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Game theory provides an effective way to model strategic interactions among rational agents. In the context of formal verification, these ideas can be used to produce guarantees on the correctness of multi-agent systems, with a diverse range of applications from computer security to autonomous driving. Psychological games (PGs) were developed as a way to model and analyse agents with belief-dependent motivations, opening up the possibility to model how human emotions can influence behaviour. In PGs, players' utilities depend not only on what actually happens (which strategies players choose to adopt), but also on what the players had expected to happen (their belief as to the strategies that would be played). Despite receiving much attention in fields such as economics and psychology, very little consideration has been given to their applicability to problems in computer science, nor to practical algorithms and tool support. In this paper, we start to bridge that gap, proposing methods to solve PGs and implementing them within PRISM-games, a formal verification tool for stochastic games. We discuss how to model these games, highlight specific challenges for their analysis and illustrate the usefulness of our approach on several case studies, including human behaviour in traffic scenarios.

We consider a variant of continuous-state partially-observable stochastic games with neural perception mechanisms and an asymmetric information structure. One agent has partial information, with the observation function implemented as a neural network, while the other agent is assumed to have full knowledge of the state. We present, for the first time, an efficient online method to compute an $\varepsilon$-minimax strategy profile, which requires only one linear program to be solved for each agent at every stage, instead of a complex estimation of opponent counterfactual values. For the partially-informed agent, we propose a continual resolving approach which uses lower bounds, pre-computed offline with heuristic search value iteration (HSVI), instead of opponent counterfactual values. This inherits the soundness of continual resolving at the cost of pre-computing the bound. For the fully-informed agent, we propose an inferred-belief strategy, where the agent maintains an inferred belief about the belief of the partially-informed agent based on (offline) upper bounds from HSVI, guaranteeing $\varepsilon$-distance to the value of the game at the initial belief known to both agents., Comment: 12 pages, 2 figures

Stochastic games are a well established model for multi-agent sequential decision making under uncertainty. In practical applications, though, agents often have only partial observability of their environment. Furthermore, agents increasingly perceive their environment using data-driven approaches such as neural networks trained on continuous data. We propose the model of neuro-symbolic partially-observable stochastic games (NS-POSGs), a variant of continuous-space concurrent stochastic games that explicitly incorporates neural perception mechanisms. We focus on a one-sided setting with a partially-informed agent using discrete, data-driven observations and another, fully-informed agent. We present a new method, called one-sided NS-HSVI, for approximate solution of one-sided NS-POSGs, which exploits the piecewise constant structure of the model. Using neural network pre-image analysis to construct finite polyhedral representations and particle-based representations for beliefs, we implement our approach and illustrate its practical applicability to the analysis of pedestrian-vehicle and pursuit-evasion scenarios., Comment: 42 pages, 6 figures. Extended version of paper to be published in FM 2024

The increasing trend to integrate neural networks and conventional software components in safety-critical settings calls for methodologies for their formal modelling, verification and correct-by-construction policy synthesis. We introduce neuro-symbolic partially observable Markov decision processes (NS-POMDPs), a variant of continuous-state POMDPs with discrete observations and actions, in which the agent perceives a continuous-state environment using a neural {\revise perception mechanism} and makes decisions symbolically. The perception mechanism classifies inputs such as images and sensor values into symbolic percepts, which are used in decision making. We study the problem of optimising discounted cumulative rewards for NS-POMDPs. Working directly with the continuous state space, we exploit the underlying structure of the model and the neural perception mechanism to propose a novel piecewise linear and convex representation (P-PWLC) in terms of polyhedra covering the state space and value vectors, and extend Bellman backups to this representation. We prove the convexity and continuity of value functions and present two value iteration algorithms that ensure finite representability. The first is a classical (exact) value iteration algorithm extending the $\alpha$-functions of Porta {\em et al} (2006) to the P-PWLC representation for continuous-state spaces. The second is a point-based (approximate) method called NS-HSVI, which uses the P-PWLC representation and belief-value induced functions to approximate value functions from below and above for two types of beliefs, particle-based and region-based. Using a prototype implementation, we show the practical applicability of our approach on two case studies that employ (trained) ReLU neural networks as perception functions, by synthesising (approximately) optimal strategies., Comment: 65 pages, 14 figures

Stochastic games are a convenient formalism for modelling systems that comprise rational agents competing or collaborating within uncertain environments. Probabilistic model checking techniques for this class of models allow us to formally specify quantitative specifications of either collective or individual behaviour and then automatically synthesise strategies for the agents under which these specifications are guaranteed to be satisfied. Although good progress has been made on algorithms and tool support, efficiency and scalability remain a challenge. In this paper, we investigate a symbolic implementation based on multi-terminal binary decision diagrams. We describe how to build and verify turn-based stochastic games against either zero-sum or Nash equilibrium based temporal logic specifications. We collate a set of benchmarks for this class of games, and evaluate the performance of our approach, showing that it is superior in a number of cases and that strategies synthesised in a symbolic fashion can be considerably more compact.

Game-theoretic concepts have been extensively studied in economics to provide insight into competitive behaviour and strategic decision making. As computing systems increasingly involve concurrently acting autonomous agents, game-theoretic approaches are becoming widespread in computer science as a faithful modelling abstraction. These techniques can be used to reason about the competitive or collaborative behaviour of multiple rational agents with distinct goals or objectives. This paper provides an overview of recent advances in developing a modelling, verification and strategy synthesis framework for concurrent stochastic games implemented in the probabilistic model checker PRISM-games. This is based on a temporal logic that supports finite- and infinite-horizon temporal properties in both a zero-sum and nonzero-sum setting, the latter using Nash and correlated equilibria with respect to two optimality criteria, social welfare and social fairness. We summarise the key concepts, logics and algorithms and the currently available tool support. Future challenges and recent progress in adapting the framework and algorithmic solutions to continuous environments and neural networks are also outlined., Comment: 22 pages, 7 figures

Neuro-symbolic approaches to artificial intelligence, which combine neural networks with classical symbolic techniques, are growing in prominence, necessitating formal approaches to reason about their correctness. We propose a novel modelling formalism called neuro-symbolic concurrent stochastic games (NS-CSGs), which comprise two probabilistic finite-state agents interacting in a shared continuous-state environment. Each agent observes the environment using a neural perception mechanism, which converts inputs such as images into symbolic percepts, and makes decisions symbolically. We focus on the class of NS-CSGs with Borel state spaces and prove the existence and measurability of the value function for zero-sum discounted cumulative rewards under piecewise-constant restrictions on the components of this class of models. To compute values and synthesise strategies, we present, for the first time, practical value iteration (VI) and policy iteration (PI) algorithms to solve this new subclass of continuous-state CSGs. These require a finite decomposition of the environment induced by the neural perception mechanisms of the agents and rely on finite abstract representations of value functions and strategies closed under VI or PI. First, we introduce a Borel measurable piecewise-constant (B-PWC) representation of value functions, extend minimax backups to this representation and propose a value iteration algorithm called B-PWC VI. Second, we introduce two novel representations for the value functions and strategies, constant-piecewise-linear (CON-PWL) and constant-piecewise-constant (CON-PWC) respectively, and propose Minimax-action-free PI by extending a recent PI method based on alternating player choices for finite state spaces to Borel state spaces, which does not require normal-form games to be solved., Comment: 58 pages, 7 figures

Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application of game-theoretic methods is more recent. Tools such as PRISM-games support automated verification and synthesis of zero-sum and (epsilon-optimal subgame-perfect) social welfare Nash equilibria properties for concurrent stochastic games. However, these methods become inefficient as the number of agents grows and may also generate equilibria that yield significant variations in the outcomes for individual agents. Instead, we consider correlated equilibria, in which players can coordinate through public signals, and introduce an alternative optimality criterion of social fairness, which can be applied to both Nash and correlated equilibria. We show that correlated equilibria are easier to compute, are more equitable, and can also improve joint outcomes. We implement algorithms for both normal form games and the more complex case of multi-player concurrent stochastic games with temporal logic specifications.

Design and control of autonomous systems that operate in uncertain or adversarial environments can be facilitated by formal modelling and analysis. Probabilistic model checking is a technique to automatically verify, for a given temporal logic specification, that a system model satisfies the specification, as well as to synthesise an optimal strategy for its control. This method has recently been extended to multi-agent systems that exhibit competitive or cooperative behaviour modelled via stochastic games and synthesis of equilibria strategies. In this paper, we provide an overview of probabilistic model checking, focusing on models supported by the PRISM and PRISM-games model checkers. This includes fully observable and partially observable Markov decision processes, as well as turn-based and concurrent stochastic games, together with associated probabilistic temporal logics. We demonstrate the applicability of the framework through illustrative examples from autonomous systems. Finally, we highlight research challenges and suggest directions for future work in this area.

Automated verification techniques for stochastic games allow formal reasoning about systems that feature competitive or collaborative behaviour among rational agents in uncertain or probabilistic settings. Existing tools and techniques focus on turn-based games, where each state of the game is controlled by a single player, and on zero-sum properties, where two players or coalitions have directly opposing objectives. In this paper, we present automated verification techniques for concurrent stochastic games (CSGs), which provide a more natural model of concurrent decision making and interaction. We also consider (social welfare) Nash equilibria, to formally identify scenarios where two players or coalitions with distinct goals can collaborate to optimise their joint performance. We propose an extension of the temporal logic rPATL for specifying quantitative properties in this setting and present corresponding algorithms for verification and strategy synthesis for a variant of stopping games. For finite-horizon properties the computation is exact, while for infinite-horizon it is approximate using value iteration. For zero-sum properties it requires solving matrix games via linear programming, and for equilibria-based properties we find social welfare or social cost Nash equilibria of bimatrix games via the method of labelled polytopes through an SMT encoding. We implement this approach in PRISM-games, which required extending the tool's modelling language for CSGs, and apply it to case studies from domains including robotics, computer security and computer networks, explicitly demonstrating the benefits of both CSGs and equilibria-based properties.

Concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) are an ideal formalism for modelling probabilistic systems that feature multiple players or components with distinct objectives making concurrent, rational decisions. Examples include communication or security protocols and multi-robot navigation. Verification methods for CSGs exist but are limited to scenarios where agents or players are grouped into two coalitions, with those in the same coalition sharing an identical objective. In this paper, we propose multi-coalitional verification techniques for CSGs. We use subgame-perfect social welfare (or social cost) optimal Nash equilibria, which are strategies where there is no incentive for any coalition to unilaterally change its strategy in any game state, and where the total combined objectives are maximised (or minimised). We present an extension of the temporal logic rPATL (probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic with rewards) to specify equilibria-based properties for any number of distinct coalitions, and a corresponding model checking algorithm for a variant of stopping games. We implement our techniques in the PRISM-games tool and apply them to several case studies, including a secret sharing protocol and a public good game.

Quantitative verification techniques have been developed for the formal analysis of a variety of probabilistic models, such as Markov chains, Markov decision process and their variants. They can be used to produce guarantees on quantitative aspects of system behaviour, for example safety, reliability and performance, or to help synthesise controllers that ensure such guarantees are met. We propose the model of turn-based probabilistic timed multi-player games, which incorporates probabilistic choice, real-time clocks and nondeterministic behaviour across multiple players. Building on the digital clocks approach for the simpler model of probabilistic timed automata, we show how to compute the key measures that underlie quantitative verification, namely the probability and expected cumulative price to reach a target. We illustrate this on case studies from computer security and task scheduling.

Probabilistic model checking for stochastic games enables formal verification of systems that comprise competing or collaborating entities operating in a stochastic environment. Despite good progress in the area, existing approaches focus on zero-sum goals and cannot reason about scenarios where entities are endowed with different objectives. In this paper, we propose probabilistic model checking techniques for concurrent stochastic games based on Nash equilibria. We extend the temporal logic rPATL (probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic with rewards) to allow reasoning about players with distinct quantitative goals, which capture either the probability of an event occurring or a reward measure. We present algorithms to synthesise strategies that are subgame perfect social welfare optimal Nash equilibria, i.e., where there is no incentive for any players to unilaterally change their strategy in any state of the game, whilst the combined probabilities or rewards are maximised. We implement our techniques in the PRISM-games tool and apply them to several case studies, including network protocols and robot navigation, showing the benefits compared to existing approaches.

If autonomous vehicles are to be widely accepted, we need to ensure their safe operation. For this reason, verification and validation (V&V) approaches must be developed that are suitable for this domain. Model checking is a formal technique which allows us to exhaustively explore the paths of an abstract model of a system. Using a probabilistic model checker such as PRISM, we may determine properties such as the expected time for a mission, or the probability that a specific mission failure occurs. However, model checking of complex systems is difficult due to the loss of information during abstraction. This is especially so when considering systems such as autonomous vehicles which are subject to external influences. An alternative solution is the use of Monte Carlo simulation to explore the results of a continuous-time model of the system. The main disadvantage of this approach is that the approach is not exhaustive as not all executions of the system are analysed. We are therefore interested in developing a framework for formal verification of autonomous vehicles, using Monte Carlo simulation to inform and validate our symbolic models during the initial stages of development. In this paper, we present a continuous-time model of a quadrotor unmanned aircraft undertaking an autonomous mission. We employ this model in Monte Carlo simulation to obtain specific mission properties which will inform the symbolic models employed in formal verification.

Probabilistic timed automata are a suitable formalism to model systems with real-time, nondeterministic and probabilistic behaviour. We study two-player zero-sum games on such automata where the objective of the game is specified as the expected time to reach a target. The two players---called player Min and player Max---compete by proposing timed moves simultaneously and the move with a shorter delay is performed. The first player attempts to minimise the given objective while the second tries to maximise the objective. We observe that these games are not determined, and study decision problems related to computing the upper and lower values, showing that the problems are decidable and lie in the complexity class NEXPTIME $\cap$ co-NEXPTIME., Comment: Manuscript accepted to Theoretical Computer Science

Formal verification of agents representing robot behaviour is a growing area due to the demand that autonomous systems have to be proven safe. In this paper we present an abstract definition of autonomy which can be used to model autonomous scenarios and propose the use of small-scale simulation models representing abstract actions to infer quantitative data. To demonstrate the applicability of the approach we build and verify a model of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in an exemplary autonomous scenario, utilising this approach.

We propose automated techniques for the verification and control of probabilistic real-time systems that are only partially observable. To formally model such systems, we define an extension of probabilistic timed automata in which local states are partially visible to an observer or controller. We give a probabilistic temporal logic that can express a range of quantitative properties of these models, relating to the probability of an event's occurrence or the expected value of a reward measure. We then propose techniques to either verify that such a property holds or to synthesise a controller for the model which makes it true. Our approach is based on an integer discretisation of the model's dense-time behaviour and a grid-based abstraction of the uncountable belief space induced by partial observability. The latter is necessarily approximate since the underlying problem is undecidable, however we show how both lower and upper bounds on numerical results can be generated. We illustrate the effectiveness of the approach by implementing it in the PRISM model checker and applying it to several case studies, from the domains of computer security and task scheduling.

This volume contains the proceedings of the Ninth Workshop on Quantitative Aspects of Programming Languages (QAPL 2011), held in Saarbrucken, Germany, April 1--3, 2011. QAPL 2011 is a satellite event of the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software (ETAPS 2011). The workshop theme is on quantitative aspects of computation. These aspects are related to the use of physical quantities (storage space, time, bandwidth, etc.) as well as mathematical quantities (e.g. probability and measures for reliability, security and trust), and play an important (sometimes essential) role in characterising the behavior and determining the properties of systems. Such quantities are central to the definition of both the model of systems (architecture, language design, semantics) and the methodologies and tools for the analysis and verification of the systems properties. The aim of this workshop is to discuss the explicit use of quantitative information such as time and probabilities either directly in the model or as a tool for the analysis of systems.

This volume contains the proceedings of the Eighth Workshop on Quantitative Aspects of Programming Languages (QAPL 2010), held in Paphos, Cyprus, on March 27-28, 2010. QAPL 2010 is a satellite event of the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software (ETAPS 2010). The workshop theme is on quantitative aspects of computation. These aspects are related to the use of physical quantities (storage space, time, bandwidth, etc.) as well as mathematical quantities (e.g. probability and measures for reliability, security and trust), and play an important (sometimes essential) role in characterising the behavior and determining the properties of systems. Such quantities are central to the definition of both the model of systems (architecture, language design, semantics) and the methodologies and tools for the analysis and verification of the systems properties. The aim of this workshop is to discuss the explicit use of quantitative information such as time and probabilities either directly in the model or as a tool for the analysis of systems.

Two-player zero-sum games are a well-established model for synthesising controllers that optimise some performance criterion. In such games one player represents the controller, while the other describes the (adversarial) environment, and controller synthesis corresponds to computing the optimal strategies of the controller for a given criterion. Asarin and Maler initiated the study of quantitative games on (non-probabilistic) timed automata by synthesising controllers which optimise the time to reach a final state. The correctness and termination of their approach was dependent on exploiting the properties of a special class of functions, called simple functions, that can be finitely represented. In this paper we consider quantitative games over probabilistic timed automata. Since the concept of simple functions is not sufficient to solve games in this setting, we generalise simple functions to so-called quasi-simple functions. Then, using this class of functions, we demonstrate that the problem of solving games with either expected reachability-time or expected discounted-time criteria on probabilistic timed automata are in NEXPTIME $\cap$ co-NEXPTIME.