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SUMMARY The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region's future. The United States, [...]

Updated October 11, 2023 Contents Introduction Background Definitions of the Arctic Arctic Circle Definition Definition in Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 Other Definitions Population of the Arctic [...]

The article provides background on U.S. Navy force structure and shipbuilding plans and discusses issues for the U.S. Congress. Information is presented on current number of ships, 355-ship force-level goal of 2026, preferred 381-ship force-level goal of 2023, force-level goals result from force structure assessments and fiscal year 2025 shipbuilding plans. Issues for Congress include industrial base capacity constraints, shipbuilding costs and procurement of Virginia-class submarines.

Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. There have been exceptions to the Navy's ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. Names for Navy ship types currently or recently procured for the Navy include the following: • The first and second SSBN-826 class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) have been named District of Columbia and Wisconsin. • Until 2020, Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines were named largely for states, but the most recent nine have been named for four earlier U.S. Navy attack submarines, a former Secretary of the Navy, an island, and (most recently) three cities, suggesting that the naming rule for the class might have shifted to naming the boats for cities. • Of the Navy's 15 most recently named aircraft carriers, 10 have been named for past U.S. Presidents and 2 for Members of Congress. • Destroyers are being named for deceased members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including Secretaries of the Navy. • The first six FFG-62 class frigates have been named for people and U.S. Navy ships of the Revolutionary War and the early republic. • Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) were named for regionally important U.S. cities and communities. • Amphibious assault ships (LHAs) are being named for U.S. Marine Corps battles, early U.S. Navy sailing ships, or aircraft carriers from World War II. • San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for major U.S. cities and communities and the cities and communities that were attacked on September 11, 2001. • John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers are being named for people who fought for civil rights and human rights. • Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs) are being named for small U.S. cities and counties. • The first two Expeditionary Medical Ships (EMSs) have been named Bethesda and Balboa to honor Naval Support Activity Bethesda and the Balboa Naval Hospital in San Diego. • Expeditionary Transport Docks (ESDs) and Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESBs) are being named for famous names or places of historical significance to U.S. Marines. • Navajo (TATS-6) class towing, salvage, and rescue ships are being named for prominent Native Americans or Native American tribes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the implications of intensified U.S. competition with China and Russia, often termed great power competition (GPC), which has shifted the defense discourse from counterterrorism to broader strategic concerns. Topics include the redefinition of U.S. grand strategy and military planning, the evolving nature of defense budget considerations, and the necessity for organizational changes within the Department of Defense to address contemporary threats.

The article focuses on the implications of China's naval modernization for U.S. Navy capabilities. Topics include China's expanding naval fleet and its growing operations in the Western Pacific, comparisons of ship numbers between the U.S. and China, and U.S. strategic responses, including increased presence and new operational concepts, to counteract China's maritime advancements.

The article focuses on the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program, detailing its operations, funding, and congressional issues. It highlights how Aegis-equipped Navy ships provide critical defense against potential ballistic missile threats from countries like Iran and North Korea, with the number of BMD-capable ships expected to grow significantly by fiscal year 2030.

The article focuses on the U.S. Navy's development and acquisition programs for large unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), specifically the Large Unmanned Surface Vehicle (LUSV), Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MUSV), and Extra-Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV). It details the Navy's shift towards a distributed fleet architecture to enhance operational capabilities while minimizing risks associated with concentrating assets.

The article focuses on the development and funding of shipboard solid-state lasers (SSLs) by the U.S. Navy for enhanced surface-ship self-defense against threats like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and anti-ship missiles (ASCMs). It outlines key programs, strategic concerns regarding the survivability of Navy surface ships, and the advantages of SSLs in improving defense capabilities and cost-effectiveness.

The article provides information on the U.S. Navy's Virginia-class (SSN-774) nuclear-powered attack submarine program and AUKUS submarine (Pillar 1) project, as well as policy considerations for Congress. The budget proposed by the Navy for fiscal year 2025 seeks to procure one SSN-774 that would become the 41st boat in the class, with an estimated cost of 5,759.5 million dollars. Pillar 1 involves the deployment, selling and development of SSN by Australia, the United kingdom and the U.S.

The article provides information on the U.S. Navy's Ford-class (CVN-78) aircraft carrier program and related policy considerations for Congress. A CVN-78 was commissioned in fiscal year (FY) 2008 and was commissioned into service on July 22, 2017. The budget proposed by the Navy for FY2025 seeks 2,143.9 million dollars to procure several Ford-class ships. Oversight issues to be considered by Congress include the future aircraft carrier force level.

The article provides information on the U.S. Navy's Constellation-class (FFG-62) frigate program and related considerations for Congress. The program aims to procure at least 20 FFG-62 frigates, including the six ships that have been acquired through fiscal year (FY) 2024. The budget proposed by the Navy for FY2025 requests 1,170.4 million dollars to procure the seventh ship in the program. Potential oversight issues to be considered by Congress include the risk of cost growth in the program.

The article provides information on the U.S. Navy's Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) and Zumwalt (DDG-1000) destroyer programs and related policy considerations for Congress. The Navy has procured 94 DDG-51 ships through fiscal year (FY) 2024. The budget proposed by the Navy for FY2025 seeks to procure two more DDG-51 costing about 2.5 billion dollars each. The Navy procured three DDG-1000 destroyers in FY2007 to FY2009 but plans no further procurement of the ships.

The article provides information on the U.S. Navy's John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler shipbuilding programs and related considerations for Congress. The program aims to procure a total of 20 TAO-205 class oilers, including the 10 ships that have been acquired through fiscal year (FY) 2024. The budget proposal of the Navy for FY2025 schedules the procurement of the next two ships for FY2026. Issues to be considered by Congress include cost growth and schedule delays in the program.

The article provides information on the U.S. Navy's Medium Landing Ship program and related considerations for Congress. The program aims to procure a class of 18 to 35 amphibious ships to support the Marine Corps in implementing its Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept. The budget proposed by the Navy for fiscal year 2025 seeks 268.1 million dollars for procuring the first ship in the program. Congress needs to consider the funding and acquisition strategy for the program.

The Navy’s Columbia (SSBN-826) class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program is a program to design and build a class of 12 new SSBNs to replace the Navy’s current force of 14 aging Ohio-class SSBNs. Since 2013, the Navy has consistently identified the Columbia-class program as the Navy’s top priority program. The Navy procured the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021; the boat was funded with three-year incremental funding in FY2021-FY2023. The Navy procured the second Columbia-class boat in FY2024; the boat is being funded with two-year incremental funding (also called split funding) in FY2024-FY2025. The Navy wants to procure the remaining 10 boats in the program—boats 3 through 12—at a rate of one per year in FY2026- FY2035. The Navy’s FY2025 budget submission estimates the total procurement cost of the first boat at $15,179.1 million (i.e., about $15.2 billion) and the procurement cost of the second Columbia-class boat at $9,283.1 million (i.e., about $9.3 billion). The first boat’s procurement cost is much higher than that of subsequent boats in the class because the first boat includes most of the detail design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the class. (It is a long-standing Navy budgetary practice to incorporate the DD/NRE costs for a new class of ship into the total procurement cost of the first ship in the class.) The first boat’s estimated procurement cost includes $6,557.6 million for plans, meaning (essentially) the DD/NRE costs for the class. Excluding costs for plans, the estimated hands-on construction cost of the first ship is $8,621.5 million (i.e., about $8.6 billion). The Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget requests $3,341.2 million (i.e., about $3.3 billion) in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of the second Columbia-class boat and $6,215.9 million (i.e., about $6.2 billion) in advance procurement (AP) funding for Columbia class boats to be procured in FY2026 and subsequent years. Issues for Congress for the Columbia-class program include the following: • The impact of an estimated 12- to 16-month delay in the delivery of the first Columbia-class boat on the Navy’s plans for replacing Ohio-class SSBNs on a timely basis; • industrial-base challenges of building both Columbia-class boats and Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) at the same time; • the risk of cost growth in the Columbia-class program; and • the potential impact of the Columbia-class program on funding that will be available for other Navy programs, including other shipbuilding programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides information on the U.S. Navy's LPD-17 Flight II class amphibious ship and landing helicopter assault (LHA)-type amphibious assault ship programs, and related considerations for Congress. The program aims to procure the two amphibious ship types that are both built by Huntington Ingalls Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding. Oversight issues for Congress include technical and cost risk in both programs and the operational readiness of in-service amphibious ships.

The article explains the multiyear procurement (MYP) and block buy contracting (BBC) mechanisms that the U.S. Congress allows the Department of Defense to use for a limited number of defense acquisition programs, as well as related considerations for Congress. It describes similarities and differences between MYP and BBC, as well as the funding approaches of each contracting mechanism. It discusses issues to be faced by Congress, including the frequency of using MYP or BBC.

Required number of polar icebreakers. A 2023 Coast Guard fleet mix analysis concluded that the service will require a total of eight to nine polar icebreakers, including four to five heavy polar icebreakers and four to five medium polar icebreakers, to perform its polar (i.e., Arctic and Antarctic) missions in coming years. Current operational polar icebreaker fleet. The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of one heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star, and one medium polar icebreaker, Healy. A second Coast Guard heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Sea. Polar Sea, suffered an engine casualty in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then. Polar Star and Polar Sea entered service in 1976 and 1978, respectively, and are now well beyond their originally intended 30-year service lives. The Coast Guard plans to extend Polar Star's service life until the delivery of at least the second Polar Security Cutter (PSC; see next paragraph). Polar Security Cutter (PSC). The Coast Guard PSC program aims to acquire four or five new PSCs (i.e., heavy polar icebreakers), to be followed at some later point by the acquisition of new Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs) (i.e., medium polar icebreakers). The Coast Guard in 2021 estimated PSC procurement costs in then-year dollars as $1,297 million (i.e., about $1.3 billion) for the first ship, $921 million for the second ship, and $1,017 million (i.e., about $1.0 billion) for the third ship, for a combined estimated cost of $3,235 million (i.e., about $3.2 billion). The procurement of the first two PSCs is fully funded. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2024 budget requested $170.0 million in continued procurement funding for the PSC program. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2025 budget requests no procurement funding for the PSC program. The Coast Guard originally aimed to have the first PSC delivered in 2024, but the ship's estimated delivery date has been delayed repeatedly and may now occur no earlier than 2028. Another potential issue concerns the accuracy of the PSC's estimated procurement cost, given the PSC's size and internal complexity as well as cost growth in other Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding programs. The PSC's estimated procurement cost per weight is roughly half that of the Navy's LPD-17 Flight II and LHA amphibious ships. These amphibious ships are equipped with expensive combat system equipment that is not included in the PSC design, but whether this would account for all of the difference in cost per weight between the PSC design and the two amphibious ship designs is not clear. If substantial cost growth occurs in the PSC program, it could raise a question regarding whether to grant some form of contract relief to the PSC shipbuilder. Commercially available polar icebreaker (CAPI). The Coast Guard's proposed FY2024 budget requested $125.0 million in procurement funding for the purchase of an existing commercially available polar icebreaker (CAPI) that would be modified to become a Coast Guard polar icebreaker. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2025 budget requests no procurement funding for CAPI, but the Coast Guard's FY2025 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) includes an item for $25.0 million in procurement funding for the ship. Great Lakes icebreaker (GLIB). The Coast Guard's proposed FY2024 budget proposed to initiate a new procurement program for procuring a new Great Lakes icebreaker (GLIB) that would have capabilities similar to those of Mackinaw, the Coast Guard's existing heavy Great Lakes icebreaker. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2024 budget requested $55.0 million in initial procurement funding for the ship, and the Coast Guard's FY2024 UPL included an item for an additional $20.0 million in procurement funding for the ship. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2025 budget requests no procurement funding for GLIB, but the Coast Guard's FY2025 UPL includes an item for $25.0 million in procurement funding for the ship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Updated March 24, 2022 Contents Introduction Background Definitions of the Arctic Arctic Circle Definition Definition in Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 Other Definitions Population of the Arctic [...]

The article provides information on the U.S. Navy's TAGOS-25 Ocean Surveillance Shipbuilding Program and related issues of interest to Congress. The program aims to procure seven TAGOS-25 class ships to replace its in-service TAGOS vessels, the first of which was acquired in FY2022. The proposed budget of the Navy for fiscal year (FY) 2025 proposes to defer procurement of the second TAGOS-25 class ship to FY2026. Potential issues for Congress include the reason for deferring the procurement.

The article provides information on the naval forces of the U.S. The country's naval forces include the Navy and the Marine Corps. The ballistic missile submarines of the Navy are solely for strategic nuclear deterrence, while its general-purpose ships, including aircraft carriers and attack submarines, can perform a variety of missions other than strategic nuclear deterrence. The Navy has 297 battle force ships as of July 29, 2024.

Contents Introduction Background Definitions of Arctic Arctic Circle Definition Definition in Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 Other Definitions Population of Arctic Eight Arctic States, Including Five Arctic [...]

Contents Introduction Background Older Ships to Be Replaced by NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs Missions of NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs NSC Program OPC Program Overview Original Competition and September 2016 Contract [...]

The article discusses the potential implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on the international security environment and highlights assessments by the U.S. intelligence community. It identifies various areas where the pandemic could bring about changes, including shifts in global governance, impacts on U.S. global leadership, alterations in great power competition, changes in democratic and authoritarian governance, economic effects, and shifts in military operations.

Over the past 10 to 15 years, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition. China's actions in the SCS-including extensive island-building and baseconstruction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as actions by its maritime forces to assert China's claims against competing claims by regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam-have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China's maritime forces at the Japanadministered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. Chinese domination of China's near-seas region-meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea-could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. Potential broader U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: fulfilling U.S. security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including U.S. security relationships with treaty allies and partner states; maintaining a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies and partners; defending the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes and resisting the emergence of an alternative "might-makes-right" approach to international affairs; defending the principle of freedom of the seas, also sometimes called freedom of navigation; preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia; and pursing these goals as part of a larger U.S. strategy for competing strategically and managing relations with China. Potential specific U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: dissuading China from carrying out additional baseconstruction activities in the SCS, moving additional military personnel, equipment, and supplies to bases at sites that it occupies in the SCS, initiating island-building or base-construction activities at Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, declaring straight baselines around land features it claims in the SCS, or declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the SCS; and encouraging China to reduce or end operations by its maritime forces at the Senkaku Islands in the ECS, halt actions intended to put pressure against Philippine-occupied sites in the Spratly Islands, provide greater access by Philippine fisherman to waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal or in the Spratly Islands, adopt the U.S./Western definition regarding freedom of the seas, and accept and abide by the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China. The issue for Congress is whether the Administration's strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS is appropriate and correctly resourced, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or modify the strategy, the level of resources for implementing it, or both. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Updated July 27, 2021 Introduction The Coast Guard's Waterways Commerce Cutter (WCC) program envisages procuring 30 replacements for the Coast Guard's 35 aging river buoy tenders (WLRs), inland construction tenders [...]

The article discusses the U.S. Navy's Virginia-class next-generation attack submarine (SSN[X]) program, including its issues for Congress. Also cited are the Navy's other submarines like the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) and nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarines (SSGN), and the contractors like General Dynamics and Huntington Ingalls Industries.

The Coast Guard's program of record (POR), which dates to 2004, calls for procuring 8 National Security Cutters (NSCs), 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs), and 65 Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) as replacements for 90 aging Coast Guard high-endurance cutters, medium-endurance cutters, and patrol craft. National Security Cutters are the Coast Guard's largest and most capable general-purpose cutters; they are replacing the Coast Guard's 12 Hamilton-class high-endurance cutters. NSCs have an estimated average procurement cost of about $670 million per ship. Congress has fully funded the procurement of 11 NSCs-three more than the 8 in the Coast Guard's POR-including the 10th and 11th in FY2018, which (like the 9th NSC) were not requested by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2024 budget requests $17.1 million in procurement funding for the NSC program for post-delivery activities for the 10th and 11th NSCs, and for classwide activities. Nine NSCs have entered service; the Coast Guard accepted delivery of the 10th on October 13, 2023, and plans to commission it into service in 2024. The 11th is under construction. Offshore Patrol Cutters are intended to replace the Coast Guard's 29 aged medium-endurance cutters. Coast Guard officials describe the OPC program and the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program (which is covered in another CRS report) as the service's highest acquisition priorities. The first four OPCs are being built by Eastern Shipbuilding Group (ESG) of Panama City, FL. The Coast Guard held a full and open competition for a new contract to build the next 11 OPCs (numbers 5 through 15). On June 30, 2022, the Coast Guard announced that it had awarded a fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract to Austal USA of Mobile, AL, to produce up to 11 offshore patrol cutters (OPCs). The Coast Guard's proposed FY2024 budget requests $579.0 million in procurement funding for the construction of the sixth OPC, the procurement of long lead time materials (LLTM) for the seventh OPC, and other program costs. One oversight issue for Congress concerns substantial cost growth and schedule delays in the OPC program. A June 2023 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the OPC program states "The OPC's total acquisition cost estimate increased from $12.5 billion to $17.6 billion between 2012 and 2022. The program attributes the 40 percent increase to many factors, including restructuring the stage 1 contract [for OPCs 1 through 4] and recompeting the stage 2 requirement [for OPCs 5 through 15] in response to a disruption caused by Hurricane Michael, and increased infrastructure costs for homeports and facilities, among other things. In addition, the program incurred a 1.5-year delay in the delivery of the first four OPCs due to Hurricane Michael and issues related to manufacturing the cutter's propulsion system. GAO also found indicators that the shipbuilder's significant level of complex, uncompleted work may lead to further delays." Fast Response Cutters are considerably smaller and less expensive than OPCs; they are replacing the Coast Guard's 49 aging Island-class patrol boats. The Coast Guard's FY2020 budget submission estimated the total acquisition cost of the 58 cutters intended for domestic use at $3.748 billion, or an average of about $65 million per cutter. A total of 65 FRCs have been procured through FY2023. As of August 10, 2023, 53 FRCs have been commissioned into service. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2024 budget requests $20.0 million in procurement funding for the FRC program; this request does not include funding for procuring any additional FRCs. The Coast Guard's FY2024 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) includes, as one of its items, an unfunded priority for procuring four more FRCs (which would be the 66th through 69th in the program) for a combined procurement cost of $400.0 million, or an average of $100 million per cutter, to provide increased Coast Guard presence and engagement with allied and partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence over the past decade of intensified U.S. competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) and the Russian Federation (Russia)-often referred to as great power competition (GPC) or strategic competition-has profoundly changed the conversation about U.S. defense issues from what it was during the post-Cold War era: Counterterrorist operations and U.S. military operations in the Middle East-which had been more at the center of discussions of U.S. defense issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001-are now a less-prominent element in the conversation, and the conversation now focuses more on the following elements, all of which relate largely to China and/or Russia: ™ grand strategy and geopolitics as a starting point for discussing U.S. defense issues; ™ the force-planning standard, meaning the number and types of simultaneous or overlapping conflicts or other contingencies that the U.S. military should be sized to be able to conduct-a planning factor that can strongly impact the size of the U.S. defense budget; ™ organizational changes within the Department of Defense (DOD); ™ nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear arms control; ™ global U.S. military posture; ™ U.S. and allied military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region; ™ U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe; ™ new U.S. military service operational concepts; ™ capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare; ™ maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies; ™ innovation and speed of U.S. weapon system development and deployment; ™ mobilization capabilities for an extended-length large-scale conflict; ™ supply chain security, meaning awareness and minimization of reliance in U.S. military systems on foreign components, subcomponents, materials, and software; and ™ capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics. The issue for Congress is how U.S. defense planning and budgeting should respond to GPC and whether to approve, reject, or modify the Biden Administration's defense strategy and proposed funding levels, plans, and programs for addressing GPC. Congress's decisions on these issues could have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. defense industrial base. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service on potential implications of COVID-19 for the international security environment. It discusses various areas of potential change, including shifts in world order, global governance, U.S. leadership, relations with China and Russia, government forms, economic dynamics, and more, with a focus on how these changes could impact U.S. foreign and defense policy.

The article focuses on the U.S.-China strategic competition in the South China Sea (SCS) and the East China Sea (ECS). Topics include China's activities and territorial claims in these regions, U.S. goals for the competition, and the role of Congress in shaping the U.S. strategy and resource allocation for this competition, which has implications for U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region.

The article presents a report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service on development of large unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and underwater vehicles (UUVs) by the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy is developing and acquiring large unmanned surface vehicles (LUSVs) and underwater vehicles (UUVs) to build a more distributed fleet, avoiding concentration of capabilities in a few high-value ships. These include the LUSV, MUSV, and XLUUV, with different sizes and capabilities.

The article emphasizes that world geography, particularly the concentration of people, resources, and economic activity in Eurasia, influences U.S. strategy. U.S. policymakers aim to prevent the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia, leading to the design of U.S. military forces capable of deploying across oceans and conducting large-scale operations in Eurasia. The article also discusses the unique approach of the U.S. military, which is structured to operate globally.

The article provides an overview of the U.S. Department of the Navy (DON), emphasizing its structure as a single military department comprising the Navy and Marine Corps, with shared leadership under the Secretary of the Navy, and explains budget allocations, personnel composition. Topics include the terminology used to encompass both the Navy and Marine Corps, budget distribution between the two services, personnel statistics, and the Coast Guard's status and coordination with the Navy.

The article focuses on the U.S. Congressional Research Service and discusses the Coast Guard's Waterways Commerce Cutter (WCC) Program, aiming to replace aging river buoy tenders, inland construction tenders, and inland buoy tenders, with new cutter planned for service by 2025. Topics include WCC missions, rationale for building new cutters, and acquisition strategy, with the Coast Guard requesting funding for the program in its proposed 2024 budget.