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Most ocean-going ships are fitted with an impressed current cathodic protection (ICCP) system. The currents impressed by this system onto the seawater find their way to corroding parts of the ship’s hull, and prevent the hull from corroding. The electric field resulting from the currents around the ship is called the electric signature. This signature is a threat in seas with mines, as mines explode when they detect this signature. Therefore controlling the signature is important, especially to naval ships. In order to be able to control the signature the location and size of corrosion damage needs to be known. Today no method exists for corrosion damage estimation on a sailing ship. This study aims to develop a method for corrosion damage estimation using only measurements of an ICCP system. The research question is: To what accuracy and with what measurements can the damage distribution on a ship’s hull be reconstructed? The quality of the damage reconstruction is evaluated by how well the signature is estimated. First an analytical model is used to explore the theoretical limits of damage reconstruction. This shows damage reconstruction is limited by the number of measurement electrodes. Then damage reconstruction by numeric model inversion is attempted, but is shown to be unattainable. The proposed solution is damage reconstruction by repeatedly calculating for different damage configurations, comparing the calculated measurements to the true ones, and iterating until an optimum is found. This method works well on a ship geometry if 140 measurement sensors are used. In order to verify the damage reconstruction algorithm a scale model facility is developed. The produced field sensors show shifting offsets that are not explained, but good linearity with the electric field. Simulations and measurements with a calibration source show good similarity, but a factor of 1.6 difference that is not explained. Test with sacrificial anodes show large variations over time an, Electrical Engineering

This monograph addresses operational art during a specific period of the Korean War. Both General Walton H. Walker and General Douglas MacArthur developed operational approaches to unify Korea when the decision was made to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea. General MacArthur's approach used two major ground commands and was more daring, but it also was more complicated. General Walker, on the other hand, proposed an approach that used one unified ground commander, seemed more methodical, and was less daring. Ultimately, General MacArthur's approach was the one that was executed. The X Corps amphibious assault did not bring the anticipated result. The outloading of X Corps in preparation for the assault took longer than anticipated, and the enemy had mined the sea approaches to Wonsan. These two factors combined with an unsynchronized ground attack by I ROK Corps eliminated the chance of a successful envelopment. The monograph provides insight into the relationship between the commander's personality, his previous operational experiences, and his preference for a particular type of operational approach., The original document contains color images.

Sea mining is one of the least expensive, easiest to employ, and most highly effective methods for an adversary to deny sea control to a major sea power. It is therefore most alarming, in this era of increasing anti-U.S. terrorist activity, that the current U.S. Navy's mine countermeasures (MCM) posture falls critically short of achieving the necessary peacetime conditions to effectively counter mine threats along its Atlantic seaboard and Gulf coast. Perennial budgetary neglect and a mismanagement of the basic operational art concept of balancing the factors of Space, Time, and Force have combined to expose U.S. Navy MCM capacity as a critical vulnerability to U.S. maritime national security. The challenge of balancing these factors, as they relate to MCM capabilities, will become even more daunting in the immediate future due to nationally mandated budget sequestration. Sequestration will not only restrict legacy MCM asset maintenance and operational tempo, but also further impede already behind-schedule development of future MCM assets. However, by focusing on the direction outlined in national security and defense directives, leveraging existing multinational defense relationships, and continuing Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) initiatives, there is the potential for Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) to achieve increased efficiency in global MCM response while concurrently fortifying homeland defense MCM capacity.

Due to the United States' dependency on maritime travel, the proliferation of efficient and inexpensive naval mines poses a tremendous risk. Current mine countermeasure (MCM) technologies have a narrow field of view, preventing timely, wide-area searches. These technologies require the operator to be in proximity to the targets, a dangerous scenario made worse when in denied territory. In an effort to mitigate these risks, the use of an airborne hyperspectral sensor is proposed. The operational ability of a hyperspectral sensor to detect sub-pixel surface and submerged mines in non-littoral environments was evaluated using two common anomaly detectors: Mixture Tuned Matched Filtering (MTMF) and Reed-Xiaoli (RX). Due to the unavailability of the DoD's Spectral Infrared Imaging Technology Testbed (SPIRITT), ProSpecTIR-VS3, a sensor similar spatially and spectrally to SPIRITT was flown over a Navy test range offshore California. This experiment included three surface and three submerged targets, each with a 0.8 meter diameter. The spatial resolution of the images is dependent on the altitude of the sensor. In an effort to collect both a high spatial resolution and a low spatial resolution data set, two flight altitudes were planned. The high spatial resolution collection altitude was approximately 410 meters and the low spatial resolution altitude was approximately 800 meters. The spatial resolutions of the collections were 0.5 and 1.0 meters, respectively. This allowed for both a resolved and an unresolved analysis. While both anomaly detection techniques were found to have their flaws, the success of the study is in proving the usefulness of hyperspectral data for sub-pixel mine detection.

The utility of satellite spectral imagery is analyzed for the detection of submerged mine like objects. The targets that were utilized were sub-meter in size and emplaced in the water off the coast of La Jolla, California for a barnacle study. There were three surface targets and three submerged targets that did not exceed three meters in depth. Two meter multispectral and half meter panchromatic WorldView-2 data were used for image processing and analysis. The multispectral data proved more useful than the higher spatial resolution panchromatic data (sub-pixel vs resolved).For the multispectral data, principal component analysis was the most successful of the techniques, locating the submerged and surface targets. Attempts to use the RX-UTD anomaly detector were less successful, because of excessive false positives. This study supports the concept that commercial remote sensing is a viable option to support mine countermeasures.

The search, detection, identification and assessment components of the U.S. Navy's organic modular in-stride Mine Countermeasure (MCM) Concept of Operations (CONOPS) have been evaluated for their effectiveness as part of a hypothetical exercise in response to the existence of sea mines placed in the sea lanes of the Strait of Hormuz. The current MCM CONOPS has been shown to be capable of supporting the mine search and detection effort component allocation needs by utilizing two Airborne Mine Countermeasure (AMCM) deployed systems. This adequacy assessment is tenuous. The CONOPS relies heavily upon the Sikorsky MH- 60/S as the sole platform from which the systems operate. This reliance is further compounded by the fact both AMCM systems are not simultaneously compatible on board the MH-60/S. As such, resource availability will challenge the MCM CONOPS as well as the other missions for which the MH-60/S is intended. Additionally, the AMCM CONOPS systems are dependent upon the presence of warfighters in the helicopters above the minefield and as integral participants in the efforts to identify sea mines and to assess their threat level. Model Based System Engineering (MBSE) techniques have been combined with research and stakeholder inputs in an analysis that supports these assertions.

Survivability has always been a main concern in naval warfare. The objectives of this thesis are to analyze the combat survivability components of a surface ship, and to look at the how each of the component's design and implementation would affect the overall survivability of the ship. This thesis will take an overview look on survivability with regards to the threats that today's warships would be facing, and the vulnerability and susceptibility reduction techniques, designs and implementations. The main focus of the thesis would be on susceptibility reduction, through signature management, threat warnings, threat suppressions, tactics and integrated networks. Finally, this thesis would illustrate the effects of applying the survivability enhancement techniques in a possible engagement scenario. As the techniques involved many cross-discipline fields in engineering, this thesis also aims to prepare a foundation for the development of a naval survivability discipline in NPS for the future.

Every mine countermeasure (MCM) operation is a balance of time versus risk. In attempting to reduce time and risk, it is in the interests of the MCM community to use unmanned, stationary sensors to detect and monitor drifting mines through harbor inlets and straits. A network of stationary sensors positioned along an area of interest could be critical in such a process by removing the MCM warfighter from a threat area and reducing the time required to detect a moving target. Although many studies have been conducted to optimize sensors and sensor networks for moving target detection, few of them considered the effects of the environment. In a drifting mine scenario, an oceanographic drift model could offer an estimation of surrounding environmental effects and provide time critical estimations of target movement. These approximations can be used to further optimize sensor network components and locations through a defined methodology using estimated detection probabilities. The goal of this research is to provide such a methodology by modeling idealized stationary sensors and surface drift for the Hampton Roads Inlet., The original document contains color images.

The rise in cost of developing and maintaining an amphibious force in readiness and the risk associated with amphibious operations, in terms of lives, ships, and equipment that could potentially be lost, have raised concerns specifically over the utility of conducting amphibious assaults in the 21st century. Furthermore, the proliferation and development of sea denial weapon systems combined with a reduced naval capability to counter anti-access, area-denial threats have forced military leaders to reconsider the use of amphibious assaults to achieve operational objectives. The following paper will analyze the primary threats of anti-ship missiles and naval mines, identify shortfalls with respect to the U.S. Navy's ability to conduct naval fire support and mine countermeasure operations, and offer a counterargument and rebuttal that will address the concept of Sea Power 21 as an enabler for the future implementation of amphibious assaults. Finally, conclusions regarding the future of amphibious operations and recommendations towards making amphibious assaults a viable option will be addressed.

Mine impact burial models such as IMPACT25, IMPACT28, and IMPACT35 have been used in the MIW community in an attempt to calculate the percentage of impact burial for sea mines. Until recently the models have been deterministic, using parameters such as sediment type, air and sea trajectories, drop angle, and mine type to calculate the percentage of burial. These models have been relatively effective in calculating impact burial, but little attention has been given to the temporal effects on mine burial, known as scour burial. Another shortfall of the deterministic modeling approach is the inability to capture the stochastic nature of the input parameters. To address these issues the John Hopkins University - Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU-APL), in conjunction with the NRL has developed the Mine Burial Expert System (MBES). The MBES is a Bayesian network of physics based, deterministic models, observational data, and expert opinion. It provides the opportunity to give input parameters as probability density tables (PDTs) and receive a burial percentage as an output distribution. This allows its user to capture the variability of input parameters and converge them into variability in the burial prediction, providing valuable risk data to the mine countermeasure (MCM) Commander. The MBES has been incorporated into the Environmental Post Mission Analysis (EPMA) tool for Naval Oceanographic Office (NAVO), which could give the MCM planners an idea of the confidence level of its predictions. To understand how the variability and confidence levels can be used and how it may affect current doctrine, a series of tests have been run through the MBES. A thorough review of the results can have a significant effect on future use of the system and subsequent changes to MIW doctrine. In particular, current doctrinal sediment categories are not sufficient in capturing the resolution of the MBES predictions., The original document contains color images.

In 1915, the Allies attempted to force open the Dardanelles Straits in the face of an integrated Turkish and German defense (sea mines plus covering fire), using first their navy and then their army, with disastrous results. An analysis of the navy portion of this campaign identified a number of lessons at the strategic and operational levels pertaining specifically to risk assessments, strategic communications, proper strategic and operational planning, operational leadership, and operational art. These lessons were juxtaposed with a modern attempt by a belligerent such as Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz, yielding a number of points to consider when thinking through the implications of a Strait of Hormuz closure as well as corresponding recommendations for U.S. policymakers, strategists, and planners.

The Russian-directed protective minefields laid at Chinnampo, Hungnam and Wonsan during the Korean War reflect the further development and lethality of Russian protective mine warfare doctrine and capability. This development is the continuation in the sophistication of protective mine warfare begun in 1854 during the Crimean War. Russian minelaying developed from simple geographic barriers to a sophisticated, integrated, shaping defense. With the addition of modern technology, to include aircraft, missiles, and the increasing sophistication of mines themselves, mine warfare will increasingly become a cheap and more lethal defense to our modern, conventional navy. Continued American ignorance and lack of appreciation for mine warfare and for how its opponents could lay mines will someday cost her dearly.

The falling of a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) through a water column was modeled using a six degrees of freedom model (called STRIKE35), which contains three components: hydrodynamics, semi-empirical determination of the drag/ lift/torque coefficients (depending on the Reynolds number and the angle of attack), and water surface characteristics. To validate and verify this model, three underwater bomb trajectory tests were conducted in the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWC/WD) in the middle of Indian Wells Valley, California. During the test, several JDAMs were dropped from an airplane into two frustum ponds with the same bottom diameter of approximately 30.5 m, different surface diameters (61 m, 79 m), and different depths (7.6 m, 12.1 m). High-speed digital cameras with light/pressure sensors, and a global positioning system were used to record the location and orientation of JDAMs. Model-data inter comparison shows the capability of STRIKE35, which may lead to a new approach (breaching technology) of sea mine clearance in very shallow water (water depth less than 12.2 m, i.e. 40 ft)., Published in the Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology, p1-12, 2010.

From the Sea strategic concept has expanded naval operations from open ocean, blue-water combat environments to the littoral regions in which naval mines can both be an extremely menacing threat to U.S. forces and an effective force multiplier for the Fleet. The Navy/Marine Corps must have efficient Mine Warfare (MIW) forces to ensure the Fleet can carry out operations in the open ocean and littorals, including maintaining open sea lanes of communication and supporting Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Warfare from the Sea while denying operating areas to the enemy. Every ship has a magnetic signature, which is caused by its iron and steel components. Additionally, the earth's natural magnetic field induces a magnetization in a ship depending on its latitude, longitude, and heading. Exploitation of surface ship and submarine magnetic field signatures by naval influence mines has occurred throughout time. In order to calculate the swept path width for magnetic minesweeping systems currently in use by the U.S. Mine Warfare (MIW) forces, it is necessary to calculate the vector components of the magnetic field strength which are generated by each of several possible system configurations. The Navy's Magnetic Model addresses this needed capability. The Navy's N-Layer Magnetic Model (NLMM) is used to predict the expected performance of magnetic minesweeping equipment in a complex environment consisting of N layers, each with arbitrary conductivity and thickness. The model is used to compute the magnetic field strength produced by various U.S. Navy magnetic minesweeping configurations using a random environmental vertical conductivity structure. To better determine which parameters had the greatest effect on the model and which could be simplified or enhanced, a series of tests were run on actual data sets., The original document contains color images.

The US Navy (USN) has recognized the need for effective buried-mine hunting as one of its Organic Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Future Naval Capabilities. Current thinking envisions a two-step process for identifying buried mines. First, an initial survey, or Search-Classify-Map (SCM) mission, will be performed using low-frequency synthetic aperture sonar (SAS). Second, a Reacquire-and-Identify (RI) mission will provide confirmatory final classification by reacquiring the target, at close range, with magnetic, acoustic, and electro-optic sensors, and evaluating properties such as geometric details and magnetic moment that can be fused to identify or definitively classify the object. The goal is to demonstrate a robust capability to identify buried sea mines through sensor fusion. Specifically, the classification results of a passive magnetic sensor and an electrooptic sensor will be generated for fusion with the results from a short-range bottom-looking sonar, with all three sensors coresiding and operating simultaneously on an Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV). The Bluefin12 Buried Mine Identification (BMI) System will be used as the platform to develop a capability for the identification of buried mines. This system houses the bottom looking sonar, the Real-time Tracking Gradiometer (RTG), and an Electro-Optic Imager (EOI). This paper will address the applications of the RTG, EOI, and data fusion results with bottom looking sonar. The objective for the RTG is the enhancement of the processing that extracts target locations and magnetic moments from the raw RTG data. In particular, we are adding a capability to conduct real-time processing capability to provide autonomous target classification and localization results soon after the UUV passes the target, while the system is still performing the mission. These results will be shared with the vehicle or other tr, See also ADM202806. Published in the Proceedings of the Oceans 2009 MTS/IEEE Conference held in Biloxi, Mississippi on 26-29 October 2009. Copyright belongs to the Marine Technology Society., The original document contains color images.

Current U.S. military strategy requires assured maritime access to achieve national policy objectives. Because of our conventional superiority in the maritime domain, adversaries will seek asymmetric advantages to contest this access. Asymmetric undersea threats - such as sea mines, improvised explosive devices, combat swimmers and swimmer delivery vehicles, semi-submersibles, and mini-submarines - can disrupt assured maritime access. Operational commanders must recognize the existing danger posed by such threats, and mitigate risk through the integration of joint, multinational, and interagency forces and capabilities. This paper discusses asymmetric undersea threats and their advantages to an adversary seeking to challenge assured maritime access. Next, the paper addresses current obstacles faced by U.S. joint forces when encountering these threats. Finally, it makes recommendations on how an operational commander can mitigate the risk posed by asymmetric undersea threats.

After a lengthy hiatus -- lasting nearly six centuries -- China is reemerging as a maritime power, this time with an emphasis on undersea warfare. Between 1996 and 2006, the Chinese navy took delivery of more than thirty submarines. These vessels include two new classes of nuclear submarines -- the advanced Song-class diesel submarines and the Yuan class of diesel boats -- which, according to some reports, was a surprise for U.S. intelligence. Above and beyond this ambitious naval construction program, the People's Republic of China (PRC) received during 2005-06 an additional eight formidable Kilo-class submarines (and associated weaponry), which were purchased in 2002, to add to the four it already operated. A new nuclear submarine base on Hainan Island may well herald a new era of more extended Chinese submarine operations. Much discussion among East Asian security analysts now centers on Beijing's potential development and deployment of aircraft carriers. However, at least in the near term, this discussion amounts to a red herring. For the foreseeable future, China does not seek to rule the waves writ large but rather is seeking the much narrower and more realizable objective of dominating the East Asian littoral. While photos of a first Chinese carrier will no doubt cause a stir, the Chinese navy has in recent times focused much attention upon a decidedly more mundane and nonphotogenic arena of naval warfare: sea mines. This focus has, in combination with other asymmetric forms of naval warfare, had a significant impact on the balance of power in East Asia. People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) strategists contend that sea mines are easy to lay and difficult to sweep; their concealment potential is strong; their destructive power is high; and the threat value is long-lasting., ISSN 1943-0817; ISBN 978-1-884733-63-5.

The Navy is in need of an organic, inexpensive, swift method to neutralize or sweep waterborne mines. This thesis presents an alternative to current mine countermeasure technologies that fulfills this criteria?the use of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) to clear a minefield. It updates the general, physics-based, six degrees of freedom model, STRIKE35, to predict the three-dimensional, free-fall trajectory and orientation of a MK-84 bomb (simulating the JDAM) through a water column. It accurately predicts the final detonation position relative to an underwater mine in the very shallow water environment. Input parameters include accurate water impact speed and surface impact angle of attack. Because the model results compare well with experimental data from the Stand-Off Assault Breaching Weapon Fuze Improvement (SOABWFI) Program, we analyzed the trajectory of the weapon with structural failures. This thesis solves for the impact speed and impact angle of attack limitations to remain within the Technology Transition Agreement, the detonation location for each fuze delay setting (to include its 20% tolerance), and the trajectory changes due to different water densities. This gives strike planners a tactical decision aid to clear the minefield accurately and efficiently with existing aircraft and weapons., The original document contains color images.

Recent literature discussing the movement of U.S. forces to Guam largely focuses on the strategic advantages the island offers: specifically, its status as sovereign U.S. territory and its ability to relieve political pressures associated with the extensive U.S. military footprint on Okinawa. There are few discussions of the operational advantages and disadvantages of moving significant amounts of U.S. forces to Guam, especially in the context of a conflict between the United States and the People's Republic of China. An evaluation of Guam's geography and Chinese military philosophy, capabilities, and published discussions reveals that Apra Harbor, the only maritime egress point for the island, is quite vulnerable to offensive mining by PRC submarine. The paper discusses how this determination is made and discusses and rejects solutions available with given force infrastructure. The paper concludes that strategic leaders, having decided to maintain U.S. commitments in the region, need to provide the operational commander additional forces to provide for Guam's defense., The original document contains color images.

The purpose of smart climatology is to provide information that would be useful in operational planning at lead times of two to four weeks or greater. Decisions made at shorter lead-times are generally informed by forecasts. One of the challenges in designing a new climatology data system -- to include generation, storage, and access -- is anticipating how the data might be used, and therefore how to design the system to provide the most useful data in their most useful format. This report uses an operations research/decision analysis (OR/DA) approach to prototype the process of using smart climatology data in planning, and identifies challenges and key features of a decision-relevant climatology data system. While some commercial forecast and climatology providers, such as The Weather Channel, profit from the entertainment value of forecasts, military meteorology and oceanography (METOC) products create value by influencing operational consequences. Taking this perspective, an OR/DA framework can be used to analyze and improve the following: (1) how METOC information is used in decision-making (mission planning and execution); (2) the design of METOC products for communication to operational decision makers; and (3) the operational value created by METOC information. The OR/DA framework makes some basic assumptions that may be non-intuitive to the METOC community. First, information can only improve operational consequences if it affects decisions. There is no qualitative difference between METOC forecasts and climatology. In OR/DA analysis, all forecasts are treated as probabilistic. Operational consequences are produced by the interaction of commanders' decisions with METOC events. Therefore, OR/DA analyses are meaningful within a given decision context, or scenario. Decision policies, product design, and information value are best analyzed in expectation., The original document contains color images.

This volume contains the following articles: Is high-fidelity best for depicting situation awareness?; A cool-headed robot built for hot radiological work; Easing the strain on replenishment at sea; MURLIN defeats the deadly gaze of IR missile eyes; Scanning the seafloor for maritime operations; Better ways to link people securely by satellite; An improved tool for countering mine attack at sea; ADF frontline personnel to benefit from sports technology Personal radar warning receiver units tested; Keeping hot weather soldiers properly fed., ISSN 1441-0818. Copyright Commonewealth of Australia, 2008

Insight gained from terrorist attacks, training exercises, and intelligence intercepts over the past few years has shown a renewed interest in the use of mining as an effective means of disrupting commerce and damaging critical infrastructure. In an attempt to develop a system-of-systems architecture to defeat mines and Maritime IEDs (MIED), the project team developed several system alternatives, or Adaptive Force Packages, that incorporate both existing systems and emerging technologies. Overall performance was assessed using a U.S. Joint Forces Command sponsored war game simulating an MIED attack on ports based on the geography of Seattle and Tacoma. A critical analysis of the alternatives based on performance, suitability, cost, and risk were carried out. The study results showed that increases in performance are attainable with mixed results in cost and risk, and highlighted necessary actions and considerations that must be taken by military and civilian leaders to adequately prepare for and counter MIEDs in U.S. Ports., The original document contains color images.

The Strait of Hormuz is widely viewed as one of the most important maritime chokepoints in existence today -- certainly it is the most important in terms of the global energy system, with one fifth of the oil consumed worldwide flowing through it each day. Iran has repeatedly threatened to disrupt the flow of oil through the strait, particularly in response to an attack, with potentially dire consequences for the price of oil and the world economy. A review of detailed open-source analysis, however, indicates that Iran's ability to close the strait is not a forgone conclusion, especially in light of the extensive U.S. military presence in the region. Furthermore, closing the strait would also have severe economic consequences for Iran. So, what is Iran's ability to disrupt the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz and what is the potential impact to the global energy system? Under what circumstances might Iran attempt to do this? In light of the uncertainty, why does Iran continue to make this threat? This paper shows that Iran's threat to close the Strait of Hormuz represents an information campaign against the United States, to which we have failed to respond adequately.

Concern has grown in Congress and elsewhere since the 1990s about China's military modernization. Several of the U.S. Navy's most expensive acquisition programs, as well as Navy initiatives for homeporting ships and for training sailors, are for developing or maintaining capabilities that could be useful or critical in countering improved Chinese mantime military capabilities in coming years. The issue for Congress addressed in this report is: How should China's military modernization be factored into decisions about U.S. Navy programs? Several elements of China's military modernization have potential implications for future required U.S. Navy capabilities. These include theater-range ballistic missiles (TBMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based aircraft, naval mines, submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, nuclear weapons, and possibly high-power microwave (HPM) devices. China's naval limitations or weaknesses include capabilities for operating in waters more distant from China, joint operations, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), long-range surveillance and targeting systems, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and shipbuilding dependence on foreign suppliers.

The world economy is growing more reliant on the volume and security of traffic in the maritime straits. Given the expanding role of asymmetric warfare in littoral sea control and the growing importance of strait integrity in the global economy, understanding the intricacies of operational factors in straits is vital to the Commander's employment of sound Operational Art. This paper examines operational factors as they pertain to the uniqueness of maritime straits. The peculiarities of strait closure and resulting drastic effects in the modern global economy must be examined thoroughly in the Space-Force-Time construct to understand the power balance vital to maintaining sea-lines of communication and maritime interests of the United States and its allies. Due to the speed at which some straits can be closed and the resulting global effects, the only guarantor of integrity in those straits is to preemptively strike a belligerent's forces. If this thesis is correct, a new array of difficult problems is revealed. The timeline from actionable intelligence to a belligerent's effective strait closure is very short, if it even exists. The time that is available is not sufficient for debating reactionary plans or new course of action (COA) development. But the decision to preemptively strike may result in many unintended consequences, the most likely -- war. The two extremes: reacting to strait closure and employing a preemptive-strike leave the combatant commander few middle-ground alternatives. A case study focuses on current day Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. Finally, the paper recommends a combatant commander review and revision of courses of action under an Operational Art lens, focused through the Space-Time-Force analysis provided.

A Joint Force Commander tasked with countering a People's Republic of China (PRC) total blockade of Taiwan would have a difficult challenge. The PRC has wisely invested in anti-access technologies that make it risky for the United States to conduct operations in their backyard. Sustaining the island would be difficult, but certainly not impossible. This paper examines a potential solution to the problem by analyzing Operation Vittles, commonly known as the Berlin Airlift. In the Berlin Airlift, the western allies used the operational factors of space and force to allow time for the will of the population of West Berlin to continue its resistance. The same principle holds true in the aforementioned Taiwan scenario. The lessons learned from Berlin are applied to the design of an operation to sustain Taiwan in a crisis scenario through the use of a civilian airlift capability. This strategy is designed to place the PRC in a position where it is forced to either take the first shot, and risk loss of legitimacy on the world stage, or de-escalate the situation for a political settlement.

Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT) asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to identify capability requirements and recommend a force structure for the Iraqi Navy for 2015 and beyond. The goal of this study is two-fold: to provide Iraqi and Coalition personnel with a common assessment of capability requirements and force structure recommendations for the Iraqi Navy, and to provide the Iraqi Navy leadership with an analytical process for determining capability and force structure requirements to meet future needs. The study identifies key factors that are likely to characterize the future Iraqi Navy operating environment, conducts mission analyses, develops concepts of operations (CONOPs) for future missions, derives operational tasks and capabilities to support the CONOPs, and assesses force structure options to meet naval capabilities. The authors identify four missions for the Iraqi Navy in 2015: (1) Oil platform (OPLAT) protection -- the objective of this mission is to protect Iraq's two offshore OPLATs that provide its primary source of income; (2) Maritime security operations -- the objective of this mission is to preserve and protect the fair and legitimate use of Iraqi waters by mariners; to prevent smugglers and others from moving illicit materials through Iraqi water space; to prevent terrorist, insurgent, pirate, or other attacks from or within Iraqi waters; and to prevent the use of the maritime environment as an aid to illegitimate activity ashore; (3) Disaster response -- the objective of this mission is to respond quickly to disasters that occur within territorial waters, or that directly impact Iraqi maritime interests, by rapidly providing forces that are able to control the disaster scene and coordinate consequence management; and (4) Territorial water (TTW) defense -- the objective of this mission is to defend Iraqi TTW from conventional and unconventional threats by deterring, defeating, or neutralizing enemies., The original document contains color images. All DTIC reproductions will be in black and white.

Potential adversaries of the United States recognize that its ability to globally project combat power is essential to maintaining military dominance. Degrading US combat power projection requires a strategy of access denial which consists of geopolitical and military measures. In the Pacific Rim, the development of antiaccess capabilities is accelerating. Specifically, China has increased its procurement of ballistic, cruise, and anti-ship missiles, sea mines, and diesel submarines with a special focus on anticarrier operations. Although China seems focused on naval forces, the antiaccess challenge affects all services. Since the Pacific Rim continues to emerge as a global region of importance, the United States must implement access-enhancing measures now to optimize its power-projection capability in future operations. The central question for the Air Force centers on how land-based airpower can assist in answering the emerging antiaccess challenge in that region. This is not the first time the United States has faced a significant antiaccess challenge. It encountered a severe challenge from the Soviet Union during the Cold War when confronted with multiple nuclear delivery means that threatened US military forces overseas and stateside. The US answered this antiaccess challenge in a multifaceted approach that, if applied today, would enhance our efforts in the Pacific Rim. First, US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) implemented dispersal plans for US tactical forces in Europe. Second, Strategic Air Command (SAC) put in place an operational concept called Reflex Action, which enhanced the survivability of the long-range bomber force through dispersal and forward-deployed alert operations supported by an early warning system. Third, the successful pursuit of a strategic triad allowed the United States to retain a strategic advantage throughout the Cold War.

Whilst autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) are increasingly being used to perform MCM tasks, the capability of these systems is limited in terms of their ability to network and co-operate effectively with other manned or unmanned assets. This paper describes a processing system which is being developed at NURC to address this missing capability. In addition to describing the system approach and implementation progress, the underlying requirement for the system is analyzed through a review of typical mission needs and the performance constraints of current technology., See also ADM202416. Presented at the RTO Applied Vehicle Technology Panel (AVT) Symposium held in Florence, Italy on 14-17 May 2007. Published in Platform Innovations and System Integration for Unmanned Air, Land and Sea Vehicles, RTO-MP-AVT-146, paper no. 8, 2007.

Technological advances and the proliferation of sea mines have increased the asymmetric threat to expeditionary forces in the littorals as well as to naval forces in general. Mine countermeasures is a complex area of naval warfare and the existence of a robust capability in this area is critical to the successful execution of naval and expeditionary operations and the attainment of joint operational maneuver. The potential exists for non-state actors to acquire sea mines and subsequently employ mine warfare as a means of crippling the Navy throughout its range of military operations. The Navy has an obligation to develop and effectively employ critical operational capabilities to counter that threat. Operational commanders must recognize the capabilities at their disposal as well as their limitations to plan and make appropriate risk decisions., The original document contains color images.

The Strait of Hormuz is a unique waterway vital to world commerce; as such, it is of military importance as well. The strait is narrow and has turbulent currents that change in intensity and direction due to the reverse estuarine flow of the Persian Gulf. On the border between extratropical and monsoonal atmospheric synoptic influences, the wind direction and intensity are dependent on time of year, which side of the strait due to terrain, and time of day due to land/sea breeze cycles. Utilization of model field inputs (from near real-time models) to tactical decision aids greatly enhances the information output by those aids. Using the examples of drifting mines and oil spills, the utility of these model fields is shown when compared to climatology inputs. OILMAP, the oil dispersion model developed at Applied Science Associates, is used in this study to demonstrate how the behavior of an oil spill reacts with model field inputs for surface winds and currents from the Naval Oceanographic Office and the Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center, followed by comparative analysis between climatology inputs. Drift mine behavior is analyzed utilizing a simple Lagrangian drift model with model field inputs compared with climatology inputs. The results from the comparisons show that the variable nature of the wind/current direction and speed through the strait is impossible to capture using climatology inputs. Winds less than 5 m/s are not a factor in the movement of an oil slick; even compared to the slowest of currents at ~10-15 cm/s. It is determined that the tidal nature of the currents through the strait, combined with variable strength of the winds, make prediction of oil slick or mine drift track unrealistic using climatology data. Therefore, using operational, near real-time environmental data is necessary for information superiority., Master of Science in Physical Oceanography

Concern has grown in Congress and elsewhere about China's military modernization. The topic is an increasing factor in discussions over future required U.S. Navy capabilities. The issue for Congress addressed in this report is: How should China's military modernization be factored into decisions about U.S. Navy programs? Several elements of China's military modernization have potential implications for future required U.S. Navy capabilities. These include theater-range ballistic missiles (TBMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based aircraft, submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, naval mines, nuclear weapons, and possibly highpower microwave (HPM) devices. China's naval limitations or weaknesses include capabilities for operating in waters more distant from China, joint operations, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), long-range surveillance and targeting systems, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and logistics. Observers believe a near-term focus of China's military modernization is to field a force that can succeed in a short-duration conflict with Taiwan and act as an antiaccess force to deter U.S. intervention or delay the arrival of U.S. forces, particularly naval and air forces, in such a conflict. Some analysts speculate that China may attain (or believe that it has attained) a capable maritime anti-access force, or elements of it, by about 2010. Other observers believe this will happen later. Potential broader or longer-term goals of China's naval modernization include asserting China's regional military leadership and protecting China's maritime territorial, economic, and energy interests., The original document contains color images.

In support of Military Mine Warfare (MIW) clearance operations for safe vessel passage, analysts perform change detection by visually comparing historical high-resolution sidescan sonar imagery (SSI) with newly collected SSI in an attempt to identify newly placed objects. The objective of MIW change detection is to match objects detected in new SSI with historical objects stored in a database. Any newly detected objects not successfully matched are flagged for investigation. A requirement exists for a system to perform real-time change detection and classification. This paper presents an Automated Change Detection and Classification (ACDC) System, developed by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and the Naval Oceanographic Office (NAVOCEANO), which aids analysts in performing change detection in real-time (RT) by co-registering new and historical imagery and using automated change detection algorithms that suggest imagery changes. In this paper, ACDC-RT components are described and results given from a recent change detection experiment., Presented at the Undersea Defense Technology Pacific 2006 Conference, held in San Diego, California on 6-8 December 2006. Published in proceedings of the same as Paper number NRL-PP-7440-2006-1013. Prepared in collaboration with Mine Warfare Department, Naval Oceanographic Office, Stennis Space Center, MS. The original document contains color images.