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There is a general consensus that schizophrenia (SZ) is characterized by major changes in the sense of self. Phenomenological studies suggest that these changes in the sense of self stem from a basic disturbance, hence the term 'basic self-disturbance'. While imaging studies demonstrate changes in various regions during self-focused tasks, the exact neural correlates of such basic self-disturbances remain unclear. If the self-disturbance is indeed basic and thereby underlies all other symptoms, one would expect it to be related to more global rather than local changes in the brain. Testing this hypothesis, we conducted a systematic review of fMRI studies on self in SZ. Our main findings are 1. Abnormal activity related to the self can be observed in a variety of different regions ranging from higher-order transmodal to lower-order unimodal regions, 2. These findings hold true across different tasks including self-reflection, self-referentiality, and self-agency, and 3. The global neural abnormalities related to the self in SZ correspond to all layers of the self, predominantly the mental and exteroceptive self. Such global neural disturbance of self converges well with the basic self-disturbance as described in phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Changes in EEG have been reported in both major depressive disorder (MDD) and bipolar disorder (BD). Specifically, power changes in EEG alpha and theta frequency bands during rest and task are known in both disorders. This leaves open whether there are changes in yet another component of the electrophysiological EEG signal, namely phase-related processes that may allow for distinguishing MDD and BD. For that purpose, we investigate EEG-based spontaneous phase in the resting state of MDD, BD and healthy controls. Our main findings show: (i) decreased spontaneous phase variability in frontal theta of both MDD and BD compared to HC; (ii) decreased spontaneous phase variability in central-parietal alpha in MDD compared to both BD and HC; (iii) increased delays or lags of alpha phase cycles in MDD (but not in BD), which (iv) correlate with the decreased phase variability in MDD. Together, we show similar (decreased frontal theta variability) and distinct (decreased central-parietal alpha variability with increased lags or delays) findings in the spontaneous phase dynamics of MDD and BD. This suggests potential relevance of theta and alpha phase dynamics in distinguishing MDD and BD in clinical differential-diagnosis. • Resting state EEG shows decreased variability in major depressive disorder • Frontal theta phase variability is decreased in both depression and bipolar disorder • Centro-parietal phase variability is decreased in depression but not bipolar disorder • Depressed but not bipolar patients show phase lag in centro-parietal alpha The alpha lag correlated with decreased variability in depression [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Catatonia is featured by complex symptoms combining motor, affective and behavioral phenomena as well as by its syndrome character with trans-diagnostic occurrence. It paradigmatically shows the limits of current forms of psychopathology like affective and cognitive approaches with respect to both clinical symptoms and brain mechanisms. We therefore suggest Spatiotemporal Psychopathology (STPP) which, as recently introduced, is here developed further following the latest findings in both clinical psychiatry and neuroscience. STPP is characterized by two core features: (i) an experience-based approach that accounts for symptoms primarily in terms of first-person experience of time-space as distinct from third-person observation of specific functions and related behavior; (ii) an integrated brain-mind approach where the brain's neural topography and dynamic, e.g., inner time and space, are shared by the mind's mental topography and dynamic, e.g., time-space experience, as their "common currency". We demonstrate how these two features can well account for both symptom complexity and trans-diagnostic nature of catatonia. In conclusion, catatonia can serve as paradigmatic example for the need to develop a more comprehensive psychopathological approach in psychiatry. This is provided by STPP that allows integrating subjective experience, clinical symptoms and the brain's neural activity in terms of their inner space-time, e.g., topography and dynamic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the role of the brain's ongoing activity for cognition? The predominant perspectives associate ongoing brain activity with resting state, the default-mode network (DMN), and internally oriented mentation. This triad is often contrasted with task states, non-DMN brain networks, and externally oriented mentation, together comprising a "dual model" of brain and cognition. In opposition to this duality, however, we propose that ongoing brain activity serves as a neuronal baseline; this builds upon Raichle's original search for the default mode of brain function that extended beyond the canonical default-mode brain regions. That entails what we refer to as the "baseline model." Akin to an internal biological clock for the rest of the organism, the ongoing brain activity may serve as an internal point of reference or standard by providing a shared neural code for the brain's rest as well as task states, including their associated cognition. Such shared neural code is manifest in the spatiotemporal organization of the brain's ongoing activity, including its global signal topography and dynamics like intrinsic neural timescales. We conclude that recent empirical evidence supports a baseline model over the dual model; the ongoing activity provides a global shared neural code that allows integrating the brain's rest and task states, its DMN and non-DMN, and internally and externally oriented cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The search for the subjective nature of our self is intensely debated in philosophy and neuroscience. However, despite all progress, the subjectivity of self and how it fits into the seemingly objective world remains elusive. Drawing on recent empirical data, we show how the self is shaped by the brain's scale-free activity, that is, long-range temporal correlation (LRTC) and the world's ecological context. We assume that the scale-free LRTC of the world–brain relation provides the ontological basis for the point of view as the foundation of subjectivity within the world. We conclude that the temporal, that is, scale-free based point of view through the world–brain relation provides the ontologically necessary a posteriori condition for the subjectivity of self on a deeper neuro-ecological level. This extends phenomenological concepts like subjectivity and world beyond both Heidegger's fundamental ontology and Sartre's phenomenological ontology: it complements their subjectivity-based ontologies with a truly world-based ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary neuroscience has firmly established that mental state variation concurs with changes in neural dynamic activity in a complex way that a one-to-one mapping cannot describe. To explore the scenario of the multifaceted changes in neural dynamics associated with simple mental state variation, we took cognitive load – a common cognitive manipulation in psychology – as a venue to characterize how multiple neural dynamic features are simultaneously altered by the manipulation and how their sensitivity differs. Electroencephalogram was collected from 152 participants performing stimulus-free tasks with different demands. The results show that task demand alters wide-ranging neural dynamic features, including band-specific oscillations across broad frequency bands, scale-free dynamics, and cross-frequency phase-amplitude coupling. The scale-free dynamics outperformed others in indexing cognitive load variation. This study demonstrates a complex relationship between cognitive dynamics and neural dynamics, which points to a necessity to integrate multifaceted neural dynamic features when studying mind-brain relationship in the future. Analysis of EEG data from 152 participants performing stimulus-free tasks with different demands suggests that manipulation of cognitive load by changing the task demand alters wide-ranging neural dynamic features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Input processing in the brain is mediated by phase synchronization and intrinsic neural timescales, both of which have been implicated in schizophrenia. Their relationship remains unclear, though. Recruiting a schizophrenia EEG sample from the B-SNIP consortium dataset (n = 134, 70 schizophrenia patients, 64 controls), we investigate phase synchronization, as measured by intertrial phase coherence (ITPC), and intrinsic neural timescales, as measured by the autocorrelation window (ACW) during both the rest and oddball-task states. The main goal of our paper was to investigate whether reported shifts from shorter to longer timescales are related to decreased ITPC. Our findings show (i) decreases in both theta and alpha ITPC in response to both standard and deviant tones; and (iii) a negative correlation of ITPC and ACW in healthy subjects while such correlation is no longer present in SCZ participants. Together, we demonstrate evidence of abnormally long intrinsic neural timescales (ACW) in resting-state EEG of schizophrenia as well as their dissociation from phase synchronization (ITPC). Our data suggest that, during input processing, the resting state's abnormally long intrinsic neural timescales tilt the balance of temporal segregation and integration towards the latter. That results in temporal imprecision with decreased phase synchronization in response to inputs. Our findings provide further evidence for a basic temporal disturbance in schizophrenia on the different timescales (longer ACW and shorter ITPC), which, in the future, might be able to explain common symptoms related to the temporal experience in schizophrenia, for example temporal fragmentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can we characterize psychopathological symptoms and connect them to the brain? Current psychopathological symptoms only focus on either the symptoms themselves or predominantly on the brain. This leaves open their intimate connection. A novel approach, Spatiotemporal Psychopathology, proposes that the brain inner spatiotemporal organisation of its neural activity provides the spatiotemporal organization of the psychopathological symptoms. Specifically, the brains' neuronal topography and dynamic is manifest in a more or less analogous spatiotemporal organisation on the mental level, i.e., mental topography and dynamic. This is strongly supported by various examples including major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and autism. We therefore conclude that Spatiotemporal Psychopathology provides a promising approach to intimately connect brain and symptoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existential crisis of nihilism in schizophrenia has been reported since the early days of psychiatry. Taking first-person accounts concerning nihilistic experiences of both the self and the world as vantage point, we aim to develop a dynamic existential model of the pathological development of existential nihilism. Since the phenomenology of such a crisis is intrinsically subjective, we especially take the immediate and pre-reflective first-person perspective's (FPP) experience (instead of objectified symptoms and diagnoses) of schizophrenia into consideration. The hereby developed existential model consists of 3 conceptualized stages that are nested into each other, which defines what we mean by existential. At the same time, the model intrinsically converges with the phenomenological concept of the self-world structure notable inside our existential framework. Regarding the 3 individual stages, we suggest that the onset or first stage of nihilistic pathogenesis is reflected by phenomenological solipsism, that is, a general disruption of the FPP experience. Paradigmatically, this initial disruption contains the well-known crisis of common sense in schizophrenia. The following second stage of epistemological solipsism negatively affects all possible perspectives of experience, that is, the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of subjectivity. Therefore, within the second stage, solipsism expands from a disruption of immediate and pre-reflective experience (first stage) to a disruption of reflective experience and principal knowledge (second stage), as mirrored in abnormal epistemological limitations of principal knowledge. Finally, the experience of the annihilation of healthy self-consciousness into the ultimate collapse of the individual's existence defines the third stage. The schizophrenic individual consequently loses her/his vital experience since the intentional structure of consciousness including any sense of reality breaks down. Such a descriptive-interpretative existential model of nihilism in schizophrenia may ultimately serve as input for future psychopathological investigations of nihilism in general, including, for instance, its manifestation in depression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Convergence of neuroscientific theories of consciousness. • Inclusion of stimulus-induced, prestimulus, and spontaneous activity. • Measures and mechanism of different theories. • Temporo-spatial dynamics and nesteness as unifying framework. Various theories for the neural basis of consciousness have been proposed, suggesting a diversity of neural signs and mechanisms. We ask to what extent this diversity is real, or whether many theories share the same basic ideas with a potential for convergence towards a more unified theory of the neural basis of consciousness. For that purpose, we review and compare the various neural signs, measures, and mechanisms proposed in the different theories. We demonstrate that different theories focus on neural signs and measures of distinct aspects of neural activity including stimulus-related, prestimulus, and resting state activity as well as on distinct features of consciousness. Therefore, the various mechanisms proposed in the different theories may, in part, complement each other. Together, we provide insight into the shared basis and convergences (and, in part, discrepancies) of the different theories of consciousness. We conclude that the different theories concern distinct aspects of both neural activity and consciousness which, as we suppose, may be integrated and nested within the brain's overall temporo-spatial dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Context-dependence of neuronal activity. • Divisive normalization can account for context-dependence. • Context-dependence is mediated by canonical microcircuits. • Canonical microcircuits include inhibition and excitation. • Inhibition and excitation are abnormal in psychiatric disorders like schizophrenia and depression. Neural activity on cellular, regional, and behavioral levels shows context-dependence. Here we suggest the processing of input-output relationships in terms divisive normalization (DN), including (i) summing/averaging inputs and (ii) normalizing output against input stages, as a computational mechanism to underlie context-dependence. Input summation and output normalization are mediated by input-output relationships in canonical microcircuits (CM). DN/CM are altered in psychiatric disorders like schizophrenia or depression whose various symptoms can be characterized by abnormal context-dependence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we investigate levels of time in the Zhuangzi, through a conceptual framework rooted in Leibniz' philosophy of time. We begin by drawing three different levels of time in Leibniz: cognition-based, experience-based, and world-based. We then show that not only can parallel levels of time be identified in the Zhuangzi, but also a distinctively new, that is, fourth level of time can be distinguished, which pertains to bodily skill. We finally discuss the significance of this study in a contemporary context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Shows the relationships between measures of neural activity and mental features. • Neuro-mental relationships are characterized by an inverted-U shaped curve. • Intermediate or average values seen in healthy states with optimal mental function. • Extreme values indicate poor function of the same mental feature across disorders. • Sub-optimal mental function and at-risk state between average and extreme values. Traditionally, studies emphasize differences in neural measures between pathological and healthy groups, assuming a binary distinction between the groups, and a linear relationship between neural measures and symptoms. Here, we present four examples that show a continuous relation across the divide of normal and pathological states between neural measures and mental functions. This relation can be characterized by a non-linear inverted-U shaped curve. Along this curve, mid-range or average expression of a neural measure is associated with optimal function of a mental feature (in healthy states), whereas extreme expression, either high or low, is associated with sub-optimal function, and occurs in different neural disorders. Neural expression between the optimal or intermediate and pathological or extreme values is associated with sub-optimal function and at-risk mental states. Thus, this model of neuro-mental relationship can be summarized as "average is good, extremes are bad". By focussing on neuro-mental relationships, this model can facilitate the transition of psychiatry from a categorical to a dimensional and individualized approach needed in the era of precision medicine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dreams are one of the most bizarre and least understood states of consciousness. Bridging the gap between brain and phenomenology of (un)conscious experience, we propose the Topographic-dynamic Re-organization model of Dreams (TRoD). Topographically, dreams are characterized by a shift towards increased activity and connectivity in the default-mode network (DMN) while they are reduced in the central executive network, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (except in lucid dreaming). This topographic re-organization is accompanied by dynamic changes; a shift towards slower frequencies and longer timescales. This puts dreams dynamically in an intermediate position between awake state and NREM 2/SWS sleep. TRoD proposes that the shift towards DMN and slower frequencies leads to an abnormal spatiotemporal framing of input processing including both internally- and externally-generated inputs (from body and environment). In dreams, a shift away from temporal segregation to temporal integration of inputs results in the often bizarre and highly self-centric mental contents as well as hallucinatory-like states. We conclude that topography and temporal dynamics are core features of the TroD, which may provide the connection of neural and mental activity, e.g., brain and experience during dreams as their "common currency". • Topographic-dynamic Re-organization model of Dreams (TRoD) bridge the gap between brain and experience. • The neuro-phenomenology of dreams is characterized by topographic and dynamic changes. • In dreams topographic changes are related to a shift towards DMN and Visual cortex at the expense of CEN. • In dreams dynamic changes shift towards slower frequencies with longer timescales. • TRoD constitutes an altered spatiotemporal structure of consciousness corresponding to bizarreness of dreams. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neuroimaging provided much insight into the neural activity of the brain and its alterations in psychiatric disorders. However, despite extensive research, the exact neuronal mechanisms leading to the various psychopathological symptoms remain unclear, yet. In addition to task-evoked activity during affective, cognitive, or other challenges, the brain's spontaneous or resting state activity has come increasingly into the focus. Basically all psychiatric disorders show abnormal resting state activity with the relation to psychopathological symptoms remaining unclear though. I here suggest to conceive the brain's spontaneous activity in spatiotemporal terms that is, by various mechanisms that are based on its spatial, i.e., functional connectivity, and temporal, i.e., fluctuations in different frequencies, features. I here point out two such spatiotemporal mechanisms, i.e., “spatiotemporal binding and integration”. Alterations in the resting state's spatial and temporal features lead to abnormal “spatiotemporal binding and integration” which results in abnormal contents in cognition as in the various psychopathological symptoms. This, together with concrete empirical evidence, is demonstrated in depression and schizophrenia. I therefore conclude that we need to develop a spatiotemporal approach to psychopathology, “spatiotemporal psychopathology:” as I call it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study represents a systematic review of the insights provided by resting state functional MRI (rs-fMRI) use in the glioma population. Following PRISMA guidelines, 45 studies were included in the review and were classified in glioma-related neuronal changes (n = 28) and eloquent area localization (n = 17). Despite the heterogeneous nature of the studies, there is considerable evidence of diffuse functional reorganization occurring in the setting of gliomas with local and interhemispheric functional connectivity alterations involving different functional networks. The studies showed evidence of decreased long distance functional connectivity and increased global local efficiency occurring in the setting of gliomas. The tumour grade seems to correlate with distinct functional connectivity changes. Overall, there is a potential clinical utility of rs-fMRI for identifying the functional brain network disruptions occurring in the setting of gliomas. Further studies utilizing standardized analytical methods are required to elucidate the mechanism through which gliomas induce global changes in brain connectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consciousness research has much focused on faster frequencies like alpha or gamma while neglecting the slower ones in the infraslow (0.001–0.1 Hz) and slow (0.1–1 Hz) frequency range. These slower frequency ranges have a “bad reputation” though; their increase in power can observed during the loss of consciousness as in sleep, anesthesia, and vegetative state. However, at the same time, slower frequencies have been conceived instrumental for consciousness. The present paper aims to resolve this paradox which I describe as “paradox of slow frequencies”. I first show various data that suggest a central role of slower frequencies in integrating faster ones, i.e., “temporo-spatial integration and nestedness”. Such “temporo-spatial integration and nestedness” is disrupted during the loss of consciousness as in anesthesia and sleep leading to “temporo-spatial fragmentation and isolation” between slow and fast frequencies. Slow frequencies are supposedly mediated by neural activity in upper cortical layers in higher-order associative regions as distinguished from lower cortical layers that are related to faster frequencies. Taken together, slower and faster frequencies take on different roles for the level/state of consciousness. Faster frequencies by themselves are sufficient and thus a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) while slower frequencies are a necessary non-sufficient condition of possible consciousness, e.g., a neural predisposition of the level/state of consciousness (NPC). This resolves the “paradox of slow frequencies” in that it assigns different roles to slower and faster frequencies in consciousness, i.e., NCC and NPC. Taken as NCC and NPC, fast and slow frequencies including their relation as in “temporo-spatial integration and nestedness” can be considered a first “building bloc” of a future “temporo-spatial theory of consciousness” (TTC) (Northoff, 2013; Northoff, 2014b; Northoff & Huang, 2017). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Time and space are the basic building blocks of nature. As a unique existent in nature, our brain exists in time and takes up space. The brain’s activity itself also constitutes and spreads in its own (intrinsic) time and space that is crucial for consciousness. Consciousness is a complex phenomenon including different dimensions: level/state, content/form, phenomenal aspects, and cognitive features. We propose a Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) focusing primarily on the temporal and spatial features of the brain activity. We postulate four different neuronal mechanisms accounting for the different dimensions of consciousness: (i) “temporo-spatial nestedness” of the spontaneous activity accounts for the level/state of consciousness as neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC); (ii) “temporo-spatial alignment” of the pre-stimulus activity accounts for the content/form of consciousness as neural prerequisite of consciousness (preNCC); (iii) “temporo-spatial expansion” of early stimulus-induced activity accounts for phenomenal consciousness as neural correlates of consciousness (NCC); (iv) “temporo-spatial globalization” of late stimulus-induced activity accounts for the cognitive features of consciousness as neural consequence of consciousness (NCCcon). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the interaction between cortical midline structures (CMS)' neuronal mechanism and their psychological outputs. Topics discussed include personal identity in the form of temporal stability and self-continuity; temporal features of CMS neuronal activity such as transformation into self-continuity; and use of spatiotemporal memory than cognitive memory in self-continuity and identity.

Schizophrenia is a complex neuropsychiatric disorder with a variety of symptoms that include sensorimotor, affective, cognitive, and social changes. The exact neuronal mechanisms underlying these symptoms remain unclear though. Neuroimaging has focused mainly on the brain’s extrinsic activity, specifically task-evoked or stimulus-induced activity, as related to the sensorimotor, affective, cognitive, and social functions. Recently, the focus has shifted to the brain’s spontaneous activity, otherwise known as its resting state activity. While various spatial and temporal abnormalities have been observed in spontaneous activity in schizophrenia, their meaning and significance for the different psychopathological symptoms in schizophrenia, are yet to be defined. The first aim in this paper is to provide an overview of recent findings concerning changes in the spatial (e.g., functional connectivity) and temporal (e.g., couplings between different frequency fluctuations) properties of spontaneous activity in schizophrenia. The second aim is to link these spatiotemporal changes to the various psychopathological symptoms of schizophrenia, with a specific focus on basic symptoms, formal thought disorder, and ego-disturbances. Based on the various findings described, we postulate that the spatiotemporal changes on the neuronal level of the brain’s spontaneous activity transform into corresponding spatiotemporal changes on the psychological level which, in turn, leads to the different kinds of psychopathological symptoms. We consequently suggest a spatiotemporal rather than cognitive or sensory approach to the condition, amounting to what we describe as “Spatiotemporal Psychopathology”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Different aspects of the self have been reported to be affected in many neurological or psychiatric diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease (AD), including mainly higher-level cognitive self-unawareness. This higher sense of self-awareness is most likely related to and dependent on episodic memory, due to the proper integration of ourselves in time, with a permanent conservation of ourselves ( i.e ., sense of continuity across time). Reviewing studies in this field, our objective is thus to raise possible explanations, especially with the help of neuroimaging studies, for where such self-awareness deficits originate in AD patients. We describe not only episodic (and autobiographical memory) impairment in patients, but also the important role of cortical midline structures, the Default Mode Network, and the resting state (intrinsic brain activity) for the processing of self-related information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How global and local activity interact with each other is a common question in complex systems like climate and economy. Analogously, the brain too displays ‘global’ activity that interacts with local-regional activity and modulates behavior. The brain’s global activity, investigated as global signal in fMRI, so far, has mainly been conceived as non-neuronal noise. We here review the findings from healthy and clinical populations to demonstrate the neural basis and functions of global signal to brain and behavior. We show that global signal (i) is closely coupled with physiological signals and modulates the arousal level; and (ii) organizes an elaborated dynamic topography and coordinates the different forms of cognition. We also postulate a Dual-Layer Model including both background and surface layers. Together, the latest evidence strongly suggests the need to go beyond the view of global signal as noise by embracing a dual-layer model with background and surface layer.Zhang and Northoff revisit the findings of global signal in fMRI from healthy and clinical populations and suggest that a dual-layer model of global signal, which takes into account both background and surface layer, may be more accurate than a single-layer view [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

William James postulated a “stream of consciousness” that presupposes temporal continuity. The neuronal mechanisms underlying the construction of such temporal continuity remain unclear, however, in my contribution, I propose a neuro-phenomenal hypothesis that is based on slow cortical potentials and their extension of the present moment as described in the phenomenal term of “width of present”. More specifically, I focus on the way the brain's neural activity needs to be encoded in order to make possible the “stream of consciousness.” This leads us again to the low-frequency fluctuations of the brain's neural activity and more specifically to slow cortical potentials (SCPs). Due to their long phase duration as low-frequency fluctuations, SCPs can integrate different stimuli and their associated neural activity from different regions in one converging region. Such integration may be central for consciousness to occur, as it was recently postulated by He and Raichle. They leave open, however, the question of the exact neuronal mechanisms, like the encoding strategy, that make possible the association of the otherwise purely neuronal SCP with consciousness and its phenomenal features. I hypothesize that SCPs allow for linking and connecting different discrete points in physical time by encoding their statistically based temporal differences rather than the single discrete time points by themselves. This presupposes difference-based coding rather than stimulus-based coding. The encoding of such statistically based temporal differences makes it possible to “go beyond” the merely physical features of the stimuli; that is, their single discrete time points and their conduction delays (as related to their neural processing in the brain). This, in turn, makes possible the constitution of “local temporal continuity” of neural activity in one particular region. The concept of “local temporal continuity” signifies the linkage and integration of different discrete time points into one neural activity in a particular region. How does such local temporal continuity predispose the experience of time in consciousness? For that, I turn to phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl and his description of what he calls “inner time consciousness” (Husserl and Brough, 1990). One hallmark of humans' “inner time consciousness” is that we experience events and objects in succession and duration in our consciousness; according to Husserl, this amounts to what he calls the “width of [the] present.” The concept of the width of present describes the extension of the present beyond the single discrete time point, such as, for instance, when we perceive different tones as a melody. I now hypothesize the degree of the width of present to be directly dependent upon and thus predisposed by the degree of the temporal differences between two (or more) discrete time points as they are encoded into neural activity. I therefore conclude that the SCPs and their encoding of neural activity in terms of temporal differences must be regarded a neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC) as distinguished from a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psychopathology as the investigation and classification of experience, behavior and symptoms in psychiatric patients is an old discipline that ranges back to the end of the 19th century. Since then different approaches to psychopathology have been suggested. Recent investigations showing abnormalities in the brain on different levels raise the question how the gap between brain and psyche, between neural abnormalities and alteration in experience and behavior can be bridged. Historical approaches like descriptive (Jaspers) and structural (Minkoswki) psychopathology as well as the more current phenomenological psychopathology (Paarnas, Fuchs, Sass, Stanghellini) remain on the side of the psyche giving detailed description of the phenomenal level of experience while leaving open the link to the brain. In contrast, the recently introduced Research Domain Classification (RDoC) aims at explicitly linking brain and psyche by starting from so-called 'neuro-behavioral constructs'. How does Spatiotemporal Psychopathology, as demonstrated in the first paper on depression, stand in relation to these approaches? In a nutshell, Spatiotemporal Psychopathology aims to bridge the gap between brain and psyche. Specifically, as demonstrated in depression in the first paper, the focus is on the spatiotemporal features of the brain's intrinsic activity and how they are transformed into corresponding spatiotemporal features in experience on the phenomenal level and behavioral changes, which can well account for the symptoms in these patients. This second paper focuses on some of the theoretical background assumptions in Spatiotemporal Psychopathology by directly comparing it to descriptive, structural, and phenomenological psychopathology as well as to RDoC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite intense neurobiological investigation in psychiatric disorders like major depressive disorder (MDD), the basic disturbance that underlies the psychopathological symptoms of MDD remains, nevertheless, unclear. Neuroimaging has focused mainly on the brain's extrinsic activity, specifically task-evoked or stimulus-induced activity, as related to the various sensorimotor, affective, cognitive, and social functions. Recently, the focus has shifted to the brain's intrinsic activity, otherwise known as its resting state activity. While various abnormalities have been observed during this activity, their meaning and significance for depression, along with its various psychopathological symptoms, are yet to be defined. Based on findings in healthy brain resting state activity and its particular spatial and temporal structure - defined in a functional and physiological sense rather than anatomical and structural - I claim that the various depressive symptoms are spatiotemporal disturbances of the resting state activity and its spatiotemporal structure. This is supported by recent findings that link ruminations and increased self-focus in depression to abnormal spatial organization of resting state activity. Analogously, affective and cognitive symptoms like anhedonia, suicidal ideation, and thought disorder can be traced to an increased focus on the past, increased past-focus as basic temporal disturbance o the resting state. Based on these findings, I conclude that the various depressive symptoms must be conceived as spatiotemporal disturbances of the brain's resting state's activity and its spatiotemporal structure. Importantly, this entails a new form of psychopathology, "Spatiotemporal Psychopathology" that directly links the brain and psyche, therefore having major diagnostic and therapeutic implications for clinical practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the self? This is a question that has long been discussed in (Western) philosophy where the self is traditionally conceived a higher-order function at the apex or pinnacle of all functions. This tradition has been transferred to recent neuroscience where the self is often considered to be a higher-order cognitive function reflected in memory and other high-level judgements. However, other lines of research demonstrate a close and intimate relationship between self-specificity and more basic functions like perceptions, emotions and reward. This paper focuses on the relationship between self-specificity and other basic functions relating to emotions, reward and perception. I propose the basis model that conceives self-specificity as a fundamental feature of the brain's spontaneous activity. This is supported by recent findings showing rest-self overlap in midline regions as well as findings demonstrating that the resting state can predict subsequent degrees of self-specificity. I conclude that such self-specificity in the brain's spontaneous activity may be central in linking the self to either internal or external stimuli. This may also provide the basis for coding the self as subject in relation to internal (i.e., self-consciousness) or external (i.e., phenomenal consciousness) mental events. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

While several hypotheses about the neural mechanisms underlying auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH) have been suggested, the exact role of the recently highlighted intrinsic resting state activity of the brain remains unclear. Based on recent findings, we therefore developed what we call the 'resting state hypotheses' of AVH. Our hypothesis suggest that AVH may be traced back to abnormally elevated resting state activity in auditory cortex itself, abnormal modulation of the auditory cortex by anterior cortical midline regions as part of the default-mode network, and neural confusion between auditory cortical resting state changes and stimulus-induced activity. We discuss evidence in favour of our 'resting state hypothesis' and show its correspondence with phenomenal, i.e., subjective-experiential features as explored in phenomenological accounts. Therefore I speak of a 'neurophenomenal resting state hypothesis' of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

William James famously characterized consciousness by ‘stream of consciousness’ which describes the temporal continuity and flow of the contents of consciousness in our ‘inner time consciousness’. More specifically he distinguished between “substantive parts”, the contents of consciousness, and “transitive parts”, the linkages between different contents. While much research has recently focused on the substantive parts, the neural mechanisms underlying the transitive parts and their characterization by the balance between ‘sensible continuity’ and ‘continuous change’ remain unclear. The aim of this paper is to develop so-called neuro-phenomenal hypothesis about specifically the transitive parts and their two phenomenal hallmark features, sensible continuity and continuous change in ‘inner time consciousness’. Based on recent findings, I hypothesize that the cortical midline structures and their high degree of variability and strong low frequency fluctuations play an essential role in mediating the phenomenal balance between sensible continuity and continuous change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The self is central in our experience and has often been assumed to be necessary for any kind of consciousness in philosophy. Recent investigations in neuroscience demonstrate a particular set of regions such as the cortical midline regions to be associated with the processing of stimuli specifically related to the self as distinguished from those remaining unrelated to the self. Furthermore, findings show a close overlap between self-related activity and high levels of resting state activity in especially anterior midline regions. Interestingly, recent findings in psychiatric disorders such as depression and schizophrenia show resting state abnormalities in exactly these regions, that is in the cortical midline structures. Based on phenomenal and neural observations, I here suggest a neurophenomenal approach that directly links neuronal and phenomenal features (without sandwiching cognitive or sensorimotor functions) to psychopathological symptoms of self in depression and schizophrenia. © 2014 S. Karger AG, Basel [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self and emotion have been discussed separately in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience whereas their relationship has been rather neglected. We here suggest that they are intrinsically linked by demonstrating that self-relatedness accounts for the subjectivity of emotions, and emotional valence reflects affectivity of the self. Based on functional imaging studies, we discuss different possible spatio-temporal patterns of neural activity in anterior cortical mid-line structures (aCMS) that allow us to link and, at the same time, to distinguish self-relatedness and emotional valence. We conclude that the aCMS may be crucial in affectively colouring our self and associating our emotional feelings with the self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consciousness and its neural mechanisms remain a mystery. Current neuroscientific theories focus predominantly on the external input/stimulus and the associated stimulus-related activity during conscious contents. Despite all progress, we encounter two gaps: (i) a gap between spontaneous and stimulus-related activity; (ii) a gap between neuronal and phenomenal features. A novel, different, and unique approach, Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) aims to bridge both gaps. The TTC focuses on the brain's spontaneous activity and how its spatial topography and temporal dynamic shape stimulus-related activity and resurface in the corresponding spatial and temporal features of consciousness, i.e., 'common currency'. The TTC introduces four temporo-spatial mechanisms: expansion, globalization, alignment, and nestedness. These are associated with distinct dimensions of consciousness including phenomenal content, access, form/structure, and level/state, respectively. Following up on the first introduction of the TTC in 2017, we review updates, further develop these temporo-spatial mechanisms, and postulate specific neurophenomenal hypotheses. We conclude that the TTC offers a viable approach for (i) linking spontaneous and stimulus-related activity in conscious states; (ii) determining specific neuronal and neurophenomenal mechanisms for the distinct dimensions of consciousness; (iii) an integrative and unifying framework of different neuroscientific theories of consciousness; and (iv) offers novel empirically grounded conceptual assumptions about the biological and ontological nature of consciousness and its relation to the brain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Time is a key element of consciousness as it includes multiple timescales from shorter to longer ones. This is reflected in our experience of various short-term phenomenal contents at discrete points in time as part of an ongoing, more continuous, and long-term 'stream of consciousness'. Can Integrated Information Theory (IIT) account for this multitude of timescales of consciousness? According to the theory, the relevant spatiotemporal scale for consciousness is the one in which the system reaches the maximum cause-effect power; IIT currently predicts that experience occurs on the order of short timescales, namely, between 100 and 300 ms (theta and alpha frequency range). This can well account for the integration of single inputs into a particular phenomenal content. However, such short timescales leave open the temporal relation of specific phenomenal contents to others during the course of the ongoing time, that is, the stream of consciousness. For that purpose, we converge the IIT with the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC), which, assuming a multitude of different timescales, can take into view the temporal integration of specific phenomenal contents with other phenomenal contents over time. On the neuronal side, this is detailed by considering those neuronal mechanisms driving the non-additive interaction of pre-stimulus activity with the input resulting in stimulus-related activity. Due to their non-additive interaction, the single input is not only integrated with others in the short-term timescales of 100–300 ms (alpha and theta frequencies) (as predicted by IIT) but, at the same time, also virtually expanded in its temporal (and spatial) features; this is related to the longer timescales (delta and slower frequencies) that are carried over from pre-stimulus to stimulus-related activity. Such a non-additive pre-stimulus-input interaction amounts to temporo-spatial expansion as a key mechanism of TTC for the constitution of phenomenal contents including their embedding or nesting within the ongoing temporal dynamic, i.e., the stream of consciousness. In conclusion, we propose converging the short-term integration of inputs postulated in IIT (100–300 ms as in the alpha and theta frequency range) with the longer timescales (in delta and slower frequencies) of temporo-spatial expansion in TTC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aim: Time is a core aspect of psychopathology with potential for clinical use and early intervention. Temporal experience, perception, judgement and processing are distorted in various psychiatric disorders such as mood (depression and mania), anxiety, autistic, impulse‐control, dissociative and attention‐deficit/hyperactivity disorders. Can these disorders of time be used as early diagnostic or predictive markers? To answer this question, we develop a Transdiagnostic Taxonomy of (disordered) Time (TTT) that maps on to the symptomatological, phenomenal, perceptual and functional descriptions of each underlying disorder in a 2 × 2 × 2 state space. Temporal distortions may precede functional decline, and so assist efforts at early detection and intervention in at‐risk groups. Method: Firstly, this article integrates a psychological model of how time is processed with a subjective or phenomenological model of how time is experienced or perceived. Secondly, the integrated combined model of time is then used to heuristically map major psychiatric disorders on to the basic elements of temporal flow and integration. Results: The TTT systematically describes the basic temporal nature of eight diagnostic categories of psychiatric illness. It differentiates between diagnoses primarily associated with distorted "macro‐level" phenomenal temporal experiences (i.e. anxiety, dissociation/PTSD, depression, and mania) from those primarily related to distorted 'micro‐level' temporal processing (i.e. psychotic, impulse‐control, autistic and attention‐deficit/hyperactivity disorders). Conclusions: The TTT allows differential diagnostic classification of various psychiatric disorders in terms of a possible underlying time disorder, making it useful for future diagnostic and predictive purposes using novel techniques of temporal processing, time perception, passage of time, and time perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the psychopathology and pathophysiology of depression. It presents the case of an executive assistant who was hospitalized with a severe episode of depression when her boss, a chief executive officer of a major company, shouted at her due to the allegedly bad tasting coffee that she prepared. The work of A. Vanhaudenhuyse and colleagues on the condition is also cited.

We have experience and are conscious of the world. Who though is conscious? This is the subject or self of experience. While in the past the concept of self has been matter of philosophical discussion, psychoanalysis shifted it into the domain of psychology where it surfaced as ego. More recently, brain imaging allows to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying our subjective experience of a self. The article focuses on discussing different concepts of self as based on the philosophical accounts. These are then complemented by neuroscientific data on self and self-reference. Finally both philosophical and neuroscientific accounts are directly compared with each other while at the same time their relevance for psychoanalysis of self and ego are pointed out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empathy is a multicomponent function that includes sensorimotor, affective, and cognitive components. Although especially the affective component may implicate interoception and interoceptive awareness, the impact of interoception on empathy has never been evaluated behaviorally or neurophysiologically. Here, we tested how a preceding period of interoceptive awareness impacts and modulates neural activity during subsequent empathy. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and measured the sequential interaction between interoception and empathy using fMRI in 18 healthy subjects. We found that the preceding interoceptive awareness period significantly enhanced neural activity during empathy in bilateral anterior insula and various cortical midline regions. The enhancement of neural activity during empathy in both interoceptive and empathy networks by preceding interoceptive awareness suggests a close relationship between interoception and empathy; thereby, interoception seems to be implicated to yielding empathy. Hum Brain Mapp, 2013. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Current neuroscience applies a bi-dimensional model to consciousness. Content and level of consciousness have been distinguished from each other in their underlying neuronal mechanisms. This though leaves open the role of the brain''s intrinsic activity and its particular temporal and spatial structure in consciousness. I here review and investigate the spatial and temporal features of the brain''s intrinsic activity in detail and postulate what I describe as spatiotemporal structure that implies a virtual (e.g., statistically based) spatiotemporal continuity. Such spatiotemporal continuity is supposed to structure and organize the neural processing of the incoming extrinsic stimuli and their potential association with consciousness. I therefore conclude that the current bi-dimensional view of consciousness focusing only on content and level may need to be complemented by a third dimension, the form, e.g., spatiotemporal structure, as provided by the intrinsic activity. In short, I here opt for tri-rather than bi-dimensional view of consciousness. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Studies of intrinsic brain activity in the resting state have become increasingly common. A productive discussion of what analysis methods are appropriate, of the importance of physiologic correction and of the potential interpretations of results has been ongoing. However, less attention has been paid to factors other than physiologic noise that may confound resting-state experiments. These range from straightforward factors, such as ensuring that participants are all instructed in the same manner, to more obscure participant-related factors, such as body weight. We provide an overview of such potentially confounding factors, along with some suggested approaches for minimizing their impact. A particular theme that emerges from the overview is the range of systematic differences between types of study groups (e.g., between patients and controls) that may influence resting-state study results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cultural neuroscience (CN) is an interdisciplinary field that investigates the relationship between culture (e.g., value and belief systems and practices shared by groups) and human brain functions. In this review we describe the origin, aims, and methods of CN as well as its conceptual framework and major findings. We also clarify several misunderstandings of CN research. Finally, we discuss the implications of CN findings for understanding human brain function in sociocultural contexts and novel questions that future CN research should address. By doing so, we hope to provide a clear picture of the CN approach to the human brain and culture and to elucidate the intrinsically biosocial nature of the functional organization of the human brain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Depression, conceptualized as major depressive disorder (MDD), is a complex psychiatric disorder with multiple behavioral changes and alterations in various brain regions. Biochemically, serotonin and others substances like GABA, glutamate, norepinephrin, adrenaline/noradrenaline play an essential role in the pathogenesis of MDD. The paper reviews recent human neuroimaging findings on how the genes underlying these biochemical substances modulate neural activity, behavior, and ultimately clinical symptoms. Current data provide solid evidence that genes related to serotonin impact emotion-related neural activity in the amygdala and the anterior cingulate cortex. By contrast, evidence is not as strong for genes related to biochemical substances other than serotonin and other regions of the brain. The review concludes with discussing future genetic, neural, and clinical challenges that point out the central role of gene×environment and brain×environment interactions as genetic and neural predispositions of depression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The early philosopher Immanuel Kant suggested that the mind''s intrinsic features are intimately linked to the extrinsic stimuli of the environment it processes. Currently, the field faces an analogous problem with regard to the brain. Kant''s ideas may provide novel insights into how the brain''s intrinsic features must be so that they can be linked to the neural processing of extrinsic stimuli to enable the latter''s association with consciousness and self. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Background: Identification of potentially harmful stimuli is necessary for the well-being and self-preservation of all organisms. However, the neural substrates involved in the processing of aversive stimuli are not well understood. For instance, painful and non-painful aversive stimuli are largely thought to activate different neural networks. However, it is presently unclear whether there is a common aversion-related network of brain regions responsible for the basic processing of aversive stimuli. To help clarify this issue, this report used a cross-species translational approach in humans (i.e. meta-analysis) and rodents (i.e. systematic review of functional neuroanatomy). Results: Animal and human data combined to show a core aversion-related network, consisting of similar cortical (i.e. MCC, PCC, AI, DMPFC, RTG, SMA, VLOFC; see results section or abbreviation section for full names) and subcortical (i.e. Amyg, BNST, DS, Hab, Hipp/Parahipp, Hyp, NAc, NTS, PAG, PBN, raphe, septal nuclei, Thal, LC, midbrain) regions. In addition, a number of regions appeared to be more involved in pain-related (e.g. sensory cortex) or non-pain-related (e.g. amygdala) aversive processing. Conclusions: This investigation suggests that aversive processing, at the most basic level, relies on similar neural substrates, and that differential responses may be due, in part, to the recruitment of additional structures as well as the spatio-temporal dynamic activity of the network. This network perspective may provide a clearer understanding of why components of this circuit appear dysfunctional in some psychiatric and pain-related disorders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Major depressive disorder (MDD) has traditionally been characterized by various psychological symptoms, involvement of diverse functional systems (e.g., somatic, affect, cognition, reward, etc.), and with progress in neuroscience, an increasing number of brain regions. This has led to the general assumption that MDD is a stress–responsive brain ‘system disorder’ where either one or several alterations infiltrate a large number of functional systems in the brain that control the organism''s somatic, affective, and cognitive life. However, while the effects or consequences of the abnormal changes in the functional systems of, for instance affect, cognition or reward have been investigated extensively, the underlying core mechanism(s) underlying MDD remain unknown. Hypotheses are proliferating rapidly, though. Based on recent findings, we will entertain an abnormality in the resting-state activity in MDD to be a core feature. Based on both animal and human data, we hypothesize that abnormal resting-state activity levels may impact stimulus-induced neural activity in medially situated core systems for self-representation as well as external stimulus (especially stress, specifically separation distress) interactions. Moreover, due to nested hierarchy between subcortical and cortical regions, we assume ‘highjacking’ of higher cortical affective and cognitive functions by lower subcortical primary-process emotional systems. This may account for the predominance of negative affect in somatic and cognitive functional system operations with the consecutive generation of the diverse symptoms in MDD. We will here focus on the neuroanatomical and biochemical basis of resting-state abnormalities in MDD including their linkage to the diverse psychopathological symptoms in depression. However, our ‘resting-state hypothesis’ may go well beyond that by being sufficiently precise to be linked to genetic, social, immunological, and endocrine dimensions and hypotheses as well as to clinical dimensions like endophenotypes and various diagnostic-prognostic biomarkers. Taken together, our ‘resting-state hypothesis’ may be considered a first tentative framework for MDD that integrates translational data, the various dimensions, and subcortical–cortical systems while at the same time providing the link to the clinical level of symptoms, endophenotypes and biomarkers. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The problem of the self has been of increasing interest in recent neuroscience. Brain imaging studies have raised the question of whether neural activity in cortical midline regions is self-specific and whether self-specific activity is related to resting state activity (RSA). A quantitative meta-analysis that included 87 studies, representing 1433 participants, was conducted to discuss these questions. First, the specificity of the self (e.g. hearing one''s own name, seeing one''s own face) was tested and compared across familiar (using stimuli from personally known people) and other (non-self–non-familiar, i.e. strangers and widely-known figures) conditions. Second, the relationship between the self and resting state activity, as reflected by the default-mode network (DMN), was tested. The results indicated that the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (PACC) is specifically involved in self-processing when compared to familiarity, other, and task/stimulus effects. On the contrary, other midline regions, i.e., medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) were functionally unspecific as they were recruited during the processing of both self-specific and familiar stimuli. Finally, the PACC was recruited during self-specific stimuli and this activity overlapped with DMN activity during resting state, thus distinguishing the self-related processing from both that of the familiar and other conditions. Taken together, our data suggest that our sense of self may result from a specific kind of interaction between resting state activity and stimulus-induced activity, i.e., rest–stimulus interaction, within the midline regions. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Neuroscience has increasingly explored the neural mechanisms underlying our sense of self. Recent studies have demonstrated the recruitment of regions like the ventral tegmental area, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and the ventral striatum to self-specific stimuli—regions typically associated with reward-related processing. This raises the question of whether there is a relationship between self and reward and, if so, how these different fields can be linked. Three relationship models that aim to explore the relationship between self and reward are discussed here: integration, segregation, and parallel processing. Their pros and cons are reviewed in light of the most recent findings. The conclusion is that both the fields of self and reward may benefit from increased interaction. This interaction may help to fill in some of the missing pieces regarding reward-related processing, as well as illuminate how brain function can bring forward the philosophical concept and psychological reality of self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: While several hypotheses about the neural mechanisms underlying auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH) have been suggested, the exact role of the recently highlighted intrinsic resting state activity of the brain remains unclear. Based on recent findings, we therefore developed what we call the ‘resting state hypotheses’ of AVH. Our hypothesis suggest that AVH may be traced back to abnormally elevated resting state activity in auditory cortex itself, abnormal modulation of the auditory cortex by anterior cortical midline regions as part of the default-mode network, and neural confusion between auditory cortical resting state changes and stimulus-induced activity. We discuss evidence in favour of our ‘resting state hypothesis’ and show its correspondence with phenomenological accounts. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]