Search

The article presents notes related to police science. First part of the article discusses identification of a body by means of a tailor's label. Laundry marks and cleaners' marks are often used by the police for ascertaining the identity of the owner of a garment. In some instances the writing or printing may be so faded or indistinct that it cannot be deciphered by ordinary inspection. A case involving an illegible name on a tailor's label was investigated by the Chicago Police Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory.

The article reports on abstracts of articles on criminal cases, laboratory examinations, legal decisions, fingerprints and photography and others. Some of these abstract are as follows: An interesting case involving the identification of a suspect by means of a coat is reported in the April- June 1938 by Detective Inspector R. Tankard of the Birkenhead Borough Police. A police officer, in attempting to arrest a man accused of indecent exposure was suddenly attacked; a struggle followed, and the suspect made his escape, leaving behind his coat, hat and raincoat. A few hours later a hat, coat and overcoat were stolen from a house not far from the scene of the attack upon the officer. This occurrence was connected at once with the assault and a description was broadcast of the assailant and the stolen clothing. By this means the offender was traced to Liverpool. In another incident, while establishing the guilt of Adam Richetti for his participation in the Kansas City Union Station massacre the state produced expert testimony to the effect that a cartridge found at the scene of the crime had been fired from a pistol recovered from "Pretty Boy" Floyd, whom eye witnesses identified as a participant in the shooting while in company with the defendant.

The article presents information about two decisions that were given recently by the California Supreme Court and by the District Court of Appeals. In the case of Arais v. Kalensnikoff, in California, a question arose regarding the utilization of the results of blood grouping tests in a paternity determination. At the trial the results of the test were admitted and they indicated the impossibility of the defendant's being the father of the child in question. Nevertheless, because of other evidence introduced at the trial the court found in favor of the plaintiff. The court ruled that the law makes no distinction whatever between expert testimony and evidence of other character. Although it encourages the demonstration of the truth of the issues before a court by any means which are generally accepted as tending to prove the facts in dispute, when there is a conflict between scientific testimony and testimony as to the facts, the jury or trial court, must determine the relative weight of the evidence.

This article presents regarding the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court on the admissibility of recorded wire tapping evidence. The Supreme Court of Minnesota in the recent decision of State v. Raasch, upheld the admissibility of a recording of wire tapping evidence. Upon examination of the record we find that the witnesses who testified to the transcribing of the telephone conversations upon the pamograph records sufficiently identified the defendant's voice. True, they did not know his voice at the time they started making the records, but not only did the defendant respond to his name when his office was called on the telephone, but after the making of the records these witnesses saw the defendant and heard him talk repeatedly, so at the time they testified they were able to testify positively that the voice they had heard over the telephone at the time the pamograph records were taken was the defendant's voice. There were occasions upon the trial when the needle of the reproducing mechanism jumped from one groove of the record to another, thus omitting a part of the conversation, but in such cases the record was played over and the whole conversation reproduced.

This article discusses the Pipher v. State court case. The defendant was found guilty of an assault to murder. It appears the injured woman and her party had visited several taverns before coming to the defendant's liquor dispensary and there, after a short time, engaged in a heated argument with the defendant, who brandished a revolver and ordered the party off the premises. The defendant alleges that when she displayed the weapon, one of the women held her arm while the victim came behind the bar to grapple for the gun and was accidently shot. The examining physician, after describing the wounds, testified that there was no evidence of powder burns. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the decision of the trial court and ruled the defendant's objection was not well founded because she did not present any evidence to corroborate her claim of accidental shooting or show that the gun was within twenty inches of the wound, which it inflicted at the time of firing.

The article focuses on the destruction of fingerprints by skin grafting. On October 30, 1941, a hitch hiker was picked up on suspicion near El Paso, Texas by two Texas State Highway Patrolmen. Later when an attempt was made to take his fingerprints it was discovered that there were no friction ridges on the end joints of his fingers. The prisoner, who gave the names of Paul Cline and Robert James Pitts, stated that he had the skin on his fingertips removed and replaced with skin taken from the sides of his chest, the operation having been performed in May, 1941. The operation left the end joints of the fingers and thumbs covered by epidermis taken from the chest and free from papillary ridges essential to fingerprint recording. Although the fingerprints taken at the time of his arrest showed no ridge texture, the identity of the prisoner was subsequently established by means of ridge characteristics of the second joints. He was found to be an ex-convict with a long criminal record and at the time of his arrest was wanted on a felony charge.

The article presents information on the curious occurrence of identifiable fingerprints outlined in bacterial colonies. As an experiment in the study of the bacterial flora of the skin, the thumb was sweated in a moist, warm chamber and then pressed gently upon the surface of a nutrient agar plate three successive times. The plate was then incubated to grow the bacteria, with the result shown in the accompanying illustration. Only the first impression resulted in an entire and identifiable fingerprint; the second is a fragmentary impression containing only a few fingerprint ridges, and the third shows no pattern traces at all. The physician reports that the clearly formed design of the first impression is composed of small pinpoint colonies derived from bacteria normally living in the deeper parts of the cornified layer of the skin and can be demonstrated only by the type of experiment described, in which the cornified layer becomes swollen and spongy as in the familiar "wash-woman's hand."

The article focuses on the case Commonwealth v. Peronace, in Pennsylvania. An expert testified that a revolver such as that used by the defendant would throw shells a certain distance if held in a normal position. Upon appeal from the trial court's conviction the Supreme Court stated that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, appellant having admitted firing the gun, the jury could infer that he held it in a normal position.

The article presents information about the qualification of expert witness in a case involving firearms identification. In the case of State v. Couch, an expert witness testified to the effect that various shells were fired from certain guns in evidence, which testimony served to secure a conviction against the defendant. Upon appeal the defendant contended that since the witness was not a ballistic expert he should not have been permitted to testify. To this objection the Supreme Court of Missouri said that the witness did testify that he was not a ballistic expert, but that he had much experience in the work of identifying firearms, that the term ballistic expert did not apply to his line of work. In this the witness may be technically correct. But, be that as it may, the witness' testimony disclosed that he was an expert in the identification of firearms and bullets by the comparison method by means of a microscope. The rule is now settled that such evidence is competent and may be considered by the jury in arriving at a verdict.