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Core organization design issues have emerged in recent popular and influential discussions of managers and organizations, specifically in a genre of writing—the “bossless company narrative”—that declares that the classic managerial hierarchy is dead. In this article, we review our critical discussion of this genre in our book, Why Managers Still Matter, arguing that the narrative manifests bad empiricism and half-baked organization theory. However, we also raise the possibility of a charitable reading of the genre: it points to themes in organization design theory that are currently underdeveloped, notably with respect to, for example, the impact of organizational structure and control on employee motivations and the importance of contingencies such as the characteristics of knowledge for organization design.

The editors of the Journal of Organization Design invited several organization design scholars to provide brief reflections on our book Why Managers Matter: The Perils of the Bossless Company. The contributors have raised a host of interesting and important issues related to the theme of the book, including thoughtful objections to some of our arguments as well as suggestions on different roads forward for research in organization design. These include the need to distinguish more strongly between top and middle management, to include broader psychological ramifications of bossless companies, to treat in greater detail the implications of self-selection into distinct kinds of organizations, to consider more carefully the implications of our argument that to some extent humans are biologically hardwired for hierarchy, and to explore the particular challenges for flat organizations that pursue “social” goals. In this brief comment, we summarize some reactions to the essays, clarify a few misunderstandings, and suggest additional work to be done.

Transaction cost economics (TCE) carefully analyzes market failure while remaining largely silent about hierarchical failure. We argue this omission occurs because TCE’s opportunism assumption does not consider organizational member motivations under different hierarchical forms. Thus, TCE does not fully examine opportunistic behavior under hierarchy, resulting in an incomplete governance analysis. To fill this gap, we build a discriminating alignment theory of hierarchical choice that incorporates explicit motivations under each hierarchical form. We make three contributions to TCE with this theory. First, using the counterproductive work behavior and goal framing literatures, we predict specific motivations (effort, visceral, financial or status opportunism, or collaboration) across hierarchical forms. Second, we predict when “efficient” hierarchical forms (mapped from Williamson’s internal governance analysis) do not effectively mitigate opportunistic behavior, creating hierarchical failure. In these cases, we augment the hierarchical forms with supplemental governance mechanisms necessary to efficiently govern the exchange. Finally, we investigate how different motivations across hierarchical forms lead to excess misalignment costs to enhance our understanding of hierarchical failures. Examining how both transaction hazards and specific motivations drive particular behaviors allows for a more nuanced understanding of specific “costs and competencies” of hierarchy and in turn hierarchical failure in TCE

Much entrepreneurship research has focused on explaining why some countries and regions have more entrepreneurial activity than others, and the role played in this regard by cross-national and cross-regional differences in institutions. However, this stream has not considered entrepreneurship from a process perspective that is, as a set of activities that unfold over different, discernible stages, and has therefore not examined how institutions and policies impact entrepreneurship in different stages of the process. To address this highly policy-relevant gap, we consider the role of institutions for both nascent and realized entrepreneurship, combining cross-country data of entrepreneurial nascency and start-up activity with standard measures of institutions in structural models to obtain estimates of the moderating and mediating effects of policies and institutions of different quality. Analyzing data on early entrepreneurial activities from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, data on new firm formation from the World Bank, and Economic Freedom of the World and Doing Business data, we find that a larger government sector leads to lower levels of both measures of entrepreneurship, while legal quality only impacts later-stage entrepreneurship. In general, the main impact of institutions lies in the later stage of entrepreneurship. We suggest that attention allocation by entrepreneurs may help explain these findings.

Research summaryThe strategic management and international business fields have followed, in some respects, quite similar intellectual trajectories, as reflected in the push for a field of “global strategy.” However, a key distinction in the strategy literature—namely, Williamson's distinction between “strategizing” and “economizing”—has not been explicitly recognized in the international business/global strategy fields. We argue that progress can be made in global strategy by recognizing this distinction and exploring the interaction between “strategizing” and “economizing.” To lend credence to this claim, we offer a simple model of the entry decision which highlights both economizing and strategizing aspects of this decision. We also offer recommendations on economizing-strategizing research in global strategy.Managerial summaryMultinational enterprises gain competitive advantage either by improving the efficiency with which they operate (by having unique resources, lowering costs, or improving managerial practices) or by exercising their market and bargaining power. Most research has emphasized the former source of competitive advantage. However, in actuality, the two sources are intertwined. We detail how they are intertwined by means of a simple numerical example of the entry decision facing a company that can choose between competing or collaborating with the local firm. We show that strategizing plays into the entry decision in this case.

Surviving and thriving in the context of VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity) has become a pressing issue in international business. While contemporary international business scholarship offers insight into resilience-building under VUCA conditions, the mechanisms that link decision-making at the top with organizational action are less clear. We proffer a sand-clock model of resilience-building that combines resourcefulness, time interpretations, and entrepreneurial judgments. MNE decision-makers can apply the model to build resilience for surviving and thriving in a VUCA context by embracing sustainability, analyzing temporal signals, and making better judgments.

Monteiro and Miranda (2022) argue that owners differ in their ability to select and work within a particular institutional environment, suggesting “institutional competence” as a dimension of ownership competence distinct from what we call governance, matching, and timing competence. We agree that institutions matter and welcome the chance to describe their role in detail. However, rather than treating institutional competence as a separate channel by which owners create value from their assets, we think institutional features can be modeled as “shift parameters” that moderate the effect of ownership competencies on outcomes. In developing this argument we reflect more broadly on the interplay between ownership competence and institutional uncertainty, noting that society at large benefits from individual-level ownership competence, ownership by some owners may cause harm to other owners, and property-rights enforcement and ownership competence are complements in generating private and societal benefits.

We examine the externalisation of labour as a strategic response to a temporary exogenous shock (i.e. COVID-19). Combining ideas from employment externalisation theory and the CATO framework (which are both extensions of transaction costs economics), we argue that firms that are hit harder by the COVID-19 shock are more likely to plan hiring freelancers that replace permanent employees. The mechanism we argue for is that firms seek to reposition quickly, which lowers comparative adjustment costs and reduces constraints on switching employment modes in future, depending on the extent of task co-specialisation. Analysing survey data obtained from 1,090 Danish small medium enterprises during the initial COVID-19 lockdown supports our hypotheses. Our findings contribute to the research on strategic responses to crises and provide novel understanding of why firms may externalise employment.

We analyze the role and effect of ecosystem leadership understood as the exercise of effort towards others with the purpose of establishing and maintaining an ecosystem around a focal systemic innovation. While there has been much attention to the firms that sponsor ecosystems in the ecosystem literature, ecosystem leaders are usually characterized in an atheoretical manner, and the emphasis is on, leadership in existing ecosystems, thus neglecting the role leadership might play in ecosystem emergence. We clarify and provide theoretical grounding for the important role of leadership in emerging and maturing ecosystems. Building on transaction cost economics, we conceptualize an ecosystem as a governance structure that enables and sustains coordination and cooperation among multiple economic agents towards a focal innovative value proposition. Our basic argument is that the emergence of such an ecosystems is hampered by coordination and cooperation problems which markets and the price system cannot solve by itself. Resolving these problems requires assistance, and such assistance is what we call ecosystem leadership. To further characterize the exercise of leadership we use Teece's tripartite dynamic capabilities scheme. Leadership enables ecosystem emergence through three externally-oriented dynamic capabilities: facilitating the formation of a shared vision (sensing), inducing others to make ecosystem-specific investments (seizing) and engaging in ad hoc problem solving to create and maintain stability (reconfiguring/transforming). The latter capability in particular often continues to be important in a mature ecosystem. We provide a characterization of these capabilities and argue that the ecosystem leader role in a mature ecosystem likely stems from having successfully exercised these capabilities and that their exercise also puts the leader in a prime position for value capture. We discuss implications of our arguments for ecosystem theories, for managers and for policy makers.

Divergent but complementary perspectives have been articulated regarding how management practices and their implementation influence firm performance. Integrating such perspectives in the human resource (HR) management literature, we examine how HR management practices formulated at firm level interact with HR decisions at lower levels, and how this affects firm performance. HR implementation models have proposed that consistency in HR practices across organizational levels and units is key; conversely, idiosyncratic deals (i-deals) theory advances individualization as a central principle, suggesting that lower-level initiative in making decisions that reflect local circumstances should have beneficial effects. Addressing the interplay between the consistency and individualization perspectives in a sample of 870 employees nested in 36 firms, we present evidence suggesting that individualized HR decisions positively affect firm performance only in the presence of strong firm-level HR practices. This interplay occurs through two mediating social exchange processes: perceived organizational support and perceived distributive justice. ispartof: Journal Of Management Studies vol:59 issue:3 pages:660-694 status: published

Zellweger and Zenger's (ZZ) article, “Entrepreneurs as scientists: A pragmatist approach to producing value out of uncertainty,” represents a potentially influential contribution to the understanding of decision making under uncertainty. This short paper points to two major problems in their article: it 1) seeks to reduce uncertainty to risk and ignores the problem of unknown unknowns, and 2) does not identify the key inferential problem of linking the few current data points known by an entrepreneur to her imagination as it pertains to an unknowable future. We point to devising alternative models of learning that have the potential to overcome these problems as a research effort that should be prioritized within the emerging field of entrepreneurial learning.

Research on business model innovation (BMI) processes is blossoming and expanding in many directions. Hence, the time is ripe to summarize and systematize this body of knowledge for the benefit of current and future BMI scholars. In this article, we take stock of the current literature to clarify the concept of a BMI process, develop a categorization scheme (a “BMI process framework”), and discuss future research possibilities. Building on a systematic literature review of 114 papers, our categorization delineates different types of BMI processes and corresponding sub-processes. Moreover, we develop a framework that illustrates how BMI processes are interrelated and interconnected. Finally, we identify the main process-related research gaps in BMI research and provide directions for future research that emerge from our categorization and discussion.

Henry Mintzberg’s celebrated critique of the “design school” argued that strategy is best thought of as adaptive, bottom-up, and based on dispersed knowledge and learning. Yet Mintzberg’s account lacks a clear and comprehensive theoretical underpinning, especially regarding how to guide emergent strategy in dynamic environments, and leverage it to exploit value creation. We provide this foundation by showing how Mintzberg’s critique of planning and design at the level of organizational strategy is in key ways anticipated by F.A. Hayek’s critique of planning and design at the societal level. Both writers are critical of rationalist epistemology and instead stress experiential knowledge, fallibility, and unanticipated social consequences. Hayek also extends Mintzberg’s work by showing how rules in the firm capture adaptive, experiential, tacit, and dispersed knowledge in the context of dynamic environments. A framework of rules thus creates inimitable and non-substitutable resources that enable the firm to fully exploit its competitive advantage.

Organizations involve joint production where members engage in purposive coordination and cooperation with others. Scholars have often noted the importance of “moral factors” in facilitating such collaboration but previous research has not adequately explained the nature of these moral factors, how they are embodied within joint production, or why organization members willingly adhere to them. We draw upon virtue ethics to address these questions. We argue that joint production represents a distinct, organization-level practice embodying morally salient standards of professional excellence that contribute to the development of members’ virtues through habituation. We then elaborate microfoundations for this account, developing a virtue ethical account of human agency as directed toward human flourishing such that members willingly adhere to organizational norms and values when they coherently embody goods that contribute to human flourishing.

Entrepreneurship, defined as judgmental decision-making under conditions of uncertainty, is studied in many different disciplines across the social sciences and humanities. Despite the growth of the field, however, there is still relatively little research on the philosophical foundations of entrepreneurial action. This chapter highlights some connections between this entrepreneurial judgment and practical wisdom. It first examines the roots of entrepreneurial decision-making as explained through the framework of “Austrian” economics, especially with regard to action, choice, and uncertainty. It then compares entrepreneurial judgment and practical wisdom in light of Aristotle’s five intellectual virtues, noting some similarities and tensions. Finally, it discusses some moral aspects of entrepreneurial action and their relation to human flourishing, and the institutional foundations that support this relationship.

Digital transformation is fundamentally changing the business landscape. It is also affecting the roles of top managers within firms. Our survey of more than 160 senior managers in Europe suggests that digitalization, rather than encouraging more decentralized forms of management, will lead to an expanded role for headquarters and further empowerment of top managers. While acknowledging the benefits of the digital transformation, in this Executive Digest we identify five key challenges for newly empowered top managers and offer solutions for these digitalization traps., Security: staffonly

The introduction of mobile devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets), to the workplace has had many positive effects. While research also indicates that mobile devices may lead to the misallocation and depletion of attention, the negative effects, particularly on interactions in organizations, remain less well understood. We draw on micro-sociology to analyze the use of mobile devices in situations of purposeful co-presence, such as meetings and settings that require a joint effort to solve one or more problems. In these situations, the use of mobile devices is likely to de-energize actors and lead to behaviors that are contrary to the aims of establishing situations of purposeful co-presence. We identify ways in which organizations can avoid the negative consequences of mobile devices (while keeping the positive consequences), ranging from building norms regarding the use of such devices to restructuring work processes (e.g., making activities less interdependent and making less use of purposeful co-presence).

Research summaryResearch has examined how “economizing” and “strategizing” mechanisms interact in driving competitive outcomes, but the role of coalitions in this process has received little attention. Coalitions are formed to create more value (i.e., economizing) and to strengthen competitive positions (i.e., strategizing). Based on a formal coalitional model, we derive several unintuitive results. We show that economizing actions may backfire because creating more value may lead other players to strategize more aggressively, offsetting the additional value creation. Moreover, creating countervailing power—that is, building a coalition against players with significant power such as monopolists—not only allows the coalition to appropriate more value, but may also benefit the powerful trading partner by reducing competition among the coalition members. Coalition‐formation can hurt coalitions members by reducing economizing investments.Managerial summaryManagers typically seek competitive advantage either by improving efficiency (by having unique resources, lowering costs, or improving managerial practices) or by trying to obtain stronger bargaining positions against their buyers or suppliers. We show that these two approaches interact in surprising ways. For example, efficiency improvements create more opportunity for profit, but also give trading partners stronger incentives to bargain for a share of that profit. At the same time, small buyers or sellers can band together into clubs or cooperatives to get better deals from a powerful trading partner, thereby restraining competition among themselves. However, large firms can try to prevent such coalitions from forming by pursuing vertical integration of potential coalition members. We explore a variety of bargaining situations and show that the ability to encourage or thwart coalition formation is an important managerial tool, Research summary: Research has examined how “economizing” and “strategizing” mechanisms interact in driving competitive outcomes, but the role of coalitions in this process has received little attention. Coalitions are formed to create more value (i.e., economizing) and to strengthen competitive positions (i.e., strategizing). Based on a formal coalitional model, we derive several unintuitive results. We show that economizing actions may backfire because creating more value may lead other players to strategize more aggressively, offsetting the additional value creation. Moreover, creating countervailing power—that is, building a coalition against players with significant power such as monopolists—not only allows the coalition to appropriate more value, but may also benefit the powerful trading partner by reducing competition among the coalition members. Coalition-formation can hurt coalitions members by reducing economizing investments. Managerial summary: Managers typically seek competitive advantage either by improving efficiency (by having unique resources, lowering costs, or improving managerial practices) or by trying to obtain stronger bargaining positions against their buyers or suppliers. We show that these two approaches interact in surprising ways. For example, efficiency improvements create more opportunity for profit, but also give trading partners stronger incentives to bargain for a share of that profit. At the same time, small buyers or sellers can band together into clubs or cooperatives to get better deals from a powerful trading partner, thereby restraining competition among themselves. However, large firms can try to prevent such coalitions from forming by pursuing vertical integration of potential coalition members. We explore a variety of bargaining situations and show that the ability to encourage or thwart coalition formation is an important managerial tool.

Debate in management research on the status of the opportunity construct is now more than a decade old. We argue that the debate has led to little additional insight in entrepreneurship, and we develop the case for abandoning the construct altogether. Uncertainty is central to entrepreneurship and innovation yet absent from opportunity-based approaches. We offer instead a judgment-based approach of entrepreneurship that revolves around the nexus of resource heterogeneity and uncertainty and is operationalized in the beliefs-actions-results (BAR) framework.

Entrepreneurship has emerged as a major research theme across a number of disciplines and fields, including the industrial dynamics tradition. Entrepreneurship is often seen as closely linked to firms and firm formation. However, the links between economic organization and entrepreneurship are unclear. Do entrepreneurs always need firms to realize their plans? If so, why? Can firms be “entrepreneurial”? If so, what is the difference between an entrepreneurial and a non-entrepreneurial firm? More broadly, how can entrepreneurship be informed by the theory of the firm and vice versa? These foundational issues in both the theory of the firm and the field of entrepreneurship have not been resolved. This dialogue between two scholars who have worked at the intersection of entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm for more than 20 years addresses such key questions as: What is the meaning of “uncertainty” and what is its role? What are the features and roles of resources? How are resources linked to property rights and the firm? On what basis can we say that firms differ in the extent to which they are “entrepreneurial”?

While considerable research interest has been devoted to university governance (i.e., the allocation of authority overdecisions in a university), little is known about the formation and content of university strategy and how it relates touniversity governance and organization. To further our knowledge about university strategy and its relation to universitygovernance, we undertake a process study of the emergence of strategies for the organization of research workat one of the largest business schools in the world, the Copenhagen Business School (CBS), in the period 1987 to2009. We find that CBS strategy processes in this period followed a “guided evolution” model, in which the top manager(president) invited bottom-up (research) initiatives, and supported selected ones. Such processes are likely toarise in, and be appropriate for, organizations that are characterized by considerable ambiguity, unclear/vague input/output measures, conflicting interests, and substantial heterogeneity in activities, as exemplified by universities. Wediscuss the benefits and costs of the guided evolution approach.

Provides the first systematic treatment of property rights ideas as they apply to strategy Explores the concept of micro-foundations as they relate to management and organizational theory Examines the property rights approach to firm strategy

The purpose of this article is to reinvigorate research in the intersection of corporate strategy and the theory of the firm in light of the rapid advancement of digital technologies. Using the theory of the firm as an interpretive lens, we focus our analysis on the implications of the emerging digital age for three broad domains of corporate strategy: (1) corporate (competitive) advantage, (2) firm scale, scope, and boundaries, and (3) internal structure and design. Recognizing that digitalization exacerbates ambiguity and paradoxes, we sketch foundational strategies for future research. We suggest that there is a need to develop knowledge that accounts for the new realities of the digital age, depending on whether the corporate strategy phenomena under investigation and the theories of the firm used to explain them, are existing or new. The article serves also as introduction to the Journal of Management Studies Special Issue on the topic.

What is now called the judgment-based approach to entrepreneurship (JBA) has a rich pedigree in Austrian economics and continues to grow rapidly in that tradition as well as in various research fields in business and management. The JBA has also attracted some criticisms. Frédéric Sautet’s recent review essay is an example. Sautet’s main concern is that the JBA rejects Israel Kirzner’s alertness/discovery approach which, in Sautet’s view, provides a more compelling basis for theorizing. Unfortunately, we do not find Sautet’s criticisms of the JBA convincing. They frequently ignore our arguments about entrepreneurial judgment and its manifestation in the business firm, fail to address our criticisms of the alertness/discovery approach, and are rooted in a flawed understanding of the history of economic thought.

The taxation of the multinational enterprise (MNE) has been a continuing concern for policymakers. We argue that the changing nature of the mobile MNE (e.g., its improved ability to fine-slice the value chain and disperse it geographically) makes it increasingly important to rethink current tax policies. First, there should be more focus on the inefficiencies that arise when taxation leads to the inefficient location of MNE activities. Thus, MNEs may shift activities to low-tax jurisdictions that offer lucrative pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives, but do not enable their investments to maximize their contribution to global value creation. Second, international tax regimes should ensure that MNEs pay for their consumption of local public goods, and public finance scholars have long known that the taxation-based distortions are minimized when the tax objects are immobile. However, the bulk of current tax policies are aimed at corporate profits that are both poor proxies for the consumption of local public goods as well as extremely mobile. Integrating theory from international business, public finance and economic geography, our analysis demonstrates that moving the incidence of taxation from corporate profits to dividends and consumption would unambiguously improve both wealth creation and efficiency.

Microfoundations have become an important theme in recent macro-management research. However, the international management (IM) field is an exception to this. We document the lack of attention on microfoundations in IM research by focusing on knowledge sharing – a key IM research field – which we investigate by means of a keyword-based literature study of the leading IM and general management journals. We discuss possible reasons why microfoundations have so far met with less resonance in IM research. We point to the training and background of IM scholars as possible reasons. We also highlight the significance that IM scholars place on context and structure in explanation. These may be seen as contrary to a microfoundations perspective, a view that we show is incorrect. We end by identifying several microfoundational issues in IM research, calling for a sustained effort with respect to theory, heuristics, and empirics.

Elert and Henrekson (2019) draw important connections between Austrian economics and the Schumpeterian literatures on “development blocs” and “the experimentally organized economy.” We appreciate their emphasis on experimentation and think that Austrian ideas on the time structure of production and the multiple specificities of capital offer complementary insights into why production is likely to be clustered, localized, and path-dependent. While we agree that Austrian economics can benefit from a “meso” level of analysis between individuals and market outcomes, we do not think their proposed Experimentally Organized Economy framework adds much to existing Austrian theory and policy analysis. We also suggest that, by focusing on Kirzner’s entrepreneurial discovery approach, Elert and Henrekson miss other Austrian approaches to entrepreneurship that can better inform their analysis.

Research Summary: The global strategy literature highlights the role of headquarters (HQ) in realizing global integration benefits while enabling independent subsidiary strategic initiatives. We construct a game‐theoretic model of the interaction between HQ and subsidiaries, and, building on procedural justice theory, we analyze the motivational costs that can result from the anticipation or realization of HQ intervention in subsidiary initiatives. We also analyze the implications for MNC‐level value creation when HQ managers, fearing subsidiary managers’ emotion‐based reactions, refrain from intervening. We derive a number of counter‐intuitive results, for example, that good HQ behavior may involve forgoing opportunities for value creation, and that procedural justice systems may sometimes be counterproductive.Managerial Summary: Headquarters (HQ) in multinational corporations are required to balance global integration and local autonomy within the organization. This balancing act sometimes requires HQ to intervene in subsidiary matters and to overrule the subunits’ decisions. While an intervention might create integration advantages, it may also have a negative impact on the motivation of subsidiary managers, who might feel that their effort and their decisions are overruled. We focus on such motivational issues and investigate how fair decision‐making processes applied by the HQ influence subsidiaries’ entrepreneurial behavior and their reactions to the overruling. Our findings show that, under specific conditions, HQ need to forgo value‐creating interventions, and that a strong focus on a procedural justice culture within the firm can be detrimental.

Online communities have emerged as important organizational forms, but there are many gaps in our understanding. In particular, researchers have mainly focused on individual-level drivers of behaviors in communities, while downplaying (formal, informal) context at various levels. We theorize that different dimensions of context (i.e. omnibus and discrete context) influence decision-making in online communities through mechanisms involving community members’ attention. Specifically, context influences which problems members perceive and which solutions they retrieve and apply, thereby shaping the process of matching solutions and problems. We derive four hypotheses about contribution behaviors in online communities and how such behaviors are influenced by context. The empirical setting for our study is the open-source software community. We find support for our hypotheses in a unique dataset that captures the behavior of 24,057 community members who used the SourceForge.net online platform from 2000 to 2002.

Microfoundations have been one of the key themes in strategy research over the last decade or so. Fundamentally, microfoundations seek to understand collective (e.g., firm)-level constructs in terms of the actions and interactions of individuals. This chapter briefly discusses the nature of microfoundations, provides an exposition of the microfoundational currents in contemporary strategy thinking, and discusses the key challenges that need to be addressed to advance microfoundational research. Chief among these challenges are the development and application of proper empirical methods and developing models of decision-making that are particularly relevant in a strategy context. The latter task involves going beyond expected utility or bounded rationality models and developing models that can address genuine (“deep”) uncertainty.

We study what determines delegation of authority over innovation decisions in firms. Extant research that addresses this topic in an open innovation context, suggests that firms that engage in open innovation tend to delegate authority over innovation decisions. We provide a more nuanced argument that considers important contingencies. Thus, we argue that the extent of delegation depends upon the combined effect of the relative importance of innovation decisions to the firm's strategy and, when a firm engages in open innovation, on the nature of the external knowledge (scientific vs. practical) that it seeks to absorb from the external environment. We test our hypotheses on data from a double-respondent survey of Danish firms that we link to Community Innovation Survey data and to the Danish Integrated Database for Labor Market Research. We provide econometric results that support our hypotheses.

Capitalism, characterized by private ownership, coordination through markets, and decentralization, is blamed for a variety of economic, environmental, and social ills. These critiques often confuse capitalism with cronyism, a system of government favoritism toward particular firms. We show how this confusion harms management research, teaching, and practice.