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In recent decades, global extreme poverty has been substantially reduced. While over a third of the world’s population lived below the extreme poverty line (less than $1.90 per day) in 1990, that share had fallen to just 10% by 2015 (World Bank, 2018). This dramatic improvement has shown the world that it is possible to end extreme poverty, and the international development community has thus set itself a goal to do that by 2030. Meanwhile, national inequality has also become a topic of greater focus in the development policy debate in recent years (World Bank, 2016). These two distinct, but connected, issues have been recognised by the international community with inclusion in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as both a goal to end poverty (SDG 1) and a goal to reduce inequality within countries (SDG 10)., Two Pager

Since the 1980s, income inequality has increased substantially in several countries. Yet the political logic that triggered rising inequality in some places but not in others remains poorly understood. This paper builds a theory that links central bank independence to these dynamics. It posits the existence of three mechanisms that tie central bank independence to inequality. First, central bank independence indirectly constrains fiscal policy and weakens a government's ability to engage in redistribution. Second, central bank independence incentivizes governments to deregulate financial markets, which generates a boom in asset values. These assets are predominantly in the hands of wealthier segments of the population. Third, to contain inflationary pressures, governments actively promote policies that weaken the bargaining power of workers. Together, these policies strengthen secular trends towards higher inequality according to standard indicators. Empirically, the analysis finds a strong relation between central bank independence and inequality, as well as support for each of the mechanisms. From a policy perspective, our findings contribute to knowledge on the undesirable side effects of central bank independence.

The goals of ending extreme poverty by 2030 and working towards a more equal distribution of incomes are part of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals. Using data from 166 countries comprising 97.5 percent of the world's population, we simulate scenarios for global poverty from 2019 to 2030 under various assumptions about growth and inequality. We use different assumptions about growth incidence curves to model changes in inequality, and rely on a machine-learning algorithm called model-based recursive partitioning to model how growth in GDP is passed through to growth as observed in household surveys. When holding within-country inequality unchanged and letting GDP per capita grow according to World Bank forecasts and historically observed growth rates, our simulations suggest that the number of extreme poor (living on less than 1.90 US Dollars/day) will remain above 600 million in 2030, resulting in a global extreme poverty rate of 7.4 percent. If the Gini index in each country decreases by 1 percent per year, the global poverty rate could reduce to around 6.3 percent in 2030, equivalent to 89 million fewer people living in extreme poverty. Reducing each country's Gini index by 1 percent per year has a larger impact on global poverty than increasing each country's annual growth 1 percentage points above forecasts. We also study the impact of COVID-19 on poverty and find that the pandemic may have driven around 60 million people into extreme poverty in 2020. If the virus increased the Gini by 2 pecent in all countries, then more than 90 million may have been driven into extreme poverty in 2020.

Rising obesity rates are one of the most challenging public health issues in many emerging economies. The extent to which the nutritional composition of food consumed away from home is behind this rise, and the links with socioeconomic status, is not yet well understood. This paper explores this question by combining a representative restaurant survey that includes detailed information on the nutritional composition of the most widely consumed meals in Metropolitan Lima and a representative household survey with anthropometric measures of adult women. The findings indicate that the nutritional quality in restaurants located in the food environment of the households is significantly associated with higher rates of obesity and overweight. Up to 15 percent of the socioeconomic gradient in obesity is attributable to restaurant food quality, with sodium being the main driver. This highlights the importance of considering the food environment to inform public health policies, particularly for the poor.

As in many countries, tax collection is a development challenge in Kosovo. Kosovo is one of the poorest and youngest countries in Europe in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and both demographics and statehood. The lack of an independent monetary policy — given that Kosovo has adopted the euro as the national currency — means that ensuring the sustainability of fiscal policy is critical. However, limited tax revenues hamper the government's ability to address economic cycles. Between 2011 and 2017, total government revenue amounted to about 14 percent of GDP, below the average of 19 percent among countries in Europe and Central Asia. Unlike other countries, Kosovar government relies on taxes for more than 85 percent of its revenues. Mobilizing tax revenues is therefore critical. The Tax Administration of Kosovo (TAK) requested assistance from the World Bank and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) to address this challenge using an evidence-based approach. To this end, the World Bank and GIZ applied behavioral insights to promote tax compliance among specific groups of taxpayers. Three experiments were designed, implemented, and evaluated in 2018 that involved sending behaviorally informed reminders using letters, e-mails, and short messaging service (SMS) messages to various groups of taxpayers to induce timely and honest declarations and payments. The short-term objective of these trials was to increase the number and timeliness of tax declarations. Simple, behaviorally designed messages were effective in inducing tax declaration. Messages helped raise the tax declaration rate by an average of around 3 percentage points during a period of between four and six weeks. Among personal income tax (PIT) declarations, this represents a 59 percent increase in compliance, equivalent to over 200 more annual tax declarations among participants. The likelihood of payment rose in many instances, and no significant difference was found in the amounts of taxes paid. Lessons from the tax experiments in Kosovo highlight the benefits of rigorous impact evaluation and the need to establish processes that help integrate tax collection functions and data systems.

Conventional economic wisdom has long maintained that there is a necessary trade-off between pursuit of the efficiency of a system and any attempts to improve equity between participants within that system. Economist Robert Lucas demonstrated the implications of this common economic axiom when he wrote: “Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution [...] the potential for improving the lives of poor people by finding different ways of distributing current production is nothing compared to the apparently limitless potential of increasing production.” (Lucas, 2004) Indeed, many economists have suggested that too little inequality or too generous a distribution of benefits may undermine the individual’s incentive to work hard and take risks. Setting aside the harsh rhetoric used by Lucas, the practical and ethical acceptability of such a trade-off is debatable. Moreover, evidence from recent decades suggests that the trade-off itself is, in many cases, entirely avoidable. A large body of research has shown that improved competition and economic efficiency are indeed compatible with government efforts to address inequality and reduce poverty, as assessed in a World Bank report (World Bank, 2016). Contrary to another common belief about economic interventions, this research indicates that such policy interventions can be tailored to succeed in all countries and at all times; even low- and middle-income countries in times of economic crisis can successfully pursue policies to improve economic distribution, with negligible negative impacts on efficiency and, in many cases, even positive ones. Some examples of such pro-equity and pro-efficiency measures include those promoting early childhood development, universal health care, quality education, conditional cash transfers, rural infra-structure investment, and well-designed tax policy. Overall, four critical policy points stand out: A trade-off is not inevitable. Policymakers do not need to give up on reducing inequality for the sake of growth. A good choice of policies can achieve both. In the last two decades, research has generated substantive evidence about which policies work to foster growth and reduce inequalities. Policies can redress the inequalities children are born into while fostering growth. But the wrong sets of policies can magnify inequalities early in life and thereafter. All countries can, under most circumstances, implement policies that are both pro-equity and pro-efficiency., Briefing Paper

Herkömmlichen Wirtschaftsweisheiten folgend, ging man lange davon aus, dass es unmöglich ist, ein System gleichzeitig effizienter zu gestalten und auf eine größere Gleichheit der Menschen in diesem System hinzuarbeiten. Der Ökonom Robert Lucas beschrieb die Folgen dieses weitverbreiteten Axioms folgendermaßen: „Von allen Neigungen, die einer soliden Wirtschaft schaden, ist die Fokussierung auf Verteilungsfragen am weitesten verbreitet und aus meiner Sicht sogar am verheerendsten […] Das Potenzial zur Verbesserung des Lebensstandards der Armen durch verschiedene Arten der Umverteilung der gegenwärtigen Produktion verblasst im Gegensatz zum schier unerschöpflichen Potenzial zur Produktionssteigerung.“ (Lucas, 2004) In der Tat haben viele Wirtschaftswissenschaftler die Meinung vertreten, dass eine geringe Ungleichheit oder eine zu großzügige Verteilung von Leistungen den Anreiz schmälern könnte, hart zu arbeiten und Risiken einzugehen. Jenseits der harschen Rhetorik von Lucas lässt sich diese Prämisse sicherlich aus praktischen wie aus ethischen Erwägungen heraus kritisieren. Zumal es Forschungsergebnisse aus den letzten Jahrzehnten gibt, wonach es in vielen Fällen gar nicht um ein „Entweder-Oder“ geht. Es gibt umfangreiches Forschungsmaterial, das belegt, dass verstärkter Wettbewerb und größere wirtschaftliche Effizienz durchaus mit staatlichen Bemühungen zur Reduzierung von Ungleichheit und Armut kompatibel sind, wie etwa aus einem Bericht der Weltbank hervorgeht (Weltbank, 2016). Konträr zu einer weiteren weit verbreiteten Annahme über staatliche Eingriffe in die Wirtschaft, weist die Forschung ebenfalls darauf hin, dass solche Interventionen erfolgreich auf die Bedürfnisse aller Länder und zu jedem beliebigen Zeitpunkt angepasst werden können. Selbst Länder mit niedrigem oder mittleren Einkommen können während einer Wirtschaftskrise erfolgreich wirtschaftliche Umverteilungsmaßnahmen vornehmen, die vernachlässigbare Auswirkungen auf die Effizienz haben und des Öfteren sogar positive Wirkungen entfalten. Solche Maßnahmen, die gleichzeitig auf größere Gleichheit und größere Effizienz ausgerichtet sind, umfassen zum Beispiel Programme in den Bereichen frühkindliche Entwicklung, allgemeine Gesundheitsversorgung, hochwertige Bildung, konditionierte bargeldbasierte Transfers (cash transfers), Investitionen in die ländliche Infrastruktur sowie eine gut konzipierte Steuerpolitik. Zentrale Bedeutung kommt folgenden vier Punkten zu: (1) Es geht nicht um ein „Entweder-Oder“. Entscheidungsträger müssen zugunsten des Wirtschaftswachstums nicht auf Maßnahmen zur Reduzierung von Ungleichheit verzichten. Eine gute Politik kann beides erreichen. (2) In den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten hat die Forschung substanzielle Belege dafür erbracht, welche Art von Politik sowohl das Wachstum fördert als auch Ungleichheiten reduzieren hilft. (3) Politik kann ungleichen Bedingungen, in die Kinder hineingeboren werden und die sich auf deren weitere Entwicklung auswirken, entgegenwirken. (4) In den meisten Fällen können alle Länder Maßnahmen implementieren, die sowohl auf größere Gleich­heit als auch auf mehr Wachstums abzielen., Analysen und Stellungnahmen

A country where an individual’s chances of success depend little on the socio-economic success of his or her parents is said to be a country with high relative intergenerational mobility. A government’s motivation for seeking to improve mobility is arguably two-fold. There is a fairness argument and an economic efficiency argument. When mobility is low, it means that individuals are not operating on a level playing field. The odds of someone born to parents from the bottom of their generation will be stacked against him or her. This is not only unfair but also leads to a waste of human capital, as talented individuals may not be given the opportunity to reach their full potential. Reducing this inefficiency will raise the stock of human capital and thereby stimulate economic growth. Since the waste of human capital tends to be concentrated toward the bottom of the distribution, the growth brought about by mobility-promoting policy interventions tends to be of an inclusive nature, in line with the spirit of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 10 on reducing inequality. For large parts of the world’s population, individual education is still too closely tied to the education of one’s parents, and there is a clear divide between the high-income and developing world. The patterns observed globally are also observed within Europe. Intergenerational mobility (or equality of opportunity) is visibly lower in the new member states (i.e. Eastern Europe), where national incomes are lower. Raising investment in the human capital of poor children towards levels that are more comparable to the investment received by children from richer families will curb the importance of parental background in determining an individual’s human capital. Countries at any stage of development can raise intergenerational mobility by investing more to equalise opportunities. The evidence strongly suggests that public interventions are more likely to increase mobility when: a) public investments are sufficiently large, b) are targeted to benefit disadvantaged families/ neighbourhoods, c) focus on early childhood, and d) when there is a low degree of political power captured by the rich., Briefing Paper

"Shared prosperity" has become a common phrase in the development policy discourse. This short paper provides its most widely used operational definition -- the growth rate in the average income of the poorest 40 percent of a country's population -- and describes its origins. The paper discusses how this notion relates to well-established concepts and social indicators, including social welfare, poverty, inequality, and mobility, and reviews some of its design shortcomings. The paper then looks at household survey data to assess recent progress in this indicator globally. The analysis finds that during 2008–13, mean incomes for the poorest 40 percent rose in 60 of 83 countries. In 49 of them, accounting for 65 percent of the sampled population, it rose faster than overall average incomes. Finally, the paper briefly reviews a (non-exhaustive) range of 'pre-distribution' and 'redistribution' policies with a sound empirical track record of raising productivity and well-being among the poor, thus contributing to shared prosperity.

The adoption of the shared prosperity goal by the World Bank in 2013 and Sustainable Development Goal 10, on inequality, by the United Nations in 2015 should strengthen the focus of development interventions and cooperation on the income growth of the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution (the bottom 40). However, little is known about within-country allocation patterns among the projects of development institutions. This paper proposes a new geographic targeting indicator and related methodology to assess the within-country aid allocations of donors by correlating the distribution of funding within countries with the geographical distribution of the bottom 40. Applying this methodology to World Bank funding for projects approved over 2005–14 shows that, of the 58 countries in the sample, 42 exhibit a positive correlation between the shares of the bottom 40 and World Bank funding, and, in almost half of these, the correlation is above 0.5. Slightly more than a quarter of the countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, exhibit a negative correlation. The presence of the bottom 40 is typically correlated with the population size of an administrative area. A regression analysis shows that, controlling for population, the correlation between the bottom 40 and World Bank funding switches sign and becomes significant and negative on average. This is entirely driven by Sub-Saharan Africa, because the correlation is insignificant in the rest of the world regions. Hence, the significant and positive correlation in the estimations without controlling for population suggests that World Bank project funding is concentrated in administrative areas in which more people live (including the bottom 40) rather than in poorer administrative areas. ispartof: World Bank Group Policy Research Working Paper Series 8247/2017 pages:1-24 status: published

In 2013, the World Bank adopted two goals: First, reduce global extreme poverty to 3 percent by 2030. Second, promote shared prosperity defined as the income growth of the bottom 40 percent of the population within a country. This paper simulates the global poverty headcount under three growth scenarios for the bottom 40 percent up to 2030. The analysis deploys a set of"shared prosperity premiums,"in which the bottom 40 percent in each country grows at a differential rate from the projected growth in the mean. With no distributional change, the global headcount reaches between 6.7 and 4.7 percent in 2030, depending on the average growth scenario used for the simulations. However, if the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grow 2 percentage points faster than the mean, the World Bank's poverty goal is achieved with the global poverty falling to below 3 percent in 2030 in the scenarios which average growth rates are extrapolated from the early 2000s. While such a"shared prosperity premium"is not unprecedented in recent growth spells, maintaining it over 20 years in every country is optimistic. The paper shows that in the baseline growth scenario, the global poverty rate could either reach the 3 percent target, or be close to 10 percent, depending on the"shared prosperity premium."

Die Notwendigkeit einer besseren Koordinierung der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (EZ) der Europäischen Union (EU) wird von den meisten Akteuren aus Wissenschaft und Praxis nicht in Frage gestellt. Sie ergibt sich aus der Frag­mentierung und Proliferation der öffentlichen EZ, die in jüngster Zeit trotz der Rufe nach einer stärkeren Harmo­nisierung und Arbeitsteilung deutlich zugenommen hat. In den vergangenen zehn Jahren hat die EU eine Reihe guter technischer Lösungen zur Überwindung der Frag­mentierung entwickelt. Die größten Herausforderungen der unge­nügenden Koordinierung sind allerdings nicht technischer Art, sondern stehen im Zusammenhang mit einem klaren poli­tischen Bekenntnis und der Formulierung einer Marsch­route für weitere Verbesserungen. Bei den bestehenden Verpflichtungen der EU zur Koordinierung der EZ und der aktuellen Mechanismen ist kein einheitliches Kosten-/Nutzen-Bild erkennbar. Die Bemühun­gen der EU im Zusammenhang mit der internationalen Debatte über die Wirksamkeit und insbesondere die Aspekte der Koordinierung der EZ gehen nicht immer mit Verbes­serungen auf der nationalen Ebene einzelner Mitgliedstaaten einher. Bereits bestehende Koordinierungsbemühungen für die drei Hauptbereiche (Politik, Programmplanung und Umsetzung) müssen auf den Prüfstand gestellt werden, um die europäische Entwicklungspolitik auf die Herausforderun­gen abzustimmen. Das erfordert eine Überprüfung von Instrumenten wie Arbeitsteilung, gemeinsame Planung und programmbasierte Ansätze. Einsparungen und sonstige Vorteile einer verbesserten oder verstärkten Koordinierung der europäischen EZ müssen sowohl qualitativ als auch quantitativ bewertet werden. Insgesamt gibt es drei zentrale Erklärungen für die EU- Koordinierungsdefizite: Es besteht kein Konsens darüber, welches das richtige Maß für die Koordinierung sein sollte. Die politische Ökonomie der Geberkoordinierung ist komplex; es gibt starke Anreize, die einer verstärkten Koordinierung entgegenwirken (z. B. das Interesse von Mitgliedstaaten an Sichtbarkeit). Die politische Ökonomie der Partnerländer hinsichtlich des Umgangs mit Gebern ist ebenfalls komplex und begünstigt nicht immer eine verstärkte Koordinierung (Frag­mentierung von Gebern als Strategie zur Risikostreuung, z. B. in Fällen politischer Konditio­nalität). Geringere Transaktionskosten gehören zu den potenziellen Vorteilen der Koordinierung, die einfach zu erzielen und sichtbar sind. Darüber hinaus kann die Koordinierung der EZ auf EU-Ebene größere entwicklungspolitische Wirkungen entfalten. Die Quantifizierung aller mögli­chen Vorteile ist allerdings schwierig, weil es nahezu un­möglich ist, den Wendepunkt zu identifizieren, an dem der Nutzen die Kosten überwiegt, und weil qualitative Vorteile schwer zu beziffern sind. Es lassen sich verschiedene Szenarien für die Gestaltung der künf­tigen EU-Entwicklungspolitik identifizieren. Für die EZ der EU wäre ein voll integrierter Ansatz zumindest theoretisch der beste Weg zur Überwindung der Frag­mentierung und der damit verbundenen Kosten. Allerdings ist nicht zu erwarten, dass die Mitgliedstaaten das tatsächlich anstreben und umsetzen wollen.

The need for more coordination in European development cooperation is acknowledged by most academics and practi-tioners. It emerges because there has been a strong increase in the level of fragmentation and proliferation of official development assistance (ODA) in recent years, despite the calls for stronger harmonisation and division of labour. Over the last 10 years, the European Union has invented a number of good technical solutions to overcome the disadvantages of fragmentation. However, the main challenges of inad¬equate Euro¬pean coordination are not related to technical coordi¬nation but to a clear policy commitment and guidance to improve further. Existing EU commitments on coordination in development cooperation and current mechanisms offer a mixed picture on the benefits and costs of EU coordination. The EU’s efforts in the context of the international aid-effectiveness debate – and more specifically, aspects related to aid coordination – are not always accompanied by similar improvements at the national level of individual member states. Existing coordina¬tion efforts for the three main areas of coordination (policy, programming and implementation) have to be reviewed in order to adapt European development policy to the challenges. This includes a review of tools like division of labour, joint program¬ming, programme-based approaches and blending. Savings and other benefits from improved or increased coordination in EU development aid have to be assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Overall, there are three pivotal explanations for the current shortcomings with coordination at the EU level: 1. There is no consensus on what the right level of coordina¬tion is or should be. 2. The political economy of donor coordination is complex; there are strong incentives working against more coordination (such as the interest of member states in “visibility”). 3. The political economy of partner countries is complex as well and not always in favour of more coordination (fragmentation of donors as a strategy to diversify risks, e.g. in cases of enforced political conditionality). Savings in transaction costs seem to be the most evident and straightforward potential gains of coordination. Aid coordination at the EU level may create significant benefits both in terms of efficiency and in terms of impact. However, the calculation of transaction costs is challenging because the identification of the “inflection point”, where the bene¬fits surpass the costs, is virtually impossible and because qualitative benefits are difficult to assess. Currently, there are five model scenarios for shaping future EU development policy, of which only three would cor-respond to a progressive increase in EU coordination: i) “bilateralisation of EU aid policies”, ii) business as usual, iii) “different-speeds approach”, iv) “escalation of coordination” and v) “aid as an integrated policy”. For European development aid, a fully integrated approach would be, at least in theory, the best way to tackle fragmentation and the costs associated with it. However, member states do not really appear to be ready to fully “buy in” and “walk the talk”. An “escalation of coordination” (incremental increase of coordinated approaches) may imply a combination of short, medium and long-term coordination efforts in order to comply with international commitments through minor changes to the Lisbon Treaty.

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), which governs relations between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group and the European Union (EU), will expire in the year 2020. While the three pillars of this framework addressing political dialogue, development cooperation and trade are generally considered to have served their purpose well, there are clear signs that significant changes within the ACP group, the EU and the wider international landscape demand a different articulation of the relationship. A tacit understanding among Europeans is that the ball is in the ACP’s corner in terms of defining and determining their own future as a group and its relationship vis-à-vis the EU as such. However, a momentum needs to be built for the coming 2015 revision of the Cotonou Agreement with a view to a plausible post-2020 scenario, in which the EU also needs to set out its own desires and priorities in giving shape to the cooperation. In previous years the EU Member States increasingly “outsourced” the management of the partnership to the European Commission, but there is a gradually growing recognition that the CPA is presently the principal functioning vehicle guiding EUAfrica relations. European perceptions on the future of the Cotonou Agreement point to two sets of arguments, namely: Reasons to do away with the ACP-EU partnership: Weak rationale to keep a common framework with these very different regions, combined with weak evidence of the development of an ACP identity or intra-ACP trade; Decreasing relevance of ex-colonial ties, particularly in the context of an enlarged EU, but also more generally of the agreement’s strong focus on official development assistance; Poor track record in shaping joint positions and interventions at international fora. Elements in the partnership deemed worth preserving: Legally binding nature that favours political dialogue as well as predictability and strategy ownership in development cooperation; A relatively strong performance of the European Development Fund (EDF) compared to other EU development cooperation instruments, combined with its multi-stakeholder approach to the design and management of development strategies; Potential alliance for global public goods provision. Despite the fact that there is not yet an official position from the EU nor its Member States on what should happen after the CPA expires, European actors (European Commission, European Parliament, Member States) seem to be inclined to move towards a more regional approach of the Union’s external relations while maintaining the valuable aspects of the present setup. While the EU’s declining strategic interest in the Caribbean – and especially the Pacific – is no secret, too rejectionist a stance towards the cooperation framework by EU Member States could seriously harm the promotion of their values and interests in Africa. The EU would currently seem most inclined to preserve key elements of the CPA in a “light version” of the current ACP-EU agreement, by transferring those elements into separate EU regional strategies towards Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, or a combination of both. European policy discussions on this matter are also long overdue, given that the preparations for the third revision of the CPA in 2015 will be a key “warming-up session” for the negotiations for post-2020. The EPA negotiations have seriously and negatively affected ACPEU relations in the recent past and could also harm the EU’s own position and trade with Africa in the medium- to long term if continued in the same manner.

Das Partnerschaftsabkommen von Cotonou (CPA), das die Beziehungen zwischen der AKP-Gruppe (Afrika, Karibik und Pazifik) und der Europäischen Union (EU) regelt, läuft im Jahr 2020 aus. Obwohl die drei Säulen des Abkommens – politischer Dialog, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und Handel – nach allgemeiner Einschätzung ihren Zweck gut erfüllt haben, gibt es deutliche Zeichen, dass signifikante Veränderungen innerhalb der AKP-Gruppe, der EU und der weiteren internationalen Landschaft eine Neubestimmung der Beziehungen erfordern. Unter den Europäern besteht stillschweigende Übereinkunft, dass der Ball im Feld der AKP liegt, wenn es um darum geht, ihre Zukunft als Gruppe und ihre Beziehung gegenüber der EU als solche zu bestimmen. Für die kommende Überarbeitung des Cotonou-Abkommens 2015 muss jedoch ein Momentum mit Blick auf ein glaubwürdiges Nach-2020- Szenario geschaffen werden. Dabei muss die EU ebenfalls ihre Wünsche und Prioritäten für die Zusammenarbeit benennen. Die Erkenntnis wächst, dass das CPA derzeit das wesentliche funktionierende Vehikel ist, das die Beziehungen zwischen EU und Afrika lenkt. Gründe, die AKP-EU-Partnerschaft abzuschaffen: Es gibt keine guten Gründe einen gemeinsamen Rahmen für diese sehr verschiedenen Regionen aufrechtzuerhalten, zumal es kaum Anzeichen gibt, dass sich eine AKP-Identität oder ein Intra-AKP-Handel entwickelt. Die Bedeutung der ehemaligen Kolonialbeziehungen nimmt ab, insbesondere im Kontext der erweiterten EU, aber auch allgemein durch den starken Fokus des Abkommens auf offizieller Entwicklungshilfe. Schlechte Erfolgsbilanz bei der Gestaltung gemeinsamer Positionen und Interventionen auf internationalen Foren. Elemente der Partnerschaft, die als erhaltenswert betrachtet werden: Die Rechtsverbindlichkeit begünstigt den politischen Dialog sowie die Berechenbarkeit und die Strategie- Ownership in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Ein relativ erfolgreicher Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds (EEF) im Vergleich zu anderen Instrumenten der EU-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in Kombination mit seinem Multi-Stakeholder -Ansatz bei der Entwicklung und dem Management von Entwicklungsstrategien. Potenzielle Bündnisse bei der Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter. Obwohl es bisher weder von der EU noch ihren Mitgliedsstaaten eine offizielle Position gibt, was nach dem Auslaufen des CPA geschehen soll, scheinen Europäische Akteure (Europäische Kommission, Europäisches Parlament, Mitgliedsstaaten) bei den Außenbeziehungen der EU zu einem stärker regionalen Ansatz zu tendieren und dabei die nützlichen Aspekte der derzeitigen Struktur erhalten zu wollen. Auch wenn das abnehmende strategische Interesse der EU an der Karibik und insbesondere des Pazifik kein Geheimnis ist, könnte eine allzu ablehnende Haltung gegenüber dem Rahmenabkommen für Zusammenarbeit durch die EUMitgliedsstaaten der Förderung ihrer Werte und Interessen in Afrika schweren Schaden zufügen. Die EU scheint derzeit am meisten geneigt, die Schlüsselelemente des CPA in einer Light Version des aktuellen AKPEU- Abkommens zu erhalten, indem diese in separate EURegionalstrategien gegenüber Afrika, dem Karibik- und Pazifikraum überführt werden. Diskussionen zur europäischen Politik in dieser Sache sind angesichts der Tatsache, dass die Vorbereitungen für die dritte Überarbeitung des CPA 2015 eine wesentliche „Aufwärmphase“ für die Verhandlungen über die Zeit nach 2020 sein werden, seit langem überfällig. Die EPA-Verhandlungen haben in jüngerer Zeit den AKP-EU-Beziehungen schwer geschadet und könnten, wenn sie so fortgeführt werden, auch die EUPosition und den Handel mit Afrika mittel- und langfristig beeinträchtigen.

The distribution of global income is extremely unequal. In 2011, the richest 20 per cent of the world’s population controlled more than 80 per cent of the world’s income, compared to less than 2 per cent for the poorest 20 per cent. In many parts of the developing world, inequality remains stubbornly high even as absolute numbers of people living in poverty fall. Studies by the World Bank, the IMF, UNDP and UNICEF have all shown that high inequality is detrimental to sustainable economic growth and long-term poverty reduction. While recent EU policy statements have recognised that inequality is a major development challenge, few concrete measures are in place for tackling it. The European Commission’s October 2011 “Agenda for Change” proposed that the EU would focus on “inclusive and sustainable growth”, thereby enabling more people to benefit from wealth and job creation. But the Agenda does not grapple with the politically sensitive question of what “inclusive” actually means. In August 2012 the Commission started to answer this question with a “Communication on social protection in EU development cooperation”. This document makes some welcome suggestions, including placing social protection at the heart of dialogue with developing countries. There is no controversy about the need to equip workers with the education and skills needed to participate in a growing economy. Only a mean-spirited few would argue with the benefits of universal healthcare and social protection for improving equality of opportunity. Reducing income inequality is, however, also crucial. This raises difficult questions for EU development policy. First, should the EU devote more political and financial resources to support efforts to confront inequality in developing countries? If so, should these be primarily focussed on middle-income countries, or leastdeveloped countries as well? Second, what is the role of the state vis-à-vis the private sector? Would facilitating more private sector activity help reduce inequality? Third, what are the lessons from the EU’s own experiences in promoting inclusiveness that could be translated into its international development policies? How can these lessons be offered to partners without creating an impression that the EU is lecturing them? Measures aimed at reducing income disparities should be central to any development strategy, both for middle- income countries where income is growing and for poorer countries where mechanisms for capturing and redistributing wealth are absent. In the current political climate, such progressive thinking is out of favour in most European countries. The EU is shying away from models that worked for Europe itself and have started to work in parts of Latin America. Rather, it is replicating the “growth-plus-safety nets” model, with added emphasis on the private sector. While this is an improvement on discredited “Washington Consensus” approaches, it is still predicated on the “trickle down” philosophy and does not target inequality specifically.

Das globale Einkommen ist äußerst ungleich verteilt: Die wohlhabendsten 20 % der Weltbevölkerung verfügten 2011 über mehr als 80 % des Welteinkommens, verglichen mit weniger als 2 % für die ärmsten 20 %. In vielen Entwicklungsländern hält sich die Ungleichheit hartnäckig, obwohl die absolute Zahl der in Armut lebenden Menschen zurückgeht. Studien der Weltbank, des Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF), des UN-Entwicklungsprogramms (UNDP) und des UN-Kinderhilfswerks (UNICEF) zeigen: Ausgeprägte Ungleichheit erschwert ein nachhaltiges Wirtschaftswachstum und den dauerhaften Rückgang von Armut. Trotz jüngster Grundsatzerklärungen, dass Ungleichheit ein erhebliches Entwicklungshindernis darstellt, unternimmt die Europäische Union (EU) nur wenig, um diese zu bekämpfen. In der „Agenda für den Wandel“ der Europäischen Kommission vom Oktober 2011 kündigt die EU an, sich auf „ein breitenwirksames und nachhaltiges Wachstum“ zu konzentrieren, durch das mehr Menschen von Wohlstand und der Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen profitieren. Allerdings setzt sich die Agenda nicht mit der politisch heiklen Definition von „breitenwirksam“ auseinander. Um dies nachzuholen, veröffentlichte die Kommission im August 2012 eine Mitteilung über „Sozialschutz in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Europäischen Union“. Das Dokument enthält einige begrüßenswerte Vorschläge, wie den, Sozialschutz in den Mittelpunkt des Dialogs mit Entwicklungsländern zu stellen. Es ist unbestritten, dass Arbeitnehmer mit den Kenntnissen und Fähigkeiten ausgestattet werden müssen, um sich sich in eine wachsende Wirtschaft einzubringen. Selbstverständlich sind eine allgemeine Gesundheitsversorgung und soziale Sicherheit wichtig um Chancengleichheit zu erhöhen. Ebenso wichtig ist es indes, Einkommensungleichheit abzubauen. Damit stellen sich der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik schwierige Fragen. Erstens: Sollte die EU mehr politische und finanzielle Ressourcen bereitstellen, um die Ungleichheit in Entwicklungsländern zu bekämpfen? Wenn ja, sollten primär Länder mit mittlerem Einkommen oder auch die am wenigsten entwickelten Länder unterstützt werden? Zweitens: Welche Rolle spielt der Staat mit Blick auf die Privatwirtschaft? Würde eine Förderung letzterer helfen, Ungleichheit zu verringern? Drittens: Welche eigenen Erfahrungen mit der Förderung von Inklusivität könnte die EU in die Entwicklungspolitik einbringen? Wie kann die EU diese Lehren Partnern anbieten, ohne als belehrend empfunden zu werden? Maßnahmen zum Abbau von Einkommensdisparitäten sollten Kernelement jeder Entwicklungsstrategie sein,sowohl für Länder mit wachsendem mittlerem Einkommen als auch für ärmere Länder, in denen Mechanismen zur Umverteilung von Mitteln fehlen. Im aktuellen politischen Klima sind solche progressiven Überlegungen im Großteil Europas unpopulär. Die EU schreckt vor Modellen zurück, die für Europa funktionierten und in Teilen Lateinamerikas zu funktionieren beginnen. Stattdessen repliziert sie das „Wachstum-plus-Sicherungsnetze“-Modell – mit zusätzlicher Betonung der Privatwirtschaft. Obwohl dies eine Verbesserung gegenüber des diskreditierten „Washington Consensus“ ist, basiert es dennoch auf der „Trickle-down“ -Philosophie und zielt nicht explizit auf Ungleichheit ab.

Growth that reduces poverty is often considered pro-poor regardless of whether the poor benefit from it more than the non-poor. Such growth could simply be termed poverty-reducing growth. This paper argues that for growth to be pro-poor it should disproportionally benefit the poor. The paper proposes an operational definition of pro-poor growth that restricts it to the cases in which the mean income of the poor increases proportionally more than that of the non-poor. A new index is proposed based exclusively on the redistributional component of poverty-gap changes obtained through an exact decomposition. It is then shown that this component measures how pro-poor growth is over a given period based on the above mentioned definition. The paper further presents several indicators for evaluating and monitoring the 'pro-poorness' of growth over time and concludes with an empirical illustration for the case of Honduras.