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On August 29, 2021, the United States government oversaw the emergent establishment of Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), led by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and implemented by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Department of State (DoS), to safely resettle U.S. citizens and Afghan nationals from Afghanistan to the United States. Evacuees were temporarily housed at several overseas locations in Europe and Asia* before being transported via military and charter flights through two U.S. international airports, and onward to eight U.S. military bases

To determine prevalence of, seroprevalence of, and potential exposure to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) among a cohort of evacuees returning to the United States from Wuhan, China, in January 2020, we conducted a cross-sectional study of quarantined evacuees from 1 repatriation flight. Overall, 193 of 195 evacuees completed exposure surveys and submitted upper respiratory or serum specimens or both at arrival in the United States. Nearly all evacuees had taken preventive measures to limit potential exposure while in Wuhan, and none had detectable SARS-CoV-2 in upper respiratory tract specimens, suggesting the absence of asymptomatic respiratory shedding among this group at the time of testing. Evidence of antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 was detected in 1 evacuee, who reported experiencing no symptoms or high-risk exposures in the previous 2 months. These findings demonstrated that this group of evacuees posed a low risk of introducing SARS-CoV-2 to the United States.

BackgroundThe Diamond Princess cruise ship was the site of a large outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Of 437 Americans and their travel companions on the ship, 114 (26%) tested positive for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2).MethodsWe interviewed 229 American passengers and crew after disembarkation following a ship-based quarantine to identify risk factors for infection and characterize transmission onboard the ship.ResultsThe attack rate for passengers in single-person cabins or without infected cabinmates was 18% (58/329), compared with 63% (27/43) for those sharing a cabin with an asymptomatic infected cabinmate, and 81% (25/31) for those with a symptomatic infected cabinmate. Whole genome sequences from specimens from passengers who shared cabins clustered together. Of 66 SARS-CoV-2-positive American travelers with complete symptom information, 14 (21%) were asymptomatic while on the ship. Among SARS-CoV-2-positive Americans, 10 (9%) required intensive care, of whom 7 were ≥70 years.ConclusionsOur findings highlight the high risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission on cruise ships. High rates of SARS-CoV-2 positivity in cabinmates of individuals with asymptomatic infections suggest that triage by symptom status in shared quarters is insufficient to halt transmission. A high rate of intensive care unit admission among older individuals complicates the prospect of future cruise travel during the pandemic, given typical cruise passenger demographics. The magnitude and severe outcomes of this outbreak were major factors contributing to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s decision to halt cruise ship travel in US waters in March 2020.

An estimated 30 million passengers are transported on 272 cruise ships worldwide each year* (1). Cruise ships bring diverse populations into proximity for many days, facilitating transmission of respiratory illness (2). SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease (COVID-19) was first identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 and has since spread worldwide to at least 187 countries and territories. Widespread COVID-19 transmission on cruise ships has been reported as well (3). Passengers on certain cruise ship voyages might be aged ≥65 years, which places them at greater risk for severe consequences of SARS-CoV-2 infection (4). During February-March 2020, COVID-19 outbreaks associated with three cruise ship voyages have caused more than 800 laboratory-confirmed cases among passengers and crew, including 10 deaths. Transmission occurred across multiple voyages of several ships. This report describes public health responses to COVID-19 outbreaks on these ships. COVID-19 on cruise ships poses a risk for rapid spread of disease, causing outbreaks in a vulnerable population, and aggressive efforts are required to contain spread. All persons should defer all cruise travel worldwide during the COVID-19 pandemic.

During the 2014-2016 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic in West Africa, CDC implemented travel and border health measures to prevent international spread of the disease, educate and protect travelers and communities, and minimize disruption of international travel and trade. CDC staff provided in-country technical assistance for exit screening in countries in West Africa with Ebola outbreaks, implemented an enhanced entry risk assessment and management program for travelers at U.S. ports of entry, and disseminated information and guidance for specific groups of travelers and relevant organizations. New and existing partnerships were crucial to the success of this response, including partnerships with international organizations, such as the World Health Organization, the International Organization for Migration, and nongovernment organizations, as well as domestic partnerships with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and state and local health departments. Although difficult to assess, travel and border health measures might have helped control the epidemic's spread in West Africa by deterring or preventing travel by symptomatic or exposed persons and by educating travelers about protecting themselves. Enhanced entry risk assessment at U.S. airports facilitated management of travelers after arrival, including the recommended active monitoring. These measures also reassured airlines, shipping companies, port partners, and travelers that travel was safe and might have helped maintain continued flow of passenger traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected region. Travel and border health measures implemented in the countries with Ebola outbreaks laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts related to borders and travel, including development of regional surveillance systems, cross-border coordination, and implementation of core capacities at designated official points of entry in accordance with the International Health Regulations (2005). New mechanisms developed during this response to target risk assessment and management of travelers arriving in the United States may enhance future public health responses. The activities summarized in this report would not have been possible without collaboration with many U.S. and international partners (http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/partners.html).

Objective.CDC routinely conducts contact investigations involving travelers on commercial conveyances, such as aircrafts, cargo vessels, and cruise ships.Methods.The agency used established systems of communication and partnerships with other federal agencies to quickly provide accurate traveler contact information to states and jurisdictions to alert contacts of potential exposure to two travelers with Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) who had entered the United States on commercial flights in April and May 2014.Results.Applying the same process used to trace and notify travelers during routine investigations, such as those for tuberculosis or measles, CDC was able to notify most travelers of their potential exposure to MERS-CoV during the first few days of each investigation.Conclusion.To prevent the introduction and spread of newly emerging infectious diseases, travelers need to be located and contacted quickly.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Quarantine Stations distribute select lifesaving drug products that are not commercially available or are in limited supply in the United States for emergency treatment of certain health conditions. Following a retrospective analysis of shipment records, the authors estimated an average of 6.66 hours saved per shipment when drug products were distributed from quarantine stations compared to a hypothetical centralized site from CDC headquarters in Atlanta, GA. This evaluation supports the continued use of a decentralized model which leverages CDC’s regional presence and maximizes efficiency in the distribution of lifesaving drugs.

To achieve compliance with the revised World Health Organization International Health Regulations (IHR 2005), countries must be able to rapidly prevent, detect, and respond to public health threats. Most nations, however, remain unprepared to manage and control complex health emergencies, whether due to natural disasters, emerging infectious disease outbreaks, or the inadvertent or intentional release of highly pathogenic organisms. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) works with countries and partners to build and strengthen global health security preparedness so they can quickly respond to public health crises. This report highlights selected CDC global health protection platform accomplishments that help mitigate global health threats and build core, cross-cutting capacity to identify and contain disease outbreaks at their source. CDC contributions support country efforts to achieve IHR 2005 compliance, contribute to the international framework for countering infectious disease crises, and enhance health security for Americans and populations around the world.

The first ever case of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was reported in September 2012. This report describes the approaches taken by CDC, in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other partners, to respond to this novel virus, and outlines the agency responses prior to the first case appearing in the United States in May 2014. During this time, CDC's response integrated multiple disciplines and was divided into three distinct phases: before, during, and after the initial activation of its Emergency Operations Center. CDC's response to MERS-CoV required a large effort, deploying at least 353 staff members who worked in the areas of surveillance, laboratory capacity, infection control guidance, and travelers' health. This response built on CDC's experience with previous outbreaks of other pathogens and provided useful lessons for future emerging threats.

Our traveler-based estimate was 2.3-fold higher than the number of laboratory-confirmed cases recorded., Using data from travelers to 4 countries in the Middle East, we estimated 3,250 (95% CI 1,300–6,600) severe cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome occurred in this region during September 2012–January 2016. This number is 2.3-fold higher than the number of laboratory-confirmed cases recorded in these countries.

In 2012, an outbreak of infection with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), was detected in the Arabian Peninsula. Modeling can produce estimates of the expected annual number of symptomatic cases of MERS-CoV infection exported and the likelihood of exportation from source countries in the Middle East to countries outside the region.

This report highlights the first two cases of MERS coronavirus in the United States. Although these patients were not transplant recipients, it is important for transplant professionals to be aware of this infection and to consider it when evaluating patients with respiratory illnesses and travel to the Arabian peninsula.

Inhalation anthrax occurred in a man who vacationed in 4 US states where anthrax is enzootic. Despite an extensive multi-agency investigation, the specific source was not detected, and no additional related human or animal cases were found. Although rare, inhalation anthrax can occur naturally in the United States.

Bacillus anthracis was identified in a 61-year-old man hospitalized in Minnesota, USA. Cooperation between the hospital and the state health agency enhanced prompt identification of the pathogen. Treatment comprising antimicrobial drugs, anthrax immune globulin, and pleural drainage led to full recovery; however, the role of passive immunization in anthrax treatment requires further evaluation.

Zika virus is a flavivirus transmitted primarily by Aedes species mosquitoes. Increasing evidence links Zika virus infection during pregnancy to adverse pregnancy and birth outcomes, including pregnancy loss, intrauterine growth restriction, eye defects, congenital brain abnormalities, and other fetal abnormalities. The virus has also been determined to be sexually transmitted. Because of the potential risks associated with Zika virus infection during pregnancy, CDC has recommended that health care providers discuss prevention of unintended pregnancy with women and couples who reside in areas of active Zika virus transmission and do not want to become pregnant. However, limitations in access to contraception in some of these areas might affect the ability to prevent an unintended pregnancy. As of March 16, 2016, the highest number of Zika virus disease cases in the United States and U.S. territories were reported from Puerto Rico. The number of cases will likely rise with increasing mosquito activity in affected areas, resulting in increased risk for transmission to pregnant women. High rates of unintended and adolescent pregnancies in Puerto Rico suggest that, in the context of this outbreak, access to contraception might need to be improved. CDC estimates that 138,000 women of reproductive age (aged 15-44 years) in Puerto Rico do not desire pregnancy and are not using one of the most effective or moderately effective contraceptive methods, and therefore might experience an unintended pregnancy. CDC and other federal and local partners are seeking to expand access to contraception for these persons. Such efforts have the potential to increase contraceptive access and use, reduce unintended pregnancies, and lead to fewer adverse pregnancy and birth outcomes associated with Zika virus infection during pregnancy. The assessment of challenges and resources related to contraceptive access in Puerto Rico might be a useful model for other areas with active transmission of Zika virus.

Before the current Ebola epidemic in West Africa, there were few documented cases of symptomatic Ebola patients traveling by commercial airline, and no evidence of transmission to passengers or crew members during airline travel. In July 2014 two persons with confirmed Ebola virus infection who were infected early in the Nigeria outbreak traveled by commercial airline while symptomatic, involving a total of four flights (two international flights and two Nigeria domestic flights). It is not clear what symptoms either of these two passengers experienced during flight; however, one collapsed in the airport shortly after landing, and the other was documented to have fever, vomiting, and diarrhea on the day the flight arrived. Neither infected passenger transmitted Ebola to other passengers or crew on these flights. In October 2014, another airline passenger, a U.S. health care worker who had traveled domestically on two commercial flights, was confirmed to have Ebola virus infection. Given that the time of onset of symptoms was uncertain, an Ebola airline contact investigation in the United States was conducted. In total, follow-up was conducted for 268 contacts in nine states, including all 247 passengers from both flights, 12 flight crew members, eight cleaning crew members, and one federal airport worker (81 of these contacts were documented in a report published previously). All contacts were accounted for by state and local jurisdictions and followed until completion of their 21-day incubation periods. No secondary cases of Ebola were identified in this investigation, confirming that transmission of Ebola during commercial air travel did not occur.

In response to the largest recognized Ebola virus disease epidemic now occurring in West Africa, the governments of affected countries, CDC, the World Health Organization (WHO), and other international organizations have collaborated to implement strategies to control spread of the virus. One strategy recommended by WHO calls for countries with Ebola transmission to screen all persons exiting the country for "unexplained febrile illness consistent with potential Ebola infection." Exit screening at points of departure is intended to reduce the likelihood of international spread of the virus. To initiate this strategy, CDC, WHO, and other global partners were invited by the ministries of health of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to assist them in developing and implementing exit screening procedures. Since the program began in August 2014, an estimated 80,000 travelers, of whom approximately 12,000 were en route to the United States, have departed by air from the three countries with Ebola transmission. Procedures were implemented to deny boarding to ill travelers and persons who reported a high risk for exposure to Ebola; no international air traveler from these countries has been reported as symptomatic with Ebola during travel since these procedures were implemented.

Zika virus is a mosquito-borne flavivirus primarily transmitted by Aedes aegypti mosquitoes (1,2). Infection with Zika virus is asymptomatic in an estimated 80% of cases (2,3), and when Zika virus does cause illness, symptoms are generally mild and self-limited. Recent evidence suggests a possible association between maternal Zika virus infection and adverse fetal outcomes, such as congenital microcephaly (4,5), as well as a possible association with Guillain-Barré syndrome. Currently, no vaccine or medication exists to prevent or treat Zika virus infection. Persons residing in or traveling to areas of active Zika virus transmission should take steps to prevent Zika virus infection through prevention of mosquito bites (http://www.cdc.gov/zika/prevention/).

Introduction:The [US] Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act (the WMD Act of 1996) heralded a new wave of spending by the federal government on counter-terrorism efforts. Between 1996 and 2000, the United States of America (US) federal government allocated large sums of funding to the States for bioterrorism preparedness. Distribution of these funds between institutions involved in first-responder care (e.g., fire and safety departments) and hospitals was uneven. It is unknown whether these additional funds had an impact on the level of hospital preparedness for managing mass casualties involving hazardous materials at the local level, including potential terrorist attacks with chemical agents.Objectives:(1) To compare 1996 and 2000 measures of preparedness among hospitals of a major US metropolitan area for dealing with hazardous material casualties, including terrorism that involved the use of weapons of mass destruction; and (2) To provide guidance for the improvement of emergency preparedness and response in US hospitals.Methods:In July 1996 and again in July 2000, 21 hospitals in one major US city were surveyed by questionnaire. A survey was used to assess the amounts of antidote stocks held available for treatment of casualties caused by toxic chemical agents and institutional response capabilities including the number of showers for decontaminating patients, the level of worker protection, and the number of staff trained to decontaminate patients.Results:Hospital preparedness for treating and decontaminating patients exposed to toxic chemical agents was inadequate in 1996 and in 2000. From 1996 to 2000, there was no statistically significant change in the lack of hospital preparedness for stocking of nerve agent and cyanide antidotes. Capacity for decontamination of patients, which included appropriate hazardous material infrastructure and trained staff, generally was unimproved from 1996 to 2000 with the exception of an increase of nearly 30% in hospitals with at least one decontamination shower facility.Conclusion:Hospitals surveyed in this study were poorly prepared to manage chemical emergency incidents, including terrorism. This lack of hospital preparedness did not change significantly between 1996 and 2000 despite increased funds allocated to bioterrorism preparedness at the local level.

Twenty minutes ago, terrorists releasedwhat was probably a weaponized bio-logical or chemical agent in a largecity. Those affected seem to be withinabout a 12-square-block area. Despiteofficial advice to stay calm and toavoid medical facilities unless ill orinjured, the entire city panics.On what appears to be the edge ofthe exposure area, the 4-year-old Smittboy has become ill. Other family mem-bers fear that they have been exposedto the agent but are not yet showingsymptoms. They all head to the hos-pital, afraid for their lives.At the city’s emergency depart-ments (EDs), clinicians have realizedthat the symptoms seem to be cholin-ergic (a syndrome that producessweating, tearing, and diarrhea andis a common effect of chemical war-fare agents) and of relatively rapidonset, ruling out most biological agentsas the cause. Together, the city’s hos-pitals have enough resources to pro-vide potentially lifesaving treatmentto about 150 moderately ill or 50 seri-ously ill people. No one can estimatehow long it will be until additionalmedications and equipment arrive; itwill at least be many hours, or longer,if other areas have also been affected.Patients crowd the EDs claiming tohave symptoms, although many ofthem clearly are not (yet) ill. TheSmitts demand treatment for theirchild and medication that is pre-sumed to be prophylactic forthemselves.Many fire, police, and emergencymedical system (EMS) personnel arerequesting supplies of Mark 1 kits(nerve agent antidotes in autoinjec-tors), but they are in very short supply.The hospitals’ ethics committees,which have never discussed this issue,are attempting conference calls to for-mulate recommendations, but, withcommunications tied up, have not yetbeen able to do so.

The U.S. fully implemented the International Health Regulations and submitted 59 potential Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC) to WHO since 2007. The 2009 H1N1influenza pandemic, first notified as required notification of a novel strain of influenza by the U.S., is the only event determined to be a PHEIC by WHO to date. The public health impact of information sharing of PHEICs on a secure IHR website or of direct exchanges between trusted IHR National Focal Points is not known. However, a shared platform and assessment tool has facilitated notifications across national borders.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention convened panels of anthrax experts to review and update guidelines for anthrax postexposure prophylaxis and treatment. The panels included civilian and military anthrax experts and clinicians with experience treating anthrax patients. Specialties represented included internal medicine, pediatrics, obstetrics, infectious disease, emergency medicine, critical care, pulmonology, hematology, and nephrology. Panelists discussed recent patients with systemic anthrax; reviews of published, unpublished, and proprietary data regarding antimicrobial drugs and anthrax antitoxins; and critical care measures of potential benefit to patients with anthrax. This article updates antimicrobial postexposure prophylaxis and antimicrobial and antitoxin treatment options and describes potentially beneficial critical care measures for persons with anthrax, including clinical procedures for infected nonpregnant adults. Changes from previous guidelines include an expanded discussion of critical care and clinical procedures and additional antimicrobial choices, including preferred antimicrobial drug treatment for possible anthrax meningitis.

The US Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise convened subject matter experts at the 2010 HHS Burkholderia Workshop to develop consensus recommendations for postexposure prophylaxis against and treatment for Burkholderia pseudomallei and B. mallei infections, which cause melioidosis and glanders, respectively. Drugs recommended by consensus of the participants are ceftazidime or meropenem for initial intensive therapy, and trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole or amoxicillin/clavulanic acid for eradication therapy. For postexposure prophylaxis, recommended drugs are trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole or co-amoxiclav. To improve the timely diagnosis of melioidosis and glanders, further development and wide distribution of rapid diagnostic assays were also recommended. Standardized animal models and B. pseudomallei strains are needed for further development of therapeutic options. Training for laboratory technicians and physicians would facilitate better diagnosis and treatment options.

Deliberate dissemination of a biological agent via several different routes presents the latest challenge to global public health security. Novel pathogens and transmission methods can easily be exploited to cause disease outbreaks. Advancements in molecular biology that make it possible to genetically modify, edit, or disrupt the genome of pathogens increase the disease risk of an accidental or intentional release of pathogens with pandemic potential. The occurrence of a disease at more than an endemic level may stimulate an investigation to determine the source of the disease, who has the disease, when it occurred, and how it spreads. When intentional release of pathogens is suspected, investigators have the additional task of attributing the outbreak not only to a pathogen but also to a human source. The deliberate nature of such dissemination may be obvious. However, some forms of bioterrorism may be more covert, requiring molecular methods to uncover. The field of microbial forensics emerged following the anthrax attack in the United States in 2001 to extend epidemiologic principles to aid in the investigation of bioterrorism incidents. Microbial forensics combines epidemiology with genomic and microbiologic methods, to identify, characterize, and ascribe the cause of an incident resulting from the intentional or unintentional release of a harmful pathogen. Unlike routine epidemiologic investigations, microbial forensic investigations are undertaken when there is a potential crime due to the release of a pathogen with disease-causing potential. The investigation is conducted to attribute cause to a source based on indisputable evidence and is used to support criminal charges against the perpetrator(s). However, because bioterrorism may be unannounced, the initial investigation will start the same as to any public health incident of concern. This chapter discusses how epidemiology integrated with laboratory science can be used to identify the source of diseases caused by microorganisms or toxins—especially for attribution purposes.

The development of mass dispensing clinics and mass vaccination clinics should be incorporated into community disaster plans. Federal assistance in the event of a large-scale public health emergency requiring mass antibiotic prophylaxis or vaccination includes obtaining necessary medications from several sources. In the United States, the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is a federally managed supply of antibiotics, vaccines, antitoxins, antivirals, medical supplies, and equipment that is available to affected areas once local, state, or regional supplies are depleted or systems are overwhelmed. Points of dispensing (PODs) operation are the mechanisms available for dispensing medication or administering vaccines to large population after a catastrophic event. Medication-related adverse events may be seen in varying numbers in a mass dispensing or mass vaccination campaign. Each POD location should have the appropriate equipment such as forklifts or pallet jacks to move deliveries as well as sufficient equipment to provide cold chain storage as needed.

Objectives: To assess the change in prevalence of bioterrorism training among emergency medicine (EM) residencies from 1998 to 2005, to characterize current training, and to identify characteristics of programs that have implemented more intensive training methods. Methods: This was a national cross sectional survey of the 133 U.S. EM residencies participating in the 2005 National Resident Matching Program; comparison with a baseline survey from 1998 was performed. Types of training provided were assessed, and programs using experiential methods were identified. Results: Of 112 programs (84.2%) responding, 98% reported formal training in bioterrorism, increased from 53% (40/76) responding in 1998. In 2005, most programs with bioterrorism training (65%) used at least three methods of instruction, mostly lectures (95%) and disaster drills (80%). Fewer programs used experiential methods such as field exercises or bioterrorism-specific rotations (35% and 13%, respectively). Compared with other programs, residency programs with more complex, experiential methods were more likely to teach bioterrorism-related topics at least twice a year (83% vs. 59%; p = 0.018), to teach at least three topics (60% vs. 40%; p = 0.02), and to report funding for bioterrorism research and education (74% vs. 45%; p = 0.007). Experiential and nonexperiential programs were similar in program type (university or nonuniversity), length of program, number of residents, geographic location, and urban or rural setting. Conclusions: Training of EM residents in bioterrorism preparedness has increased markedly since 1998. However, training is often of low intensity, relying mainly on nonexperiential instruction such as lectures. Although current recommendations are that training in bioterrorism include experiential learning experiences, the authors found the rate of these experiences to be low.

The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NSP) program was created as a national resource and is an essential response component of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC's) larger Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Initiative. The role of the NPS program is to maintain a national repository of life-saving pharmaceuticals and medical supplies that can be delivered to communities in the event of a biological or chemical terrorist attack or an event involving mass casualties. The NPS is to be a re-supply and backup mechanism to state and local emergency response. Before a decision is made to deploy NPS assets, CDC will collaborate with local, state, and federal officials to determine the nature and extent of the event. Once the federal decision to deploy NPS assets is made, CDC's NPS program will arrange for delivery of assets to reach the affected area within 12 hours.

Resource management is a critical component of disaster preparedness and response. The type and quantity of resources and supplies needed by any particular community will be determined by several factors including the disasters affecting the community, existing resources within the community, resources available from neighboring communities, and the vulnerability assessment of a community. Ideally only needed resources should be requested and delivered. Unsolicited aid can often hamper an emergency response. The needs of a community will change during a disaster. Often the immediate need focuses on the medical sector. Issues such as hygiene, water and shelter will occur later. Disaster planning and logistical management of resources should not only consider the short-term needs of the community but also the long-term consequences of a disaster on the community.

The threat of domestic and international terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction-terrorism (WMD-T) has become an increasing public health concern for US citizens. WMD-T events may have a major effect on many societal sectors but particularly on the health care delivery system. Anticipated medical problems might include the need for large quantities of medical equipment and supplies, as well as capable and unaffected health care providers. In the setting of WMD-T, triage may bear little resemblance to the standard approach to civilian triage. To address these issues to the maximum benefit of our patients, we must first develop collective forethought and a broad-based consensus that these decisions must reach beyond the hospital emergency department. Critical decisions like these should not be made on an individual case-by-case basis. Physicians should never be placed in a position of individually deciding to deny treatment to patients without the guidance of a policy or protocol. Emergency physicians, however, may easily find themselves in a situation in which the demand for resources clearly exceeds supply. It is for this reason that emergency care providers, personnel, hospital administrators, religious leaders, and medical ethics committees need to engage in bioethical decision making before an acute bioterrorist event.

The article by Nordin et al. (1) in this issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases describes the use of syndromic surveillance to detect inhalational anthrax resulting from a hypothetical covert release of Bacillus anthracis spores at a major shopping mall. This study is an important evaluation of syndromic surveillance's utility in detecting an inhalational anthrax epidemic against a background of real patient presentations. Based on historical clinical data from a large health maintenance organization (HMO), the authors evaluated the sensitivity of a syndromic surveillance system to detect an incident by season of the year, day of the week when the release occurred, and attack rate in mall patrons. Although numbers of persons exposed and becoming ill, as modeled in the study, are not specified, the effect can be inferred from the specified methods. On the basis of information from the mall's Web site (2) and the methods stated in the article, the number of cases associated with a 15% attack rate in mall visitors (115,000 daily average) and workers (12,000) would be ≈19,000 (if no additional exposures occurred after day of release). Of these patients, 59% would be from the metropolitan area in which the mall was located, an additional 6% would reside within a 150-mile radius of the metropolitan area, and the remainder would be from more distant points, including international visitors. Syndromic surveillance, with the HMO patient database, would detect 50% of such incidents by day 5, with only 20% detected by day 4. Lesser attack rates would notably lower the probability of detection. Even more problematic, the syndromic surveillance systems, as modeled, would fail to detect the outbreak in 13% of releases in summer and 47% of releases in winter. Performance would improve markedly with higher attack rates. After detection of an aberrant signal, the occurrence of a syndrome must be investigated to determine the cause, and exposure history of patients must be determined to discover the source. These investigations could result in additional delay before a targeted response could be mounted to prevent more illnesses. Such delays are problematic because the effectiveness of postexposure prophylaxis for inhalational anthrax is related to speed of implementation (3). The authors point out that an astute clinician might diagnose inhalational anthrax in a patient before syndromic surveillance detected that an outbreak of some type was occurring. If, as the 15% attack rate scenario suggests, >100 patients had onset of illness on day 2 after exposure, a correct diagnosis could be established for at least 1 patient by day 4. By this time, hundreds of inhalational anthrax patients would be seen at hospitals, at least 1 day before the syndromic surveillance system, as modeled, would have a 50% probability of signaling the outbreak. The issue now becomes whether or not syndromic surveillance can augment the public health response to an outbreak. For example, if a syndromic surveillance system allowed follow-up of individual cases, it might accelerate case finding and investigation into the source of infection. This potential role of syndromic surveillance was not included in the modeled scenario. Syndromic surveillance systems, of the type modeled by Nordin et al., may be too slow to allow public health officials and policy makers to mount a sufficiently rapid postexposure prophylaxis campaign. Therefore, the ability of many current syndromic surveillance systems to rapidly detect bioterrorist attacks needs to be improved. Another reason to improve syndromic surveillance systems is that the systems may have public health value other than detecting bioterrorist attacks, such as tracking the course of seasonal diseases. We should not forget, however, that clinical care providers will continue to have a critical role in detecting bioterrorist attacks, and communications must be maintained with these first-line sentinels.