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The United States has embarked on a wide-ranging nuclear modernization program that will ultimately see every nuclear delivery system replaced with newer versions over the coming decades. In this issue of the Nuclear Notebook, we estimate that the United States maintains a stockpile of approximately 3,708 warheads—an unchanged estimate from the previous year. Of these, only about 1,770 warheads are deployed, while approximately 1,938 are held in reserve. Additionally, approximately 1,336 retired warheads are awaiting dismantlement, giving a total inventory of approximately 5,044 nuclear warheads. Of the approximately 1,770 warheads that are deployed, 400 are on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, roughly 970 are on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 300 are at bomber bases in the United States, and approximately 100 tactical bombs are at European bases. The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, senior research fellow Matt Korda, research associate Eliana Johns, and program associate Mackenzie Knight. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists dating back to 1987, go to . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia is in the late stages of a multi-decade long modernization program to replace all of its Soviet-era nuclear-capable systems with newer versions. In this issue of the Nuclear Notebook, we estimate that Russia now possesses approximately 4,380 nuclear warheads for its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces—a net reduction of approximately 109 from last year's estimate. Although the number of Russian strategic launchers is not expected to change significantly in the foreseeable future, the number of warheads assigned to them might increase. The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, senior research fellow Matt Korda, research associate Eliana Johns, and Herbert Scoville Jr. peace fellow Mackenzie Knight. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists dating back to 1987, go to . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Each nuclear weapon test contributes to a global burden of released radioactivity. Between 1945 and 1996, more than 2,000 nuclear tests were conducted, three-quarters of which were underground. Underground nuclear tests involved placing the nuclear device in a cavity drilled or excavated beneath the surface. The goal was to contain the explosion and its effects to the immediate vicinity of the detonation point, ultimately minimizing the release of radioactive materials into the atmosphere. While these tests successfully curtailed the atmospheric release and radioactive fallout, they created dynamic responses within crustal formations caused by local shock waves from the explosion. This paper discusses the legacy of underground nuclear testing, addressing issues from containment failure to the phenomenological effects after underground detonations and the pathways of subsequent dispersal of radionuclides to the environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The closer you are to nuclear weapons, the more you are aware of their dangers. People today seem to have forgotten—if they ever knew—what a single nuclear weapon can do. Which, if nothing else, is something that atmospheric testing can accomplish: Remind everyone of what's at stake. The inhabitants of the Marshall Islands, whose home was turned into a nuclear proving ground, have certainly never forgotten. Nor has the crew of a Japanese fishing vessel that strayed too close to the nuclear weapon test known as Bravo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States has accepted increasingly stringent limits on nuclear testing, culminating in the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. However, the US Senate in 1999 failed to consent to ratification, given concerns about verifying the treaty and maintaining safe and reliable US nuclear weapons without testing. Since then, the US Stockpile Stewardship Program has matured and allowed certification that US nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable without nuclear explosive testing. Likewise, advances in the US Nuclear Detonation Detection System and the International Monitoring System make virtually all tests detectable. Bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into force is in the US interest, as it would lock in an American advantage in nuclear knowledge and expertise and hinder other states from developing more sophisticated nuclear arms. Unfortunately, however, American domestic politics and the difficult international environment make it unlikely that the treaty will enter into force in the near term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The modernization of China's nuclear arsenal has both accelerated and expanded in recent years. In this issue of the Nuclear Notebook, we estimate that China now possesses roughly 500 nuclear warheads, with more in production to arm future delivery systems. China is now believed to have one of the fastest-growing nuclear arsenals among the nine nuclear-armed states. The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, senior research fellow Matt Korda, research associate Eliana Johns, and Herbert Scoville Jr. peace fellow Mackenzie Knight. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists dating back to 1987, go to . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2021, New York City passed some of the most progressive nuclear disarmament legislation of any major city in the United States, supported by local activists from the New York Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (NYCAN). In this essay, two of the people behind this effort share some details of their success with local government as an example of what others can do to bring nuclear abolitionist activism home. They also give a sense of New York's long history as a nuclear city—and as a locus of action for disarmament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Young Americans are coming of age immersed in daily news and controversy about rising perils like climate change, and emerging ones like artificial intelligence. Generation Z has produced and embraced movements for climate action like the school strikes led by Greta Thunberg that connect to other social justice movements. But the threat posed by nuclear weapons remains a disconnected abstraction to many young people, even as tensions between nuclear-armed states over conflicts like the invasions of Ukraine and Gaza renew fears of a nuclear confrontation that were more common decades ago. In this personal essay, a life-long opponent of nuclear weapons raised during the Cold War reflects on intergenerational lessons about activism, and teaching college students to embrace their curiosity, and their fear, on the way to saving the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, senior research fellow Matt Korda, research associate Eliana Johns, and Scoville fellow Mackenzie Knight. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue's column examines the current state of global nuclear sharing arrangements, which include non- nuclear countries that possess nuclear-capable delivery systems for employment of a nuclear-armed state's nuclear weapons. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns, go to https:// thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1999 Kargil War, India defended its territory from a Pakistani incursion but--in a departure from its historical behavior and standing war plans--chose not to expand the war with counter-attacks into Pakistan. Many observers attribute this restraint to nuclear deterrence, since India and Pakistan had become declared nuclear powers just a year earlier. In fact, India's restraint was rooted not in deterrence, but specific strategic conditions. Those conditions no longer apply--and in a future conflict India may be encouraged to take especially risky and escalatory wartime action, which would pose an unprecedented test for nuclear deterrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an interview with California Congressman Ted Lieu, he discusses what individuals can do to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons and climate change. Lieu emphasizes the importance of contacting members of Congress and expressing concerns through meetings, emails, or social media. He also suggests writing letters to the editor and supporting organizations that advocate for change. While public pressure can be effective, Lieu acknowledges that it depends on the issue and the intensity of the pressure. He encourages individuals to continue pushing for change and educating members of Congress on the importance of these issues. [Extracted from the article]

The associability of artificial intelligence (AI) as a dual-use technology for nuclear material production (NMP) within the academic and practitioner communities remains widely neglected, and so a widening opportunity for AI to aid in illicit and covert non-peaceful applications exists. To address this emerging gap, this paper investigates the evolving and applicable uses of AI and finds broad evidence of its use to optimize performance, promote innovation, reduce costs, and enhance safety associated with the development and production of nuclear material. AI's use in this arena will, thereby, facilitate broader accessibility of peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, while at the same time cause concerns that said improvements can aid the illicit development of nuclear weapons. As such, this paper advocates for a three-dimensional solution to manage the evolving dual-use concern of AI that involves advancing states-centric monitoring and regulation, promoting intellectual exchange between the nonproliferation sector and the AI industry, and encouraging AI industrial contributions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, senior research fellow Matt Korda, and research associate Eliana Johns. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue's column examines Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, which we estimate to currently include approximately 170 warheads and which could realistically grow to around 200 by 2025 at the current growth rate. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns, go to . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, senior research associate Matt Korda, and research associate Eliana Johns. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue's column reviews the status of France's nuclear arsenal and finds that the stockpile of approximately 290 warheads has remained stable in recent years, but that significant modernizations are underway regarding ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submarines, aircraft, and the nuclear industrial complex. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns, go to . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project: Director Hans M. Kristensen, Senior Research Associate and Project Manager Matt Korda, and Research Associate Eliana Reynolds. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue's column examines Russia's nuclear arsenal, which includes a stockpile of approximately 4,489 warheads. Of these, some 1,674 strategic warheads are deployed on ballistic missiles and at heavy bomber bases, while an approximate additional 999 strategic warheads, along with 1,816 nonstrategic warheads, are held in reserve. The Russian arsenal continues its broad modernization intended to replace most Soviet-era weapons by the late-2020s. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns, go to . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Keywords: Broken Arrows; nuclear weapons; accidents; safety; command and control; close call EN Broken Arrows nuclear weapons accidents safety command and control close call 148 154 7 05/16/23 20230501 NES 230501 In the world of accidents, close calls, and near-misses, perhaps nothing is more chilling than incidents involving nuclear weapons. So, to answer your question, the US Defense Department uses "Broken Arrow" to mean a nuclear accident with a US weapon that caused the unauthorized launch or jettisoning of a nuclear weapon, a fire, an explosion, a radioactive release, or a full-scale detonation. More important, the large number of close calls and near-misses shows that no system for safeguarding nuclear weapons can ever be 100-percent effective - meaning that the United States (and other nuclear weapons nations, which have Broken Arrows of their own) can never completely eliminate the potential for catastrophic nuclear error. B Schlosser: b Right, we're not talking about close calls or near-misses with Russian weapons, British weapons, French weapons, or what might have happened with weapons in India, Pakistan, North Korea, China... Worldwide, we have no idea how many nuclear-weapon accidents have occurred. [Extracted from the article]

We present an efficient implementation of analytical non-adiabatic derivative coupling elements for the coupled cluster singles and doubles model. The derivative coupling elements are evaluated in a biorthonormal formulation in which the nuclear derivative acts on the right electronic state, where this state is biorthonormal with respect to the set of left states. This stands in contrast to earlier implementations based on normalized states and a gradient formula for the derivative coupling. As an illustration of the implementation, we determine a minimum energy conical intersection between the nπ* and ππ* states in the nucleobase thymine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contemporary international relations, the interaction between conventional and nuclear powers creates a complex dynamic that significantly influences states' threat perceptions and behaviors. The discovery in mid-2021 that China had constructed three new missile silo fields raised questions about whether a shift had occurred in China's traditional minimum nuclear deterrence strategy. This study posits that China is deviating from its long-standing nuclear strategy. Adverse changes in the conventional balance between the United States and China have incentivized China to enhance its nuclear capabilities and improve its nuclear force's deterrence capability by developing its conventional capabilities. A state that perceives its nuclear deterrence to be able to be weakened by the conventional capabilities of its adversary tends to respond by strengthening its nuclear deterrence. Similarly, such a state can enhance its conventional capabilities to increase the survivability of its nuclear forces. Chinese experts view the United States' conventional precision strike capabilities as a significant threat to China's assured retaliation capability. Furthermore, these experts believe that China's nuclear arsenal faces a more diverse range of conventional threats compared to the past. This study aims to analyze the reasons behind China's expansion of its nuclear missile silos. The study also examines the role of nuclear weapons in China's military doctrine as well as recent modernization efforts within the Chinese military. The focal point of this study is to understand China's evolving nuclear capabilities based on its threat perceptions and their impact on global security dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Los Alamos, New Mexico has an enduring and complicated relationship with its past. During World War II, its residents worked to create the world's first atomic weapons. The nuclear legacies of the Manhattan Project are global, but in contemporary Los Alamos the Project is often primarily considered a local history before a national or international one. The community's modern identity is constructed in part through creating its history, and this article studies two children's performances of the Manhattan Project past. The plots of these performances attempt to sidestep difficult history by avoiding nuclear weapons, which can ironically raise their uncanny specter in the imagination of the audience. The community history created in the performances privileges white scientist perspectives and at times flattens differences between past and present. This performed Manhattan Project is not only domestic – Los Alamos domesticates its complex history through these performances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the end of the Cold War in Southern Africa and its impact on the Apartheid Government's nuclear weapons program. The program was developed as a strategic deterrent against perceived communist threats in the region. However, with the changing political landscape, including the end of hostilities in Angola and the rise of progressive leaders like FW de Klerk, the program was deemed unnecessary and a burden. In 1989, de Klerk ordered the termination of the program and the dismantling of the nuclear arsenal. This decision, along with South Africa's subsequent commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, played a significant role in the country's transition to democracy and its emergence as a leader in promoting disarmament. [Extracted from the article]

Nearly fifty years ago on 22 June 1973, US President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev signed the US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. This bilateral instrument established concrete rules of the road for reducing the risk of nuclear use by means of mutual restraint and dialogue. However, despite being the product of more than a year of intense negotiations between the White House and the Kremlin, one of the Agreement's primary architects, Henry Kissinger, later dismissed it as having 'achieved little that was positive'. This article examines why Nixon and Kissinger pursued this Agreement in the first place and the extent to which they accomplished their goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As North Korea emphasized its "second mission," the reunification of the two Koreas, with its nuclear weapons, South Korea has been mobilizing all potential resources to deter North Korea's attempt. Indeed, it rapidly improved its relations with Japan as well as strengthened the U.S. extended deterrence through the "Washington Declaration" in early 2023. The United States, South Korea, and Japan even initiated their trilateral summit meeting to discuss their combined deterrence posture against North Korea. This article evaluates South Korea's current nuclear preparedness, including preemptive/preventive strikes, missile defense, and civil defense, identifies weaknesses, and analyzes whether Japan can mitigate the weakness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do the costs of proliferation shape the public support for building nuclear weapons? Public opinion matters, especially in a democracy, because the masses can affect the nuclear policy choices that political elites make. Yet the existing literature on nuclear proliferation has not incorporated the public's cost sensitivity in the analysis. We therefore do not fully understand the sources of public attitudes toward nuclearization. By fielding a novel survey experiment in South Korea, I found that the economic and human costs of economic sanctions and preventive strikes dampen South Koreans' preferences for nuclear armament. Relative to the no-cost condition, economic and human costs reduce the support levels by 25.1% points and 19.4% points, respectively and in the case of combined costs the support decreases by 29.6% points. However, South Koreans still have relatively high levels of support for a nuclear arsenal even after the exposure to the costs of nuclearization. This implies that the rally effect resulting from hostile international responses may mitigate the negative cost effects to some degree. This study can contribute to the growing literature by providing new theoretical foundations and empirical results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most nuclear dyads are characterized by some degree of nuclear and conventional asymmetry. This paper argues that these asymmetries create an environment in which deliberate nuclear first use (DNFU) can be rational. This possibility has been discarded in the formal literature on nuclear escalation because of the common reliance on the assumption of mutually assured destruction (MAD). This paper develops a formal model that traces how and under what circumstances two types of DNFU are rational. First, nuclear imbalances and advancements in counterforce technologies create a damage limitation incentive for a strong actor. Second, conventional asymmetry creates an incentive for the coercive use of nuclear weapons by the weaker player. Moreover, this paper illustrates that these asymmetric conditions are a relevant characteristic in important and very different nuclear dyads: DPRK–US, Pakistan–India, and Russia–US. Thus, the model demonstrates the potential core drivers of DNFU in today's nuclear landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that existing quantitative studies mistakenly assume that all nuclear states can impose nuclear destruction on opponents by simply distinguishing nuclear states from non-nuclear states. This practice, however, does not capture variation in 1) nuclear states' possession of delivery capabilities, 2) the range of deployed nuclear delivery systems, and 3) the geographic distance between nuclear states and their dyadic counterparts. Instead of this monadic nuclear statehood approach, I propose the dyadic nuclear reach approach, which uses a new dyad-specific measure of states' strategic nuclear delivery capabilities. It codes whether a nuclear state can launch a nuclear strike against a given opponent by using the information about the estimated range of each nuclear state's strategic nuclear delivery platforms, nuclear operation bases, and states' capital cities. An empirical application shows that using an appropriate measure of nuclear capabilities does significantly alter existing empirical knowledge of nuclear weapons and international conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research analyses the "word of the year 2022": Permacrisis. Through the Semantic Differential tool (Osgood in Am Anthropol 66: 171-200, 1964), 16 words were investigated among those most searched for in Google Search in the second half of 2022. Central questions are: What are the cultural differences in permacrisis connotation among five countries (Italy, France, United Kingdom, Germany and Poland)? What are the cultural differences in how permacrisis is connotated? How do different political orientations relate to the concepts of Politics and Democracy regarding permacrisis? The research showed how the Permacrisis is strongly linked to concepts such as Nuclear weapons, World War III and the COVID-19 virus. On a sample of 1273, the study showed evident cultural differences in permacrisis connotation, such as the emphasis on Weapons by the Italians or the Economic Crisis by the Germans. Statistical analysis reveals different anxieties: i.e. Italians fear losing their strength, the French anger about not being heard, while the British are anxious to remain socially isolated. A contrast between the concepts of Politics and Democracy was analysed on the sample's declarations of belonging to political orientations such as Conservatives, Christian democrats, Social democrats, Greens and the Left. Finally, the concept of Climate Crisis has been analysed, which results in the Semantic Differential, against any prevision, placed in a more peripheral orbit than the concepts associated with Permacrisis. Complete Tables and Figures can be consulted at the Open Science Framework URL https://osf.io/bwcp3/?view_only=be46b29bbf4d47ceba50138f82f2cd1d. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the role of mega size African Pentecostal/charismatic prophets and charismatic figures in the public response to Covid-19. There were responses to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in late 2019, and in Africa, a lot of these were religious. This article examines the intersection between religion and the Covid-19 pandemic, in the context contemporary African charismatic-prophetism. The data is sought mainly from oral and media sources of the various charismatic figures at the center of the discussion. The same religious interpretations that inform the understanding of events in society and human life in Africa were extended to the interpretation, diagnosis, and response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The charismatic power and influence of Pentecostal/charismatic church leaders, such as Emmanuel Makandiwa of Zimbabwe, was evident through the public role that the prophets played as these churches articulated their responses to the pandemic as a public health issue with spiritual implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This short article introduces our Special Issue on 'Anticipating the Future of War: AI, Automated Systems, and Resort-to-Force Decision Making'. We begin by stepping back and briefly commenting on the current military AI landscape. We then turn to the hitherto largely neglected prospect of AI-driven systems influencing state-level decision making on the resort to force. Although such systems already have a limited and indirect impact on decisions to initiate war, we contend that they will increasingly influence such deliberations in more direct ways – either in the context of automated self-defence or through decision-support systems that inform human deliberations. Citing the steady proliferation of AI-enabled systems in other realms of decision making, combined with the perceived need to match the capabilities of potential adversaries in what has aptly been described as an AI 'global arms race', we argue that this development is inevitable, will likely occur in the near future, and promises to be highly consequential. After surveying four thematic 'complications' that we associate with this anticipated development, we preview the twelve diverse, multidisciplinary, and often provocative articles that constitute this Special Issue. Each engages with one of our four complications and addresses a significant risk or benefit of AI-driven technologies infiltrating the decision to wage war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1985, British psychoanalyst Hanna Segal delivered the paper 'Silence is the Real Crime' to the first meeting of the group International Psychoanalysts Against Nuclear Weapons in Hamburg, appealing to her fellow analysts to counteract the denial of the geopolitical realities that characterized the late Cold War by intervening in public debates regarding the threat of nuclear war. A year later she gave a paper in London discussing clinical cases of patients who brought their nuclear anxieties to the couch. This article considers Segal's political and clinical writings on the psychological consequences of the atomic age, situating them in the context in which she was living, writing and practising as an analyst: 1980s Britain in a moment of 'nuclear anxiety'. I argue that Segal's anti-nuclear writings shed light on what she called the 'very very tricky' relationship between psychoanalysis and politics. Segal confronted the tension between maintaining clinical neutrality in the consulting room while publicly expressing her political commitments, wrestling with the complex relationships between individuals and the societies in which they live. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue contributes to the global dialogue on a nuclear weapons ban by evaluating how regional politics enable or hinder a global ban on nuclear weapons. The insights of 17 contributions offer a nuanced and diverse account of the landscape of nuclear disarmament, arguing that understanding the diversity of regional perspectives, lenses, and approaches is crucial for advancing toward a global nuclear weapons ban. This introduction sets the stage for a detailed exploration of common themes, aiming to shed light on the structural elements that characterize regional and global nuclear politics. For that, we employ a Comparative Area Studies Approach to explore venues and patterns across different regions, offering a comprehensive analysis that underscores the importance of considering local, regional, and global dimensions in tandem. We delineate three key elements that either facilitate or impede the implementation of a nuclear weapons ban: (1) Inclusivity: How key actors participate and are included in the policy-making process at the global, regional, and local levels; (2) Inequalities: how power inequalities shape social processes that enable or hinder the continuity of nuclear weapons; (3) Institutions: how networks and institutions are organized and structured between each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay seeks to provide an overview of the dynamics of nuclear order in the newly emergent geostrategic space of the Indo-Pacific. With the onset of increasingly sharp access/denial competition between the United States of America and China, the otherwise bilateral and dyadic rivalries are getting meshed together into the newly emergent geostrategic arena of the Indo-Pacific. This poses proliferation risks and miscalculations among the rival nuclear-armed dyads which populate the Indo-Pacific. Accordingly, the essay draws out the contours of the nuclear order and the attendant strategic necessities which mold the challenges posed to nonproliferation by the competition between nuclear armed states in the Indo-Pacific. It is argued that an action-reaction dynamic abounds in the region and as such given increasing competition between the United States & China and simultaneous Sino-India competition, the prospects for nuclear nonproliferation look bleak. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)is an essential milestone in the history of disarmament. The Korean Peninsula has historically been a victim of great power rivalries in Northeast Asia. The paper argues that North Korea's nuclear ambitions need to contextualize the persistent nuclear threats and the erosion of traditional arms control regime in the region. Despite the unchanging security scenario on the Korean peninsula, even after the Cold War and North-South Confrontation, North Korea's nuclear issue has been caught in the web of great power rivalry. It also argues that so far, the NPT has failed to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and nuclear disarmament would not be achieved with nuclear deterrence, and all the parties must join the treaty by acknowledging the urgent need through the prism of the constant escalating risks of nuclear conflict in the region. Converting the existing truce agreement to a permanent or partial peace agreement on the Korean War could be a starting point in solving North Korea's nuclear deadlock and denuclearizing process. The only nuclear weapon country that voted on the first committee General Assembly draft resolution of TPNW signifies that North Korea seems optimistic to walk in the path of a global mission of the nuclear weapon free world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1994, India enthusiastically supported the United Nations process for negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It expected the treaty would ban all types of nuclear testing and pave the way for nuclear disarmament. The final treaty negotiated in 1996 did not commit itself to this goal of disarmament and India ultimately rejected it. However, behind this rejection also lies the story of India's deteriorating national security outlook and decision-makers' keen desire to avoid their country being subjected to a discriminatory nonproliferation regime enacted by the nuclear weapon states. The key questions guiding the query on (CTBT) are: What were the reasons behind India's initial support of the CTBT in 1993? And what transpired between 1994 and 1996 that led India to change its stand? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research paper explores the nuanced perspectives of South Asian nations, primarily India and Pakistan, on the global efforts toward nuclear disarmament. Against a complex regional security landscape, historical conflicts, and evolving nuclear doctrines, this study employs a qualitative research design, drawing on document analysis and existing literature. The findings reveal divergent views between India and Pakistan, often shaped by intricate factors of security considerations, regional dynamics, and domestic political influences. The paper discusses the implications of South Asian stances on global disarmament efforts. It proposes potential pathways for fostering dialogue and cooperation in pursuing nuclear disarmament in the region. Through an in-depth examination of South Asian perspectives, this research contributes valuable insights to the broader discourse on nuclear disarmament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article makes the argument that the role of the European NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies, and especially the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), may and should play a key role in the future of nuclear disarmament. Once the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is signed and ratified by more or less 100 NNWS, mostly from the Global South, it will be up to the allied NNWS to make up their mind about their role vis-à-vis nuclear disarmament. Will they continue to behave as protégés by (and in some way also protectors of) the nuclear-armed states and break the disarmament process further, or will they shake off the nuclear "protection" in the interest of making progress toward a world without nuclear weapons? This article zooms in on the European NATO allies in particular. The TPNW can and will be used to put pressure on the European NATO allies to switch sides, and it can, on its turn, be used by the European NATO allies to stigmatize the nuclear-armed states in order to make progress in the direction of nuclear elimination. The article starts by reviewing the origins and objectives of the TPNW. In the next section, its impact will be scrutinized. We then turn to the current and possible future role of the European NATO allies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the developments and interconnections between regional and global-level negotiations to prohibit nuclear weapons. Ambassador Sergio Duarte, who has been one of the leading negotiators on nuclear weapons disarmament and nonproliferation since the 1960s and is the current president of the Pugwash movement, traces the history of Latin American and Caribbean efforts to forge stronger ties and foster regional cooperation. He goes back to the first quarter of the nineteenth century to show how those ties laid the ground for the conception of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the first Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in a populated area, and facilitated the region's active role in nuclear affairs. He also dives into other successful arrangements, such as the creation of a binational agency (ABACC) that ensures control of nuclear materials in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to build confidence and increase cooperation in the nuclear field, and he describes the region's key role in enabling the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay explores the evolution of the humanitarian disarmament initiative toward the TPNW and the links and influences from Latin America civil society efforts. Shifting away from traditional military objectives, humanitarian disarmament integrates civil society organizations, prioritizes Human Security over State security, and emphasizes the humanitarian impact of weapons. The paper examines key campaigns, including the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the Control Arms Campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), elucidating their advocacy strategies. It highlights the unique features of humanitarian disarmament, stressing obligations beyond elimination, addressing challenges in multilateral forums, and presenting Latin America's distinct approach. The essay concludes by discussing the status of nuclear disarmament in the region, emphasizing universalization efforts and contextual challenges, including the rise of alt-right movements and the region's historical commitment to nuclear disarmament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay explores the complex dynamics surrounding the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. It examines the regional and international perspectives on a nuclear weapons-ban norm and the motivations behind them of some key players, including Iran, Israel, and Egypt. The essay discusses the interplay between the regional and international levels that shapes the approaches of those key players to regional security and the fundamental differences and security concerns that have prevented any change in normative practice. It then discusses the potential impact of an NWFZ on the regional balance of power. It provides an important perspective on the complex and volatile geostrategy of the Middle East and the competing interests that may affect the adoption of the nuclear weapons-ban norm in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Africa's perspectives on nuclear weapons (and other world-order issues) remain largely unexplored. They are, therefore, little known or not known at all. This essay seeks to take a modest step to fill the gap by bringing into focus the nuclear discourse of the Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui—a forgotten "classic," many of whose ideas have stood the test of time and might even help us to better understand the nature of the challenges of global nuclear disarmament as well as think creatively about solutions. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, Mazrui was a passionate and foremost proponent of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Africa and the Middle East. However, he never advocated this for its own sake but only as a means of achieving the most fundamental and desirable goal of global nuclear disarmament. A dose of the disease, in Mazrui's view, must be used as a part of the necessary cure. Hence his idea—"proliferate to abolish." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to review the perceptions of the Southeast European countries toward the NPT and TPNW and identify the main determinants of their disarmament policies. It analyzes official statements of the Southeast European states during the NPT preparatory meetings and review conferences, and their positions in various stages of the TPNW development, to bring out a position of a certain country toward the NPT and TPNW and then dive into analysis of the determinants of the outcomes. The paper contributes to the deeper understanding of the disarmament policy choices of the Southeast European states, thus also contributing to the assessment of possible changes in their positions regarding the nuclear weapons ban. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The West often indicate in discourse their desire to disarm. However, Western pro-nuclear disarmament rhetoric is often contested, since Western nuclear powers claim there are impeding factors to disarmament. These factors usually include the compromise of the security of their allies and generic 'security reasons'. The argument is that concrete disarmament efforts are unfeasible and unrealistic because they do not consider the wide range of security concerns that nuclear weapons help mitigate. Oftentimes, the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies is invoked to justify the need for nuclear weapons. In that sense, I argue that the West instrumentalizes the NATO to rationalize and legitimize their nuclear weapons possession. They do so by 1) deflecting criticism related to nuclear policy to the organization; 2) passing the buck regarding the blame of maintaining nuclear weapons; 3) coercing NATO allies to adopt pro-nuclear policies; and 4) creating threats to justify these policies. Nuclear weapons symbolize material and reputational power and nuclear disarmament represents a severe loss of power for these States. The West creates a narrative wherein nuclear weapons are a 'necessary evil' to guarantee their own security and their allies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union has traditionally been an efficient actor on nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but a poor actor on disarmament, mainly due to internal decisions within the Union on this issue. However, due to the growing crisis in the global arms control architecture and the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), increased pressure is being exerted on the EU not only to adopt concrete positions on this issue, but also to act. This, it is argued, will be complicated, if not impossible, due to the internal structure and decision-making process of the Union, which cannot be asked to do more than it can do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Review Conference of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been one of the primary international arenas for discussing pathways to establishing a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (ME WMDFZ). This contentious issue was considered the make-or-break factor that determined whether some past Review Conferences could adopt a final document. With the commencement of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2019, mandated by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), questions have been raised about whether this new track replaces the NPT in addressing the Zone issue and, if not, in what format both tracks should interact. This essay sets the context for these questions by discussing evolving nuclear risks in the Middle East, the linkages between the NPT and the Zone, and the potential risks of decoupling the Zone issue from the NPT review process. The essay then argues for a balanced approach in which the NPT and the UNGA-mandated tracks function in conjunction with, and complement, each other. This approach would preserve the integrity and efficacy of each process and maintain the region's commitments to the Zone, to abolishing nuclear weapons and to preventing further proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution features an interview with Benetick Kabua Maddison, the Executive Director of the Marshallese Educational Initiative (MEI), an NGO that aims to raise awareness of the effects of nuclear testing and climate change on the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). The RMI was the site of 67 nuclear tests conducted by the United States between 1946 and 1958, which resulted in environmental degradation and health problems for the local population. The interview explores the current renegotiation of the Compact of Free Association (COFA), a treaty that governs the political and economic relationship between the RMI and the US. The interview also discusses the challenges and opportunities for the Marshallese community, the conflicting statements regarding the contamination of the RMI, and the prospects of a nuclear weapons ban and global solidarity to address the twin existential threats facing the RMI and the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to theories of international order-making, the most powerful states seek to institute global norms that suit their interests. Less appreciated, however, is that powerful states have also sought to undermine certain norms to maintain particular types of order. With their outsized influence in the international system, how do great powers resist emerging norms? This article presents a case illustration of US strategies to resist the reemerging anti-nuclear weapon norm. This norm was institutionalized in July 2017 with the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Though US strategies did not stop the norm from codification within the TPNW, US actions seek to maintain this norm in a state of limbo, whereby the norm does not become fully entrenched within the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essence of Russian security policy is composed of the combined use of conventional and unconventional threats in both war and peacetime. Russia aims to dominate the process of escalation especially by frequently threatening nuclear war in Ukraine. It attempts to maintain the strategic initiative superiority, forcing its enemies to act under its control. Put differently, through the means of manipulating the fear of nuclear war in Ukraine, it tries to avert other states from directly intervening in the battlefield and to prevent military aid delivered to its enemies from becoming strategic. Methodologically, this article examines Russia's effort to gain dominance in escalating tensions through nuclear risk as a case study. The nuclear risk hinges on the uncertainty of nuclear deterrence. The nuances of this often-ignored uncertainty are explained in this article. Since such a uncertainty poses credible risk of nuclear war, absolute victory is not possible. No party will get everything it wants; therefore, the only solution is diplomatic compromise through negotiation. The importance and implications of this article lie in the fact that the problems and warnings examined here are likely not only in Ukraine but also in a possible future crisis over Taiwan or future conflicts involving nuclear powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]