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Visual functions are reviewed that coincide with conscious as opposed to unconscious vision. Four stages of vision are identified, going from the fully invisible, to subjectively invisible, unattended, and clearly visible. It is proposed that feature extraction, categorization, and some aspects of visual inference occur during full and subjective invisibility. Functions related to perceptual organization, such as grouping and figure-ground segregation, occur during inattention as well as full visibility. It is argued that perceptual organization is the function that is central to understanding the transition from unconscious to conscious seeing. It is discussed what this implies for theories of consciousness such as Recurrent Processing Theory, Higher Order Thought Theory, Integrated Information Theory, and Global Neuronal Workspace Theory.

The article deals with the issue of conscious experience. Rather than focusing on the extensive philosophical discussions this article is focusing fully on the findings of empirical science. At the beginning, reader will learn about the historical milestones that have contributed to the acceptance of research of conscious experience as the full-fledged empirical topic. The core of this article, however, is tied to the central question of consciousness research, namely where in the brain we should seek conscious experience. Based on the empirical studies, there are reasons why some neural regions can be considered more important than others in forming consciousness and conscious experience. Finally, this article will discuss the idea that a full-fledged conscious experience consists of two neural mechanisms that must be selectively considered in the future research of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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An important question in neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) studies is whether event-related potential (ERP) component P3 reflects visual awareness or the confidence with which one reports a visual experience. In the present study, participants detected visual stimuli presented at threshold-level contrast, then rated their subjective confidence with respect to their response on a four-point scale (very confident, quite confident, slightly confident, and not confident at all). Because awareness responses in trials with rating of “not confident at all” were likely noise, we analyzed the data excluding those trials. The ERP results revealed a significant positive difference in P3 amplitude between “aware” and “unaware” trials. P3 amplitude was more positive in aware trials compared to unaware trials. Importantly, this pattern was observed for trials with combined confidence ratings of “very confident” and “quite confident,” and for trials with confidence ratings of “slightly confident,” suggesting that awareness alone can modulate P3. A significant interaction between awareness and confidence is reported, suggesting that confidence influences P3 as well. In addition, ERP results revealed that visual awareness negativity (VAN) was observed over posterior temporal and occipital electrodes and largely not influenced by confidence. This result indicated that VAN is an early neural correlate of visual awareness.

An important question in neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) studies is whether event-related potential (ERP) component P3 reflects visual awareness or the confidence with which one reports a visual experience. In the present study, participants detected visual stimuli presented at threshold-level contrast, then rated their subjective confidence with respect to their response on a four-point scale (very confident, quite confident, slightly confident, and not confident at all). Because awareness responses in trials with rating of "not confident at all" were likely noise, we analyzed the data excluding those trials. The ERP results revealed a significant positive difference in P3 amplitude between "aware" and "unaware" trials. P3 amplitude was more positive in aware trials compared to unaware trials. Importantly, this pattern was observed for trials with combined confidence ratings of "very confident" and "quite confident," and for trials with confidence ratings of "slightly confident," suggesting that awareness alone can modulate P3. A significant interaction between awareness and confidence is reported, suggesting that confidence influences P3 as well. In addition, ERP results revealed that visual awareness negativity (VAN) was observed over posterior temporal and occipital electrodes and largely not influenced by confidence. This result indicated that VAN is an early neural correlate of visual awareness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article re-examines Ned Block's (, ) conceptual distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have phenomenally conscious representations without being able to cognitively access them is criticized as not being supported by evidence. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relevant empirical data is offered which leaves the link between phenomenology and accessibility intact. Moreover, it is shown that Block's claim that phenomenology and accessibility have different neural substrates is highly problematic in light of empirical evidence. Finally, his claim that there can be phenomenology without cognitive accessibility is at odds with his endorsement of the 'same-order-theory' of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive brain functions including sensory processing and control of behavior are understood as “neurocomputation” in axonal–dendritic synaptic networks of “integrate-and-fire” neurons. Cognitive neurocomputation with consciousness is accompanied by 30- to 90-Hz gamma synchrony electroencephalography (EEG), and non-conscious neurocomputation is not. Gamma synchrony EEG derives largely from neuronal groups linked by dendritic–dendritic gap junctions, forming transient syncytia (“dendritic webs”) in input/integration layers oriented sideways to axonal–dendritic neurocomputational flow. As gap junctions open and close, a gamma-synchronized dendritic web can rapidly change topology and move through the brain as a spatiotemporal envelope performing collective integration and volitional choices correlating with consciousness. The “conscious pilot” is a metaphorical description for a mobile gamma-synchronized dendritic web as vehicle for a conscious agent/pilot which experiences and assumes control of otherwise non-conscious auto-pilot neurocomputation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our chronically impoverished explanatory capacity in respect of P-consciousness is highly suggestive of a problem with science itself rather than its lack of acquisition of some particular knowledge. The hidden assumption built into science is that science itself is a completed human behaviour. Removal of this assumption is achieved through a simple revision to our science model which is constructed, outlined and named 'dual aspect science' (DAS). It is constructed with reference to existing science being 'single aspect science'. DAS is consistent with and predictive of the very explanatory poverty that generated it and is simultaneously a seamless upgrade; no existing law of nature is altered or lost. The framework is completely empirically self-consistent and is validated empirically. DAS eliminates the behavioural inconsistencies currently inhabiting a world in which single aspect science has been inherited rather than chosen and in which its presuppositions are implemented through habit rather than by scientific examination of options by the scientists actually carrying out science. The proposed DAS framework provides a working vantage point from which an explanation of P-consciousness becomes expected and meaningful. The framework requires that we rediscover what we scientists do and then discover something new about ourselves: that how we have been doing science is not the entire story. Dual aspect science shows us what we have not been doing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: By most accounts, the mind arises from the integrated activity of large populations of neurons distributed across multiple brain regions. A contrasting model is presented in the present paper that places the mind/brain interface not at the whole brain level but at the level of single neurons. Specifically, it is proposed that each neuron in the nervous system is independently conscious, with conscious content corresponding to the spatial pattern of a portion of that neuron''s dendritic electrical activity. For most neurons, such as those in the hypothalamus or posterior sensory cortices, the conscious activity would be assumed to be simple and unable to directly affect the organism''s macroscopic conscious behavior. For a subpopulation of layer 5 pyramidal neurons in the lateral prefrontal cortices, however, an arrangement is proposed to be present such that, at any given moment: (i) the spatial pattern of electrical activity in a portion of the dendritic tree of each neuron in the subpopulation individually manifests a complexity and diversity sufficient to account for the complexity and diversity of conscious experience; (ii) the dendritic trees of the neurons in the subpopulation all contain similar spatial electrical patterns; (iii) the spatial electrical pattern in the dendritic tree of each neuron interacts non-linearly with the remaining ambient dendritic electrical activity to determine the neuron''s overall axonal response; (iv) the dendritic spatial pattern is reexpressed at the population level by the spatial pattern exhibited by a synchronously firing subgroup of the conscious neurons, thereby providing a mechanism by which conscious activity at the neuronal level can influence overall behavior. The resulting scheme is one in which conscious behavior appears to be the product of a single macroscopic mind, but is actually the integrated output of a chorus of minds, each associated with a different neuron. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

It has been shown that P3b is not a signature of perceptual awareness per se but is instead more closely associated with postperceptual processing (Cohen et al., 2020). Here, we seek to investigate whether human participants' attentional states are different in the report and the no-report conditions. This difference in attentional states, if exists, may lead to degraded consciousness of the stimuli in the no-report condition, and it therefore remains unknown whether the disappearance of P3b is because of a lack of reportability or degraded consciousness. Results of our experiment 1 showed that participants did experience degraded contents of consciousness in the no-report condition. However, results of experiment 2 showed that the degraded contents of consciousness did not influence the amplitude of P3b. These findings strengthen the claim that P3b is not a signature of perceptual awareness but is associated with postperceptual processing., (Copyright © 2022 Chen et al.)

Visual functions are reviewed that coincide with conscious as opposed to unconscious vision. Four stages of vision are identified, going from the fully invisible, to subjectively invisible, unattended, and clearly visible. It is proposed that feature extraction, categorization, and some aspects of visual inference occur during full and subjective invisibility. Functions related to perceptual organization, such as grouping and figure-ground segregation, occur during inattention as well as full visibility. It is argued that perceptual organization is the function that is central to understanding the transition from unconscious to conscious seeing. It is discussed what this implies for theories of consciousness such as Recurrent Processing Theory, Higher Order Thought Theory, Integrated Information Theory, and Global Neuronal Workspace Theory., (Copyright © 2020 Lamme.)

Two electrophysiological components have been extensively investigated as candidate neural correlates of perceptual consciousness: An early, occipitally realized component occurring 130-320 ms after stimulus onset and a late, frontally realized component occurring 320-510 ms after stimulus onset. Recent studies have suggested that the late component may not be uniquely related to perceptual consciousness, but also to sensory expectations, task associations, and selective attention. We conducted a magnetoencephalographic study; using multivariate analysis, we compared classification accuracies when decoding perceptual consciousness from the 2 components using sources from occipital and frontal lobes. We found that occipital sources during the early time range were significantly more accurate in decoding perceptual consciousness than frontal sources during both the early and late time ranges. These results are the first of its kind where the predictive values of the 2 components are quantitatively compared, and they provide further evidence for the primary importance of occipital sources in realizing perceptual consciousness. The results have important consequences for current theories of perceptual consciousness, especially theories emphasizing the role of frontal sources., (© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.)