Wittgenstein���s Tractatus construes the nature of reasoning in a manner which sharply conflicts with the conventional wisdom that logic is normative, not descriptive of thought. For although we sometimes seem to reason incorrectly, Wittgenstein denies that we can make logical mistakes (5.473). My aim in this paper is to show that the Tractatus provides us with good reasons to rethink some of the central assumptions that are standardly made in thinking about the relation between logic and thought. In particular, the rejection of logical mistakes is to be understood in connection with Wittgenstein���s non���psychological approach to the thinking subject (5.641). On Wittgenstein���s view, inference, understanding, and meaning are holistically related; cases of defective reasoning are to be explained in terms of a defective grasp of meaning which manifests in an indeterminate use of signs. Invalid reasoning therefore does not count for Wittgenstein as a species of reasoning, but rather as the mere illusion of reasoning. The rejection of logical mistakes thus gives voice to a radical disjunctivist approach., {"references":["BOGHOSSIAN, Paul (2014). «What is Inference». Philosophical Studies, vol. 169, no. 1: pp. 1–18.","BRONZO, Silver (2017). «Wittgenstein, Theories of Meaning, and Linguistic Disjunctivism». European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 25, no.4, pp. 1340–1363","CONANT, James (1992). «The Search for Logically Alien Thought: Descartes, Kant, Frege, and the Tractatus». Philosophical Topics, vol. 20, no. 1: pp. 115–180.","CONANT, James (2020). «Wittgenstein's Critique of the Additive Conception of Language». Nordic Wittgenstein Review, vol. 9: pp. 7–36.","DAVIDSON, Donald (1974). «On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme». Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, vol. 47: pp. 5–20.","DIAMOND, Cora (1991). «Throwing Away the Ladder». In: The Realistic Spirit. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 95–114.","DIAMOND, Cora (2000). «Ethics, Imagination and the Method of the Tractatus». in: The New Wittgenstein. Edited by A. Crary and R. Read. London & New York: Routledge, pp. 149–173.","FREGE, Gottlob (1984). «Thoughts». In Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy. Edited by B. McGuinness, translated by P. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 351–372.","HELD, Jonas (2020). Schlussfolgern. Berlin: Schwabe Verlag.","KREMER, Michael (2007). «The Cardinal Problem of Philosophy». In: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond, edited by Alice Crary. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 143–176.","MARCUS, Eric (2021). Belief, Inference, and the Self–Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.","MCDOWELL, John (1998). «Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge». In: Meaning, Knowledge and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 369–394.","RAMSEY, Frank. P. (1990). «Philosophy (1929)». In: F. P. Ramsey: Philosophical Papers. Edited by D. H. Mellor. Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–7.","STROUD, Barry. (1979). «Inference, Belief, and Understanding». Mind 88 (350): pp. 179–196.","WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig (1960). Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.","WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig (1984). Notebooks, 1914–1916. Edited by G. H. Von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. 2nd edition. University of Chicago Press.","WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig (2009). Philosophical Investigations. Translation and edited by G.E.M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Malden, Oxford and Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley–Blackwell."]}