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Young people's gender practices and the function of the school in shaping these practices have become a contentious issue in Chinese public discussions over the past decade. This article explores an emergent strain of thinking within this debate: that schools should promote the notion of gender equality. Focusing on the case of Daode yu fazhi (Morality and legal rule) textbooks currently used in all junior high schools (Grades 7-9) across the country, the article employs qualitative textual analysis to examine whether and how the gender equality principle is presented to youth in the Xi Jinping era (2012-). The study finds that the Xi-era textbooks promote the principle of equality between men and women and urge young people to fight for the implementation of this principle. In a notable break from the past, the books also acknowledge the existence of diverse gender practices among contemporary youth. At the same time, the textbooks endorse the notion of "natural" gender difference and "harmonious" gender complementarity. The books also censor gender/sexuality expressions that do not conform with hegemonic binary gender norms. Reflecting patriarchal and heteronormative ideologies reinforced by nationalist politics and a growing moral anxiety about the blurring of boundaries between masculinity and femininity, the Xi era curriculum ultimately leaves little space for flexible gender formulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores two aspects of the privatization of childhood in contemporary urban China: the emergent discourse on children's privacy and children's growing seclusion within the home. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, the author describes urban caregivers' engagement with the issue of children's privacy, and argues that we are now witnessing a transformation in Chinese notions of childhood, privacy and subjectivity. The result of a complex interaction between official discourses, demographic changes and economic forces, this transformation is also a product of the persistent influence of Confucian values, and the unique childhood experiences of a particular generation of urban Chinese parents. (Contains 15 notes.)

In a recent decision the Israeli High Court of Justice, the highest instance in the Israeli judicial system, authorized the forcible transfer of some 1,000 Palestinians from a West Bank community. Much like a biopsy sample, the article draws on its microanalysis of this individual case to expose a malady afflicting the body politic and entire corpus of judicial decisions concerning Israel's conduct in the occupied Palestinian territory. This malady's symptoms are increasingly evident across the global legal order. The proposition advanced in this article is three-fold: first, from the perspective of international legal doctrine, the judgment lacks any foundation, bringing about tragic consequences for the affected communities while offering a farcically inadequate account of international law. Second, the measures employed to displace the community are but an example of myriad legal technologies developed by the Israeli authorities and facilitated by Israeli courts that have fragmented the occupied territory into numerous zones, relegating Palestinians to a "no-place" while Jewish settlers take over their land. Third, while the judiciary has always been complicit in this process, the Israeli High Court of Justice's farcical treatment of international law in the case is indicative of change in its approach to international law. The Israeli court, however, is not alone in signaling disengagement from international law: the withering away of the "global community of courts" is a phenomenon of the times we live in, suggesting both that the cost attached to blatant violations of international law may be minimal and that we are moving from a rule of law to a rule by law paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Schools worldwide have long engaged in various forms of 'war education'. In China, an extensive 'Patriotic Education' campaign and an expanded 'National Defense Education' curriculum have led to an increase in youth-oriented military programs in the 2000s. Previous work on the implementation of these programs in Chinese schools has mostly focused on urban elite youth, while overlooking the reception of these programs by non-urban, non-elite populations. The present study addresses this issue by examining youth perceptions and experiences of military training courses in urban and rural high schools. Drawing on the analysis of Chinese publications in the 2000s and on data from field interviews with students of different backgrounds, the study finds that youth military training constitutes a contentious program. Although the Chinese government promotes the program as crucial for military strengthening and the fostering of a patriotic spirit, PRC academic and media writers provide alternative rationales for the program, which at times undermine the logic of government articulations. Meanwhile, interviews with youth document divergent attitudes and even resentment towards the program, especially among city youth. This finding casts doubt on the assumption that military-training courses necessarily contribute to the increased 'militarization' of Chinese youth and education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1990s, the Chinese party-state has attempted to teach its youth how to think and speak about the nation through a "patriotic education" campaign waged in schools, the media and on public sites. The reception of these messages by youth of different social backgrounds remains a disputed issue, however. Drawing on a multi-sited field study conducted among rural and urban Han Chinese youth attending different types of schools, this article explores the effects of the patriotic education campaign on youth conceptions of the nation by examining the rhetoric high-school students employ when asked to reflect upon their nation. The study reveals that a majority of youth statements conform to the language and contents of the patriotic education campaign; however, there are significant differences in the discursive stances of urban youth and rural youth and of those attending academic and non-academic, vocational schools. These findings call into question the party-state's current vision of China as a "unified" national collectivity. They highlight the existence of variances in the sense of collective belonging and national identity of Chinese youth, while underscoring the importance of social positioning and perceived life chances in producing these variances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces the subject-matter of a symposium on international law and science-fiction. The impact of new technologies on human rights, humanitarian issues and indeed on what it means to be human in a technological age, suffers from a paucity of international legal attention. The latter has been attributed to various factors ranging from technophobia and technological illiteracy, inclusive of an instrumentalist view of technology, to the sense that such attention is the domain of science-fiction, not of international law. The article extends an invitation to pay attention to the attention science-fiction has given to the man-machine interaction and its impact on the human condition. Placing this invitation in the context of the ‘‘law and literature’’ movement, the article exemplifies its value with respect to two technologies, one directed at creating life or saving it (cloning and organ donation) and the other at ending life (lethal autonomous robots). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]