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Der vorliegende Band basiert auf den Beiträgen der Wissenschaftler und Studierenden, die am IRISEN-II-Sommerkurs teilgenommen haben, und gibt einen Überblick über Inhalte und Diskussionen dieses Studienkurses. Konzepte und Methoden zur Beurteilung des globalen Wandels und seiner Folgen für Mensch und Natur in Nordeuropa standen im Mittelpunkt des von der Europäischen Union geförderten IRISEN-II-Studienkurses, der vom 21. Juli bis 3. August 2002 an der Forschungsstation Abisko in Nordschweden stattfand. Hauptanliegen des Kurses war es, die komplexen Beziehungen zwischen Umwelt und Gesellschaft bei regionalen Klimaveränderungen aufzuzeigen und die Bedeutung interdisziplinärer Forschung und einer Kooperation zwischen Wissenschaft und Entscheidungsträgern sowie gesellschaftlichen Interessengruppen hervorzuheben. Der Kurs bot 30 Doktoranden und Postdoktoranden natur- und gesellschaftswissenschaftlicher Disziplinen aus 12 Ländern die Gelegenheit, mit über 25 Experten verschiedener Nationalitäten und Fachwissenschaften aus Forschung und Praxis in Vorlesungen, Diskussionsforen und auf Exkursionen in einen interdisziplinären Dialog zu treten. The present volume is based on the lectures by the 26 scientists involved in IRISEN-II as well as the student presentations given in the frame of the discussion forums during the course.The Advanced Study Course IRISEN-II introduced 30 European graduate students from 12 countries to interdisciplinary research on global change. The course addressed the issue of regional climate change in the European North and its impacts on the one hand and the methodologies for regional climate modelling and integrated climate impact studies on the other. The course, which was carried out at Abisko Scientific research Station in subarctic Sweden from July 21 to August 3, 2002, was funded by the European Commission.

Der vorliegende Beitrag bringt zwei gesellschafts- und kulturtheoretische Diskurse aus verschiedenen Jahrzehnten, die eng mit der gesellschaftlichen Form der Netzwerke verbunden sind, zusammen und reflektiert sie in Bezug auf Bildung. Manuel Castells hat in den 1980er Jahren den Begriff der "Netzwerkgesellschaft" geprägt. Er schätzte in diesem Konzept Netzwerke als neue, dominierende Form der Gesellschaft ein. Zentrale gesellschaftliche Institutionen, Finanzmärkte, Firmen, Medien, Politik und Kultur sind in der Netzwerk-Logik miteinander verbunden. Macht sitzt an den Schnittstellen und wird damit schwer greifbar. Das zweite Konzept, "metamodernism" (2017) nach Robin van den Akker und Timotheus Vermeulen und "metamodernity" (2021) nach Jonathan Rowson und Laymen Pascal, ist ein jüngerer Diskurs, der mit der Frage: "Was kommt nach der Postmoderne?" nach neuen Interpretationsfolien für grundlegende globale Entwicklungstrends sucht. Auch hier wird neben der Digitalisierung die Netzwerkorganisation als essentielles Element der gesellschaftlichen Organisation und Dynamik gesehen. Diese Diskurse sind auch in der Bildungspolitik der OECD und der EU angekommen, marginal auch im Bildungswesen selbst, insbesondere im Nordischen, bislang allerdings noch nicht spezifisch im österreichischen Erwachsenenbildungsdiskurs. (DIPF/Orig.) This article introduces two social theory and cultural theory discourses from different decades that are closely connected to the social form of networks and reflects on them with regard to education. In the 1980s, Manuel Castells coined the term "network society". He thought networks were the new, dominant form of society. In the logic of networks, key social institutions, financial markets, businesses, media, politics and culture are linked with each other. Power is situated at the interfaces and thus becomes hard to grasp. The second concept, metamodernism (2017) according to Robin van den Akker and Timotheus Vermeulen and metamodernity (2021) according to Jonathan Rowson and Layman Pascal, is a more recent discourse that seeks new ways to interpret basic global development trends by asking the question "What comes after the postmodern?". Along with the digital transformation, it also sees network organization as the main element of social organization and dynamics. Though these discourses have also reached the educational policy of the OECD and the EU and to a limited extent the education system of the Nordic countries in particular, they are not specifically present in Austrian adult education discourse yet. (DIPF/Orig.)

As Brexit removes the Nordic countries’ most powerful ally from the EU, what does this imply for their approach to European affairs? The literature on small states within the EU suggests that they can counterbalance limited bargaining capacities by entering two types of alliances: strategic partnerships with bigger member states and institutionalised cooperation on a regional basis. Against this backdrop we ask whether, by significantly raising the costs of non-cooperation for Nordic governments, the Brexit referendum has triggered a revival of Nordic political cooperation. We scrutinise this conjecture by analysing Nordic strategies of coalition-building on EU financial and budgetary policy, specifically looking at attempts to reform Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union and proposals to strengthen the EU’s fiscal powers. We find that Nordic governments have successfully collaborated on these issues in the context of new alliances such as the ‘New Hanseatic League’ or the ‘Frugal Four.’ Yet, their coalition-building strategies rely on relatively loose and issue-specific alliances rather than an institutionalisation of Nordic political cooperation, implying that this revival of Nordic political cooperation hardly involves the institutions of ‘official’ Nordic cooperation. We argue that this reflects lasting differences among the Nordics’ approach to the EU as well as electorates’ scepticism about supranational institution-building, implying that ‘reluctant Europeans’ are often also ‘reluctant Scandinavians.’

The Nordic countries constitute an interesting laboratory for the study of differentiated European Integration. Even though Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden share some historical, cultural, socio-economic and political characteristics, all those countries have ultimately opted for a different kind of relationship with the EU. Whereas Finland, a member of the Eurozone since its inception in 1999, has been considered to be part of the Union’s ‘inner core’ for quite some time, Iceland and Norway, in contrast, have opted to remain outside the EU albeit closely associated via the European Economic Area Agreement. The variation of relationships has also been reflected in Nordic parties’ positioning vis-à-vis European integration in general and differentiation of European integration in particular. Broadly speaking, party families can be distinguished along traditional (e.g., agrarian, Christian democratic, conservative, and social democratic) and modern (e.g., socialist left, green, and populist radical right) ideological orientations. Although political parties belonging to both the traditional and modern Nordic party families have adopted different stances on European differentiated integration, we would assume—against the backdrop of Nordic cooperation—higher levels of transnational cooperation in European matters. Consequently, this article examines the similarities and differences between parties belonging to the same ideological family, and the extent of transnational party cooperation in the Nordic countries. Drawing on a series of interviews conducted with party representatives as well as on official party documents, this article shows that although institutionalized party cooperation mostly reflects divisions between party families, such institutionalization does not include a common vision for European integration. We conclude that the low level of partisan Nordic integration is primarily caused by domestic-level factors, such as intra-party divisions, government participation and public opinion.

A decade ago, Nordic cooperation on security and defence matters gained momentum, having been largely absent from the map of Nordic cooperation during the Cold War and its aftermath. This article analyses developments along three dimensions of Nordic cooperation: military defence (focusing on the Nordic Defence Cooperation), civil security (in the form of the ‘Haga’ process), and political cooperation (through the implementation of the Stoltenberg report). Three observations stand out as a result: First, that the three dimensions are intimately related against the background of a common Nordic conceptualization of security; second, that there is simultaneously variation in significant respects (such as driving forces, scope, and degree of institutionalization); and third, that Nordic security and defence cooperation has developed in the context of European and transatlantic security dynamics and cooperation. The second part of the analysis seeks to interpret this picture from the analytical perspective of differentiated integration. The article ends with a set of reflections on the future of Nordic security and defence cooperation in light of the Coronavirus pandemic.

Nordic governments frequently broadcast their ambition to do more together on the international stage. The five Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Norway) also share many basic goals as foreign policy actors, including a steadfast and vocal commitment to safeguarding the ‘rules-based international order.’ Why then, do we not see more organized Nordic foreign policy collaboration, for example in the form of a joint ‘grand strategy’ on core foreign policy issues, or in relation to great powers and international organizations? In this article, we draw on Charles Tilly’s concept of ‘repertoires’ to address the discrepancy between ambitions and developments in Nordic foreign policy cooperation, highlighting how the bundles of policy instruments—repertoires—that each Nordic state has developed over time take on an identity-defining quality. We argue that the Nordic states have invested in and become attached to their foreign policy differences, niches, and ‘brands.’ On the international scene, and especially when interacting with significant other states, they tend not only to stick to what they know how to do and are accustomed to doing but also to promote their national rather than their Nordic profile. While Nordic cooperation forms part of all the five states’ foreign policy repertoire in specific policy areas, these are marginal compared to the distinctive repertoires on which each Nordic state rely in relation to more powerful states. It is therefore unlikely that we will see a ‘common order’ among the Nordic states in the foreign policy domain in the near future.

The general housing policy trend in Europe has been towards neoliberalization meaning less state involvement in housing market and less government support for housing production. However, private rental markets are still regulated in many European countries. Here, we classify 33 European countries based on rent regulation system and welfare state regime. There seems to be some but not too much correspondence between the welfare state regime and whether rents are controlled. However, it seems that the role of rent regulation depends on the context and one should take a closer look at specific cases. We look at Nordic welfare states that are similar in that all represent the social democratic welfare model but different in their housing regimes by which we mean the basic principles of how housing provision in the country is organized.

Youth unemployment is a factor influencing European policy. The effects of financial crisis of 2008 in youth unemployment were prominent and varied across European countries and regions. This notebook aims to identify key representative trajectories of youth unemployment by NUTS 2 regions in Europe from 2008 to 2018. Moreover, this notebook provides a self-contained research workflow that is fully reproducible and transparent, using a wide range of functionalities offered by computational notebooks. The results show that there is a divide between northern and southern regions. Northern regions follow stable low youth unemployment levels, while southern regions follow stable high youth unemployment levels. Finally, the results show that there are patterns of regional inequalities between major metropolitan areas and their adjacent regions.

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is not based on legitimate or reasonable security interests - it is a blatant rejection of Europe's security order. President Vladi­mir Putin already made this clear in his televised address on 21 February preceding the attack. Previously, Finland and Sweden had recalled the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Final Act of 1975, to which Russia - as the successor state of the Soviet Union - has committed itself. According to the Helsinki Final Act, the sovereign equality of the signatory states is to be respected - and with it their right to choose their alliances freely. Moscow's military aggression not only pushes Helsinki and Stock­holm closer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to an unprecedented extent, but it also makes the containment of Russian power an urgent matter once again. In the long term, it will have implications on the stability in the High North as well. (author's abstract)

With populations rapidly aging, the development over time in the cognitive function among the elderly approaching or reaching retirement is important for successful aging at work and planning pension policies. However, few studies in this field focus on this age group. This study characterizes time trends in cognitive function among 55-69-year-old Europeans from 2006 to 2015, and compares these trends by region, gender, and education. This study analyzes 40,689 subjects in Waves 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) covering ten countries. Cognitive function was measured by Recall and Verbal Fluency. Educational levels were classified by quartiles. A Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) model was used to explore the association between cognitive function and development over time after controlling for confounders. Further stratification analysis using GEE models was conducted, stratified by region, gender and education. Cognitive function improved significantly in southern and central Europe over the observed timeframe, whereas it did not in northern Europe. Those with relative low levels of formal education displayed the most rapid increases in cognitive function in southern and central Europe. Among those with lower education in southern Europe, males’ cognitive function improved more quickly than females’. The improvement of cognitive function at ages 55-69 in southern and central Europe may contribute to continuing engagement with productive activities in old age. Educational interventions for people with lower levels of education may be most effective in achieving such engagement. This paper extends the literature on the development over time in the cognitive function among the elderly close to retirement age in Europe by analysing southern, central and northern Europe, as well as differences by region, gender and education. The results may provide evidence for planning pension policies and educational interventions.

Russlands Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine basiert nicht auf legitimen und nachvollziehbaren Sicherheitsinteressen, sondern ist eine Absage an die Sicherheitsordnung Europas. Dies hat Präsident Putin in seiner Fernsehansprache vom 21. Februar, die den Angriff einleitete, klargestellt. Finnland und Schweden hatten schon davor an die KSZE-Schlussakte von 1975 erinnert, auf die sich Russland als Nachfolgestaat der Sow­jetunion verpflichtet hat. Demnach ist die souveräne Gleichheit der Unterzeichnerstaaten zu achten - und damit auch ihr Recht auf die eigene, freie Bündniswahl. Die militärische Aggression Moskaus drängt Helsinki und Stockholm nicht nur in einem noch nie dagewesenen Ausmaß näher an die Nato, sondern macht zudem die Ein­hegung russischer Macht wieder dringlich, was auch die Stabilität im hohen Norden tangieren wird. (Autorenreferat)

As a hub of finance, art, design and science, the city of London has long attracted migrants interested in study and career opportunities or simply excited about living in an open, global city. Over the last few decades, it has also been a key migration destination for Europeans originating from the Nordic countries. Based on survey data gathered through an online questionnaire, this article focuses on Nordic migrants currently living in London. Since the June 2016 referendum, the Brexit process has forced these voluntary and rather privileged migrants to question their inclusion in British society. This article discusses the role of migrant capital, i.e., the skills and resources created as a result of migration, at a time of uncertainty brought on by Brexit. It examines how these migrants see their position within the social hierarchy of the city and its job market, as well as within the local and transnational networks they maintain to their countries of origin. Their Nordic background is valuable thanks to the cultural capital embodied in their habitus as well as the social capital available via the Nordic networks in UK and transnationally. As a hub of finance, art, design and science, the city of London has long attracted migrants interested in study and career opportunities or simply excited about living in an open, global city. Over the last few decades, it has also been a key migration destination for Europeans originating from the Nordic countries. Based on survey data gathered through an online questionnaire, this article focuses on Nordic migrants currently living in London. Since the June 2016 referendum, the Brexit process has forced these voluntary and rather privileged migrants to question their inclusion in British society. This article discusses the role of migrant capital, i.e., the skills and resources created as a result of migration, at a time of uncertainty brought on by Brexit. It examines how these migrants see their position within the social hierarchy of the city and its job market, as well as within the local and transnational networks they maintain to their countries of origin. Their Nordic background is valuable thanks to the cultural capital embodied in their habitus as well as the social capital available via the Nordic networks in UK and transnationally.

Using data from Eurobarometer 83.4, this study combines the two branches of research that address climate-related and biodiversity-related opinions and actions of individuals in the EU. The literature shows that the differences between climate-related and biodiversity-related policies correspond, at an individual level, to a person's basic attitudes towards environmental protection and towards nature protection, respectively. The contribution of this study is to demonstrate how these attitudes can influence behavior that has environmental repercussions for both issues, such as food consumption practices. The analysis focused on two Eurobarometer questions about buying local and seasonal food (to fight climate change) and about buying organic and local food (to protect biodiversity and nature). The results of two multinomial regression analyses, separately in Northwestern European countries and Eastern and Southern European countries, demonstrated that climate-related and biodiversity-related attitudes were, independent of each other, related to the adoption of these purchase behaviors. The results may support Europe’s new Farm to Fork (F2F) strategy and indicate that improving food consumption practices can enable individuals to better play their part in fighting climate change and biodiversity loss simultaneously, which opens up interesting new perspectives for policymakers, businesses and consumers.

Source at http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/up.v4i1.1680. In the Nordic countries, we are witnessing a proliferation of novel and more experimental ways of citizen and authority interaction within the field of urban planning and governance. These formats are seen in urban regeneration projects and planning experiments that endorse more inclusive interactions between public authorities and local actors than in the traditional formal hearings. The intention of this article is to explore the potential of these forms of participation in contributing to social innovation particularly related to including citizens that are difficult to reach, and in creating new arenas for interaction and collaboration. Theoretically, the article is inspired by the concepts of social innovation, planning as experimentation (Hillier, 2007; Nyseth, Pløger, & Holm, 2010), and co-creation (Voorberg, Bekkers, & Tummers, 2013). Empirically, the article draws on three different cases from Norway and Denmark which entailed some novel ways of involving local citizens in urban planning. Finally, the article discusses how formal planning procedures can gain inspiration from such initiatives.

This article examines teachers' beliefs about the aims of citizenship education in 12 countries from Europe and Asia. A latent class analysis of the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study of 2009 identified three distinct profiles of teachers' beliefs about the goals of citizenship education. These profiles are associated with teachers' characteristics and with national indicators of democratic development. Profiles can be more useful than single beliefs in understanding how teaching contributes to students' civic development. Teachers across countries thought it far more important to foster students' participation in the school or local community than to foster future political participation.

This article explores how two seemingly contradictory global trends&mdash, scientific rationality and religious expressiveness&mdash, intersect and are negotiated in people&rsquo, s lives in Nordic countries. We focus on Finland and Sweden, both countries with reputations of being highly secular and modernized welfare states. The article draws on our multi-sited ethnography in Finland and Sweden, including interviews with health practitioners, academics, and students identifying as Lutheran, Orthodox, Muslim, or anthroposophic. Building on new institutionalist World Society Theory, the article asks whether individuals perceive any conflict at the intersection of &ldquo, science&rdquo, and &ldquo, religion&rdquo, and how they negotiate such a relationship while working or studying in universities and health clinics, prime sites of global secularism and scientific rationality. Our findings attest to people&rsquo, s creative artistry while managing their religious identifications in a secular, Nordic, organizational culture in which religion is often constructed as old-fashioned or irrelevant. We identify and discuss three widespread modes of negotiation by which people discursively manage and account for the relationship between science and religion in their working space: segregation, estrangement, and incorporation. Such surprising similarities point to the effects of global institutionalized secularism and scientific rationality that shape the negotiation of people&rsquo, s religious and spiritual identities, while also illustrating how local context must be factored into future, empirical research on discourses of science and religion.

In September 2020, the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) conducted an expert workshop on the future of conflict for Europe. Participants from across the continent were invited to develop forward-looking scenarios for crises impacting European security up until 2030.

This study used the Programme for International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) dataset to examine informal literacy learning’s effects on adults’ literacy proficiency. Also, the factors associated with informal literacy learning at and outside of work were studied. The study participants were Nordic adults aged 35–65 years. The statistical method was regression analysis, and the results indicate that informal literacy activities at work are associated primarily with occupation, and informal literacy activities outside of work with education, parents’ education and gender. Initial education, occupation, language background and age exerted the strongest estimated associations with reading literacy proficiency. Informal learning, particularly reading outside of work, exerted a statistically significant effect independent of adults’ backgrounds, indicating that it may offer all adults the opportunity to develop literacy proficiency. (DIPF/Orig.)

This issue of Social Inclusion takes the dazzling and fuzzy term ‘universalism’ to scrutiny. The editorial introduces different usages of the term in the academic debate. It first discusses universalism as an idea, then as a process, and finally its dimensions. The articles published in this issue are situated in the debate.

Bilateral diplomacy has become increasingly important in today's multipolar world. A number of cases are analysed in this DIIS Working Paper, where Nordic countries have been 'disciplined' in bilateral diplomacy by the emerging great powers of Russia, China, or India. Compared to the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, with US unipolarity and EU normative power, the Nordics have experienced a narrowing of their freedom of manoeuvre. It is no longer possible, without significant costs, to criticise these great powers' internal affairs or foreign policies based on allegedly universal values. In general, it is crucial for decision-makers not to overstep their state's freedom of manoeuvre. But on the other hand, they should not be too docile and desist from occasionally challenging its limits. Trial balloons or parallel action with related countries might do exactly that.

This article examines whether Nordic administrative collaboration is still ‘alive and kicking,’ or whether it has been marginalized by increased integration into Europe and strong international reform trajectories. We analyse the scope and intensity of Nordic administrative collaboration from a structural perspective based on the perceptions of civil servants in the Norwegian central government. We also address the implications of Nordic collaboration for policy design and reform measures. The main conclusion is that Nordic administrative collaboration can best be described as differentiated integration. The scope of Nordic administrative collaboration is rather broad, and its internal structural features vary significantly. Nordic collaboration is perceived to have more of an effect on policy design than on specific administrative reform means and measures. However, structural features also matter.

This article explores the adaptation of Norway and Sweden to one of the major challenges to global public health, antimicrobial resistance (AMR). Guided by assumptions derived from institutional theory, the article investigates whether, and, if so, how the AMR problem has affected the two Nordic countries’ administrative systems and frameworks for Nordic cooperation. The article builds on selected literature, expert interviews, and public documents. The findings suggest that the international impact on Norway and Sweden’s managerial adaptation to AMR is limited. Instead, adaptation takes place through incremental change within existing structures for disease prevention and control and follows traditional ways of organizing political and administrative systems.