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This work studies Stackelberg network interdiction games -- an important class of games in which a defender first allocates (randomized) defense resources to a set of critical nodes on a graph while an adversary chooses its path to attack these nodes accordingly. We consider a boundedly rational adversary in which the adversary's response model is based on a dynamic form of classic logit-based discrete choice models. We show that the problem of finding an optimal interdiction strategy for the defender in the rational setting is NP-hard. The resulting optimization is in fact non-convex and additionally, involves complex terms that sum over exponentially many paths. We tackle these computational challenges by presenting new efficient approximation algorithms with bounded solution guarantees. First, we address the exponentially-many-path challenge by proposing a polynomial-time dynamic programming-based formulation. We then show that the gradient of the non-convex objective can also be computed in polynomial time, which allows us to use a gradient-based method to solve the problem efficiently. Second, we identify a restricted problem that is convex and hence gradient-based methods find the global optimal solution for this restricted problem. We further identify mild conditions under which this restricted problem provides a bounded approximation for the original problem.

Recent research on vulnerabilities of deep reinforcement learning (RL) has shown that adversarial policies adopted by an adversary agent can influence a target RL agent (victim agent) to perform poorly in a multi-agent environment. In existing studies, adversarial policies are directly trained based on experiences of interacting with the victim agent. There is a key shortcoming of this approach; knowledge derived from historical interactions may not be properly generalized to unexplored policy regions of the victim agent, making the trained adversarial policy significantly less effective. In this work, we design a new effective adversarial policy learning algorithm that overcomes this shortcoming. The core idea of our new algorithm is to create a new imitator to imitate the victim agent's policy while the adversarial policy will be trained not only based on interactions with the victim agent but also based on feedback from the imitator to forecast victim's intention. By doing so, we can leverage the capability of imitation learning in well capturing underlying characteristics of the victim policy only based on sample trajectories of the victim. Our victim imitation learning model differs from prior models as the environment's dynamics are driven by adversary's policy and will keep changing during the adversarial policy training. We provide a provable bound to guarantee a desired imitating policy when the adversary's policy becomes stable. We further strengthen our adversarial policy learning by making our imitator a stronger version of the victim. Finally, our extensive experiments using four competitive MuJoCo game environments show that our proposed adversarial policy learning algorithm outperforms state-of-the-art algorithms.

This paper studies the problem of multi-step manipulative attacks in Stackelberg security games, in which a clever attacker attempts to orchestrate its attacks over multiple time steps to mislead the defender's learning of the attacker's behavior. This attack manipulation eventually influences the defender's patrol strategy towards the attacker's benefit. Previous work along this line of research only focuses on one-shot games in which the defender learns the attacker's behavior and then designs a corresponding strategy only once. Our work, on the other hand, investigates the long-term impact of the attacker's manipulation in which current attack and defense choices of players determine the future learning and patrol planning of the defender. This paper has three key contributions. First, we introduce a new multi-step manipulative attack game model that captures the impact of sequential manipulative attacks carried out by the attacker over the entire time horizon. Second, we propose a new algorithm to compute an optimal manipulative attack plan for the attacker, which tackles the challenge of multiple connected optimization components involved in the computation across multiple time steps. Finally, we present extensive experimental results on the impact of such misleading attacks, showing a significant benefit for the attacker and loss for the defender.

Most algorithmic studies on multi-agent information design so far have focused on the restricted situation with no inter-agent externalities; a few exceptions investigated truly strategic games such as zero-sum games and second-price auctions but have all focused only on optimal public signaling. This paper initiates the algorithmic information design of both \emph{public} and \emph{private} signaling in a fundamental class of games with negative externalities, i.e., singleton congestion games, with wide application in today's digital economy, machine scheduling, routing, etc. For both public and private signaling, we show that the optimal information design can be efficiently computed when the number of resources is a constant. To our knowledge, this is the first set of efficient \emph{exact} algorithms for information design in succinctly representable many-player games. Our results hinge on novel techniques such as developing certain "reduced forms" to compactly characterize equilibria in public signaling or to represent players' marginal beliefs in private signaling. When there are many resources, we show computational intractability results. To overcome the issue of multiple equilibria, here we introduce a new notion of equilibrium-\emph{oblivious} hardness, which rules out any possibility of computing a good signaling scheme, irrespective of the equilibrium selection rule., Comment: Accepted to EC'22

The electrostatic potential profile of a spherical soft particle is derived by solving the Poisson-Boltzmann equations on a spherical system both numerically and analytically. The soft particle is assumed to consist of an ion-permeable charged outer layer and a non-permeable charged core with constant charged density. The contribution of the core to the potential profile is calculated for different charges and dielectric constants. Our results show that the charged core heavily influences the local potential within the soft particle. In contrast, the potential distribution outside the particle in the salt solution is found to be weakly dependent on the core features. These findings are consistent with previous experiments showing the minor impact of the core of the MS2 virus on its overall electrical properties. Our studies also indicate that while a change in temperature from 290 K to 310 K only slightly varies the potential, the ionic strength in the range of 1-600 mM has a significant effect on the potential profile. Our studies would provide good understanding for experimental research in the field of biophysics and nanomedicine., Comment: 5 pages, 3 figures