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When children use online apps, they often share personal information, such as their name, address, and birthday. In the present study, we investigated the mental models children use to reason about what apps are allowed to do with personal data after it has been willingly shared with an app. 57 children ages 8- to 11-years-old were read a story in which they were asked to judge whether an online game (app) was allowed or not allowed to perform four different actions: looking, saving, selling, and showing. We compared these judgments to a comparison condition where we asked children what users themselves should be allowed to do with their data. We found that children viewed the app as less permitted to act on the data than users as well as some further differences by action-type. Our findings suggest that children use something akin to a “lending” model to conceptualize data transfers, in which apps have less rights than users despite the data being willingly transferred to the app. Our findings also suggest that children differentiate among the uses of information as children think certain actions by the app are less permissible than others (e.g., looking is more permissible than selling).

Defining developmental progressions can be an important step in identifying developmental precursors and mechanisms of change, within and across areas of reasoning. In one exploratory study, we examine whether the development of children's thinking about ownership follows a systematic progression wherein some components emerge reliably before others. We examine this issue in a sample of 72 children: 40 older 2-year-olds, M[subscript age] = 2.78 (0.14); R = 2.50-3.00, and 32 older 4-year-olds, M[subscript age] = 4.77 (0.16); R = 4.50-5.00, living in Michigan in the United States. We use a battery of four established ownership tasks that tested different aspects of children's ownership thinking. A Guttman test revealed a reliable sequence that explained 81.9% of children's performance. Namely, we discovered that identifying familiar owned objects emerged first, control of permission as a cue to ownership second, understanding ownership transfers third, and the tracking of sets of identical objects last. This ordering suggests two foundational ownership abilities on which more complex reasoning may be built: the ability to include information about familiar owners in children's mental models of objects and recognizing that control is central to ownership. The observed progression is an important first step toward developing a formal ownership scale. This study paves the way for mapping the conceptual and information-processing demands (e.g., executive functioning, memory) that likely underlie change in ownership thinking across childhood.

How people conceptualize learning is related to real-world educational consequences across many domains of education. Despite its centrality to the educational system, we know little about how the public reasons about language acquisition, and the potential consequences for their thinking about real-world issues (e.g., policy endorsements). The current studies examined people's essentialist beliefs about language acquisition (e.g., that language is innate and biologically based), then investigated how individual differences in these beliefs related to the endorsement of educational myths and policies. We probed several dimensions of essentialist beliefs, including that language acquisition is innate, genetically based, and wired in the brain. In two studies, we tested specific hypotheses regarding the extent to which people use essentialist thinking when reasoning about: learning a specific language (e.g., Korean), learning a first language more generally, and learning two or more languages. Across studies, participants were more likely to essentialize the ability to learn multiple languages than one's first language, and more likely to essentialize the learning of multiple languages and one's first language than the learning of a particular language. We also found substantial individual differences in the degree to which participants essentialized language acquisition. In both studies, these individual differences correlated with an endorsement of language-related educational neuromyths (Study 1 and pre-registered Study 2), and rejection of educational policies that promote multilingual education (Study 2). Together, these studies reveal the complexity of how people reason about language acquisition and its corresponding educational consequences.

This exploratory report investigates how children, aged 6- to 12-years, reason about divisions in labour. It focuses on understanding when in development children might associate higher status groups with intellectual as opposed to physical labour. It explores this question by introducing a sample of mostly mid/high-SES American children to a novel factory setting and then asking them who is likely to have one of two jobs: a 'builder' (physical labour), or 'thinker' (intellectual labour) job. Older children were more likely than younger children to associate an individual's higher social status with intellectual labour work as opposed to physical labour work. Children also explained their reasoning, and with age their explanations focused more on social factors like the role of access to 'choices' or opportunities in shaping the nature of others' work.

How possessions gain personal meaning has been a topic of interest to diverse fields studying the mind. Traditionally, the personal value of possessions is hypothesized to be driven by their special histories (Belk, 1988). We provide evidence that people value possessions for their ability to regulate distress. During the pandemic, people (N=333) reported having coping-possessions that helped them to regulate emotions (49%), solve problems (26%), or both (25%). Coping-possessions had high personal and monetary values (M=4.82 and 4.45, respectively; one-sample t-tests against midpoint, ps < .001) with problem-focused possessions having higher monetary values than emotion-focused ones (p < .001). The majority of coping-possessions, however, had mundane histories (e.g., bought at a store) rather than noteworthy ones (p < .001), suggesting that the emotional functions of objects contribute to their perceived personal value. This work also has implications for how adults use objects to regulate their emotions (Timpano & Port, 2021).

The present study investigates young children’s reasoning about who owns the information users share with apps. 87 children ages 5-years to 10-years were asked to judge who owned two types of information after it had been willingly shared by users: general and personal information. Based on an informational autonomy account, we predicted that young children would judge that the user owns their personal information but not their general information. We found that by 8-years-old children were indeed more likely to judge that users own the personal information they share with apps than they were to judge that users own the general information they share with them. However, younger children judged that the general information was owned by the user at similar rates to the personal information. Further exploration of our data suggests these changes are likely driven by beliefs about the ownership of general information.

People often over value their current property. For example,even young children will choose to keep their current propertyover trading it for property of similar utility (Hartley & Fisher,2018). In two experiments (N = 180), we examined howchildren aged 3 and 4 weigh the potential loss of existingproperty against the gain of property in their reasoning aboutothers’ actions. We found that by 4-years-old, children expectothers to prioritize the retention of existing property over theacquisition of new property. We suggest that this expectationreflects an understanding that people often value what theyalready own more than what they can potentially gain. Wediscuss the implications of our findings for competing theoriesof ownership reasoning, and for children’s reasoning about lossaversion.

The learning style myth is a commonly held myth that matching instruction to a student's "learning style" will result in improved learning, while providing mismatched instruction will result in suboptimal learning. The present study used a short online reasoning exercise about the efficacy of multimodal instruction to investigate the nature of learning styles beliefs. We aimed to: understand how learning style beliefs interact with beliefs about multimodal learning; characterize the potential complexity of learning style beliefs and understand how this short exercise might influence endorsements of learning styles. Many participants who believed in the learning style myth supported the efficacy of multimodal learning, and many were willing to revise their belief in the myth after the exercise. Personal experiences and worldviews were commonly cited as reasons for maintaining beliefs in learning styles. Findings reveal the complexity of learning style beliefs, and how they interact with evidence in previously undocumented ways.

Introduction: In two experiments, we examine the degree to which adults (Experiment 1) and children 5-to-8-years-old (Experiment 2) use diversity to infer a group's cooperative and innovative potential. Methods: Participants heard a child-friendly vignette about a competition in which a homogenous and diverse group were competing to design the perfect toy. They were then probed using questions related to the group's innovative potential and cooperative potential and asked to justify their responses. Results: Results show that adults believed that the diverse group would produce the more innovative product, while children endorsed the homogenous group. When asked a question probing cooperation, adults selected the homogenous group, whereas children were equally likely to select either group. Analysis of adults' explanations showed their explanations differed depending on which group they endorsed. However, children's explanations did not show this nuance. Exploratory analyses suggest that participants' responses were influenced by their personal experiences with gender and racial diversity. Discussion: People's appreciation of the link between group diversity and group potential changes across the lifespan likely due to life experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study investigated children's understanding that an object's history may increase its significance, an appreciation that underpins the concept of historical authenticity (i.e., the idea that an item's history determines its true identity, beyond its functional or material qualities, leading people to value real items over copies or fakes). We examined the development of historical significance through the lens of parent–child conversations, and children's performance on an authenticity assessment. The final sample was American, 79.2% monoracial White, and mid‐high socio‐economic status (SES) and included 48 parent–child pairs: 24 with younger children (R = 3.5 to 4.5 years) and 24 with older children (R = 5.5 to 6.5 years). Parent–child pairs discussed three books we created, with three storylines: a museum (culturally authentic) storyline, a clean‐up (personally authentic) storyline, and a control storyline. Across measures, conversations suggested that authenticity may begin as a "placeholder concept" that is initially rooted in a broad appreciation for the significance of old objects and only later filled in with specifics. This placeholder initially directs children's learning about authenticity by linking, in an unspecified way, the value and significance of objects to their past. For example, we found that young children appropriately appealed to history (vs. perceptual or functional features of objects) in contexts regarding authentic objects but struggled in determining which objects were more significant on the post‐test assessment, suggesting that they attend to object history but are not yet sure how histories matter for making authenticity judgments. We also found some evidence that directing children's attention toward conceptual information related to object history may in turn direct them away from material or perceptual considerations, as seen in trade‐offs in parents' and children's conversations. Together, this exploratory report offers many new avenues for work on the development of authenticity concepts in childhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated 4- and 5-year-olds' (N = 194) appreciation of the link between knowledge and ownership. Namely, we asked whether preschoolers appreciate the ways in which owners are typically knowledgeable about artifacts. Experiment 1 revealed that 4- and 5-year-olds view owners as better sources of knowledge about artifacts than those who simply like artifacts. Experiment 2 built on these findings by showing that 5-year-olds appreciate that owners typically have deep knowledge about artifacts and that they can use this appreciation to guide inferences about who owns what. These experiments are some of the first to investigate how children's inferences about knowledge and ownership are intertwined. As such, they have implications for our understanding of early childhood cognition. First, they provide insights into how object-person relations influence judgments of expertise. Second, they extend current understandings of ownership by demonstrating that ownership influences preschoolers' reasoning in other domains (i.e., knowledge) and by showing that preschoolers' theories of ownership extend beyond normative considerations (i.e., ownership rights). Together, these findings lay the groundwork for a new area of work on how ownership influences children's reasoning about knowledge.

Decades of research suggest that learning styles, or the belief that people learn better when they receive instruction in their dominant way of learning, may be one of the most pervasive myths about cognition. Nonetheless, little is known about what it means to believe in learning styles. The present investigation uses one theoretical framework--psychological essentialism--to explore the content and consistency of people's learning style beliefs. Psychological essentialism is a belief that certain categories (such as dogs, girls, or visual learners) have an underlying reality or true nature that is biologically based and highly predictive of many other features (Gelman, 2003). We tested the prevalence of erroneous essentialist beliefs regarding learning styles in both educators and noneducators, including that learning styles are innate, unchanging, discrete, and wired into the brain. In each of two experiments, we identified two groups of learning style believers, with one group holding an essentialist interpretation of learning styles, and the other group holding a nonessentialist interpretation of learning styles. No differences were found between educators' and noneducators' beliefs. In fact, only one factor was found to be a significant predictor of learning style beliefs for educators: the age of the population with whom they work. Specifically, those who worked with younger children were more likely to interpret learning styles in an essentialist way. Together the findings demonstrate that learning style beliefs are far more complex and variable than previously recognized.

In two experiments (N = 64), we told 6- to 7-year-olds about improbable or impossible outcomes (Experiment 1) and about impossible outcomes concerning ordinary or magical agents (Experiment 2). In both experiments, children claimed that the outcomes were impossible and could not happen, but nonetheless generated realistic and natural explanations for the outcomes. These findings show that 6- to 7-year-olds are strongly inclined to provide natural explanations. The findings are also informative about children's judgments about whether outcomes are possible, and further suggest that asymmetries between children's predictions and explanations may stem from differences in how these 2 forms of reasoning are constrained by possibility.

Two experiments examined children's understanding of how ownership affects object use. In Experiment 1, 84 children age 4-6 were asked what a person was allowed to do with a human-made object that either belonged to the person or belonged to someone else. In Experiment 2, 44 children age 4-5 were asked what a person was allowed to do with a natural object that belonged to the person, belonged to someone else, or belonged to no one. Children were permitted to provide as many responses as they wished. Children's responses reflected an appreciation that ownership affects a wide range of object uses, including harmless object use. Children's responses also reflected an appreciation that owner's rights should be upheld regardless of whether the owner's identity is known, or whether the owner is nearby. Moreover, children's responses suggest that they view ownership as restricting nonowners from using property, rather than affecting use by entitling owners.

Two experiments provide evidence that preschoolers selectively infer history when explaining outcomes and infer past events that could have plausibly happened. In Experiment 1, thirty-three 3-year-olds and thirty-six 4-year-olds explained why a character owns or likes certain objects. In Experiment 2, thirty-four 4-year-olds and thirty-six 5-year-olds explained why a character either owns or is using the objects. Children aged 4 and 5 years, but not 3 years, inferred history when explaining ownership, but not when explaining liking or use. They also tailored their explanations to reflect likelihood, allowing them to infer plausible past events. These findings are informative about the development of children's ability to infer history in their explanations and also suggest that preschoolers appreciate that ownership depends on past investment.

Young children show competence in reasoning about how ownership affects object use. In the present experiments, we investigate how influential ownership is for young children by examining their explanations. In three experiments, we asked 3- to 5-year-olds ( N = 323) to explain why it was acceptable (Experiments 1-3) or unacceptable (Experiment 2 and 3) for a person to use an object. In Experiments 1 and 2, older preschoolers referenced ownership more than alternative considerations when explaining why it was acceptable or unacceptable for a person to use an object, even though ownership was not mentioned to them. In Experiment 3, ownership was mentioned to children. Here, younger preschoolers frequently referenced ownership when explaining unacceptability of using an object, but not when explaining why using it was acceptable. These findings suggest that ownership is influential in preschoolers' explanations about the acceptability of using objects, but that the scope of its influence increases with age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]