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The Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 caused serious damage to firms and banks in Yokohama City. We explore the role of the financial support by the Bank of Japan (BoJ) through local banks in a firm's survival and recovery from the natural disaster. We find that the small‐ and medium‐sized firms (SMEs) that had a relatively large correspondent bank with a large number of bills rediscounted by BoJ had a higher likelihood of survival but lower growth after the earthquake. Liquidity supply by the central bank for recovery from a negative shock can have both positive and negative impacts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1937, the Japanese government accelerated the expansion of its military expenditure and began to impose controls on the economy to maintain the balance of international payments. The controls were developed through trial and error. The cotton spinning industry was one of the industries most deeply affected by these controls. Initially, the government simply reduced the allocation of foreign exchange for raw cotton imports. However, because this measure prevented the export of cotton products, especially to countries outside the yen bloc, a new scheme of control, the 'export–import link system', was adopted from the second half of 1938. This scheme was intentionally designed to give firms incentives to export to non‐yen bloc countries and to incorporate elements of market mechanisms into the system of economic controls. Analysing firm‐level data, we find that under the link system, firms with higher labour productivity (LP) tended to grow faster, as occurs under a market economy. This relationship was not observed during the early stage of the controls. This difference is reflected in the pattern of change in aggregate LP. Under the export–import link system, the positive reallocation effect was substantial, similar to a market economy, whereas it was almost zero under the early controls. These findings indicate that the design of controls matters for the performance of controlled economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bank of Japan (BOJ) expanded its liquidity provision in response to a series of financial panics from 1931–1932; however, the BOJ restricted its lending mostly to correspondent banks. We use the BOJ's preferential treatment of correspondent banks as a quasi-experimental setting to examine the impact of central bank lending on financial intermediation. We find that deposits and loans did not fall as fast for correspondent banks as for other banks during the panic period. Furthermore, correspondent banks were less likely to be closed. The results suggest that central banks' liquidity provision plays a critical backstop role during financial stringency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategic interaction among firms may hinder the reduction of excess capacity in a declining industry. Policy interventions that attempt to reduce excess capacity may increase efficiency by accelerating the capital adjustment but may decrease efficiency by increasing the market power of firms and/or by distorting firms' divestment decisions. We study capacity coordination policies—forcing firms to reduce their capacity simultaneously—applied to the Japanese cement industry. Estimation results suggest that these interventions did not increase market power because reduction in capacity resulted in higher utilization of the remaining plants, and did not distort firms' scrappage decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2006.11.002 Byline: Tetsuji Okazaki Keywords: Lender of Last Resort; Central bank; Monetary policy; Financial crisis; Bank; Japan Abstract: This paper explores how the Bank of Japan (BOJ) dealt with the trade-off between stability of the financial system and the moral hazard of banks in pre-war Japan. The BOJ concentrated Lender of Last Resort (LLR) loans with those banks that had an established transaction relationship with the BOJ. At the same time, the BOJ carefully selected its transaction counterparts, and did not hesitate to end the relationship if the performance of a counterpart declined. Further, the BOJ was selective in providing LLR loans. Through this policy, the BOJ could avoid the moral hazard that the LLR policy might otherwise have incurred. Author Affiliation: Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan Article History: Received 1 March 2006

The Japanese financial system is regarded as a key factor behind Japan's remarkable post-war growth. The main bank arrangements, linking companies with a principal source of funds, and complementary institutional networks were complex and intricate, and underpinned industrial investment and expansion. In the 1950s, the city banks, as the main banks of manufacturers, were asked to supply large amounts of funds to their clients, acting as substitutes of the stock market. As their liquidity decreased, post-war reconstruction policies reduced their risk-bearing capabilities. In order to stabilise the system and to sustain the funds needed for strategic industries, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan began actively to regulate the financial markets, while the Ministry of International Trade and Industry co-ordinated policy with the industrial sector. It was this system of complementary institutions, including the main banks, long-term financial institutions, and government agencies, which enabled Japan's high-speed growth., Many scholars, businessmen and policy makers regard the Japanese experience as a model for developing countries, while others try to derive lessons for the transforming socialist countries of eastern Europe. [...]