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The article argues that current conceptual approaches in civil-military relations are deeply flawed resulting in its irrelevance in analyzing major issues including war and the collapse of democracy. After highlighting major flaws in the work of the late Samuel Huntington and those who follow his approach, the article argues that other conceptual approaches, including Security Sector Reform, are also flawed, or in the case of the “military effectiveness” literature, largely irrelevant. In explaining the main causes of the flawed conceptual literature, the article highlights the absence of good data and challenges in methodology. While arguing that military forces are very unlikely to engage in armed combat, it highlights the roles and missions which in the world today are implanted by these forces. As it is virtually impossible to prove effectiveness of the armed forces in these roles and missions, the article proposes a conceptual approach based on requirements.

The doyen of democratization studies and American policies in support of democratization globally, Professor Larry Diamond, recently published an article in The American Interest with the title “The Liberal Democratic Order in Crisis” in which the header correctly states the main message of the article. “We are at a tipping point. Around the world, many democracies are hanging by a threat and autocrats are preparing more savage assaults on what remains of freedom.” The focus in this chapter is on Brazil, and mainly on how democratic politics ironically has led to vast improvements in accountability mechanisms while leading to regression in civil – military relations. It is important to emphasize from the beginning of this chapter that the regression in civil-military relations, with implications for democracy, is due mainly to the dynamics of democratic politics and not the supposed nefarious plans and plots of the Brazilian Armed Forces

There is much in the current news about Russian security contractors dying in Syria. It must be remembered that the Russian contractors were preceded by American security contractors, who came to total more than twenty-five thousand in Iraq in 2009. The difference between the two is that there are mechanisms for accountability in the United States when contractors violate their mandate or international law.

European nations might consider an institutional option in their ongoing fight against terrorism. Research on intelligence reform globally indicates that certain institutional innovations to combating terrorism that may not have been seriously considered by decisionmakers in some European countries.

To usefully discuss security, one must analyze the security providers states utilize to enhance international and domestic security. These are the armed forces, police, and intelligence agencies. This paper analyzes the implications of democratization on the requirements-posited as strategies, resources, and coordination institutions-these providers require in order to achieve the goals civilian leaders set for them. In analyzing case studies of how nations implement six different tasks, it becomes clear that the absence, or weakness, in any of the requirements leads to serious weakness in implementation. Two findings from the case studies are particularly important for policy. First, presidents, who are elected directly and for fixed terms, may ignore or even abolish institutions, including national security councils, that are created to coordinate policy. Second, as civilians are in control, if they lack clear incentives they are not willing to provide the necessary requirements for the security providers.

The Trump Administration sent its proposed budget to the U.S. Congress on March 16. A key provision of the budget is an increase in the Department of Defense (DoD) budget by $54 billion dollars, a 10% increase. At the same time, this proposal decreases the budget of the State Department by $10.1 billion, or 28%. This illconsidered maneuver will only serve to increase our nation’s insecurity. Of particular concern is that no strategy is attached to the DoD's increased funding. Rather than a strategy or plan, the basis for such important decisions appears to be political or even personal.

The Northern Triangle countries of Central America consisting of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have the highest homicide rates in the world and are characterized by corruption, drug trafficking, and impunity. It is likely the 50,000 unaccompanied alien children attempting to cross into the U.S. in 2014 will increase in 2016. The U.S. Congress appropriated $750 million for the region. Based upon past experience with the umbrella program for the region, the Central America Regional Security Initiative, it appears the perilous situation in the region is unlikely to improve. Approaching the problems of the region from a political perspective, this article draws upon the experience of Nicaragua, where the security sector is integrated, and recommends the consideration of the intelligence fusion center concept, proven by the 78 currently functioning in the U.S., to encourage the integration of the security sector under democratic control in the three countries.

Embora Portugal seja uma nação relativamente pequena da Europa Ocidental, o país serve como um excelente estudo de caso para a discussão sobre as relações civis-militares na medida em que criou, praticamente do zero, instituições de controle civil e democrático das Forças Armadas, capazes de responder a mudanças no ambiente nacional e internacional. Ademais, construiu estruturas conjuntas de comando e formação profissional para aprimorar simultaneamente o controle civil e a eficácia das Forças Armadas. Portugal foi a primeira das “novas democracias”, tendo inaugurado a Terceira Onda de Democratização em 25 de abril de 1974. O regime autoritário português (1928-1974) não foi, em sentido estrito, uma ditadura militar, embora tivesse apoio dos militares; na luta contra três guerras de insurreição na África, entre 1961 e 1974, os contingentes das Forças Armadas elevaram- se a 200mil homens e chegarama absorver cerca demetade dos orçamentos governamentais.

The proposal by President Cristina Kirchner to abolish the Secretariat of Intelligence (SI) may make sense, at least to her, in the current political context of the Nisman death, but should be deeply considered before any action is taken. In neighboring Brazil, in 1990 President Fernando Collor de Mello, fulfilling a campaign promise, abolished the National Information Service (SNI) the intelligence service of the military that governed 1964-85, and it was not politically possible to create a new civilian intelligence service, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), until 1999. During that time the government was basically blind to civil unrest caused by the Landless Workers’ Movement and to drug lords in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Once the ABIN was created, it was extremely limited in its sphere of action, and is prohibited, for example, from doing intercepts. Most of the scandals that ABIN has been involved in during the past fifteen years are due to its being illegally involved in intercepts, something that any intelligence agency must have access to.

Civil-military relations in Portugal are analyzed employing a framework with empirical indicators focusing on the three dimensions of democratic civilian control, effectiveness in roles and missions, and efficiency. Despite the economic crisis, and consequent lack of government resources, this analysis of Portugal is positive in comparative perspective. In addition to the influence and incentives of international organizations, specifically NATO, EU, and the UN, the author emphasizes how civilians and military use defense policy and the armed forces in pursuing strategic goals. The author is distinguished professor emeritus at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley, and has published scholarly books and articles on civil-military relations, reform of intelligence agencies, Central American street gangs, and the use of private security contractors by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The United States has gone further than any country in the “privatization of security”. Other countries may find the economic or financial logic in the use of contractors persuasive. The US experience with contracting out security, particularly in Iraq, was problematic, and can serve as a cautionary tale in order that other countries might learn how to avoid the pitfalls.

The United States has returned to Iraq, this time to combat the Islamic State. President Barack Obama’s strategy to ‘degrade, and ultimately destroy the terrorist group’ faces serious problems due to political obstacles in obtaining Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) and more importantly because of neglect of the crucial role of private contractors. Although the narrative has changed, and there is no public mention of contractors, they remain central to all that the Department of Defense does in the US and abroad. Suggestions are offered on how their performance can be improved to support President Obama’s strategy.

In our edited book, Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, Steven Boraz and I argued that intelligence should be analyzed as a subset of civil-military relations. In addition to the three reasons given there-that intelligence is a monopoly of the military in most non-democratic regimes; that even in older democracies including the United States the military plays a very large role in intelligence; and that both exist to ensure national security - another can be added, at least in the case of Brazil, that while democratic civilian control has been achieved, minimal attention and commitment are given to achieving effectiveness.

The main emphasis in US security assistance is 'building partner capacity'. To understand prospects for building capacity implies knowledge of the security sector, including the armed forces and also national police and intelligence agencies. The scholarly sub-discipline that should be useful for analysis of a nation's use of armed forces is civil-military relations as it ostensibly directs attention to when and how civilians choose to utilize their nation's armed forces. The goal in this article is to further refine the field of civil-military relations by focusing attention on two main concepts - democratic civilian control and strategy - and discussing their relevance in the context of building partner capacity.

Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) Brochure 2014

This article analyzes Brazilian civil–military relations using a framework that directs attention to the institutions of not only democratic civilian control, but also of military effectiveness and efficiency. The article argues that democratic civilian control over the armed forces in Brazil is exercised by a wide variety of mechanisms, many of which are not specifically designed for this purpose, but are instead part of a vast array of institutions that exercise control and oversight over public bureaucracies in general. Military prerogatives that were once high are now moderate or low, and there is currently no question of civilian control of the armed forces. However, several questions remain regarding the effectiveness of the armed forces. The article also emphasizes the importance of civilian staff assuming responsibilities in defense, as they have in virtually all other areas of government policy.

The main emphasis in U.S. security assistance is "building partner capacity". To understand prospects for building capacity implies knowledge of the security sector, including the armed forces and also national police and intelligence agencies. The scholarly sub-discipline that should be useful for analysis of a nation's use of armed forces is civil-military relations as it ostensibly directs attention to when and how civilians choose to utilize their nation's armed forces. The goal in this paper is to further refine the field of civil-military relations by focusing attention on two main concepts - democratic civilian control and strategy - and discussing their relevance in the context of building partner capacity.

The revelations of Booz Allen Hamilton contractor Edward Snowden regarding the activities of the National Security Agency (NSA) at home and abroad have focused more attention on the issue of reforming intelligence in the U.S. than at any time since the last major reforms of the 1970s. Whereas in the 1970s the focus was mainly on the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, this time it is the NSA, which, due to a high level of secrecy, was until recently commonly known as “No Such Agency”. Snowden’s revelations have received both praise, with appeals in the U.S. and abroad f or him to be granted amnesty, or even be awarded the Nobel Peace prize, and condemnation with him being characterized as a traitor and spy. In order for the reader to understand the general issue of reform of U.S. intelligence, I will first call attention to three key characteristics of the intelligence process in any democracy, and then analyze reform in terms of the institutions and processes that would be central to any reform.

The coup in Bamako, on 22 March 2012 both gave lie to the apparent stability of Mali as a democratic country and resulted in the taking of power of an assortment of armed combatants in the North of the country, which resulted in armed intervention by France. This article is about the coup itself that created the power vacuum allowing the insurrection to grow and ultimately take power in the North. The authors have developed a framework for analyzing civil-military relations they believe is more useful than other available frameworks in understanding the role of the military in politics.

Street gangs – pandillas in Spanish – are a major security challenge in the three Northern Triangle countries of Central America – El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.[1] They are also considered a threat in many US cities, with particular focus on the Mara Salvatrucha, MS-13. Domestic party politics in the three countries have resulted in the reliance of heavy hand (mano dura) responses to the gangs, which have mainly served to exacerbate the problem. The anomalous situation of Nicaragua, which has a lower level of per capita income and socio-economic development than its three neighbors to the North, but a much less serious gang problem, should attract the attention of serious researchers. The case of Nicaragua, and the more recent experience of the Government of El Salvador brokering a truce between the main gangs, suggests the importance of

Portugal has been a consolidated democracy since the mid-1980s. Elections are free and fair, political rights are protected both de jure and de facto, there is media pluralism and freedom and the judicial system is independent. The legal basis and practical functioning of the democratic system are evident. However, while the formal aspects of Portugal’s democracy are not in question, there is substantial and growing public dissatisfaction with its performance. Portugal also falls short in terms of sustainable policy performance and of governance capacity.

This article introduces the topic of pandillas (street gangs) and their implications for security in Central America. There is minimal scholarly literature on pandillas and security. In part this is due to serious challenges in analyzing pandillas. First, pandilla members consider truth to be situational; data derived directly from them is suspect. Second, those who know most about them are involved in NGOs that rely on foreign assistance for their work. The project reports they produce go to funders abroad and are generally not published. Third, to research and write on pandillas is dangerous.

Within the realm of civilian control of the armed forces as a subset of civil-military relations, probably the most problematic issue is control of the intelligence services. This is due not only to the legacies of the prior, non-democratic regimes, in which the intelligence or security apparatus was a key element of control, and in which human rights abuses often were allowed, but also to the inherent tension everywhere between intelligence and democracy. Democracy requires accountability of the governors to the governed, and transparency. Intelligence services, by contrast, must operate in secret to be effective, thus violating to some degree both accountability and transparency (also called oversight). While well-established democracies have developed mechanisms to deal with this dilemma, new democracies are still in the process of creating them.

This article argues that civil-military relations should be conceptualized not only in terms of democratic civilian control but also for effectiveness in implementing a spectrum of roles and missions. It also argues that achieving effectiveness requires institutional development as a necessary but not sufficient condition. Currently in Latin America, the focus in civil-military relations remains exclusively on civilian control. While there is a growing awareness of the need for analysis beyond asserting control over the armed forces, so far nobody has proposed or adopted a broader analytical framework. This article proposes such a framework, and employs it to analyze differences among four major South American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. The explanation for the differences identified by use of the framework is found in the incentives of civilian elites in Chile and Colombia, who have recognized serious threats to national security and defense.

This article analyzes the role of the military in the contemporary politics of Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey. While there is literature on military coups, and analyses of the military in democratic consolidation, there is little on the military’s role in democratic transitions. There is virtually none on Arab or Muslim countries. The Arab Spring has brought renewed attention to the role of the military in these problematic transitions. Utilizing a common framework, based on Alfred Stepan’s “prerogatives”, the article compares and contrasts the position of the military in these three countries. In order to explain the different powers of the militaries in accord with these variables, the article then examines a series of fi ve commonly identifi ed factors promoting or impeding the political role position of the military.

Private security companies (PSCs) currently receive a great deal of attention in the news media, in sensationalist reporting, and increasingly in scholarly books and articles. While the scholarly books and articles make significant contributions to our understanding of this global phenomenon, there are several impediments to analysis that must be recognized and overcome if analysis is to be improved. Three of these impediments are reviewed in this article. The author suggests that US government material is currently available to minimize impediments and offers a framework to make analytical sense of it. Since contracting out is based on contracts, and unless the complexities of awarding and managing contracts are understood, recommendations made to reform the process of contracting out security are unrealistic.

"A workshop on global and regional security was held in Brasilia on 13 and 14 August, 2012. This event was supported and executed by the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) of the Center on Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School. PASCC is sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The participants included 9 Brazilian and 7 U.S. specialists in security, global proliferation, disarmament, and weapons of mass destruction policies. Also present were observers from the Brazilian Presidency's Secretariat for Strategic Affairs, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the U.S. State Department, and the U.S. Embassy in Brasilia."

In all democratic systems, intelligence reform is a ‘‘Gordian knot’’ that incessantly tests decisionmakers. The onus is on them to develop and maintain intelligence systems that protect democracy and are democratically accountable, while, at the same time, engage in secret operations. This challenge has no clear solution. As experts at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) put it, ‘‘the nature of intelligence is such that the balance between secrecy and democracy will always be a delicate one to strike.’’1 In well-established democracies, policymakers have developed mechanisms to tackle the ‘‘democracy–intelligence’’ dilemma, yet these mechanisms are relentlessly being revised and reworked. In new democracies, however, decision makers must create these mechanisms from ground zero, and do not always succeed in balancing effectiveness with transparency. In those that do succeed, decision makers face numerous challenges, yet they may, after long and protracted endeavors, eventually manage to accommodate effectiveness and transparency. Both interest and willingness (whether self-initiated or due to outside pressure and=or incentives) on the part of policymakers are paramount in successful intelligence reform.

In 2010, the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile established joint operational military structures as part of a more general reform of national security and defense institutions. While it is too soon to assess the impact of these institutional innovations, we can benefit from a quick overview of some of the main points of the successful U.S. effort at “jointness”1 in the Goldwater – Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (G-N). Based on the experience of the U.S., the author is not sanguine that the formal move of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to joint structures will soon result in an improvement in their joint military behavior. The U.S. Government and the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) in particular, can increase the chances of these joint structures becoming effective by orienting attention and resources to them and to the ministries of defense (MOD), which has inspired them, and not to the individual services. While Colombia has not mandated joint structures at the national level, it has established joint regional commands that most observers believe have proven effective in fighting the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaries de Colombia (FARC). USSOUTHCOM can continue to support these regional joint commands, while also seeking to influence reform at the national level of the MOD and a strengthening of the joint staff. In this paper the author looks at the new joint structures in the three Southern Cone countries and to the regional commands in Colombia.

This article examines an important (and most problematic) component of the democratic civil–military relations (CMR) concept (understood in terms of democratic control, effectiveness, and efficiency of the armed forces, police forces, and intelligence agencies). It focuses (1) on the democratization of intelligence, that is finding a proper balance between intelligence effectiveness and transparency, and (2) on what particular factors support or arrest progress in the democratization of intelligence. The article provides supporting examples from Brazil and Romania, two developing democracies that have been undergoing major reforms of their intelligence systems for almost 20 years, in terms of both transparency and effectiveness.

The author proposes in this paper a new framework for the analysis of civil – military relations in the U.S. and applies it to the use of private security contractors, mainly in Iraq. He argues that the academic literature on civil – military relations in the U.S. is not well focused as it concentrates exclusively on control, and is thus totally marginal to the contemporary debates on the use of force to achieve national goals. He illustrates this point by looking to the most serious national defense reform initiatives from the Goldwater – Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 up until the current major effort, the Project on National Security Reform. He then applies this framework to the use of private security contractors (PSC) and finds that they are problematic both in terms of control and effectiveness.

[T]his article argues that there remains a lack of consensus in Washington, particularly within the Department of Defense, on threat assessment in cyberspace and its military implications. A stark intellectual rift between “alarmists” and “skeptics” still prevails. As a result, this elementary battle has led todysfunction in the institutional response to cyber-threats and jeopardizes the implementation of aneffective military posture in cyberspace. Consequently, we need to reassess the relevance of cyberspace as a distinct military domain. To that end, this article aims for a middle ground between these opposing views, supporting the idea that cyberattacks are more than just a technical nuisance, but less than an existential threat to USnational security.

As a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain of warfare. It has become just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space.â€ These words, written by Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn last fall in Foreign Affairs, cemented the status of cyberspace as a domain of warfare like all others, and coincided nicely with US Cyber Command reaching its full operational capacity.

In June 2010, U.S. Senators Susan Collins, Joseph Lieberman, and Tom Carper introduced the Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act. One of its many aims is to protect critical infrastructures in the United States from cyber attack. In January 2011, Brandon Milhorn, staff director of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, defended the bill, saying that it would prevent a hacker from opening the floodgates of the Hoover Dam. Peter Soeth, a spokesman for the US Bureau of Reclamation, the agency which manages the Hoover Dam, objected to that example, arguing that “These types of facilities are protected by multiple layers of security, including physical separation from the internet, that are in place because of multiple security mandates and good business practices.â€

The purpose of this study is to identify looming vulnerabilities that may lead to the demise of the dollar undermining United States power and compromising its national security. In identifying vulnerabilities, we consider economists’ views of international currency dominance and Benjamin J. Cohen’s state of power theory, apply those views to the historical case of the United Kingdom, and then compare that to the present-day US in light of the National Security Strategy.

Terrorists rely on media coverage of their attacks to deliver their message to a wider audience. They often choose their victims for tactical, strategic, or symbolic reasons, but—just as often—the choice of victim matters less than the psychological impact the attack makes on society. For this reason, terrorist groups have sought the ability to execute spectacular attacks or to innovate new tactics to shock their audiences. When they succeed, they have developed a weapon of mass effect (WME). This issue of Strategic Insights explores the roles WME have played in recent history.

The Republic of China (Taiwan hereafter) and the People’s Republic of China (China hereafter) are two particularly attractive targets for internet hackers. Reports have found that, compared to other countries in the Asia and Pacific regions, China and Taiwan rank as the top two countries in terms of malicious computer activity. Reports have also shown that most hacking into Taiwanese computer systems is initiated from within China and most hacking into Chinese systems originates within Taiwan.

"For Americans, the death of Osama Bin Laden was a satisfying emotional end to the story of the 21st century's most famous terrorist leader, but it has not made the United States safer in the short run or the long run. Bin Laden's death is an accomplishment to be celebrated, but in the short-term it has not ended the two wars America still fights, it has not destroyed the international terrorist networks that Bin Laden supported, and it has not reduced the threat of extremist terrorism that faces Americans at home and abroad. Bin Laden's death, rather, demonstrates America's prioritization of domestic security goals over international norms and laws, weakening its security in the long run. And the anger and political turmoil that now embroils Pakistan, along with the concurrent weakening of US-Pakistan relations, does little to help United States security."

"The daring raid on the compound in Abbottabad by our country's most elite servicemen has been widely touted as a tremendous success both here and abroad. However, to believe the United States is more secure after the death of Osama bin Laden (OBL) is a naive notion. Osama the man is dead, but his legacy lives on. Al Qaeda [AQ] was never about one man. While OBL played an important role in the attacks of September 11th, scores of others were involved, including OBL's recently named successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Furthermore, there is essentially no evidence linking OBL to the most notorious attacks since, the Madrid railway bombings in 2004 and the London bombings in 2005. His death may have come as a blow to AQ's leadership, but there are others both willing and able to pick up his mantle of Islamic extremism and continue to terrorize the West."

Just prior to his confirmation as Commander of US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), General Keith B. Alexander identified the need to improve cyberspace situational awareness as one of his central responsibilities—and challenges.1 This mission is rooted in the need to monitor computing activities across the 15,000 networks and seven million devices that compose the Department of Defense (DoD) information and communications technology (ICT) enterprise.2 Complicating this mission further, USCYBERCOM must also conduct offensive operations in cyberspace and potentially assist the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to defend other information systems across the federal government and US critical infrastructures.3 These demands help explain what a Defense Information Systems Agency official recently called DoD’s “insatiable desire for situational awareness” in cyberspace.

"In December 1973 the Basque terrorist group ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) assassinated Admiral Carrero Blanco, the first and only prime minister in Franco's dictatorship. Between 1946 and 1999 only three other Western heads of state or prime ministers were assassinated: US President John F. Kennedy (1963), Swedish prime minister Olof Palme (1986), and Israeli prime minister Yitzak Rabin (1995). Only the Carrero assassination was the work of a terrorist group. This resounding event supposedly helped to bring about the end of the authoritarian regime and became the signal achievement of the Basque nationalist organization. To assess this terrorist attack as a weapon of mass effect, this paper will examine the strategies ETA has adopted to distinguish itself within the Basque nationalist movement; its history of innovation in ideology, funding, and capabilities; how that innovation built up to the Carrero assassination; and the effect the assassination had on Spanish democracy and ETA's standing within the Basque nationalist movement. Although the profound psychological effects of the assassination allowed ETA to claim credit for the collapse of the Franco regime, it was unable to translate that credit into tangible progress towards its political goals."

In this article the author shares her research from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan where she travelled and conducted interviews. The Constitution of Pakistan governs FATA through the colonial system established by the British in 1901, which is different from the rest of Pakistan’s governance structure. As a result the region became isolated and militants reigned free until military operations were conducted in the area. In order to prevent this from happening again the government has to integrate FATA with the rest of Pakistan. The author examines several alternatives available to the government of Pakistan to address FATA’s political status. Merging of the tribal areas with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is analyzed against a separate provincial status for FATA. In conclusion, the article ends with recommendations for Pakistan to address FATA’s governance Challenge.