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Nuclear proliferation literature typically differentiates supply-side and demand-side factors influencing the spread of nuclear weapons. These distinct approaches to the proliferation puzzle raise the following empirical questions: Does nuclear supply stimulate states' demand for nuclear weapons? Conversely, does the demand for nuclear weapons really facilitate the acquisition of nuclear supply? If such endogeneity exists between the demand-side and supply-side determinants, how would it cause empirical bias in the estimation of their effects on nuclear proliferation? This article aims to unpack endogenous mechanisms of nuclear demand and nuclear supply over the course of nuclear proliferation. In particular, it examines two potential sources of endogeneity: (1) simultaneous interactions between states' nuclear development decisions and nuclear technological capability and (2) selection bias in nuclear development. To address each source of endogeneity, simultaneous equation models and the duration models with selection are estimated, respectively. Contrary to what recent supply-side literature suggests, the empirical analyses reveal that states' nuclear demand is primarily driven by external security threats instead of their existing nuclear technology, and that their successful acquisition of nuclear technology mainly follows as the result of nuclear development efforts but does not necessarily depend on individual supply-side factors. This article addresses the typical inference issues in nuclear proliferation research and contributes to our synthetic understanding of proliferation mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Iran's pursuit of a civilian nuclear program raises concerns over the potential security threat it poses to the United States and its Middle East allies. The US suspects that Tehran's lack of compliance with the Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty signifies its intention to build atomic weapons. This article aims to examine the strategies implemented during the presidencies of Obama, Trump, and Biden to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear arsenals. Employing a constructivist theory, the study examines how each administration constructed identities, perceptions, and norms regarding Iran, and how these shaped their diplomatic approaches. Drawing on a comprehensive data of primary and secondary sources, this research sheds light on the identities, perceptions, and power dynamics shaping US–Iran relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) nuclear program has been a challenge to international security for three decades, the world still knows little about its nuclear intentions. A recently available dataset of Korean Central News Agency's English publications (1997–2018) provides a complete coverage of DPRK's nuclear activities in the time span. Our study employs the Louvain method of community detection in large networks to detect patterns and trends in North Korea's nuclear rhetoric. We have two findings: Pyongyang's primary objective is deterrence, although it also utilizes nuclear development to boost regime legitimacy. This secondary intention of legitimization is more prominent under Kim Jong-un than under Kim Jong-il, but still not as salient as deterrence. Our results suggest a policy approach of engagement and deterrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The threat of nuclear proliferation has led to the rapid development, acquisition and deployment of ballistic missile defenses around the globe. Smaller powers located in the proximity of new or potential nuclear powers must decide on the right mix of offensive and defensive capability necessary to balance the threat. In terms of defense, they have a number of choices such as indigenous development, licensing for domestic production, procurement from third parties, and participation in multilateral defensive systems. This paper presents a theoretical framework that helps explain the decision by small states to deploy a ballistic missile defense system as well as the particular type of system chosen. The framework predicts that the level of threat of both the new or potential nuclear power and the regional great power will drive fears of the security dilemma, entrapment, and abandonment. The balance of these three fears will determine whether to deploy ballistic missile defenses as well as the type of defenses. Using a case study focusing on South Korea, the paper illustrates the evolution of defensive thinking among the political elite and public support for various defensive options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mark Bell’s article (2016) is a welcome contribution to the unavoidable task of evaluating aresearch program that exhibits the problems he identifies: the failure of most quantitativestudies to offer strong explanations for proliferation patterns, and their inability to predictout-of-sample cases. His findings resonate with those of other proliferation experts. Theexisting quantitative literature, argues Bell, produces more tentative findings than scholarstypically understand. We concur fully with the first part of the last sentence but believe thatthe broader community of experts typically?does?understand the serious limitations of mostquantitative studies (and qualitative ones) on this topic.

Even during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union cooperated on nuclear safety and security. Since accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonations anywhere threaten peace everywhere, it seems straightforward that states more experienced in developing nuclear safety and security technologies would transfer such methods to other states. Yet, the historical record is mixed. Why? While existing explanations focus on the political costs and proliferation risks faced by the transferring state, this article argues that specific technological features condition the feasibility of assistance. For more complex nuclear safety and security technologies, robust technical cooperation is crucial to build the necessary trust for scientists to transfer tacit knowledge without divulging sensitive information. Leveraging elite interviews and archival evidence, my theory is supported by four case studies: US sharing of basic nuclear safety and security technologies with the Soviet Union (1961–1963); US withholding of complex nuclear safety and security technologies from China (1990–1999) and Pakistan (1998–2003); and US sharing of complex nuclear safety and security technologies with Russia (1994–2007). My findings suggest the need to examine not only the motivations behind nuclear assistance but also the process by which it occurs and the features of the technologies involved, with implications for how states cooperate to manage the global risks of emerging technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

More often than not, violence between states in the field of international relations is understood in instrumental terms. States are thought to act purposively in the pursuit of some tangible object, treating those in their way as objects; the targets of that violence respond to such treatment phlegmatically, without any sense of outrage. Drawing on psychological research in 'virtuous violence', which argues that intergroup violence is primarily moralistic in character, we present results from three survey experiments in the United States and Russia and a re-analysis of a recent study, which demonstrate that moral condemnation of adversaries is extremely easy to invoke, hard to avoid, common across different cultural contexts, and a central feature of 'binding' morality, one of the most fundamental moral foundations. Our first survey experiment presents American respondents with a fictional state developing nuclear weapons. Strategic features of the situation – offensive capability, past history, and interest divergence – generate not only threat perception but, crucially, negative moral attributions that mediate between the two. In the next two survey experiments, we show that American and Russian respondents judge aggressive action against a third country, regardless of whether the aggressor pursues water necessary for its population or oil useful for its economy. Finally, our re-analysis of Rathbun & Stein 1 shows that moral condemnation strongly mediates the effect of binding morality on support for nuclear weapons use against terrorists. Our results suggest a future agenda on morality's role in international relations that highlights ethical dynamics beyond the taming influence of humanitarianism and cosmopolitan individualism. Morality can drive conflict, not just restrain it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we explore the relationship between regional powers and security norms by examining the influence of the liberal international order (LIO) on regional security dynamics in East Asia. In examining the influence of the LIO on East Asian nonproliferation norms, the USA and its partner nations have displayed a great deal of inconsistency regarding nuclear nonproliferation. We contend that this inconsistency offers opportunities for regional powers like China to reinforce or contest expectations associated with international nuclear norms. Often perceived as a stable pillar of the international order, variations in nuclear nonproliferation norms from the global to those in East Asia suggest a need to reconsider the influence and nature of the ILO on regional orders more broadly. Due to the role regional powers play in this relationship between the global and regional levels, this research also reinforces the continued importance of the Regional Powers Research Program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How was the scope of nuclear weapons policy change immediately after the Cold War determined? Nuclear learning and worst-case thinking are common but not satisfactory answers. On the basis of primary sources in multiple languages, we posit that a particular temporalization of nuclear events in the beginning of the 1990s took place: nonproliferation timescaping. The Iraqi case of opaque proliferation was treated as the harbinger of future nuclear danger, while the breakup of the nuclear-armed USSR was depicted as not repeatable or not to worry about, and South African nuclear disarmament was reframed as a non-proliferation success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies have explored the determinants of the nuclear proliferation levels (Explore, Pursue, and Acquire). However, these studies have weaknesses, including endogeneity and multicollinearity among the independent variables. This resulted in tentative predictions of a country's nuclear program capabilities. The objective of this study is to develop a tool to predict future nuclear proliferation in a country, and thus facilitate its prevention. Specifically, we examine how applying deep learning algorithms can enhance nuclear proliferation risk prediction. We collected important determinants from the literature that were found to be significant in explaining nuclear proliferation. These determinants include economics, domestic and international security and threats, nuclear fuel cycle capacity, and tacit knowledge development in a country. We used multilayer perceptrons in the classification model. The results suggest that detecting a country's proliferation behavior using deep learning algorithms may be less tentative and more viable than other existing methods. This study provides a policy tool to identify a country's nuclear proliferation risk pattern. This information is important for developing efforts/strategies to hamper a potential proliferating country's attempt toward developing a nuclear weapons program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do childhood experiences of wartime violence affect individuals' preferences for nuclear proliferation? This paper argues that individuals who experienced severe war violence during childhood are more likely to value the security-enhancing aspects of nuclear weapons. These individuals are more concerned about being exposed to additional wartime violence, so they view nuclear weapons as a deterrent against large-scale invasions. By utilizing the geographic variation of violence intensity during the Korean War, this paper compares the pre-war and post-war cohorts who resided in severely damaged regions and relatively safe areas. Within the pre-war cohort, I find that individuals who resided in war-torn areas are more supportive of nuclear proliferation than those who were exposed to less violence. This regional difference, however, is not substantial in the post-war generation. The results suggest that direct exposure to wartime violence during childhood increases public demand for nuclear weapons when confronted with security threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why was the United States, despite its overwhelming superiority in power, unable to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons? Why did North Korea persist in its nuclear pursuit in the face of U.S. opposition? In this article, we represent nuclear proliferation and counter-proliferation as situations of subjective strategic interaction between states. We measure preferences over strategies and outcomes using operational codes of the leaders of each country, derived via linguistic analysis. Our results indicate that neither the U.S. nor North Korea accurately understood the other side’s preference ordering, and that their operational codes interacted in such a way as to produce an outcome favorable to North Korea – the weaker party - and unfavorable to the U.S. – the stronger. The wider contribution is to show that (mis)perceptions of the goals and resolve of the opponent play a crucial role in the success or failure of strong states to compel weak states and vice versa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main goal of this article is to analyze the conditions under which South Korea would decide to go nuclear. It seeks to examine the key factors that would trigger Seoul's decision for nuclear‐arming. The article contends that South Korea is likely to go nuclear under the following conditions: where South Koreans' demands for nuclear weapons continue to rise despite US security assurances; where Pyongyang's threats of its nuclear weapons attacks are increasingly directed towards Seoul as opposed to Washington; where US security assurances for South Korea become highly questionable; and where potential nearby proliferators (Japan and Taiwan, in particular) go nuclear. Any single one of these conditions might not be enough for Seoul's decision to nuclearize, but when at least any two of them are fulfilled at the same time, South Korea is highly likely to go nuclear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Iran's 2015 nuclear deal has defied the conventional wisdom over the futility of imposing economic sanctions to curtail its nuclear programme. However, the existing literature remains theoretically ill-equipped to deal with the complexities of the Iranian case. By developing a theoretical framework that elaborates on the causal pathways through which economic sanctions affect both the supply (constraints on the nuclear programme) and demand (domestic politics) sides of nuclear proliferation, the case of Iran is examined from the faltering of international nuclear negotiations in 2005 until the signing of the nuclear deal in 2015. In achieving this outcome, the demand-side pathway played a more decisive role than the supply-side pathway as it contributed to the formation of a broad-based coalition that was able to side-line the hardline neo-Principalists and pursue a path of negotiation and nuclear rollback. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]