the absence of scale-up of other interventions, such as vector control, transmission would return to pre-administration levels. The proportion of the population treated in a year was a key determinant of simulated effectiveness, irrespective of whether people are treated through high coverage in a single round or new individuals are reached by implementation of several rounds. Mass drug administration was predicted to be more effective if continued over 2 years rather than 1 year, and if done at the time of year when transmission is lowest. Interpretation Mass drug administration has the potential to reduce transmission for a limited time, but is not an effective replacement for existing vector control. Unless elimination is achieved, mass drug administration has to be repeated regularly for sustained effect.

Background Plasmodium falciparum resistance to sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP) threatens the efficacy of intermittent preventive treatment (IPTp) for malaria in pregnancy in Africa. We conducted a meta-analysis to assess the impact of SP resistance on IPTp-SP effectiveness. Methods We searched databases (1990 to March-01-2018) for clinical studies (aggregated data) or surveys (individual-participant data) containing information on low birthweight (LBW, primary outcome) and malaria by IPTp-SP dose, and for studies reporting SP-resistance molecular markers. We performed random-effects meta-analysis (clinical studies) or multivariate log-binomial regression (surveys) to obtain summarized dose-response data (Relative-Risk-Reduction:RRR) and multivariate meta-regression to explore modifying effects of SP-resistance (dhps substitutions A437G, K540E, A581G). Findings Of 1097 records, 57 studies were included in the aggregated-data meta-analysis (59,457 births). The RRR for LBW declined with increasing prevalence of Pfdhps-K540E (P-trend=0.0060) but not with Pfdhps-A437G (P-trend=0.35). The RRR in areas of high (Pfdhps-K540E >90%, n=11), moderate (Central/West Africa:Pfdhps-A437G≥90% or East/southern Africa:Pfdhps-K540E 30-90%, n=16) and low SP-resistances (n=30) were 7% (95% CI 0-13), 21% (14-29) and 27% (21-33) respectively (P-trend=0.0054, I2=69.5%). In the individual-participant analysis of 13 surveys (42,394 births), IPTp-SP was associated with reduced LBW in areas with Pfdhps-K540E>90% & Pfdhps-A581G=10% (pooled Pfdhps-A581G prevalence:37%, range 29-46) (RRR=0.5%, -16-14, n=3). Interpretation The effectiveness of IPTp-SP is reduced in areas with high SP-resistance, but IPTp-SP remains associated with reduced LBW in areas where Pfdhps-K540E prevalence exceeds 90%. IPTp-SP is not effective in areas with ≥37% prevalence of the highly-resistant sextuple Pfdhps-A581G-containing genotype.

In the thirteen years since the first report of pfhrp2 -deleted parasites in 2010, the World Health Organization (WHO) has found that 40 of 47 countries surveyed worldwide have reported pfhrp2/3 gene deletions. Due to a high prevalence of pfhrp2/3 deletions causing false-negative HRP2 RDTs, in the last five years, Eritrea, Djibouti and Ethiopia have switched or started switching to using alternative RDTs, that target pan-specific-pLDH or P. falciparum specific-pLDH alone of in combination with HRP2. However, manufacturing of alternative RDTs has not been brought to scale and there are no WHO prequalified combination tests that use Pf-pLDH instead of HRP2 for P. falciparum detection. For these reasons, the continued spread of pfhrp2/3 deletions represents a growing public health crisis that threatens efforts to control and eliminate P. falciparum malaria. National malaria control programmes, their implementing partners and test developers desperately seek pfhrp2/3 deletion data that can inform their immediate and future resource allocation. In response, we use a mathematical modelling approach to evaluate the global risk posed by pfhrp2/3 deletions and explore scenarios for how deletions will continue to spread in Africa. We incorporate current best estimates of the prevalence of pfhrp2/3 deletions and conduct a literature review to estimate model parameters known to impact the selection of pfhrp2/3 deletions for each malaria endemic country. We identify 20 countries worldwide to prioritise for surveillance and future deployment of alternative RDT, based on quickly selecting for pfhrp2/3 deletions once established. In scenarios designed to explore the continued spread of deletions in Africa, we identify 10 high threat countries that are most at risk of deletions both spreading to and subsequently being rapidly selected for. If HRP2-based RDTs continue to be relied on for malaria case management, we predict that the major route for pfhrp2 deletions to spread is south out from the current hotspot in the Horn of Africa, moving through East Africa over the next 20 years. We explore the variation in modelled timelines through an extensive parameter sensitivity analysis and despite wide uncertainties, we identify three countries that have not yet switched RDTs (Senegal, Zambia and Kenya) that are robustly identified as high risk for pfhrp2/3 deletions. These results provide a refined and updated prediction model for the emergence of pfhrp2/3 deletions in an effort to help guide pfhrp2/3 policy and prioritise future surveillance efforts and innovation., Competing Interests: Declaration of Interests OJW, RZ and TT have received personal consultancy fees from WHO related to pfhrp2/3 modelling. JBP reports research support from WHO related to pfhrp2/3 deletion molecular surveillance and, outside the scope of this manuscript, research support from Gilead Sciences, non-financial support from Abbott Laboratories, and consulting for Zymeron Corporation.