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This paper studies how increasing teacher compensation at hard-to-staff schools can reduce inequality in access to qualified teachers. Leveraging an unconditional change in the teacher compensation structure in Peru, we first show causal evidence that increasing salaries at less desirable locations attracts better quality applicants and improves student test scores. We then estimate a model of teacher preferences over local amenities, school characteristics, and wages using geocoded job postings and rich application data from the nationwide centralized teacher assignment system. Our estimated model suggests that the current policy is both ineficient and not large enough to effectively undo the inequality of initial conditions that hard-to-staff schools and their communities face. Counterfactual analyses that incorporate equilibrium sorting effects characterize alternative wage schedules and quantify the cost of reducing structural inequality in the allocation of teacher talent across schools.

This paper studies how increasing teacher compensation at hard-to-staff schools can reduce inequality in access to qualifed teachers. Leveraging an unconditional change in the teacher compensation structure in Perú, we first show causal evidence that increasing salaries at less desirable locations attracts better quality applicants and improves student test scores. We then estimate a model of teacher preferences over local amenities, school characteristics, and wages using geocoded job postings and rich application data from the nationwide centralized teacher assignment system. Our estimated model suggests that the current policy is both inefficient and not large enough to effectively undo the inequality of initial conditions that hard-to-staff schools and their communities face. Counterfactual analyses that incorporate equilibrium sorting effects characterize alternative wage schedules and quantify the cost of reducing structural inequality in the allocation of teacher talent across schools.

Circularity aims to reduce waste by closing and narrowing resource loops and by extending the lifetime of materials and products. As a consequence of this fundamentally different approach to construction practices, implementation entails a different organization of the building process. The purpose of this research is to make recommendations with respect to the actor network and the decision-making process to facilitate implementation of circularity in construction practices. First, a theoretical framework is developed to structure and prioritize decision-making to implement circularity based on resource and value strategies. Second, this framework is applied to three circular building cases in the Netherlands, relying on stakeholder interviews and documentation. These cases include a renovation project, a newly built project, and a transformation project. Third, analysis of the case study data demonstrates the actor network and decision-making process including the following aspects: Actors, resources, relations, positions, influence, and decision rounds. It can be concluded that: i) some conventional actors have acquired knowledge on circularity; and ii) expert actors emerged who have specialized in circularity. Both types of actors are a prerequisite iii) to implement circular strategies for the beginning and end phase of the building's lifetime; and iv) should be involved early on (in the design-making processes) to influence decision-making on circularity, especially concerning the long-lived layers of a building.

In the construction industry, public and semi-public clients increasingly depend on private parties to achieve project outcomes by adopting network type of governance approaches. However, social-political responsibilities remain at the public side. Hence, the general challenge for public commissioners is to find a new balance between dependency and responsibility when safeguarding competing traditional and network values. Based on three qualitative studies of a PhD project on safeguarding public values by public construction clients, applying concepts from public administration and public value theory, this paper presents three lessons learnt on future roles and responsibilities. We argue that future 'good' commissioning should be 1) more about embedding new value systems and less about changing existing values mechanisms, 2) more about paradox thinking in a convener role and less about trade-offs in a steering role and, 3) more about informal accountability in the value chain and less about formal accountability in the project chain. To ensure the 'right' kind of interference in the value process, public clients' way of coping with publicprivate conflicts, needs to correspond with the internal governance arrangements, and vice versa. Further research should focus on facilitating this alignment by providing a public value safeguarding strategy tool for public construction clients.