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With a few notable exceptions, the word "epinoia" has not been heard with a philosophical ear since the time of Epicurus and the Stoics. In addition to the scarce mentions it had received in philosophy, epinoia was strewn across the plays of Euripides and Aristophanes and, more so, across the canonical body of Christian theology, from Patristics—Origen, Cyril of Alexandria, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus the Confessor—to the late Byzantine period. Straddling the divide between the authorities of the nascent Church and those they suspected of heresy, it made a spectacular appearance in Gnostic texts (The Apocryphon of John), cryptically embodying the reconciliation of knowledge and life. On the margins of the Christian tradition, first-century CE controversial religious figures such as Simon Magus associated epinoia with the great goddess and the womb of existence, even as, three centuries later, Eunomius of Cyzicus—the theological arch-enemy of the Cappadocian Fathers, Basil and Gregory—deplored it for its hollowness and pure conventionality. In this paper, I argue that epinoia is the figure of anarchic intelligence in theology and philosophy alike. The anarchy of epinoia is its note of defiance: the escape from power it plots is the most serious challenge to power, the royal road to liberation from the oppressive unity of Being, Mind, or Concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is prima facie evidence that Theophrastus naturalized nous to the extent that he spoke of it in naturalizing terms. But our evidence also suggests that Theophrastus accepted the reasons Aristotle had for excluding nous from the reach of natural philosophy. We show that, far from revealing an inconsistency on Theophrastus' part, this apparent tension results from a consciously adopted strategy. Theophrastus is developing one aspect of Aristotle's account of nous he found underdeveloped and feared might be misunderstood, namely the infrangible organic unity of the whole human being, including its nous. That is why he insists that nous , although 'from outside,' is 'grown together' with us, why he speaks of it as a nature (phusis), and why he insists that thought is a motion (kinêsis). We show how these striking claims can be understood against the broader background of Theophrastus' natural philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle's divine nous of Metaphysics Λ.9 is generally understood to exclusively characterise the Prime Mover-God. This paper challenges this view by (1) drawing out the strong congruity between our 'best state' and that of the Prime Mover in Λ.7 and (2) removing certain key obstacles to a more inclusive reading of Λ.9: our thought is not limited to the 'human' kind (ho anthrōpinos nous , 1075a7), nor is our self-knowledge always a 'by-product' (en parergōi , 1074b36). Noēsis noēseōs , I contend, equally applies to some forms of our thought. Hence, divine thought is accessible—indeed, even commendable—to us, just as the 'divine life' of Nicomachean Ethics X.7 is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A notion that has arisen from historical-critical analysis – that the Gospels are primarily 'theological' rather than straightforwardly 'historical' documents – is explored in terms of the aspect of patristic thinking that has been described as 'mystical theology'. Here, the ancient concept of the mental faculty called the nous becomes relevant because it was often seen in the patristic writings as essentially intuitive in its operation. It was therefore related primarily to a noetic, contemplative apprehension of reality, rather than to discursive rationality. This concept is relevant not only to understanding the Gospels but also to a pluralistic understanding of the world's faith traditions, so that there is a potential link between our way of reading the Gospels and our way of assessing religious pluralism. Both may therefore be seen, in a new way, as aspects of a post-critical spirituality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With a few notable exceptions, the word “epinoia” has not been heard with a philosophical ear since the time of Epicurus and the Stoics. In addition to the scarce mentions it had received in philosophy, epinoia was strewn across the plays of Euripides and Aristophanes and, more so, across the canonical body of Christian theology, from Patristics—Origen, Cyril of Alexandria, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus the Confessor—to the late Byzantine period. Straddling the divide between the authorities of the nascent Church and those they suspected of heresy, it made a spectacular appearance in Gnostic texts (The Apocryphon of John), cryptically embodying the reconciliation of knowledge and life. On the margins of the Christian tradition, first-century CE controversial religious figures such as Simon Magus associated epinoia with the great goddess and the womb of existence, even as, three centuries later, Eunomius of Cyzicus—the theological arch-enemy of the Cappadocian Fathers, Basil and Gregory—deplored it for its hollowness and pure conventionality. In this paper, I argue that epinoia is the figure of anarchic intelligence in theology and philosophy alike. The anarchy of epinoia is its note of defiance: the escape from power it plots is the most serious challenge to power, the royal road to liberation from the oppressive unity of Being, Mind, or Concept.

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Evagrius of Pontus (345–399 AD) presents in his spiritual doctrine the concept of "pure prayer," that is, prayer not only devoid of any contact with material things but also divorced from any concrete image in the νοῦς (i. e., the mind/intellect). Upon reaching this state of deep purification, the νοῦς sees during such a prayer the light of God and also perceives himself as radiant. Evagrius specifies that the νοῦς sees itself in the colour of the sapphire or in sky-blue, or even as a star. Scholars have been asking for a long time whether, for Evagrius, this light originated within the mind itself, or came from God. It seems that monk of Pontus joins these two lights together, although considering them always as separate. The light of νοῦς itself is but a reflection of the divine light, in the same way like the moon reflects the light of the sun. Even if the νοῦς is not the source of its own light, nevertheless its light is real. In a time of deep spiritual union with God, His light illuminates the human νοῦς and turns it into radiance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Akofena is the property of Universite Felix Houphouet Boigny and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Esse artigo apresenta uma análise do filme Nous (2021), da cineasta franco-senegalesa Alice Diop, a partir de dois elementos estético-formais: a mise en scène e a montagem. Considerando certos recursos mobilizados na obra, como o uso do autobiográfico em uma perspectiva política que coloca no centro a experiência afrodiaspórica da população francesa de origem migrante, analisamos as dinâmicas entre o individual e o coletivo produzidas pelo filme. Verificamos as relações que Diop cria entre o cotidiano de habitantes racializados da periferia de Paris e de franceses brancos, colocando em perspectiva as complexidades identitárias na França contemporânea e interrogando quem faz parte, afinal, desse “nós” ao qual o título do filme faz referência.

The goal of this article is to give an overview of the current limitations and epistemological barriers in Science and Scientific Philosophy from a very general point of view. We first list and define the types of knowledge nous, doxa and episteme, and the Sobject-Observer and Object(s) of study, to proceed showing the different types of barriers that difficult the knowledge of the physical world: limitations in the language, in the logic of the Subject-Observer. Later, we discriminate between technological barriers, (temporary) limits and absolute epistemic barriers. The last type of limits are presented and discussed in some detail: the quantum of action, Planck's scale and quantum gravity (showing the importance of the trans-Planckian scale for structure formation), the cosmological horizon (a limit to the present observable Universe) and the event horizons (disconnecting the inside of some spacetimes from the rest of the Universe). We argue that physical problems in which absolute barriers seem to determine the end of the attainable knowledge, are in fact amenable to be studied, at least indirectly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that the term kinêsis bears different connotations when associated with two different Plotinian hypostases in the Enneads: Intellect and Soul1. I propose an interpretation of this term as intellectual movement when it is associated with the Intellect and spatial movement when it is associated with the Soul. In the first section, I evaluate the meaning of kinêsis in reference to the hypostasis Intellect. In the second section, I turn to a critical examination of kinêsis associated with the hypostasis Soul, emphasising the conceptual complexity of the term. I develop my interpretation on the distinction between kinêsis tês ousias and kinêsis pros ousias, translating the former as 'movement of the hypostasis' and the latter as 'movement from the hypostasis.' On this revised reading, I conclude that kinêsis in Plotinus is a context-dependent concept that alters its significance according to the hypostasis and introductory locution ('tês' or 'pros') with which it is associated. I conclude by linking Plotinian henology with Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines to illuminate an ongoing conversation between Plotinian metaphysics and Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the possible sources of the theories introduced in Phaedo 99b2-c6. It argues that Plato is primarily alluding to Aristophanes' Clouds and views held by Diogenes of Apollonia and Archelaus of Athens. But the passage, I also suggest, could serve another rhetorical function. By inviting us to reflect on whether and to what extent other natural philosophers fit the description of these theories, the text emphasises the gulf between Socrates and his predecessors. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of identifying these references for our understanding of the autobiographical passage in the Phaedo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are few places where one is so exposed and vulnerable as in the analytic room. This is so for the patient and for the analyst, especially because patient and analyst share an openness with one another, a shared unconscious Us, that extends beyond their separate or 'bounded' minds. Indeed, it is shocking to experience how much more open and vulnerable to the other we are than we'd like to believe. Different authors have developed our understanding of the inevitable shared/common unconscious produced between patient and analyst. However, clinical manifestations of the patient-analyst's unconscious Us is deficient in the literature. There is even less written on what may be gained when adopting an Us perspective. This paper is a beginning step toward both goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay proposes a brief reflection on language, considering Patristic apophaticism, as seen in the works of the Cappadocian Fathers, Dionysius and Maximus the Confessor. It discusses Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology and his Letter on Humanism, where language is called “the House of Being”. It tries to show that, according to Patristic apophaticism, the human nous is instead the “House of Being”. The difference between Heidegger and Patristic thought lies in how Being is understood. It also notes that the Letter on Humanism displays a potential openess to the “energetic theory of language”, which characterises Patristic apophaticism.

Copyright of Classica: Revista Brasileira de Estudos Clássicos is the property of Sociedade Brasileira de Estudos Classicos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Plotinos felsefesi en temelde bir sudur, türüm sürecine dayanır. Farklı adlarla anılan bu süreç bir ilk ilkeden taşarak ontolojik bir hiyerarşi dizgesi oluşturur. Bunlar Bir, Nous ve Ruh olarak özetlenebilir. Bunların her biri Plotinos tarafından bir hipostaz olarak düşünülmüş ve varlıkla ilişkilendirilmiştir. Mevcut Türkçe literatürde genellikle mükemmelden taşma öğretisiyle bilindik olan bu süreç, farklı yorumlara da kaynaklık edebilir. Bu çalışmada özellikle mükemmelden taşma diye bilinen bu yorumun dışında kalan başka yorumların var olduğuna dikkat çekmeyi amaçlar. İki ayrı metaforla izah, iki de ayrı felsefi izah olarak tespit edilecek olan birbirinden farklı sudur yorumlamaları makalenin özünü oluşturur. Metaforik izahlardan ilki, Aristotelesçi biyolojik ilke olarak özetlenebilir. Yani kendi olgunluğuna erişen her şey, mutlaka kendinden sonra gelecek bir başka şeyi üretmeli, meydana getirmelidir. Bu biyolojik bir zorunluluk olduğu kadar aynı zamanda mantıki bir zorunluluktur da. Plotinos’un bu açıklamada, bir tür canlılara özgü üreme ve üretme süreciyle Bir’den ortaya çıkan sudur süreci arasında benzerlik kurmaya çalıştığı söylenebilir. İkinci metaforik izah ise Bir’in ışık, ateş yahut kar gibi nesnelere benzetilmeye çalışılmasıdır. Bu açıklamada, ateşin, ışığın ve karın kendi özündeki varlığı Bir’in ontolojik durumunu temsil etmektedir. Bu nesnelere paralel olarak onlardan yayılan sıcaklık, parlaklık ve soğukluk ise Nous’u temsil eder. Plotinos bu nesnelerden yayılan unsurlar ile Bir’den sudur eden Nous arasında metaforik yakınlaştırma tesis etmeye çalışır. Diğer tarafta felsefi izahlardan ilki, temaşanın zorunlu refleksi açıklamasına dayanır. Buna göre Nous, Bir’in zorunlu ve bilinçsiz temaşasının bir ürünüdür ve bu temaşanın sonucunda belirlenmemiş bir varlık düzeyi olarak ortaya çıkar. Pre-entite denilebilecek bu düzey, daha sonra Bir’i temaşa etmeye yönelerek belirlenim kazanır ve Nous olmayı elde eder. İkinci felsefi izahı, çifte etkinlik teorisi olarak öne çıkarmaya çalıştık. Bu izah, öncelikle Plotinos’un Bir’i dunamis panton olarak takdim edişine dayanır. Bir, dunamis panton olarak her şeyin var edici fail gücüdür. Bir, bu haliyle iki türlü etkinlik olarak yorumlanabilir. İlki kendinde, özünde barındırdığı etkinlik halidir ki energeia tes ousias olarak tanımlanır. İkincisi ise özünden sadır olan etkinlik halidir [energeia ek tes ousias] ve başkası için ne olmayı ifade eder. Bunların açıklanması esnasında Plotinos’un Enneadlar eserinden yer yer geniş alıntılara yer verilerek sudur öğretisi analiz edilecektir. Plotinos’un sudur öğretisini anlatırken karşılaştığı zorluklar makalenin bir başka odak noktasıdır. Bu bağlamda filozofun Bir’i varlığa aşkın olarak takdim etmesi, onu tanımlanamaz olarak sunması temel problematiktir. Bu mesele, doğal olarak aynı zamanda Bir’den, Nous’un ortaya çıkışının tarif edilebilirliğini de güçleştirmektedir. Makale söz konusu sudur sürecini farklı perspektiflerden yeniden yoruma açmayı planlamaktadır. Son olarak Pythagorasçılara özgü tetraktys kavramı ışığında, söz konusu sudur sürecine dair matematiksel başka bir açıklama daha sunmaya çalışacaktır.

Uno de los aspectos de la filosofía de Anaxágoras que más interesan a Aristóteles es su teoría del noûs. Sin embargo, al respecto mantiene una postura algo bivalente, pues, por una parte, alaba al presocrático por haber puesto el noûs como principio, mientras que, por otra, se muestra decepcionado. El noûs de Anaxágoras intervendría de modo insuficiente en el universo pero también causaría el bien, es más, sería el Bien con mayúscula. Nuestro objetivo es explicar cómo Aristóteles es capaz de desarrollar ambos tipos de discurso sobre el presocrático, siendo entre ellos aparentemente contradictorios. Se ofrecen dos soluciones a esta disyuntiva: aun existiendo cierta teleología en la filosofía de Anaxágoras, ésta resulta insuficiente a los ojos de Platón y Aristóteles; la recepción del pensamiento de Anaxágoras en otros autores posteriores, pero anteriores a Aristóteles, asocia subrepticiamente la bondad con el noûs.

The philosophy of Plotinus is essentially based on a process of emanation. This process, which has various names, creates an ontological hierarchy system by starting from a first principle. These can be summarized as One, Nous, and Soul. Each of them was conceived by Plotinus as a hypostasis and connected with being. Even in Turkish Plotinus research, this process, which is commonly known with the doctrine of overflowing from perfection, has been interpreted differently. The purpose of this study is to draw attention to other interpretations outside this well-known interpretation and to present them for discussion. Different interpretations of emanation, determined as two metaphorical and two philosophical explanations, form the core of the article. The first of the metaphorical explanations can be summarized as the Aristotelian biological principle. That is, anything that reaches fullness must give rise to something else that comes after it. This is both a biological and a logical necessity. In this explanation, it can be said that Plotinus is trying to establish a similarity between the process of production and generation in living beings and the process of emanation from the One. The second metaphorical explanation is that the One is compared to objects such as light, fire, or snow. In this account, the self-existence of fire, light, and, snow represent the ontological state of the One. Parallel to these objects, the heat, brightness, and cold emanating from them represent the Nous. Plotinus attempts to establish a metaphorical approximation between the elements that emanate from these objects and Nous that emanates from the One. The first of the philosophical explanations, on the other hand, is based on the necessary reflex of contemplation. According to this, the Nous is a product of the necessary and unconscious contemplation of the One and arises as an indeterminate level of being as a result of this contemplation. This level, which can be called pre-entity, gains determination by turning to the One for contemplation and reaching nous-being. We have tried to highlight the second philosophical explanation as to the two-acts theory. This explanation relies primarily on Plotinus' account of the One as dunamis panton. The One is the productive power of all things as dunamis panton. The One as such can be interpreted as two kinds of activity. The first is the state of activity in itself, in its essence, which is defined as energeia tes ousias. The second is the state of activity [energeia ek tes ousias] that comes from its essence and expresses what it is to the other. These doctrines will be analyzed using extensive quotations from Plotinus' Enneads. The difficulties Plotinus had in describing his doctrine of emanation are another focus of this article. In this context, Plotinus' presentation of the One as absolutely transcendent and indefinable poses a difficult problem. This question, of course, also complicates the describability of the emergence of Nous from the One. In this article, this emanation process will be reinterpreted from different perspectives. Finally, in view of the Pythagorean tetractys concept, another mathematical explanation for this emanation process is presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peut-on comprendre le platonisme comme une philosophie de l’exil ? Cette contribution présente deux réponses possibles à cette question, en analysant la position des lecteurs anciens de Platon. Une première position est tenue par ceux qui, comme Plotin, vont jusqu’à nier la thèse de l'exil. Nous sommes notre intellect et notre intellect est toujours absorbé (même si nous n’en sommes pas conscients) dans la contemplation des intelligibles ; en cela, nous réalisons déjà notre vie la plus authentique dans cette vie-ci : il est donc inutile de parler d’exil. Une autre position est celle de Plutarque, qui part du constat que nous ne parvenons jamais en réalité à une connaissance complète des intelligibles. Puisque nous ne pouvons pas réaliser notre désir le plus authentique, nous nous trouvons en état d’exil. Mais cela ne doit pas conduire à la résignation : au contraire, la tâche du véritable philosophe sera de s’efforcer de rendre ce monde aussi proche que possible du monde idéal. Si la position de Plotin peut être comprise comme une célébration de la vie contemplative, celle de Plutarque nous rappelle l’importance de l’engagement pratique.

As Socrates recounts his search for causes (aitiai) in the Phaedo, he identifies the following as genuine causes: intelligence (nous), seeming best, choice of the best, and the forms. I argue that these causes should be understood as norms prescribing the conditions their effects must meet if those effects are to be produced. Thus, my account both explains what Socrates’ causes are and the way in which they cause what they cause.

For Aristotle, happiness corresponds to the highest kind of virtue. In Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle treats practical virtues, and in Book X, he treats theoretical contemplation as the best practice that might guarantee happiness. Thus, Aristotle might be said to have given two answers (naturalistic and theological) to the question of the nature of happiness. This is because the self-sufficient character of happiness implies its intrinsic value, and practical activities—which are deemed intrinsically valuable in Book I are treated as having secondary value, in Book X, as a means to the higher (theoretical) happiness. Some people believe that Aristotle has finally failed to remain committed to the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental good, falling into a contradiction in his definition of happiness. In this paper, in the first place, we draw on the analytic method and revisit the notion of kalon to show that the function of theoretical reason in acquisition of moral virtues goes beyond what is claimed by naturalistic readings. Indeed, happiness is fundamentally a theological property. Secondly, we outline two senses of self-sufficiency (the dominant end, and the comprehensive end) to suggest that the second sense enables us to reconcile the two notions of “being secondary or subsidiary” and “being done for its own sake,” in which case a proper reply might be yielded for the problem of contradiction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study adresses the question "What is the mind?" (nous) and represents the foundation of the PhD thesis "The Concept of nous in the niptic-filocalic literature". It consists of three main themes. The first refers to the notion that the mind is the image of God within man, as it, unlike the material body, is the one that resembles the characteristics of God's nature: unbound, unseen, unquantifyable, imaterial, beyond description. The second refers to the notion that God is Mind, and speciffically The First Mind, which casts the human mind in the role of medium for the comunion with God. The third identifies through examples the model by which the Holy Fathers understand the coexistence of those realities of the human spiritual anatomy, that often get confused (mind, heart, spirit, soul), which is that of the perichoresis of the Holy Trinity, consisting of components so closely tied toghether, that they can only be defined in the presence of one another and not separately, but that cannot be confused with one another, each of them having a distinct function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a work entitled On the Generation of Animals, Aristotle remarks that “intellect (nous) alone enters from outside (thurathen)”. Interpretations of this passage as dualistic dominate the history of ideas and allow for a joining together of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine on the soul. This, however, pulls against the well-known Aristotelian position that soul and body are intertwined and interdependent. The most influential interpretations thereby misrepresent Aristotle’s view on soul and lack any real engagement with his embryology. This paper seeks to extract the account of intellect (nous) in Aristotelian embryology from this interpretative background and place it within the context of his mature biological thought. A clear account of the actual import of this statement in its relevant context is given before explaining how it has been misunderstood by various interpretative traditions. The paper finishes by touching on how early commentary by Christian writers, freed as it was from the imperative to synthesise Greek philosophy, differed from those that came after. While realising that Aristotle’s position would not aid them in their explanations of the soul’s survival after death, their engagement with Aristotle’s science allowed for other aspects of theology concerning the fittingness of soul to body.

There is an affinity between Hegel's philosophy and Neoplatonism that Hegel himself explicitly pointed out. We claim that this affinity is due to systematic reasons and involves theoretical and practical aspects of both philosophies. To argue in that direction, we address the thematization of Plotinus's philosophy in the Hegelian Lessons on the history of philosophy. We seek to show that, according to Hegel, Plotinus elaborates in ancient times, for the first time, a complex synthesis of the philosophical principles that precede his own thought, and for this reason Hegel's speculative exposition ascribes to Neoplatonism the logical category of totality. In this synthesis of finite principles --which we will seek to determine in this paper--, Hegel recognizes tasks and problems close to those of his own philosophy. However, can it be asserted that Hegel's philosophy is for this reason a modern Neoplatonism, or is there a point at which both projects are revealed to have a fundamental incompatibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I defend a new reading of the final argument of the Gigantomachia passage of Plato's Sophist (249b5–249c9), according to which it is an argument for a two-kind ontology, based on the distinction between the changing beings and the unchanging beings. This argument, I urge, is addressed not only to Platonists but to all philosophers – with one exception. My reading is based on the claim that this argument does not rely on the view that nous requires unchangeable objects – what I call the traditional reading – but on the view that nous itself is unchanging. The difference between the traditional reading and my reading is that on the former, Plato's argument relies on a distinctive epistemological assumption, whereas on the latter, Plato's argument is free from any such commitments. If the argument of this paper is along the right lines, then this implies that this argument has a much more far-reaching scope than critics have usually assumed. It also invites us to reconsider Plato's approach to the question of being in the Sophist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract According to Aristotle's definition of episteme (understanding) in the Posterior Analytics, you have episteme of the proposition that P when you know why P, and you know that it is necessary that P. Episteme is therefore only available for propositions which have an explanation, i.e. the theorems of the science. It is a demanding cognitive state, since knowing the explanation of a proposition in a science requires being able to demonstrate or prove it. Aristotle occasionally refers to the counterpart notion to episteme which applies to propositions which lack an explanation, i.e. the first principles of a science. This counterpart notion is nous, or non-demonstrative understanding. Aristotle never defines it, but it should turn out to be an equally demanding cognitive state to achieve. This paper proposes that you have nous of the proposition that P when you know that nothing explains why P, you know the various ways in which the proposition that P features in explanations in the science, and you know that it is necessary that P.

In this paper I provide a global reading of Aristotle’s De Anima III 4 aimed at unveiling the rigorous argumentative structure of the chapter, which I show to exhibit the typical Aristotelian pattern of philosophical inquiry: a setting of the agenda of basic questions to be answered; a dialectical path to the position of a hypothesis; a derivation from it of relevant individu¬ating features of the object, some of which are already manifest and are accounted for as derivable from the hypothesis; and the emergence of aporiai that prima facie seem to invalidate the hypothesis but eventually allow for a deeper understanding of it. I attempt to reveal the speculative progression of the chapter by initially regarding the Actuality Principle as underlying his Assimilation Model of cognition (S cognizes F iff S’s cognitive principle becomes F due to a cognized object O that is F in actuality). Aristotle derives Unmixedness from not having limits of scope (Unlimitedness Asssumption), which is a manifest feature of νοῦς, from Unmixedness he derives Separability (these entail-ments are clarified through the first aporia), from Separability Spontaneity and from Spontaneity Self-thinkability of νοῦς (clarified through the second aporia). Although I examine the whole chapter, I focus specifically on the theoretical and methodological value of introducing and addressing the two aporiai.

In 1902 there arrived in Jena a letter from Russell laying out a proof that shattered Frege's confidence in logicism, which is widely taken to be the doctrine according to which every truth of arithmetic is re-expressible without relevant loss as a provable truth about a purely logical object. Frege was persuaded that Russell had exposed a pathology in logicism, which faced him with the task of examining its symptoms, diagnosing its cause, assessing its seriousness, arriving at a treatment option, and making an estimate of future prospects. The symptom was the contradiction that had crept into naïve set theory in the form of the set that provably is and is not its own member. The diagnosis was that it is caused by Basic Law V of the Grundgesetze (Frege, In: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik: Begrifsschriftlich abgeleitet, Jena: Herman Pohle, 1893/1903. Translated into English as Basic Laws of Arithmetic, also edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg, with Crispin Wright, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Triage answers the question, "How bad is it?" The answer was that the contradiction irreparably destroys the logicist project. The treatment option was nil. The disease was untreatable. In due course, the prognosis turned out to be that a scaled-down Fregean logic could have an honourable life as a theory inference for various domains of mathematical discourse, but not for domains containing the logical objects required for logicism. Since there aren't such objects, there aren't such domains. On the face of it, Frege's logicist collapse is astonishing. Why wouldn't he have repaired the fault in Law V and gone back to the business of bringing logicism to an assured realization? In the course of our reflections, we will have nice occasion to consider the good it might have done Frege to have booked some time with Aristotle had he been able to. By the time we're finished, we'll have cause to think that in the end the Russell might well have begged the question against Frege. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El artículo, de intención didáctica, intenta ser una presentación alternativa a la concepción del método en Hegel. Parte de la premisa de que ésta es tomada como una estrategia para reconciliar la modernidad ilustrada, particular-mente tras el evento de la Revolución Francesa de 1789, tanto con el proyecto fundacional epistémico de la modernidad temprana como con su pasado antagónico: La concepción de la racionalidad retórica y hermenéutica, tal y como ésta procede de Platón y Aristóteles. El método de Hegel se inscribiría en un afán por fusionar los aspectos omnipotentes de las narrativas ilustradas con los métodos premodernos de vinculación finita y fragmentaria con el sentido de la realidad. El texto sugiere la caducidad del proyecto, ante la ostensible inviabilidad contemporánea ante el optimismo ilustrado que lo inspira.

Abstract. This is a review article of repentance according to the writers of Philokalia. Philokalia is a collection of texts written between the fourth and fifteenth centuries by monks and Church Fathers from the Orthodox Christian tradition. Repentance is a process of renewing the inner man with tears so that the outer man is being process of holy before God and mature in Christ. There are two main points of the review: the process of repentance and the results of repentance. The process of repentance is the renewal of NOUS to Christ's maturity so that our NOUS or the intellect is not subject to the body or the desires of the flesh. The result of repentance is the sanctity of life and baptism in truth. Abstrak. Artikel ini adalah sebuah ulasan tentang pertobatan menurut pandangan para Bapa Gereja dalam buku Philokalia. Philokalia adalah kumpulan teks yang ditulis antara abad keempat sampai kelima belas oleh para rahib dan Bapa Gereja dalam tradisi Kristen Ortodoks. Pertobatan adalah suatu proses pembaruan manusia batiniah dengan air mata sehingga manusia lahiriah kembali menjadi kudus di hadapan Allah menuju kedewasaan ke arah Kristus. Ada 2 hal pokok pembahasan yaitu proses pertobatan dan hasil pertobatan. Proses pertobatan adalah pembaruan NOUS menuju kedewasaan seperti Kristus sehingga NOUS atau the intellect kita tidak takluk pada tubuh atau keinginan daging. Hasil pertobatan adalah kesucian hidup di dalam kebenaran dan pengudusan baptisan.

Happiness is a concept human being was concerned with from the very beginning of its culture. Regardless such position as poets, playwrights, philosophers and even politicians, theirs was a common state of certain ?anxiety?. On social plan, ?solving the matter? meant ?relying? the concept to good - governance. To what extent the right to happiness has been achieved is ultimately reflected by the entire development of the history of mankind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that the science of the soul only covers sublunary living things. Aristotle cannot properly ascribe ψυχή to unmoved movers since they do not have any capacities that are distinct from their activities or any matter to be structured. Heavenly bodies do not have souls in the way that mortal living things do, because their matter is not subject to alteration or generation. These beings do not fit into the hierarchy of soul powers that Aristotle relies on to provide unity to ψυχή. Their living consists in their activities, not in having a capacity for activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following study scrutinizes Plato's account of Socrates' intellectual biography in the dialogue Phaedo. This account is crucial for the interpretation of Socrates' philosophy as an „antropological turn“, that separates Presocratic philosophical tradition from its Socratic counterpart. The first part of this study exposes Plato's account in Phaedo as exaggerated and inaccurate treatment of Presocratic - especially Anaxagorean - philosophy. Study then proceeds to pinpoint common features between Plato's Socrates and Anaxagoreans. Subsequently, extensive Anaxagorean contaminations are found in Platonic theoretical (metaphysics, cosmology) as well as practical (ethics, philosophy as way of life) philosophy. The study concludes that Socrates' anthropological turn is in fact an artificial product of Plato's philosophy that calls for further examination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the concepts that deeply influenced Islamic and Western thought is the imagination (phantasia), whose origins can be found in Ancient Greek Philosophy. The imagination, which is considered one of the faculities of the soul, fulfills the task of establishing a bridge between sensory perception and noûs. It cominicates with sensory perception by preserving abstracted surrogates and noûs by creating various compounds. Because of its main point to connection with the soul's faculities, it is a fundamental point in the formation process of knowledge. In this article, we will emphasise on the perception of imagination from Plato and how it relates to sensation and noûs, as well as doxa and memory. Particularly by stating Aristotle's classification of the existence of imagination in living species, we will examine the characteristics of imagination of each species. Then we will attempt to determine the position of imagination in Aristotle's epistemology by focusing on the connection between intellect and imagination, which distinguishes human from other living beings. We will examine the question of whether imagination, which is one of the issues that both Aristotle and Neo-Platonists focus on, is an independent faculty. Then, we will focus on the mediating role of imagination in establishing a relationship with the metaphysic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

İnsan dışı doğada, canlılar arasında çeşitli birliktelik türleri mevcuttur. Bu etkileşimlerde, bazen ilişki içerisinde olan tüm canlılar fayda sağlarken kimi zaman ise canlılardan birisinin yarar, diğerinin zarar gördüğü birliktelikler olmaktadır. Tüm bu ilişkilerin genel adına birlikte (simbiyoz) yaşam denilmektedir. Birlikte yaşam tek taraflı birliktelik (kommensalizm), karşılıklı fayda birlikteliği (mutualizm) ve asalaklık (parazitizm) olmak üzere üç farklı şekilde görülmektedir. Bu çalışma insan-doğa ilişkilerini, onto-epistemik manada logos ile tin arasındaki köprüleri kaldırmadan karşılıklı fayda birlikteliği bağlamında yeniden ele almaktadır. Nous-logos diyalektiğini tenden tine yolculuk ekseninde anlamayan kavrayış ekolojik krizin çözümünü, atmosferdeki karbon miktarının azaltılması, az enerji tüketen beyaz eşyalar kullanılması vs. gibi salt mekanik çözümlerde aramaktadır. Hâlbuki bu tarz mekanik, noustan yoksun logos anlayışına dayalı çözüm önerileri, asırlardır süregelen sorunu çözmek yerine, onu daha fazla derinleştirmektedir. Günümüzde insan-doğa ilişkilerinin daha fazla kriz üretmemesi için birlik esasında birliktelik anlayışını hâkim kılmak gerekmektedir. Doğa ancak bu yolla fark edilecek ve ahlâk üzerinden bir iletişim sağlanacaktır. / There are various types of symbiotic interactions among living beings in non-human nature. While sometimes these interactions are for the benefit of both organisms in a relationship, sometimes one of the organisms in a relationship suffers. All of these relationships in general, are called symbiosis. Symbiosis is seen in three different ways which are commensalism, mutualism and parasitism. This study readdresses human-nature relationships within the context of mutualism without eliminating the bridges between logos and nous in onto-epistemic respect. The conception which does not understand the nous-logos dialect on the journey from nous to logos axis seeks for a solution to the ecological crisis by means of absolute mechanical solutions such as reducing amount of carbon in the atmosphere, use of home appliances consuming less energy etc. Though, such mechanical solution suggestions based on logos perception which lack nous, deepen the problem lasting for centuries rather than solving it. In our day, it is necessary to make the concept of from oneness to togetherness predominant in order for human-nature relationships not to lead further crisis. When togetherness from oneness or oneness from togetherness is understood, the path of togetherness will be cleared. The other, i.e. the nature will be noticed in this way, and communication through Ethics (moral) will be achieved.

This paper is intended to link the notion of bon sens with the Greek notion of noûs, that exposes the role played by the first notion in the thought of Pierre Duhem and explains the concept of noûs in the thought of Aristotle. Later, it attempts to carry out the explanation of the link that can have both notions.

Angels and exploring their existential status is one of the important issues for Islamic thinkers. The Sadra's analysis of the issue is in line with his macro plan of the harmony between of reason and narration. In some positions, He mentions the angels form philosophical perspective and calls them nous, and sometimes he speaks in the language of the Shari'ah and speaks of them as the angels. The two main questions of this essay are as follows: what is Mulla Sadra's account of the angels? How does he prove the existence of the angels? Accordingly, some of the results of this research are as follows: In Mulla Sadra's view, the angels have a variety of different types, including companion angels, keeper angels, moderator angles, and earth angels. The common feature of them is their simplicity, abstractness, actual existence, pathway of grace, and mission. The management of earthly and heavenly affairs is among the specific attributes of the angels, and among the twelve Mulla Sadra's proofs for the existence of angels, the most important one is based on the rule of ‘al-Wahid’.

Copyright of Academic Journal of Philosophy / Felsefi Düşün is the property of Pinhan Yayincilik and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

According to Aristotle's definition of episteme (understanding) in the Posterior Analytics, you have episteme of the proposition that P when you know why P, and you know that it is necessary that P. Episteme is therefore only available for propositions which have an explanation, i.e. the theorems of the science. It is a demanding cognitive state, since knowing the explanation of a proposition in a science requires being able to demonstrate or prove it. Aristotle occasionally refers to the counterpart notion to episteme which applies to propositions which lack an explanation, i.e. the first principles of a science. This counterpart notion is nous, or non-demonstrative understanding. Aristotle never defines it, but it should turn out to be an equally demanding cognitive state to achieve. This paper proposes that you have nous of the proposition that P when you know that nothing explains why P, you know the various ways in which the proposition that P features in explanations in the science, and you know that it is necessary that P. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper presents the medieval symbol of the salt-point, a dot in a square in a circle, as a functional blueprint for the emergence of the transcendent self--the person fully entangled with an inner yet higher authority that is experienced as a state of grace. Jung had intuited this selforganizing movement, individuation, through the metaphor of squaring the circle, a continual refinement of the chaotic solutio of bitter salts of experiences and memories toward an end point of coherence of body, soul, and spirit. The salt-point is explored through a fresh perspective of an emergent dissociability of time and psyche through the images of chaos, kronos and Ananke, Aion, kairos and Metanoia, and cosmos. The idea of a salt solutio of time is presented side by side with concepts such as probability and time salt crystals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to bring into conversation the understanding of anger in the writings of the Evagrian tradition and the school of John Cassian, on the one hand, and the Mahāyāna discourse on anger that is exemplified in the writings of Śāntideva, on the other hand. Evagrios's and Cassian's reflection on emotions and their role in the monastic life are grounded in the Philokalic tradition of Eastern Christianity, while also drawing on the Stoic understanding of the inner life and the Neo-Platonic tripartite notion of the self as comprising a higher nous (intellect) and a lower set of passions bridging the gap between the mind and the body. The Mahāyāna understanding of the emotions, for its part, is geared toward the achievement of active nirvāna , where practitioners can finally discern the fundamental identity between the samsaric and the nirvanic character of our attachments. This paper will uncover a variety of points of contacts between the two traditions, both of which envisage anger as an obstacle preventing communion with God or the achievement of liberation. At the same time, this reading of texts from the two traditions will also highlight their irreducible differences, as well as their distinctive understanding of subjectivity, soteriology, and ultimate reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]