Search

Wage regulation in South Africa’s clothing industry has pushed low-wage producers to restructure themselves as partnerships between former employers, now intermediaries, and worker cooperatives. Th...

The COVID-19 pandemic posed challenges for healthcare systems and political leaders across the globe. In this case study of Brazil, we argue that leadership failings at the highest level contributed to Brazil's relatively high and escalating death rates during 2020. Drawing on an analysis of a large amount of textual documentation drawn from media reports, we emphasise the role and consequences of President Jair Bolsonaro's political discourse and prioritisation of the economy. We focus on the first wave that swept across the globe between January and late June of 2020, arguing that Bolsonaro underplayed the seriousness of the epidemic, leveraged misinformation as a political strategy, promoted pseudoscience, and undermined the Ministry of Health. He also confronted subnational governments for adopting lockdown measures - a move that enabled him to blame regional governors for the short-term economic costs of COVID-19 related restrictions. We suggest that his denialist approach to climate change paved the way for his subsequent denialism of the seriousness of COVID-19 and for his undermining of social distancing, mask-wearing and other preventative responses supported by science. These sobering findings highlight the role that national leaders can play in undermining scientific approaches to both public health and the environment.

The fossil-fuelled Anthropocene, with its attendant destruction of wildlife, originated with global capitalism. Early ‘fortress’ conservation efforts focussed on delineating protected areas, but in...

In March 2020, South Africa’s government imposed a severe lockdown in response to the covid-19 pandemic The economic and social costs of the lockdown—coming on top of preexisting unemployment, poverty, hunger, and deep inequality—resulted in strong pressures on the government to ease it just as the pandemic accelerated, especially in June and July The combination of pandemic and lockdown exposed anew incompetent state institutions (with limited capacity to deliver key services), poor leadership (through an entrenched dominant party mired in corruption), a largely supine Parliament, and weak opposition parties The courts and civil society have played important but insufficient roles in holding the executive to account © 2020 National Endowment for Democracy and Johns Hopkins University Press

The black‐backed jackal Canis mesomelas, henceforth jackal, has re‐emerged as a threat to South African sheep farmers. This sparked contestation between farmers and conservationists over the reasons for their return and the relative merits of lethal and non‐lethal approaches to protecting livestock. Three separate reviews of the scientific literature converged on the same broad conclusion that lethal control of jackals is probably ineffective, but that more scientific research is necessary, especially on farms. We draw on historic evidence and recent research across a range of disciplines to show that jackal diet and behaviour varies regionally and alter in response to changing threats and opportunities. More data will not support generalisable conclusions and have already been eclipsed by broad‐scale changes in the political, economic and ecological landscapes of South Africa. Reduced government support for farmers, rising production costs and falling product prices, together with an increasing frequency of droughts, have conspired to weaken the collective management hand of farmers and, ultimately, contributed to a decline in the sheep farming industry. Many sheep farmers have sold their land to non‐commercial ‘lifestyle' farmers or expanding nature reserves, creating a growing network of safer spaces for jackals to persist, from which their offspring can sink into neighbouring commercial farmland. When these landscape‐level changes are combined with the wide phenotypic plasticity and catholic diet of the jackal, we should be neither surprised at their resurgence nor contented with suggestions that more ecological research is likely to facilitate any sustainable solutions.

Despite having protected status, poaching for the illegal trade and traditional use remains a primary threat to leopards (Panthera pardus) across southern Africa. Addressing this threat is challenging, not only because it is difficult to uncover and monitor illicit behavior, but because law enforcement and alternative intervention strategies need to account for cultural and political sensitivities to prove effective and sustainable. With up to 4 million followers in southern Africa, the recently‐established Nazareth Baptist “Shembe” Church represents the principal culturo‐religious use of illegal leopard skins in the world. This longitudinal study used in‐person questionnaires (n = 8,600) and telephone follow‐ups (n = 2,300) with Shembe followers to explore socio‐economic and experiential factors related to the desirability and possession of illegal leopard skins before and after receiving a faux alternative through the Furs for Life (FFL) intervention program. Proportional possession of authentic skins was relatively low among followers who received faux skins (21%), with declines of 7 and 13% in subsequent authentic skin acquisition and desirability, respectively. Logistic regression models revealed that authentic skin possession, both before and after receiving a faux skin, was primarily related to employment status. Desire for authentic skins increased with recipient age, but decreased with improved knowledge of leopard population status since receiving the faux skin. Followers who were dissatisfied with faux skins were likely to express a continued desire for authentic skins. Most followers (95%) were, however, satisfied with the faux alternative, having retained and worn it at gatherings, with little noticeable damage or perceived societal judgment. These results support the FFL intervention as a means of protecting leopards: Although authentic skins were still acquired, demand decreased significantly over 3 years with shifts in perception favoring faux leopard skin alternatives.

This memoir from the 2000s reflects on the role of AIDS activism and research in the struggle for antiretroviral treatment both globally and in South Africa. It draws on personal experiences and to...

Conflict between predators and small-livestock farmers is a global phenomenon adversely impacting the preservation of wildlife, the well-being of livestock and human livelihoods. Such conflict is pervasive in the Karoo region of South Africa but its contemporary history and various causes remain poorly understood. In this study, we interviewed 77 small-livestock farmers in the Central Karoo between July 2014 and March 2015 to (1) assess the spatio-temporal distribution and severity of the reported predation problems with the main regional predators of livestock (black-backed jackal, caracal and baboon) and (2) describe the perceived reasons for changes in predator numbers. Farmers reported that serious predation problems have increased since the 1990s for all three predators. Jackal predation appears to have re-emerged, particularly since the 2000s, while baboon predation seems to have escalated rapidly since 2014 for select farmers. Farms with more rugged terrain were more likely to experience serious problems with baboons and caracal but ruggedness did not predict the year of onset of problems. Farmers perceive predator numbers to be increasing and attribute this trend to declining government support for predator management, changes in farming practices and the associated increase in suitable predator habitat, from which they can recolonise commercial farms.Keywords: black-backed jackal, caracal, chacma baboon, questionnaire, rangelands

A panel study of 66 sheep farmers in the South African Karoo, in the years 2012, 2013 and 2014, revealed that farmers cull predators (black-backed jackals, caracals and baboons) in response to livestock losses. Those whose entire livelihood came from sheep farming culled predators in greater numbers. Killing predators, however, is probably counter-productive as culling is associated with greater livestock losses the following year. This finding is robust to the inclusion of a set of socio-economic and farm-level characteristics and is consistent with predator ecology (killing territorial predators can create vacancies for dispersing juveniles to move in to, resulting in greater stock losses later). Farmers also reported that both lethal and non-lethal methods to control predators were becoming less effective over time. This is in line with evidence highlighting the capacity of caracals and especially black-backed jackals to adapt to persecution. Poison use is widespread and unrelated to socio-economic status. Reported poison use increased over the study period. Poison has unintended effects on wildlife (killing non-target animals, especially scavenger species) and poses challenges for cleaner production and sustainable development.

Contemporary development strategies emphasize labour productivity growth because it has historically underpinned rising living standards. Today, however, poverty reduction and inclusive development in those developing countries with high unemployment require increasing the employment rate even if this means lower average labour productivity. We critique the International Labour Organization (ILO) for its overly universalizing advocacy of high‐productivity growth strategies and for failing to confront the trade‐off between more and better‐quality jobs. This is particularly problematic in high unemployment contexts in Southern Africa, where labour productivity growth between 2000 and 2013 came at the cost of a falling employment rate.

Clothing production increasingly occurs in global value chains. Industrial policies typically recommend ‘upgrading’ (increasing labour productivity by becoming more skill- and capital-intensive and producing higher valued products) yet firms can and do move up and down the value chain when profitable opportunities arise. This paper uses United Nations Industrial Development Organisation data on remuneration, output and employment to identify recent national development trajectories for the clothing industry. Upgrading trajectories can be pro-labour (have a rising wage share of value added) or pro-capital (a rising profit share). Pro-labour trajectories can deliver rising average wages and employment (e.g. India and China) or higher average wages for fewer workers (e.g. Sri Lanka). Pro-capital trajectories can also deliver higher average wages and employment growth (e.g. Vietnam) or rising wages for fewer workers (e.g. South Africa). Downgrading trajectories are typically associated with falling average wages but can be associated with rising average wages (as in Turkey). The desirability of a particular development trajectory depends on the economic context, especially labour market conditions. Upgrading trajectories are to be expected when unemployment is low and there is upward pressure on wages. Where unemployment is high, employment objectives are most quickly met through downgrading trajectories in which aggregate labour productivity falls as labour-intensive activities expand.

This paper explores which African countries had relatively low rates of underweight children and relatively high birth coverage (percentage of births with a skilled attendant) in the poorest quintile. Swaziland and Rwanda emerged as relatively ‘pro-poor’ in that both measures were more than one standard deviation better than predicted by GDP per capita. Unlike Swaziland, Rwanda’s status as an outlier was eliminated in regressions controlling also for urbanisation, medical professionals per 1000 people and health spending, suggesting that its pro-poor outcomes were related to these factors. AIDS funding may have helped Swaziland provide primary health care to the poor, but its high birth coverage preceded the HIV epidemic. Although relatively pro-poor in international terms, Swaziland and Rwanda emerged as relatively unequal by the CIX measure of health inequality with regard to percentage of underweight children across quintiles. It is important not to conflate relatively equal with relatively pro...

In the mid-2010s, residents of Atlantic Beach Golf Estate (ABGE) in peri-urban Cape Town became embroiled in a dispute over how to respond to a wild predator, the caracal (Caracal caracal) killing domestic cats (Felis catus). It was revealing of the policy challenges posed by both these predators for urban ecology, of social conflict over notions of ‘nature’, and how cats can be framed as family members worthy of protection or as a danger to wildlife themselves. Conservation authorities resisted requests for permission to capture, remove or radio-collar and monitor any caracals on the ABGE, even after a caracal entered a home and killed a cat. This contrasted with Cape Town’s policy on Chacma baboons (Papio ursinus) where significant resources are allocated to reducing the spatial overlap between baboon home ranges and houses, and where negotiated protocols exist for the lethal management of individuals that persist in entering urban areas despite non-lethal deterrents. It also contrasts with the lethal management of caracals inside penguin (Spheniscus demersus) colonies. Policy towards the ABGE was shaped by its history as a security/eco-estate bordering a nature reserve, but the outcome—inconsistent policy regarding caracals that incentivises affected residents to take matters into their own hands—was sub-optimal for environmental managers, affected residents and caracals. Relatively high-income ratepayers committed to living with ‘nature’ (albeit curated) in places like ABGE are potential allies in assisting environmental officials better protect penguins and caracals, thereby facilitating more biodiverse ecologies with predators in urban Cape Town.

The cruel treatment of pest rodents is a neglected area of study. This paper uses a representative survey from Khayelitsha (Cape Town) to show that a minority of residents preferred rodent control to be humane but that most did not care how rats are killed and almost a fifth said they would be 'happy' if the rats suffered. Agreeing that animal welfare is important and having become used to the presence of rats raised the probability of support for humane rodent control and decreased support for cruel rodent control. Being concerned that rats might be linked to witchcraft increased the probability of a pro-cruel stance. These results were robust to the inclusion of measures of rodent presence in the household and socio-economic status. This highlights the importance of values (notably concern about animal welfare) and cultural beliefs - in this case concerns that rodents might be linked to witchcraft - in predicting whether respondents are likely to have a pro-cruel stance on rodent control or not. Promoting the humane treatment of pest animals in this context thus requires engaging with local culture.

Populations of adaptable mesopredators are expanding globally where passive rewilding and natural recolonization are taking place, increasing the risk of conflict with remaining livestock farmers. We analysed data from two social surveys of farmers in the Karoo, South Africa, where black-backed jackals (Canis mesomelas) and caracals (Caracal caracal) have re-emerged as a threat to sheep farms in the context of falling agricultural employment and the expansion of natural areas. We show that irrespective of measurement approach, lethal control of mesopredators in this fragmented socio-economic landscape was associated with increased livestock losses the following year. Terrain ruggedness was positively, and number of farmworkers negatively, associated with livestock losses. Our study provides further evidence that lethal control of mesopredators in this context is probably counter-productive and supports calls to develop, share and financially support a range of non-lethal methods to protect livestock, especially where natural recolonization of mesopredators is occurring. A graphical abstract can be found in Electronic supplementary material. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (10.1007/s13280-019-01260-4) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Chapter 2 discusses the Lewis model of development with surplus labour and the ongoing relevance of his dualist approach as demonstrated in the industrialization of Hong Kong, India, Bangladesh, etc. We show, using examples from the South African clothing manufacturing industry, that relatively high- and low-wage firms exist in the same industry by using different technologies and targeting different product markets. There is no necessary ‘race to the bottom’. Industrial policy can usefully promote competitiveness across a range of technologies, supporting labour-intensive technologies (especially in contexts of high unemployment) without undermining firms in more skill- and capital-intensive niches. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of unemployment for development strategy, and for the relationship between development and inequality.

Chapter 7 argues that the Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU) strategy was complicated by its dual role as a trade union and investment manager. Having taken advantage of investment opportunities provided through ‘black economic empowerment policies’ to grow substantial financial assets and later also direct investments in the clothing manufacturing industry, the union, in effect, was both a representative of labour as well as a capitalist. Its political connections meant that it was well positioned to take advantage of subsidies. The incentives and opportunities facing SACTWU were consistent with a union strategy to have a smaller body of better-paid workers rather than growing its membership of lower-wage workers through labour-intensive job creation. SACTWU is suspicious of the growth of workers’ co-operatives (seeing them as sham and designed solely to avoid minimum wage regulation). We argue that the potential for workers’ co-operatives to generate more transparent and inclusive productive and distributional practices is exciting and consistent with inclusive dualism.

Chapter 6 reviews the history of collective bargaining in the South African clothing manufacturing industry. We show that its profoundly dualist character (high- and low-productivity firms co-existing) has historical and market-related roots and highlight the role of wage policy during and after apartheid in shaping the regional location of firms. The rise of China as a global producer of clothing had a profound impact on the South African industry—but it was the simultaneous introduction of national collective bargaining and the enforcement of minimum wages on relatively low-wage labour-intensive firms that drove the job losses. We describe the 2010/11 ‘compliance drive’ that resulted in legal action against the National Bargaining Council for the Clothing Manufacturing Industry by low-wage employers, including the Chinese firms (that is, owned by people who originated from Taiwan, Hong Kong, or China) in Newcastle seeking to obtain relief from the imposition of sector-wide minimum wages on their labour-intensive firms. Whilst trade union strategy as well as government policy adapted to some extent and many employers transformed their enterprises into workers’ co-operatives, that is to circumvent wage regulation, the outcome was nonetheless the preclusion of employment growth in this crucial sector.

Chapter 4 provides a history and analysis of development trajectories in the global clothing industry. Trade liberalization (specifically the end of import quotas from January 2005) and the rise of global value chains have changed the nature of the global economy since Lewis’s time. We use UNIDO data on remuneration, output, and employment to identify post-2004 national development trajectories showing that upgrading trajectories can be pro-labour (a rising wage share of value-added) or pro-capital (a rising profit share). Pro-labour trajectories can deliver rising average wages and employment (e.g. India and China) or higher average wages for fewer workers (e.g. Sri Lanka). Pro-capital trajectories can also deliver higher average wages and employment growth (e.g. Vietnam) or rising wages for fewer workers (e.g. South Africa). Downgrading trajectories are typically associated with falling average wages but can be associated with rising average wages (as in Turkey). The desirability of a particular development trajectory depends on the economic context, especially labour market conditions.

W. Arthur Lewis, the founding father of development economics, saw developing economies as dualist, that is, characterised by differences in earnings and productivity between and within economic sectors. His famous model of development, in which ‘surplus’ (unemployed and underemployed) labour was drawn out of subsistence activities and into manufacturing, was reflected in the subsequent East Asian development trajectory in which labour was drawn into low-wage, labour-intensive manufacturing, including in clothing production, before shifting into higher-wage work once the supply of surplus labour had dried up. This development strategy has become unfashionable, the concern being that in a globalized world, labour-intensive industry promises little more than an impoverishing ‘race to the bottom’. A strong strand in contemporary development discourse favours the promotion of decent work irrespective of whether surplus labour exists or not. We argue that ‘better work’ policies to ensure health and safety, minimum wages and worker representation are important. Decent work fundamentalism—that is, the promotion of higher wages and labour productivity at the cost of lower-wage job destruction—is a utopian vision with dystopic consequences for countries with high open unemployment, including most of Southern Africa. We show, using the South African clothing industry as a case study, that decent work fundamentalism ignores the benefits of dualism (the co-existence of high- and low-wage firms), resulting in the unnecessary destruction of labour-intensive jobs and the bifurcation of society into highly-paid, high-productivity insiders and unemployed outsiders. The South African case has broader relevance because of the growth in surplus labour—including in its extreme form, open unemployment—across a growing number of African countries. Inclusive dualism, as a development strategy, takes the trade-off between wages and employment seriously, prioritizes labour-intensive job creation and facilitates increased productivity where appropriate, so that jobs are created, not destroyed.

Chapter 5 considers the debate over ‘sweatshops’ in the clothing manufacturing industry, arguing that the moral economy of rival positions entails different understandings of the relationship between wages, profits, and employment. Many contemporary arguments reflect those made over a century earlier in Britain and the US. However, whereas the British Fabian socialists sought (and achieved) the simultaneous expansion of labour protection and welfare support for the unemployed, the contemporary anti-sweatshop movement focusses solely on wages. By the early twentieth century in Britain, those who lost their jobs because of rising minimum wages could expect support from the welfare system. In twenty-first-century surplus labour countries, the unemployed fall through what meagre welfare nets exist. In this context, the potential trade-off between wages and employment matters for poverty and inequality. Chapter 5 also reviews the evidence on the impact of rising minimum wages on employment both internationally and in South Africa. The impact is typically neutral or mildly negative, suggesting that policymakers are generally careful about not raising minimum wages excessively. There is, however, evidence that it is mostly unskilled workers who lose jobs when job losses occur.

Chapter 8 considers the challenge of moving towards inclusive dualism for surplus labour countries. In such countries, decent work fundamentalism threatens to perpetuate or worsen poverty and inequality. As the extreme case of South Africa’s clothing manufacturing sector shows, decent work fundamentalism not only impedes job creation but it also destroys jobs. Decent work fundamentalism is a threat not just across Southern Africa and in other parts of the world where open unemployment is very high. It is also a threat across much of Africa, where unemployment rates have already risen and are predicted to continue to rise, especially amongst young people. Given the rapid growth of the labour force and the inability of agriculture to absorb more workers, most African countries need to expand urgently non-agricultural employment in labour-intensive sectors (including clothing manufacturing). Strengthening the safety net of social protection (through cash transfers and public works programmes) can mitigate poverty, but is unlikely to be any substitute for labour-intensive development.

In this introduction to our book, Inclusive Dualism, we revisit W. Arthur Lewis’s famous model of development with surplus labour. Lewis emphasized the benefits of dualism, by which he meant economic differentiation and the coexistence of sectors (and of firms within sectors) characterized by different levels of productivity and wages. He proposed an expansion of relatively low-wage, labour-intensive jobs that would raise productivity by drawing ‘surplus’ labour out of subsistence activities. When such surplus labour dried up, wages would rise. In contrast to Lewis, post-2000 advocates of decent work fundamentalism promote wage increases as an instrument to increase labour productivity irrespective of labour market conditions. In the presence of surplus labour, this can have dystopic consequences, as the South African case shows. In South Africa, with its very high unemployment rates, strategies to promote relatively high-wage, high-productivity jobs came at the cost of labour-intensive development and even job destruction, thereby exacerbating poverty and inequality.

Chapter 3 argues that the ILO’s decent work agenda is insensitive to the needs of countries with high unemployment. We identify thirteen developing countries whose unemployment rate in 2016 was over twice the mean for low- and middle-income countries. Most are war-torn, post-communist, and unfree. However, for a set of Southern African countries, high unemployment is the consequence of domestic policy within a regional context of relatively limited opportunities for smallholder agriculture and dominated by the strength of the South African economy. Contemporary development policy advice, especially from the ILO, prioritizes labour productivity growth without confronting the need to foster relatively low-productivity employment to provide jobs for large numbers of relatively unskilled people in these countries. Rising labour productivity in the surplus labour countries during the 2000s came at the cost of stagnant, and even falling, employment rates. Given inadequate welfare support for the unemployed, such growth paths undermined inclusive development in these countries.

Haarmann, Haarmann and Nattrass describe the context, origin and development of the world’s first Basic Income pilot, located in Otjivero, Namibia. They discuss the evidence gathered and criticisms of the pilot and its assessment. They show that the Basic Income had an immediate impact on poverty, and particularly on child malnutrition, and that it fostered new small scale local economic activity. They suggest that the assumption that poor people are incapable of using a cash grant developmentally, and that the political elite is reluctant to adopt a social policy that would constitute a right, have resulted in a nationwide Basic Income not being implemented. Factual evidence will never be sufficient on its own. Only political will would enable a Basic Income to be implemented.

There is growing concern globally about the inhumane treatment of ‘pest’ animals, including rodents, and about the ecological consequences of rodenticides, notably the poisoning of non-target wildlife like raptors and scavengers. Recent contestation between Environmental Health (EH) officials in Khayelitsha, Cape Town’s largest African township, and the National Council for Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (NSPCA) illustrates the tension that can arise between innovative ecologically-focused strategies and existing legislation and animal protection practices. In 2013/14 EH officials introduced a job-creation project to trap and drown rats, describing it as ‘humane’ because it avoided poison thereby posing no danger to wildlife such as owls. The NSPCA, however, halted the project, arguing that drowning was both inhumane and illegal. Death by poison is also inhumane but the South Africa’s Animals Protection Act (1962) allows it (and trapping and hunting) to be used against ‘pests’/‘vermin’. The NSPCA, which has never challenged the Act for allowing the inhumane treatment of these animals, used it to trump local preferences. A representative survey from Khayelitsha showed that there was some support for an NSPCA-like position (14% thought that drowning was cruel and that workers should not be allowed to trap and drown rats) but that the majority (70%) indicated that they were both concerned about the poisoning of non-target animals and supported the continuation of the trapping and drowning project. This was not a contestation over whether animals should be protected, but over how to do this, and which animals to include.