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This paper asks whether history should change the way in which economists and economic historians think about populism. We use Müller's definition, according to which populism is 'an exclusionary form of identity politics, which is why it poses a threat to democracy'. We make three historical arguments. First, late‐nineteenth‐century US Populists were not populist. Second, there is no necessary relationship between populism and anti‐globalization sentiment. Third, economists have sometimes been on the wrong side of important policy debates involving opponents rightly or wrongly described as populist. History encourages us to avoid an overly simplistic view of populism and its correlates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Author(s): Kevin Hjortshøj O'Rourke [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.440573.1, New York University, , Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Branco Milanovic cannot be accused of being an unthinking cheerleader of Washington-Consensus-style [...]

What is the role of trade policy in promoting intra-Empire trade? We address the question in the context of interwar India, whose trade policies have been accused of harming British export interests. We quantify the impact of trade policy on the value and composition of Indian imports, using novel disaggregated data on both trade policies and imports for 114 commodity categories coming from 42 countries. We find that, even though Indian protection lowered total imports, it substantially boosted imports from the United Kingdom. Despite the rising tariff barriers facing British exporters, trade diversion from other countries ensured that Indian trade policy benefited them overall. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How did countries recover from the Great Depression? In this paper, we explore the argument that leaving the gold standard helped by boosting inflationary expectations, lowering real interest rates, and stimulating interest-sensitive expenditures. We do so for a sample of 27 countries, using modern nowcasting methods and a new data-set containing more than 230,000 monthly and quarterly observations for over 1,500 variables. In those cases where the departure from gold happened on well-defined dates, inflationary expectations clearly rose in the wake of departure. Instrumental variable, difference-in-difference, and synthetic matching techniques suggest that the relationship is causal. (JEL E31, E32, E42, E43, F30, N10, N20) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kevin Hjortshoj O'Rourke of NYU Abu Dhabi reviews "Against the World: Anti-Globalism and Mass Politics between the World Wars" by Tara Zahra. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: "Explores the development of nationalism in the twentieth century after World War I, discussing significant events that contributed to the rise of anti-globalization policies and social movements." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We assemble the Irish industrial data currently available for the years 1800–1921, the period during which the entire island was in a political union with Great Britain, and construct an annual index of Irish industrial output for 1800–1913. We also construct a new industrial price index. Irish industrial output grew by an average of 1.3 per cent per annum between 1800 and the outbreak of the First World War. Industrial growth was slightly slower than previously thought, especially during the two decades immediately preceding the Great Famine. While Ireland did not experience absolute deindustrialisation either before the Famine or afterwards, its industrial growth was disappointing when considered in a comparative perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We document the outbreak of a trade war after the United States adopted the Smoot-Hawley tariff in June 1930. U.S. trade partners initially protested, with many eventually choosing to retaliate with tariffs. Using a new quarterly dataset on bilateral trade for ninety-nine countries, we show that U.S. exports to retaliators fell by 28%–32%. Using a second new dataset on U.S. exports at the product level, we find that the most important U.S. exports to retaliating markets were particularly affected, suggesting a possible mechanism whereby the United States was targeted despite most-favoured-nation obligations. The retaliators' welfare gains from trade fell by 8%–16%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]