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The Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) is facing 'omni-directional' threats, including a risk of war with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). South Korea is building up an appropriate level of military force to be able to counter threats from any direction across regions and operational domains. In addition, the ROK Armed Forces are eager to contribute to a mutually complementary and robust ROK-US alliance to strengthen deterrence and territorial defense. At the same time, South Korea aims to bolster its role on the international stage by increasing its contributions to overseas deployments and out-of-area operations. It actively supports global responses against threats to the international norms and order. In South Korea, the idea that the two goals of national- and international-oriented security are complementary enjoys very broad support.

Since the 2000s, Japan has worked to strengthen and sharpen its defense strategy and readiness to better deal with the increasingly challenging Indo-Pacific security environment. The developments to date have allowed the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to become a more effective and proactive force, but the threats posed by China, North Korea, and Russia have also increased dramatically in recent years, calling for new measures expected to be unveiled in Japan's new National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) in late 2022.

While the world's attention is focused on Russia’s war against Ukraine and the inten­sifying conflict between the US and China, the security situation on the Korean Pen­insula has continued to deteriorate. North Korea is steadily advancing the expansion of its military capabilities and recently undertook significant changes in its nuclear doctrine. At the same time, the rapidly changing geopolitical context makes a reso­lution of the North Korean nuclear conflict even less likely. North Korea’s unilateral change of the status quo on the Korean Peninsula poses a serious challenge to the international community, which has few options to counter this threat that is far too dangerous to ignore. (author's abstract)

As diplomatic initiatives have thus far failed to achieve the objective of a complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Demo­cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and given that a military solution is generally considered to be unfeasible, sanctions have become the central instrument of the international community in dealing with the threat from North Korea. While inherently linked to and built upon the respective resolutions of the UN Security Council, the EU's sanctions regime against North Korea succeeds the former in terms of quantity and quality, constituting the most comprehensive sanctions regime of the EU currently in operation. Since its inception in 2006, the EU's sanctions regime against the DPRK developed in several episodes, which are built upon different logics and objectives: coercion, constraining, signaling. The political explanation for the EU's decision to adopt autonomous sanc­tions results from a set of interrelated factors, most notably the general sup­port for sanctions as an adequate tool for EU member states to use against North Korea, the influence of powerful member states, namely Germany, France, and (before Brexit) the UK, pushing for the imposition of autonomous EU measures, the lack of diplomatic engagement and eco­nomic interest, as well as third party pressure. While sanctions will remain an important aspect of the EU’s North Korea strategy in the foreseeable future, it is in Brussels' interest to supplement its sanctions-based strategy with more proactive initiatives vis-à-vis North Korea, as the current approach has distinct negative strategic implications for the EU. (author's abstract)

Denna studie vill argumentera för statskapacitetens påverkan på politisk utveckling genom att jämföra Nord- och Sydkorea. På grund av supermakterna USA och Sovjetunionens krigföring splittrades Korea till nord- och syd. Länderna var till en början autokratier men med bland annat supermakternas bidrag lyckades Sydkorea utvecklas till en demokrati medan den nordkoreanska regimens makt bara stärktes. I den teoretiska bakgrunden används statskapacitet som grund för forskningsproblemet tillsammans med fördelningen av makt, därav framväxten av institutioner samt utvecklingen av civilsamhället. Studiens resultat visar på att uppbyggnad av civilsamhället och institutioner kom att prägla den makt staten kan utöva, statskapaciteten. I enlighet med detta visar den på att i detta fall kan utökad statskapacitet utmynna i negativ utveckling.

Während die Weltöffentlichkeit auf Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine und den sich verschärfenden Konflikt zwischen den USA und China blickt, hat sich die Sicher­heits­lage auf der koreanischen Halbinsel weiter verschlechtert. Nordkorea treibt den Ausbau seiner militärischen Fähigkeiten kontinuierlich voran und hat jüngst seine Nukleardoktrin signifikant modifiziert. Der sich rasch verändernde geopolitische Kontext macht zugleich eine Lösung des Atomkonflikts noch unwahrscheinlicher. Pjöngjang hat den Status quo auf der koreanischen Halbinsel unilateral verändert. Diese neue Realität anzuerkennen ist zwar politisch nicht unumstritten. Doch sind Fortschritte in der Nordkorea-Frage kaum vorstellbar, solange die internationale Gemeinschaft weiter von unbegründeten Erwartungen ausgeht und an dem illusorischen Ziel festhält, das Land zum Verzicht auf seine Atomwaffen zu überreden oder zu zwingen.

Am 9. März 2022 wählte Südkorea einen neuen Präsidenten. Nach einem äußerst aggressiv geführten, von Skandalen geprägten Wahlkampf und einem historisch knap­pen Wahlergebnis steht nun fest: Der ehemalige Generalstaatsanwalt Yoon Suk-yeol von der konservativen oppositionellen People Power Party (PPP) wird der nächste Präsident Südkoreas und Nachfolger von Amtsinhaber Moon Jae-in. Neben zahlreichen innenpolitischen sieht sich Yoon auch mit handfesten außenpolitischen Herausforderungen konfrontiert. Inwiefern der zukünftige südkoreanische Präsident seine poli­tischen Ziele umsetzen kann, hängt nicht zuletzt davon ab, ob es ihm gelingen wird, die tiefen parteipolitischen Gräben zu überbrücken, die notwendige gesellschaftliche Unterstützung zu erlangen und politische Durchsetzungsfähigkeit unter Beweis zu stellen. (Autorenreferat)

The aim of this work is to get a deeper understanding concerning the events following the end of the six party talks 2009, when North Korea decided to withdraw. By using analytical security perspectives, neorealism and neoliberalism a further understanding for the previous members from the six party talks approaches will be discussed in this qualitative case study. By going through books and articles concerning this series of events, a deepening understanding for the security policy in east Asia accurse, and the complexity of nuclear states. The study shows that Russia, China, South Korea, Japan and the US are in some ways eager to have further discussions concerning denuclearisation in North Korea. In this process of maximising their own state security, other states have shown a greater fear if a neorealist security approach is used.

Die Attribution von Cyberangriffen ist ein souveräner Akt der EU-Mit­gliedstaaten. Diese haben jedoch unterschiedliche technische und geheim­dienstliche Fähigkeiten. Das führt zu Inkohärenzen in der europäischen Cyberdiplomatie, etwa bei der Verhängung von Cybersanktionen. Die Analyse der politischen Reaktionen auf die Cybervorfälle WannaCry, Not‑Petya, Cloud Hopper, OVCW und Bundestag-Hack offenbart folgende Probleme: Die Attribution dauert lange und ist auf Erkenntnisse von Nato-Partnern angewiesen; die technischen Realitäten und die rechtlichen Tatbestandsmerkmale zur Klassifikation und Verfolgung von Cyber­angriffen passen nicht immer zusammen; die Gewichtung der Tatbestands­merkmale ist unklar. Cybersanktionen sollen gezielte Maßnahmen und vor allem in ihrer Intensität verhältnismäßig sein: Destruktive Angriffe wie WannaCry oder NotPetya sollten härtere Konsequenzen nach sich ziehen als alltägliche Fälle von Cyberspionage wie Cloud Hopper oder Bundestag-Hack. Hier muss die EU ihre Werkzeuge genauer konfigurieren. Die EU sollte die rechtlichen Tatbestandsmerkmale schärfen und Beweis­standards zur Attribution vereinheitlichen. Die Gemeinsame Cyber-Stelle der EU und EU INTCEN im Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst sollten ge­stärkt werden, um den Austausch forensischer Informationen zu verbessern und die Politik der Attribution effektiver koordinieren zu können. Die EU-Mitgliedstaaten und ihre alliierten Partner müssen Angreifer häu­figer gemeinsam verurteilen, damit die davon ausgehende politische Bot­schaft wirklich deutlich wird. Dazu wäre es sinnvoll, für den Erlass von Cybersanktionen qualifizierte Mehrheitsentscheidungen zuzulassen. (Autorenreferat)

The attribution of cyberattacks is a sovereign act by the EU Member States. However, these all have different technical and intelligence capabilities. This leads to a lack of coherence in European cyber diplomacy, for exam­ple when imposing cyber sanctions. Analysis of policy responses to the WannaCry, NotPetya, Cloud Hopper, OPCW, and Bundestag hack cyber incidents reveals the following problems: Attribution takes a long time and relies on intelligence from NATO partners; the technical realities and the legal facts for classifying and pros­ecuting cyberattacks do not always match; the weighting of the criteria for establishing what constitutes a crime is unclear. Cyber sanctions should be proportionate, targeted measures and destructive attacks, such as WannaCry or NotPetya, should result in harsher punishment than everyday cases of cyber espionage, such as Cloud Hopper or the Bundestag hack. The EU must adapt its tools accordingly. The EU should tighten the legal criteria and harmonise the standards of evidence for attribution. The EU Joint Cyber Unit and EU INTCEN, part of the European External Action Service, should be strengthened to improve the exchange of forensic information and to coordinate attribution policy more effectively. EU Member States and their allied partners should better coordinate political signalling to condemn cyberattacks. To this end, it would make sense to allow qualified majority voting for the adoption of cyber sanctions. (author's abstract)

Die Amtszeit des US-Präsidenten Donald Trump war geprägt von Brüchen mit etablierten Normen und Prinzipien. Im Nichtverbreitungsregime, einem zentralen außenpolitischen Politikbereich der USA zeigten sich tiefgreifende Abweichungen in der strategischen Ausrichtung von Vorgängeradministrationen. Gegenüber Iran wurde eine konfrontative Ausrichtung eingeschlagen und bestehende Abkommen beendet, während gegenüber Nordkorea erst militärische Maßnahmen angedroht wurden, dann aber gemeinsame Treffen und Verhandlungen folgten. Gleichzeitig kam es innerhalb des National Security Council, dem Hauptorgan in der US-amerikanischen Außenpolitik zu einer Vielzahl von personellen Umbesetzungen. Diese strategische Neuausrichtung ist durch liberale Systemtheorien nicht erklärbar. Diese Arbeit soll daher einen Beitrag dazu leisten, das Zustandekommen von Außenpolitik unter der Administration Trump besser zu verstehen. Dazu werden Operational Codes erhoben, um Wahrnehmungen und strategische Präferenzen der zentralen Akteure innerhalb des NSC gegenüberzustellen und Dynamiken von Entscheidungsprozessen sichtbar zu machen. Es wird angenommen, dass sich die Außenpolitik unter Trump nicht aus langfristigen geopolitischen Interessen ergibt, sondern im Kontext der Person Trump betrachtet werden muss. Des Weiteren wird angenommen, dass sich außenpolitische Maßnahmen der Administration Trump auf der Gruppenebene, aus dem Zusammenspiel individueller Weltbilder ergeben. Die Nichtverbreitungspolitik wird im Kern nach der Wahrnehmung des Präsidenten ausgerichtet. Ihm gelingt es, strategische Präferenzen gegen sein beratendes Umfeld durchzusetzen, abweichende Präferenzen werden durch die Umbesetzung von Ämtern unterbunden. Dies wird durch die spieltheoretischen Ansätze der Theory of Moves und der Theory of Inferences about Preferences nachgewiesen. Damit ergibt sich eine Gruppendynamik innerhalb des NSC, die um Einheitlichkeit bemüht ist, den Austausch von Handlungsalternativen beschneidet und damit, U.S. President Donald Trump's term in office was marked by breaks with established norms and principles. Concerning the nonproliferation regime, a central foreign policy area of the United States, profound deviations from the strategic orientations of previous administrations became apparent. The Trump administration adopted a confrontational orientation toward Iran by terminating existing agreements, at the same time military measures were first threatened toward North Korea, which was then followed by joint meetings and negotiations. At the same time, there were several personnel changes of key office holders within the National Security Council, the main decision-making body in U.S. foreign policy. This strategic realignment cannot be explained by liberal systems theories. Therefore, this paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the formation of foreign policy under the Trump administration. To this end, operational codes are collected to contrast perceptions and strategic preferences of key actors within the NSC in order to reveal dynamics of the underlying decision-making processes. It is assumed that foreign policy under Trump does not result from long-term geopolitical interests but must be viewed in the context of Trump as a person. Furthermore, it is assumed that foreign policy actions of the Trump administration arise on the group level, from the interplay of individual worldviews. At its core, nonproliferation policy is aligned with the president's perceptions. He succeeds in enforcing strategic preferences against his advisory environment, whilst divergent preferences are suppressed through the reshuffling of key office holders. This is demonstrated by the game-theoretic approaches of the Theory of Moves and the Theory of Inferences about Preferences. This results in a group dynamic within the NSC that strives for uniformity, curtails the exchange of alternative courses of action, and thus tends to lead to irrational decisions., Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung der Verfasserin/des Verfassers, Arbeit an der Bibliothek noch nicht eingelangt - Daten nicht geprüft, Innsbruck, Univ., Masterarb., 2021

On September 3rd 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test that spread fear around the world. North Korea has used its nuclear capabilities in an aggressive manner for thirty years and researchers disagree on what purposes are behind the state’s nuclear policy. This debate must be discussed more thoroughly to be able to handle North Korea and other small nuclear states in the future. This paper aims to further contribute to the understanding of North Korea’s nuclear policy by studying the North Korean actions from 1992 when nuclear suspicions rose to the Korean crisis 2017. By using a process tracing method with three theories about nuclear usage the study will give an increased insight regarding the debate. To get a wider perspective an interview was conducted with Hans Blix, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who has visited North Korea. The main analytical result was that North Korea’s nuclear policy showed a high level of congruence with all three of the theories but the intensity differed on different periods in time. This conclusion can contribute to further research on North Korea and other small nuclear states.

The United States' enemy image of North Korea has been on its political agenda since the Korean war. Weapons of mass destruction has, since the Cold War, shown the complexity it brings on conflictual interests and decision-makers persuading efforts. Enemy image, per se, brings difficulties in achieving cooperation, substantially when both parties contempt high levels of enmity. However, the newly established U.S.-DPRK relationship brings hope for cooperative possibilities regarding denuclearization on the Korean peninsula. The relationship between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-Un is not based on trust, instead, it is dependent on the concrete steps taken by the other. The enemy image of North Korea has been settled on the U.S. political agenda firmly because of the principles regarding denuclearization and security. The enemy image is also an important factor to consider when examining political agendas, since the changing dynamics are dependent on how state A interpret state B and vice versa. What has articulated the dynamics of the U.S. enemy image against North Korea? and how has its enemy image changed? To answer the question at issue, a theory consumption of Eriksson and Noreen’s explanatory model is necessary. Which consists of context-dependent external and informal factors that will contribute different but coherent hypotheses.

Südkorea und die USA haben gemeinsame Militärübungen im März aufgrund der Covid‑19-Pandemie abgesagt. Pjöngjang dagegen, das Infizierungen im eigenen Land abstreitet, führte zwischen Ende Februar und Mitte April 2020 fünf Tests ballistischer Raketen durch und hielt sieben Militärübungen ab. Das nordkoreanische Regime demonstriert damit erneut seine Fähigkeiten und seine Entschlossenheit, nukleare Trä­gersysteme weiterzuentwickeln. Sollen die jüngsten Waffentests mit Blick auf etwaige Verhandlungen Druck auf Washington ausüben oder will Pjöngjang damit seinen Sta­tus als nuklear bewaffnete Militärmacht vorführen? Im Herbst 2020 stehen für Donald Trump die Präsidentschaftswahlen an, für das Regime Kim Jong Uns die Feierlich­keiten zum 75. Jubiläum der Arbeiterpartei. Für beide wäre ein außenpolitischer Erfolg wichtig; die derzeitige Entwicklung, die von Raketentests und dem Fehlen von Verhandlungen gekennzeichnet ist, lässt jedoch wenig Raum für positive Szenarien. (Autorenreferat)

This article reexamines the track record of German unification after three decades. The focus is placed on economic issues, while cultural, social, and geopolitical dimensions are dealt with more briefly. Following the introduction, Section II briefly examines the history of Germany’s national division and the East German political events in late 1989 and early 1990 that produced the unification of the two Germanies on 3 October 1990. Sections III to V subsequently discuss the major political and economic events during the Kohl, Schröder, and Merkel Chancellorships, respectively. Section III focuses on the high political and social costs of the initial economic disruption in the East due to the near single-minded focus on the rapid privatization of the former GDR enterprises. In Section IV, the negative feedback of the economic shock is discussed, namely high unemployment, the fiscal crisis of the welfare state, and the demographic collapse in the East. Section V sketches how the Great Recession of 2007-2008, the subsequent Euro currency, and the southern EU states’ debt crises collectively crowded out the topic of intra-German reconciliation. The emerging overall picture advanced in Section VI is that a combination of muddling through, routinization (here also termed as “reconciliation by accident”), and policy failure most adequately describes the outcome of Germany’s unification experience. Finally, Section VII puts forward some policy suggestions for Korean audiences deriving from the German case. It is argued that the geopolitical situation of the two Koreas is fundamentally different. Thus, South Korea’s main focus must be placed on patient inter-Korean engagement, focusing on conflict prevention while also engaging with all relevant external stakeholders.

Trotz eines weiteren persönlichen Treffens zwischen Donald Trump und Kim Jong Un im Juni und einer neuerlichen Begegnung auf Arbeitsebene zwischen Vertreterinnen und Vertretern beider Länder im Oktober liegen die Positionen Pyongyangs und Washingtons im Hinblick auf eine Denuklearisierung Nordkoreas nach wie vor weit auseinander. Eine Verständigung über zentrale Fragen, zum Beispiel darüber, was Denuklearisierung genau bedeuten und wie der zukünftige Verhandlungs­prozess ablaufen soll, setzt jedoch voraus, dass es ausreichend Raum für flexible Diplomatie und auf allen Seiten den entsprechenden politischen Willen gibt. Auch Europa sollte aktiv auf eine Wiederaufnahme des Dialogs zwischen der internationalen Gemeinschaft und Nordkorea hinarbeiten. Denn die politischen Rahmenbedingungen in Pyongyang und Washington lassen erwarten, dass sich das gegenwärtige »window of opportunity« für eine Lösung der Nuklearfrage im kommenden Jahr wieder schließen und Nord­korea sein selbstauferlegtes Moratorium für Nuklear- und Interkontinental­raketentests wieder aufheben könnte. (Autorenreferat)

Representations have a significant part in our everyday lives as they shape our understanding of the world and are related to the construction of knowledge and the formation of social relations between different cultural groups. Previous studies have questioned the objectivity of news media and representations and argued that representations are not as objective as they often claim to be. Conscious and unconscious choices such as what is to be emphasized, included, excluded, choices of words, examples, metaphors, the journalist's background and more are examples of what makes the neutrality and objectivity of news reporting questionable. This argument is further strengthened by emphasizing that news production and its consumption is neither isolated nor independent and is influenced by different levels of power. The production of news is therefore a complex interaction between different stakeholders that influence what is interesting and newsworthy to be published because in the end, news is a product to be sold. This study examines the geographical representation of North Korea in the news media with a frame perspective. Framing has in this study been interpreted as a way of representing and is understood as a framework that frames a news subject and sets the tone on how the news subject can be interpreted and understood by the receiver. The empirical data, collected from two Swedish and two South Korean digital newspapers from two time periods, April 2017 and April 2018, were analyzed using a combination of a frame analysis and a content analysis. The conclusion of this study is that there are to some extent differences on how the news media in Sweden and South Korea choose to frame North Korea. During the two time periods, the Swedish news medias makes generally a more negative representation of North Korea compared to the South Korean news medias. But overall are the frames used by the news media in both countries reflected by the situation in North Korea and th

Den här uppsatsen ämnar undersöka hur sambandet ser ut mellan Nord- och Sydkoreas sportsliga samarbeten i och med vinter-OS 2018 i PyeongChang och den ökade diplomatiska kontakt som efter har uppstått mellan länderna. För att undersöka sambandet mellan sport och diplomati har en fallstudie utförts på de två koreanska staternas diplomatiska relation under vinter-OS 2018. Fallstudien har sedan jämförts med en operationalisering av Environmental Peacebuilding theory. Resultatet beskriver en till stor del liknande process med sport istället för miljö som diplomatiskt verktyg, men konstaterar också två felkällor. Dels har sport som politisk fråga en nationalistisk aspekt som inte miljöfrågan har och dels är koreakonflikten så laddad att inga förhandlingar förs utan att konflikten är närvarande. Detta konstateras som ett problem i och med att den använda teorin baseras på miljö som en konfliktfri fråga.

In this article, we introduce the HSR Forum on mind integration by exploring how the future integration process on the Korean Peninsula will come about, focusing on the East German regime’s transition process. We conceptualize “mind” as a concept that is made up of emotions, sentiments, the will and the senses thus the mind system is the foundation that makes up the dispositions and behaviors of people from both North and South Korea. This article argues for the importance of questioning the general stereotypes that frame integration such as the unification of political systems, as well as provides an alternative approach by thickening the discussion on the social/cultural integration. On this basis, we distinguish four contextual dimensions: first, to identify the intractable conflicts on the Korean Peninsula with incongruity of national and political identities; second, to analyze the attitudes of South Koreans toward inter-Korean integration; third, to understand the differences in perception between South Korean migrants in Germany and South Koreans; and finally, to investigate North Korean defectors’ view on the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK).

Based on qualitative fieldwork among first generation Korean immigrants in Berlin, this article sheds light on their lived experiences of German division and unification. Our research questions are threefold; first, how do these immigrants from the divided Korea perceive the division and unification of Germany? Second, did the fact that the division of Germany could be overcome affect their views on the division and unification of the Korean Peninsula? Third, are there any differences between Koreans in Germany and Koreans in Korea with respect to their views on unification? Our research suggests that different from South Korea, where the discourses in the media and the academia tend to assume sharply antagonistic attitudes, discourses among Koreans in Germany are generally much more supportive of unification. This is because they have a positive perception of German unification in everyday life and, furthermore, have constructed for themselves a future-oriented identity as a people of the Korean Peninsula that will eventually be unified. Korean immigrants in Germany are considerably more optimistic about the possibility of Korean unification than people in South Korea.

This study describes South Koreans’ general perceptions of the integration of North and South Korea through a survey of 500 adults living in South Korea. The following multiple-choice questions were asked: one’s general ideas about the integration of North and South Korea; the type of Korean reunification which is mostly supported/opposed; the type of Korean reunification which is most probable; and the pros and cons of reunification as well as necessary factors for reunification. Furthermore, we examined the differences in the perception of Korean reunification among the subgroup based on participants’ demographic information (i.e., gender, age, political orientation). The main results are as follows. First, the most representative thought on integration was “geographical integration of the Korean Peninsula,” followed by “establishment of economic partnerships or communities” and “restoration of common identity.” Meanwhile, there were differences among participants with regard to the detailed representation of Korean reunification. It suggests that when the attitudes toward integration of North and South Korea society are discussed, differences in the perception among people should be considered.

This study describes South Koreans' general perceptions of the integration of North and South Korea through a survey of 500 adults living in South Korea. The following multiple-choice questions were asked: one's general ideas about the integration of North and South Korea; the type of Korean reunification which is mostly supported/opposed; the type of Korean reunification which is most probable; and the pros and cons of reunification as well as necessary factors for reunification. Furthermore, we examined the differences in the perception of Korean reunification among the subgroup based on participants' demographic information (i.e., gender, age, political orientation). The main results are as follows. First, the most representative thought on integration was "geographical integration of the Korean Peninsula," followed by "establishment of economic partnerships or communities" and "restoration of common identity." Meanwhile, there were differences among participants with regard to the detailed representation of Korean reunification. It suggests that when the attitudes toward integration of North and South Korea society are discussed, differences in the perception among people should be considered.

The Korean War, having started on June 25, 1950, has never formally ended. As the two Koreas are technically still at war, the conflict on the Korean Peninsula has become intractable. The goal of this study is to explore the attitudes of South Koreans living in the intractable conflict about how to achieve peace. To fulfill this goal, we conducted a nation-wide survey to investigate attitudes toward militant and cooperative internationalism. We also measured various variables involved with the intractable conflict. Our results indicate that the value of international harmony and equality as well as attitudes toward peace are the best predictors of cooperative internationalism, while the value of international harmony and equality as well as the attitudes toward war were the strongest predictors of militant internationalism. Our results also suggest that the tendency to regard inter-Korean relations as zero-sum relations and the attitudes toward peace mediated the relationship between international harmony and cooperative internationalism, while the zero-sum perception and attitudes toward war on the Korean Peninsula mediated the same value factor and the cooperative internationalism. Possible implications are discussed.