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To study the effects of reminder nudges in complex environments, we apply a novel experimental approach based on a computer game in which decision makers have to pay attention to and perform multiple actions within a short period of time. The set-up allows us, first, to test the effect of reminders both on reminded and non-reminded actions and thus to observe whether reminders have (positive or negative) spillovers. Second, we investigate spillovers between multiple nudges by testing the effect of scaling up the number of reminded actions. Third, we study intertemporal spillovers by investigating whether the effects of having been exposed to reminders persist after reminders are withdrawn. We observe that reminders have positive effects in the short run – multiple reminders more so than single reminders: while reminders lead to crowding-out of non-reminded actions, the positive effect on the reminded actions dominates. Yet, after withdrawal of the reminders, the negative spillover effect persists, while the positive effect partially fades out so that, overall, reminders have no effect.

A gamification approach for debunking food safety myths. We test the effects of gamification and other information formats on food safety related beliefs and behaviors in a large survey experiment in the UK and Norway. We hypothesize that a computer game can help to debunk food myths and help to change food safety related beliefs and behaviors by comparing it with a control condition. We also compare the condition with a computer game to a condition that merely presents food safety related information on its own, in form of a video, and test whether information on its own has an effect compared to the control condition. The latter is expected to have only a small effect. Further, we test whether information presented in a disgusting form has a larger effect on the outcomes of interest than neutrally framed information and whether disgust sensitivity is a moderator of the effects.

We test whether and why non-binding, self-set goals are effective even though individuals can easily revise such goals. Depending on the treatment, subjects either set a goal a few days before working on an online task or right at the start of the task. In the former case, they may or may not be explicitly asked to revise their goal at the start of the task. Consistent with the hypothesis that goals are self-regulation tools, we observe that goals set before the task are larger than goals set at the start of the task. And they are effective: Subjects work more when a goal was set a few days before the task than when it was set at the start of the task. Importantly, these results arise even though subjects revise their initial goals. They do so no matter whether goal revision is made explicit or not – suggesting that goal revision is an important factor for goal non-achievement

We study in an online, real-effort experiment how the bracketing of non-binding goals affects performance in a work-leisure self-control problem. We externally induce the goal bracket - daily goals or a weekly goal - and within that bracket let subjects set goals for how much they want to work over a one-week period. Our theoretical model predicts (i) that weekly goals create incentives to compensate for a lower than desired performance today with the promise to work harder tomorrow, whereas daily goals exclude such excuses; (ii) that subjects with daily goals set higher goals in aggregate and work harder than those with weekly goals. Our data support these predictions. Surprisingly, however, when goals are combined with an externally enforced commitment that requires subjects to spend less than a minute each day on the task to get started working, performance deteriorates because of high dropout rates from the task.

We conduct a real-effort experiment to test whether workers reciprocate generous wages by managers when workers are tempted to surf the internet. Further, we investigate how an active policy of restricting the usage of the internet affects the workers' motivation. We observe that the temptation of the internet hampers workers' willingness to reciprocate fair wages. Yet, when the manager makes an active choice not to deny internet access, workers perceive the "freedom from control" as a gift which they reciprocate with high effort. Whether the positive "freedom from control" aspect or the negative temptation aspects dominates depends on the worker's reciprocity: for highly reciprocal workers the control aspect dominates; for non-reciprocal workers the temptation aspect dominates.

I consider the shopping and consumption decision of an individual with a self-control problem. The consumer believes that restricting the consumption of a sinful product (such as chips) is in his long-run interest. But when facing the actual decision he is tempted to overeat. I ask how fims react to such self-control problems, and possibly exploit them, by offering different package sizes. In a competitive market, either one or three (small, medium and large) packages are offered. In contrast to common intuition, the large, and not the small package is a commitment device. The latter serves to exploit the naive consumer.

During the last decade knowledge about human behavior from psychology and sociology has enhanced the field of economics of education. By now research recognizes cognitive skills (as measured by achievement tests) and soft skills (personality traits not adequately measured by achievement tests) as equally important drivers of later economic outcomes, and skills are seen as multi-dimensional rather than one-dimensional. Explicitly accounting for soft skills often implies departing from the standard economic model by integrating concepts studied in behavioral and experimental economics, such as self-control, willingness to compete, intrinsic motivation, and self-confidence. We review how approaches from behavioral economics help our understanding of the complexity of educational investments and outcomes, and we discuss what insights can be gained from such concepts in the context of education.

Little is known about the demand side of paternalism. We investigate attitudes towards paternalism among Danish students. The main question is whether demand for paternalism is related to self-control, either because people with self-control problems seek commitment devices to overcome these problems, or because people with good self-control want those who lack it to changetheir behaviors. We find no evidence linking self-control to attitudes towards weak forms of paternalism (e.g. nudges or information about health consequences). But respondents with good selfcontrol are significantly more favorable towards strong paternalism (e.g. restricting choices or sin taxes) than those struggling with self-control.

We model how people formulate and evaluate goals to overcome self-control problems. People often attempt to regulate their behavior by evaluating goal-related outcomes separately (in narrow psychological accounts) rather than jointly (in a broad account). To explain this evidence, our theory of endogenous narrow or broad psychological accounts combines insights from the literatures on goals and mental accounting with models of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences. By formulating goals the individual creates expectations that induce reference points for task outcomes. These goal-induced reference points make substandard performance psychologically painful and motivate the individual to stick to his goals. How strong the commitment to goals is depends on the type of psychological account. We provide conditions when it is optimal to evaluate goals in narrow accounts. The key intuition is that broad accounts make decisions or risks in different tasks substitutes and thereby create incentives to deviate from goals. Model extensions explore the robustness of our results to different timing assumptions and goal and account revision.

It is a puzzle why people often evaluate consequences of choices separately (narrow bracketing) rather than jointly (broad bracketing). We study the hypothesis that a present-biased individual, who faces two tasks, may bracket his goals narrowly for motivational reasons. Goals motivate because they serve as reference points that make substandard performance psychologically painful. A broad goal allows high performance in one task to compensate for low performance in the other. This partially insures against the risk of falling short of ones goal(s), but creates incentives to shirk in one of the tasks. Narrow goals have a stronger motivational force and thus can be optimal. In particular, if one task outcome becomes known before working on the second task, narrow bracketing is always optimal.

Self-administered rewards are ubiquitous. They serve as incentives for personal accomplishments and are widely recommended as tools for overcoming self-control problems. However, it seems puzzling why self-rewards can work: the prospect of a reward has a motivating force only if the threat of self-denial of the reward after low performance is credible. We explain how a rational forward-looking individual may achieve commitment to self-rewards, by applying Köszegi and Rabin's (2006) model of endogenous reference point formation to a self-regulation problem. Our results show why and when self-regulation built on self-rewards can be successful and thus illustrate the power, but also the limits, of self-rewards.

This paper considers the interplay of job assignments with the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of an agent. Job assignments influence the self confidence of the agent, and thereby his intrinsic motivation. Monetary reward allow the principal to complement intrinsic motivation with extrinsic incentives. The main result is that the principal chooses an inefficient job assignment rule to enhance the agent's intrinsic motivation even though she can motivate him with monetary rewards. This shows that, in the presence of intrinsically motivated agents, it is not possible to separate job assignment decisions from incentive provision.

Inefficient job assignments are usually explained with incomplete information about employees' abilities or contractual imperfections. We show that inefficient assignments arise even without uncertainty about the employee's ability and with complete contracts. Building on this result we provide a new perspective on the Peter Principle, by incorporating the possibility that an employee works harder. Hence, earnings and output may increase with a promotion only because employees work harder, some doing so to compensate for lacking talent. As a result, promotions are desirable for most employees but may make the least able in a hierarchy level less well off.

Goals are an important source of motivation. But little is known about why and how people set them. We address these questions in a model based on two stylized facts from psychology and behavioral economics: i) Goals serve as reference points for performance. ii) Present-biased preferences create self-control problems. We show how goals permit self-regulation, but also that they are painful self-disciplining devices. Greater self-control problems therefore lead to stronger self-regulation through goals only up to a certain point. For severely present-biased preferences, the required goal for self-regulation is too painful and the individual rather gives up.